result in combinations that would not be in the spirit of the League, though others might be of great advantage.

The conviction that certain radical changes in the Covenant would eventually have to be made was general. Some of the obligations of the Covenant had clearly awakened fears that it would be difficult and even impossible to fulfill them. They were, therefore, brought forward with a view to modifying them by interpretation.

The purpose of Article 18, for example, was to prevent the making of secret treaties. It was known, however, that several military conventions had been signed which had not been and probably would not be registered. What then was to become of the obligation of that article, which requires that all treaties, in order to be binding, must be registered with the League? To cover the military engagements, it was proposed in committee that "treaties of a purely technical or administrative nature which have no bearing on international political relations" need not be registered. The equivocal character of this proposal was evident, and when it came before the Assembly it was pointed out that it might fatally invalidate Article 18. It was, therefore, not adopted as an amendment, but passed on to the next Assembly, with the understanding that, "in the meantime, Members of the League would be at liberty to interpret their obligations under Article 18 in conformity with the proposal made."

The obligations incurred under Article 16, which proved such an insurmountable obstacle to acceptance of the Covenant by the United States, were made the object of an analysis which went to the very heart of the compact.

This article provides that, "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations," etc.

The evident inconvenience of fulfilling this obligation, the possible consequences of loss to the nation severing all trade and financial relations with a neighboring State upon which it was economically dependent, and the impossibility of making such an economic blockade effective when undertaken against a strong nation, had caused a general disposition to modify this article. It was argued in the Special Blockade Commission that an "act of war" is not necessarily a "state of war," and therefore the obligation would not automatically go into effect, unless a member of the League chose to consider it a "state of war"; a subterfuge the transparency of which is clear the moment it is considered that by the terms of the article it is explicitly an act of war which brings the obligation into operation, and not a state of war; a consideration which renders the attempt to make a distinction between an act and a state of war wholly beside the mark.

The second attempt to evade the obligation of the article was the proposal to interpellate between an act of war and an economic blockade a decision by the Council that the obligation had come into effect as a necessary preliminary to action; a decision wholly superfluous if not positively ruled out by the precise terms of the article, which not only makes no mention of the Council with reference to economic blockade but distinctly pledges all the members of the League severally and immediately to sever all trade or financial relations. It is not until military or naval force is brought into question that the Council, according to Article 16, has any part to play in punishing a delinquent. It then becomes the duty of that body "to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

Interpretation having thus failed utterly to soften the obligation of each member severally and immediately to institute an economic blockade against an offender,-a duty upon which so much reliance was placed as a means of avoiding sanguinary war,-a series of amendments to the Covenant were approved by the Assembly without dissent, subject to the prescribed ratification of all the members of the Council and half the states represented in the Assembly. The first amendment thus adopted was that it is for the Council to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken place, though it rests with each State to make its own final decision in this matter in so far as its responsibilities are concerned.

In order to secure identity of action, another amendment was accepted, to the effect that the Council will notify all members of the League as to the date which it recommends for the application of economic pressure under this article, and until this is done no action is to be taken.

Thus, the economic blockade which was imposed automatically and imperatively upon all members of the League in case of violation of the Covenant, is to occur, if at all, only when the Council, in which one single vote can prevent action, recommends it and fixes the date. Pending formal ratification, these provisional amendments are to constitute "the rules for guidance" for members of the League.

As to Mandates, it is difficult to find evidence that the Assembly has any serious control over them. They were discussed on the basis of a report by a special committee, and the report was approved by the Assembly. Certain members were disposed to press for an immediate definition of Mandates, but the Assembly finally assented to leaving the whole subject in the hands of the Council, which desired not to be embarrassed pending negotiations with the United States. The Official Summary of the Secretariat states, that "the Mandate situation has generally been admitted to be one of great importance and of great difficulty, and there was a considerable divergence of opinion." The conclusion appears to be war

ranted that, if it was the original intention to internationalize in any real sense the great areas taken from Germany in Africa and the Pacific Ocean, and from Turkey in Asia, that purpose has not been realized.

With regard to the League of Nations generally, as its actual character was manifested in the sessions of the Second Assembly, it would appear that it is undergoing a radical transformation not contemplated by its founders. By its statutes it is undoubtedly a super-government. In actual practice it is not. The central and controlling international authority in Europe is not the League, but the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers. To a certain extent the members of the Supreme Council and the Council of the League are identical, but all the force being in the Supreme Council and only the obligations in the League, it is the former that is the only super-government in the proper sense of the word.

The Assembly without the Council would be a more useful body than it is, for it would then have an increased sense of responsibility. That it is even now in many respects useful admits of no doubt. It discusses with great intelligence many current questions. The Secretariat is a busy international clearing-house served by capable and industrious men. It does what such an office can, but it is without decisive authority. So long as the Supreme Council continues, the League can have no other authority than that which the Supreme Council permits it to have; and that is none, apart from the powers of the League Council which it controls.

