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offences under this act, exercise the like powers under this act as may be exercised by a commissioned officer of Her Majesty in relation to a British ship. (United States Answer, p. 28.)

The order-in-council of April 30, 1894, provided in section 1 thereof that—

The commanding officer of any vessel belonging to the naval or revenue service of the United States of America, and appointed for the time being by the President of the United States for the purpose of carrying into effect the powers conferred by this article, the name of which vessel shall have been communicated by the President of the United States to Her Majesty as being a vessel so appointed as aforesaid, may, if duly commissioned and instructed by the President in that behalf, seize and detain any British vessel which has become liable to be forfeited to Her Majesty under the provisions of the recited act, and may bring her for adjudication before any such British court of admiralty as is referred to in section 103 of the "Merchant Shipping Act, 1854," or may deliver her to any such British officer as is mentioned in the said section for the purpose of being dealt with pursuant to the recited act. (United States Answer, pp. 45, 46.)

The commanding officers of the United States Naval Forces in Behring Sea received confidential instructions in a circular to Commanding Officers, No. 22, dated July 24, 1894, in part as follows:

Sealing vessels fallen in with after the 31st of July, in the Behring Sea, are to be carefully searched to see if there are any implements on board, not under seal, except spears, that could be used in fur seal fishing.

A number of skins are to be taken indiscriminately and examined to see if there are any marks of shot, as cheap firearms, to be thrown overboard with ammunition when escape is found to be impossible, may be carried. (United States Answer, Exhibit 7.)

By instructions from the United States Treasury Department, dated April 11, 1895, the Commander of the Behring Sea Fleet was directed

It has been charged heretofore, that vessels of the patrol fleet, have not properly performed their duty in the matter of making search of sealing vessels fallen in with. Should you find a skin on board a vessel that bears satisfactory evidence of having been shot within the Behring Sea, you will seize the vessel. The search for skins, and the determination as to whether the animals were killed by spear or shot, is of equal importance with the discovery of firearms and the unlawful use of the same in Behring Sea, under the "Regulations governing vessels employed in fur seal fishing during the season of 1895." (United States Answer, Exhibit 8.)

Any special instructions for the sealing season 1896 are not included in the evidence furnished in this case. The only evidence produced of the instructions for the season 1896 is a letter from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador in Washington, dated April 14, 1896, in which, calling attention to the provision of the order-in-council of April 30, 1894, above quoted, it is stated

The President has designated the revenue steamers Bear, Rush, Perry, Corwin, Grant and Wolcott to cruise in the North Pacific Ocean and Behring

Sea, including the waters of Alaska within the dominion of the United States, for the enforcement of the acts of Congress approved April 6 and 24 and June 5, 1894, during the season of 1896. (United States Answer, Exhibit 9.)

The fact that the Kate had among her catch two seal skins that presented the appearance of being shot, when neither guns nor ammunition, except powder for the signal gun, were found on board, did not seem to the Commander of the United States Behring Sea Fleet, when the Kate was brought to him at Unalaska, "proof of guilt sufficiently strong to justify sending the vessel to court," and he ordered her immediate release; but at the same time he commended the captain of the Perry for his strict "obedience to orders to 'seize any vessel having seal skins on board that appear to have been shot.'" (United States Answer, Exhibit 11.)

In the circumstances, while there is no question of the bona fides of the officer making the seizure, it is evident that his superior officer did not consider that there was reasonable ground for the seizure. It follows, therefore, that on the evidence presented here, it must be held that the seizure of the Kate was unjustifiable, and the United States Government is responsible for any damage resulting from this seizure as the case stands.

II. As to the measure of damages:

The estimated probable catch of the Kate during the period from August 26 to September 7th inclusive, is fixed by the claimants as 145 seal skins at a value of $7.55 each, amounting to $1,094.75. This estimate is based on the catch of the Schooner Dora Sieward, which had sixteen canoes, while the Kate had twelve, being twelve-sixteenths of the 329 seals skin taken by the Dora Sieward during that period, less the 102 seal skins taken during the same period by the Kate.

A comparison of the catch of the Kate with the catch of the Dora Sieward shows that during the period between August 23rd and 26th inclusive, the Kate took 76 seals and the Sieward 166; and after the return of the Kate to the locality where she was seized, she took during the period between September 8th to 15th inclusive, 49 seals and the Sieward 102. As measured by the Sieward, the efficiency of the Kate was somewhat higher after her return, following her seizure, than prior thereto, but the efficiency of the Kate was always less than one-half the efficiency of the Sieward, as shown by a comparison of their catches day by day. Therefore, as the claimants have asked that compensation for loss of catch for the period during which she was illegally prevented from sealing should be based on a comparison with the actual catch of the Dora Sieward during the same period, the claimants cannot complain if fifty per cent (50%) of the catch of the Dora Sieward is taken as the probable catch lost by the Kate.

Inasmuch as the sealing operations of the Kate on August 26th were not disturbed, the last canoe not having come on board until 7 P.M. of that day,

the total catch being 45 seals, compensation should be allowed for the period of August 27th to September 7th inclusive, based on one-half of the Sieward's catch of 247 seals during that period, less the 57 seals taken by the Kate during that period, showing a loss of 67 seal skins, which at the price of $7.55 represents a loss of $508.05.

The Tribunal, therefore, considers that the damages for this detention should be fixed at $508.05 for her loss of profits, and $500 for the trouble occasioned by her illegal detention.

