"that, if those [Allied] Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will," etc.,

would have suggested the formation of a military committee (including, of course, naval representatives) to prepare a joint draft for submission to the political representatives of the four governments concerned. This would have resulted in full and frank discussion of the varying views of the military and naval advisers and, as in countless previous cases, would undoubtedly have resulted in prompt and harmonious agreement. But the course was followed of calling upon these advisers individually and singly for their views. There was no opportunity for discussion among themselves, such as would have had to be the case were they required to draw up a joint draft, scrutinizing and discussing every word and punctuation point before agreement.

When the American military representative with the Supreme War Council was requested to submit his views in writing to the Council of Ministers he did so guided by the following facts:

1. The unanimous recommendation of the Allied military and naval representatives in their document of October 8th in which they accepted disarmament as the first essential of the armistice;

2. His answer to cabled instructions from Washington dated October 21st for his views, in which he stated his belief that the armistice terms should be limited, as nearly as could be, to the complete disarmament and demobilization of all enemy forces on land and sea, in the belief that peace terms would be immediately thereafter imposed. 3. His unofficial knowledge of a document embodying proposed armistice terms which had already been submitted to the Council and which was commonly supposed to be receiving favorable consideration. 4. His unofficial knowledge of the proposed term in the Austrian armistice, hereinbefore quoted.

As to the first consideration above, he was surprised to find a disposition to depart from the former Allied belief that general disarmament of the enemy was an essential condition.

As to the third consideration above, relating to the document supposed to be viewed with favor by the Council of Ministers, he noted that it was proposed to take from the Germans, as a condition for granting them an armistice, approximately one-half of their machine-guns, one-half of their artillery, and other articles of fighting equipment in varying proportions to an assumed total. What would be the result? Consider the Western Front alone: 1. It left the organization of von Hindenburg's army of 4,500,000 men absolutely intact from its commander-in-chief to the private in the ranks.

2. It left the infantry organization and armament, including reserve arms and munitions absolutely intact.

3. It left them, admittedly, with some half of their artillery and onehalf of their machine guns. And other fighting appliances in similar proportion.

4. It permitted von Hindenburg to withdraw his army of, perhaps, 4,500,000 to a selected strategic point, provided only that this point should be from thirty to forty kilometers east of the Rhine.

5. There was the possibility in unknown degree that this army might promptly re-equip itself with the lost material taken from it by the armistice.

6. And what was true of von Hindenburg's army was true, to a greater or less degree, of the German armies in other theatres of the

war.

7. In short, the proposed terms not merely permitted but required Germany to concentrate all her forces of possibly 8,000,000 thoroughly trained soldiers-trained in the best of all schools, war itself-within her own territory in selected positions for national defense. Instead of taking advantage of the depressed morale of these men who knew that they were defeated on foreign soil, it was proposed to encourage a revival of their morale by the consciousness that they were concentrated in their own country where they would fight not for aggression but for home defense.

On consulting officials who had prepared these terms, the American military representative at Versailles was informed that there was at that time known with accuracy the numbers of weapons of all kinds then in the hands of German troops and in reserve and that, with the surrender of what was demanded of them, they could not re-equip themselves. This the American representative denied. He denied that they knew with sufficient accuracy the amount of captured material which the Germans could use in last resort though they, like the Allies, made no use of it as long as they had enough of their own equipment. He denied that they sufficiently knew the capacity of German plants to produce new material, such as machine guns and field artillery, even if the armistice was of relatively short duration. He denied that they knew whether, for example, even if they were certain the 30,000 machine guns was one-half of the German total, the loss of them would reduce the German total one-half below that of the Allies.

He, therefore, in compliance with the request of the Council of Ministers, submitted a memorandum. In this the opinion was stated that there should be three phases in the procedure to be followed,

"At the end of a great world-war like the present one, in which it may be assumed that one party is completely beaten, and which will be followed by radical changes in world-conditions:

"a) A complete surrender of the beaten party under such armistice conditions as will guarantee against any possible resumption of hostilities by it;

"b) A conference to determine and enforce the conditions of peace with the beaten party; and

"c) A conference (perhaps the same as above) to determine and enforce such changes in world-conditions,-incidental to the war but not necessarily forming part of the terms of peace, as are agreed upon as vital for the orderly progress of civilization and the continued peace of the world."

After giving reasons for the belief that certain of the proposed conditions were not sufficient, the following propositions were submitted:

"First, that the associated powers demand complete military disarmament and demobilization of the active land and naval forces of the enemy, leaving only such interior guards as the associated powers agree upon as necessary for the preservation of order in the home territory of the enemy. This of itself means the evacuation by disarmed and not by armed or partly armed men. The army thus disarmed cannot fight, and demobilized can not be reassembled for the purposes of this war.

"Second, that the associated powers notify the enemy that there will be no relaxation in their war aims but that these will be subject to full and reasonable discussion between the nations associated in the war; and that, even though the enemy himself may be heard on some of these matters he must submit to whatever the associated powers finally agree upon as being proper to demand for the present and for the future peace of the world."