The impression one derives from the Assembly is that it is inspired by noble motives but lacking in courage. It does not venture boldly to lay hold upon the most vital realities of the European situation. It is not fully representative of Europe; and, bound by its Covenant, which is an article in a treaty of peace imposed by war, it cannot be. Its most farsighted members know this and privately admit it. I thought that, in some cases, they recognized this with sadness. Quite evidently, the League is gradually seceding from the obligations of its Covenant. To become a real association for peace, it must transform itself fundamentally. And this, in my belief, it will continue to do. At present it is just a "league," not the Society of Nations.

I cannot close this editorial without a personal word of appreciation of the courtesy, the hospitality, and the fine faith and devotion of the personnel of the Secretariat of the League, some of whom are our own fellow-citizens, whose place is made less happy because their country is not a member of the League. It is greatly to their credit that with patience and unfailing courtesy they are willing to listen to the reasons why it is not a member.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MEXICAN OIL QUESTION

It is impossible in a brief editorial to go into all the minutia of this perplexing and complicated question. Nevertheless it may be of value to lay before the reader some of the considerations involved and the general rules growing out of the intercourse of sovereign states which relate to such problems.

For certain purposes, mineral oil has replaced coal as a desirable fuel. The oil measures thus far uncovered in Mexico involve vast pools quickly drained, so that their regulation is of immediate importance. Mexican oil is not locally used but is exported. That country is potentially rich in many products but actually poor and torn by years of factional conflict.

It is natural and legitimate therefore that any government in Mexico should desire to realize as much as possible from its mineral assets. Some two hundred million dollars of American money are estimated to have sought investment in Mexican oil. There has thus arisen a conflict of interest between the foreign capitalist who desires to mine and export oil as cheaply as possible and the sovereign which wishes to make as much as possible out of its product before it is taken out of its jurisdiction. This is attempted in two ways, by taxation and by a duty on exports.

Under Mexican law aliens may not hold land. This is the law in many other countries also and in some of the states of the American Union. To exploit Mexican oil territory, therefore, local companies were organized under local law but employing foreign capital. The possession of the surface carried with it the sub-soil minerals, including petroleum. If disputes arose the foreign lessors or owners relied upon the help of their governments when the protection of the courts seemed to fail them. Their suspicions were roused by a demand of the Mexican Government that interests in such companies owned by alien capital must renounce this right to protection from their governments. There also appeared a tendency on the part of the Mexican Government to separate surface and sub-soil interests, nationalizing the latter. But in the main oil rights acquired by aliens were undisturbed until 1917, when the new Constitution appeared. This had been adopted under Carranza's influence. The Pershing invasion of Mexico and the Mexican intrigue with Germany aimed at the United States, prior to this, naturally led to distrust of Carranza's good faith. The new Constitution made a radical change in the oil situation, though explicitly providing that it and the legislation growing out of it should not be retroactive.

It separated surface from sub-soil property, nationalizing the latter. It required payment for oil taken out in the shape of rentals and royalties to the government.

On failure to comply with various rules and regulations, it threw lands open to new entries.

It held that "foreign capital shall submit to the new laws by waiving its nationality and organizing as Mexican corporations."

And it attempted to condition drilling permits upon compliance with recent decrees. Moreover it conditioned continued operation of oil lands upon government regulations yet to be issued.

There was further a disposition shown, in spite of the non-retroactive clause of the new Constitution, to apply these new conditions to oil leases previously acquired. Such leases were protected by the court if work had been done on them, but not if sub-soil rights existed only in "expectancy," the Supreme Court granting the owner merely "the faculty of exploring and exploiting" and recognizing acquired rights only when this faculty had been "translated into positive acts" before May 1, 1917, the date of the new Constitution. I quote from a discussion of the Texas Company's Amparo case in the November journal of the American Bar Association by Edward Schuster of New York.

The Supreme Court also declared the export duties upon oil to be constitutional.

Enough has been said to describe the nature and variety of the attacks upon foreign oil property in Mexico. Each step in restriction was met by diplomatic argument and remonstrance. This brings us to the main point at issue. How far may a government go in protecting the property rights of its citizens against attack, executive, legislative and judicial, in a state with which that government is at peace?

Fundamentally beyond question, a state may do what it likes within its own jurisdiction. If unduly restrictive its acts shut out foreign capital. If it invites foreign capital, such policy implies protection. But in no case does foreign capital enjoy rights superior to the native.

There is a passage in one of Webster's papers as Secretary of State in 1851 which states clearly, and correctly as the writer thinks, the status of the nationals of one country resident in another, of a less advanced civilization:

They have chosen to settle themselves in a country where jury trials are not known; where representative government does not exist; where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unheard of; and where judicial proceedings in criminal cases are brief and summary.

Having made this election, they must necessarily abide its consequences. No man can carry the ægis of his national American liberty into a foreign country and expect to hold it up for his exemption from the dominion and authority of the laws and the sovereign power of that country, unless he be authorized to do so by virtue of treaty stipulations.

If true of alien persons, it is still more true of alien property. Such is the general principle involved. But there are two contingencies when protection to property rights thus situated and thus jeopardized is due. First in case of discrimination; second in case of confiscation.