Inasmuch as the profits for the estimated catch of the Kate during the period of detention have been allowed, there was no pecuniary damages suffered on account of the detention of the officers and the crew.

As to interest:

The British Government in their oral argument admit that the 7% interest claimed in their memorial must be reduced to 4% in conformity with the provisions of the Terms of Submission.

It appears from a note addressed by the British Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State, dated February 15, 1897, that this was the first presentation to the Government of the United States of a claim for compensation in this case. (United States Answer, Exhibit 16.) Therefore, in accordance with the Terms of Submission, section IV, the Tribunal is of the opinion that interest should be allowed at 4% on the $508.05 damages for loss of profits, from February 15, 1897, to April 26, 1912, the date of the confirmation of the schedule.

FOR THESE REASONS

The Tribunal decides that the United States Government shall pay to the Government of His Britannic Majesty, on behalf of the claimants, the sum of One thousand and eight dollars and five cents ($1,008.05), with interest at four per cent (4%) on Five hundred and eight dollars and five cents ($508.05) thereof, from February 15, 1897, to April 26, 1912. The President of the Tribunal,

HENRI FROMAGEOT.

BOOK REVIEWS *

French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo. By Graham H. Stuart, Ph.D. New York: Century Co., 1921, p. 375. Bibliography and Index.

In this volume, Dr. Stuart has given an interesting study of the foreign policy of the French Government from 1898 to 1914. It is an attempt, he claims, "to portray impartially the policy of the French foreign office, from the crisis of Fashoda to the crime of Serajevo. Before 1898, French foreign policy seemed for the most part to be merged in her colonial policy; after the death of the Archduke Ferdinand, the foreign policy of France was inextricably mingled with the foreign policy of her allies. In the critical intervening period, the policy of the Quai Dorsay stands forth against the cloudy background of European diplomacy."

The book begins with an introductory chapter on the "International Situation in 1898," the Dual and Triple Alliances, and the FrancoBritish relations of that period. Then follow three chapters which have no apparent relation to one another: one on "Fashoda" including a discussion of the Franco-British agreement of 1898, the first Peace Conference at the Hague and the policy of France and Germany in regard to the Boer War, the second on "French Diplomacy in the Orient" concerning "the Cretan Affair," French interests in Turkey, the Boxer Rebellion and adjustments with Siam, and the third dealing with French "Diplomatic Relations with Italy and the Pope." The next seven chapters cover the history of the "Entente Cordiale" and Moroccan affairs from the signing of the agreements with Great Britain and Spain in 1904 down to the Agadir incident and the FrancoGerman treaty of 1911. The twelfth and last chapter is entitled "Toward the World War," and is concerned with the "ministry of M. Poincaré" and the awakening of France to the danger of an European war.

One wonders why this last chapter was written in its present form. The obvious intention of the author seems to have been to bring down his narrative from the Franco-German treaty of 1911 to the murder at Serajevo in 1914. At least, he should have done this to justify the title of his work. But he has contented himself with giving a brief account of the general development of political affairs within France and in the Balkans during that period, without attempting to connect the trend of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula with the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand or the causes of the Great War. Indeed, he has made no effort to trace the history of French diplomatic activities in relation to Balkan affairs or the problems of Asia *The Journal assumes no responsibility for the views expressed in signed book reviews. ED.

Minor during the years 1904-1914. In view of the important bearing of the competition of France, Germany, Russia and Great Britain in the Turkish Empire (leading to the economic partition of Asiatic Turkey in June, 1914) on the political situation in Europe and on European expansion in Africa, no account of the French foreign policy during this period is complete without an analysis of their policy in regard to the progress of affairs in the Ottoman Empire.

In discussing the Fashoda episode, the author fails to make clear the intimate connection of this incident with the Franco-British competition in Africa. He ignores the colonial developments of the preceding quarter of a century, making no reference even to the fundamental facts enumerated in such secondary sources as Keltie's Partition of Africa, Johnson's Colonization of Africa or Harris's Intervention and Colonization in Africa. It is not often that one can construct an historical narrative by beginning with one conspicuous diplomatic controversy and ending with an international crime having no connection with the original controversy. Some French writers have attempted this method of composition with varying success. And Dr. Stuart has evidently followed their example in this instance. But his book would have been more complete and infinitely more valuable, if he had given us a study of French foreign policy from about 1890 to 1914 (particularly of those years when M. Hanotaux and M. Delcassé were directing the foreign and colonial policy of France), confining his attention to the field of North African and Near Eastern diplomacy. He has gained nothing by his excursions into the more distant regions of South Africa, and of the Far East. And the value of the seven chapters on Moroccan affairs-the best portion of the volume-would have been greatly enhanced.

A number of curious errors occur here and there through the book, which are possibly due to faulty proof reading. The author refers to Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter as "Herr von Kiderlen" on pages 302, 304, 308 and 310 and as "Herr Kiderlen" on pages 310, 312, 313, and 314. And on page 217, Elihu Root is named as Mr. and M. Root; while Mr. Balfour is called M. Balfour (as if he were a Frenchman) on page 105.

The author has a pleasing, straightforward style; and both the student and the diplomatic expert will find it interesting. But the frequent use of French words and quotations will prove tiresome to the average British or American reader. The volume, on the whole, is a creditable piece of work; and it should find a useful place on the reference shelves of university, college, and city libraries.

NORMAN DWIGHT HARRIS.

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