It was, of course, intended that, should these principles be accepted as the basis of an armistice, a military and naval committee would prepare the exact details. However, these principles were not accepted. The terms already before them were, with more or less modification, accepted in the draft prepared by the Ministers.

The drafts thus prepared were submitted to the Allied Council and considered at its meetings from October 31st to November 4th. It is repeated that these drafts were not prepared by the Ministers after discussion solely among themselves and unaided. They called, from time to time, for such assistance and advice as they desired, from military, naval and civilian advisers. The drafts were, however, in no sense the result of the efforts of any duly appointed body of military or naval experts. In the discussions of the Allied Council practically no change was made in the original purely military and naval terms, except to correct a few obvious and inadvertent omissions. The military men had already had their day in court and there was no further consideration given to basic principles. They were approved on November 4, 1918, and transmitted to Washington with the following declaration of the Prime Ministers:

"The Allied Governments [which do not include the United States] have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed

between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the government of Germany," etc., etc. The qualifications relate to a reservation which they made as to the interpretation to be put on the meaning of the phrase "the freedom of the seas" when that subject should be discussed in a peace conference; and on the meaning of the phrase "invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed." This was communicated to Germany on November 5th; the terms were accepted; the document was signed by both parties on November 11th; and the armistice became a closed incident save in so far as relates to its practical application.

The official records do not show that any one knew who was the author of any proposition, except the emendations or the non-military clauses that were introduced during the discussion of the Allied Council from October 31st to November 4th. Of course the Ministers knew, but they have left no records of their deliberations. With the exception of them, no one could say "This or that military or naval clause was introduced on the advice of this or that adviser." When dissatisfaction began to be felt in any quarter with the terms of the armistice or with the fact that there was any armistice at all, various persons have attempted to fix the author. Just now we are not concerned in showing who made the armistice-the fact and the terms of the fact-but in showing who did not make it.

The origin of the armistice is thus perfectly plain. The first German note was received at the Legation of Switzerland in Washington "late this afternoon,' " as the Chargé d'Affaires of that legation says in his letter of transmittal dated October 6th. On the same day, in Paris, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Germany drew up their principles to form the basis of an armistice with Germany and Austria,-almost certainly before any member of the Government at Washington could have broken the seal of the Swiss Legation on the first German note. On the morning of October 8th, the military and naval representatives of the three European Allies formulated the details of armistice terms on the basis laid down by their Prime Ministers. On October 23rd the American Government informed those three European Governments that it felt that it "could not decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice." The note added the "suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace" then the proper advisers of all four governments prepare and submit the terms of an armistice for their consideration. If those governments were not disposed to effect peace, or to have an armistice as the first step thereto, it was in their power to say so. That they were so disposed, is evident from the immediate steps taken to formulate the armistice. Finally, in their official note of November 4th, the three Prime Ministers "declare their willingness to make peace."

M. Mermeix declares positively (p. 280) that "Wilson had nothing to do

with the determination of the terms of the armistice." He claims that the military terms were practically entirely French, and the comparison which he makes between the original French draft and the one finally accepted justifies his conclusion.

Now as to the operation of the armistice and its results. There are, apparently, a good many unthinking people abroad who are inclined to lay the blame for a large part of their troubles, during the last three years or more, upon the armistice. They seem to think that were it not for that and had the Allies marched to Berlin, the situation now would be better. It accounts for their perpetual hunting for a scape-goat upon which to throw the blame. They are right in blaming the armistice; but the trouble is not due to the fact that an armistice was made, but to the kind of armistice.

An armistice is, or should be, purely a military measure. It is a cessation of arms for the sole purpose of enabling warring nations to agree on terms of peace. Its sole conditions, therefore, should be such as will absolutely guarantee against the resumption of hostilities to interrupt the men who are determining the terms of peace. The military conditions imposed on either side are the more rigorous, to the possible limit of absolute surrender, according as the other side is the more powerful when the armistice is asked for by its enemy. The President of the United States clearly understood this when, in his note of October 14th, he informed the German Government that "it must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments;" and when, in his note of October 23rd, he said that if the Allied Governments were willing to make peace, the military advisers should prepare the terms of an armistice for submission to those governments and that of the United States.

A military armistice contemplates that steps will very promptly follow for the establishment of peace. It is based on the assumption that peace is the only possible condition for prosperity and that delay in its resumption may be disastrous. But an armistice which is based upon the indefinite continuance of military control and which perhaps embodies terms of indefinite execution, only invites delay.

The one great error in the armistice, as now admitted by thinking men generally in Europe, was in the failure to demand complete surrender with resulting disarmament and demobilization. The situation would have compelled acceptance of this condition by the Germans. On the west they were confronted by a superior force of British, French and Americans, and on the south the map and the situation showed the impending attack from Italy and General Franchet d'Esperay's Army of the East.

Such an armistice could have been followed in a few days by the preliminary treaty of peace imposing the military, naval and air terms. Immediately the Allied commissions could have set to work dismantling fortifica

Wilson re fut pour rien dous la fixation des termes de l'Armistice.