XVI GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT WAR "Any one who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the control of the army by the German Parliament."-PROFESSOR DEL BRÜCK of the University of Berlin. "There was a period of the war . . . when here and there, in the English press, the phrase cropped up that there were 'two victors' in the war-England and Germany. Behind this lay the idea that English policy might rest content, in case of need, with a 'drawn' war. From the English point of view, however, this was a piece of lazy and confused thinking. They know better to-day: and they are perfectly right when they say that if the game between them and us ends in an apparent 'draw' it is we who will be the victors and they the vanquished."-PAUL ROHRBACH, in Deutsche Politik, November 25, 1916 (1). "It is thus that the mineral districts of Lorraine, to which we are already indebted for not having been annihilated in the present war, will protect us in the future war and permit us to assure the welfare of the Empire and at the same time spare the blood of the people."— Memorandum submitted to the German Government by Associations of Iron and Steel Manufacturers and Metallurgists in December, 1917. AT The world T the outset it was pointed out that the present war was launched by Germany as the first of a series planned for conquest of territory, and that it had for its initial object the crushing of France while Russia was being held in check. Later, the great eastern neighbor was to be reduced to such a condition of impotence as would result in peace terms favorable to war first of a series planned exploitation while making preparations for the next war in the series. Italy, the lightly held partner in the Triple Alliance, Germany hoped to have either as a partner or as a neutral, and she hoped against hope though it is hard to believe that she could have expected-that England would be so blind to her own danger as to keep out of the conflict. Of all this, as well as of Germany's disappointment that her plans went awry, we have new, though somewhat superfluous confirmation in the confidences of Count von Wangenheim made to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople (2). The next war envisaged The earlier German plans have been so deranged by the surprises of this war, and most of all by the wholly unexpected, but to her most welcome, collapse of Russia, that we may from now on ignore them as having been so far modified as to be of little future significance. That a "next war" is planned by Germany in order to reconquer all territory which must be given up, as well as to achieve the objectives not yet realized, there is not the shadow of a doubt. This war has not yet been preached openly in Germany, because to do so would be to acknowledge defeat, and this acknowledgment would seriously affect the morale of the German people; but in the writings of political leaders and generals, as well as in the preparatory movements already inaugurated, the plans are revealed as though in an open book. All that is necessary for their realization is an inconclusive peace, followed by almost a score of years of preparation, unless fate should in the meantime provide her an unexpectedly favorable combination of circumstances. In the succinct expression of the British Premier, "we cannot seek to escape the horrors of war by laying them up for our children." Chancellor Michaelis in 1916 sent to Austria a secret memorandum containing this paragraph: "The motive of all Germany's acts is the lack of territory, both for the development of commerce and colonization. Germany has to solve two problems-the free The memorandum dom of the seas and the opening of the route Michaelis to the southeast. And these two problems can only be solved through the destruction of England." (3, p. 19.) The late Governor-General of Belgium, General von Bissing, in a memorandum which has since been published, has developed the strategic importance of Belgium for a future war, from which memorandum the following extracts have been taken: Memoran "I must also refer to the fact that the Belgian industrial districts are of great value, not only in peace, but in the event of war. The advantages which we have been able during the present war to obtain from Belgian industry by the removal of machinery and so on, are as important as the disadvantages which our enemies have suffered through lack of this addition to their fighting strength. . dum of General von Bissing "Belgium's king can never consent to abandon his sovereignty or allow it to be restricted. . . We can read in Machiavelli that he who desires to take possession of a country will be compelled to remove the King or Regent, even by killing him. "These are grave decisions, but they must be taken. . "For years to come we must maintain the existing state of dictatorship." (4, p. 16.) To Cornelius Gurlitt, the art critic, General von Bissing wrote in 1917: "Peace cannot be secured by agreements on paper, but only by positive and adequate guarantees" (4, p. 25). future wars In December, 1917, the Association of German Manufacturers of Iron and Steel and the Association Iron and of German Metallurgists addressed a joint memorial to the German Government as well as to the German high military command. In this memorial it was demanded that Germany annex the French "minette" iron deposits of French Lorraine, by reason of their "extreme importance for German national economy and for the conduct of future wars." The demand is made that the territory annexed be extended so far westward as to place the ore fields beyond the range of French artillery, since only in this way can France be prevented from checking Germany's future wars (5, App.). Pointing out that the future life of Germany's deposits of iron is not more than fifty years, the conclusion is reached in this memorandum: Exhaustion iron ore "Let no one believe that Germany in peace time will be able to assure herself iron reserves in a future war. And let no one dare to pretend on his own responsiof Germany's bility that such iron reserves would be sufficient. "During the first forty months of this war, Germany in order to meet the needs of her national defense, spent over 50,000,000 tons of iron and steel [corresponding to nearly three times that amount or 150,000,000 tons of iron ore. W. H. H.] "We do not have the right to count that in a future war we shall have the good fortune a second time to be able to exploit the territories occupied and to increase our resources of first materials. [As already explained this was accomplished by invasion two days before war was declared. See ante p. 82. W. H. H.] "For the future war it is necessary that we dispose of considerable resources in German ore, for the richer an industrial nation is in iron ore the greater it is feared by its enemies. "In the future it will not be masses of men grouped in gigantic armies that will decide the war, but above all defensive and offensive instruments of perfected technique placed at the disposition of the combatant in sufficient quantities and constantly renewed. (3, p. 35.) The future war less a question of man power than of machines "It is thus that the mineral districts of Lorraine, to which we are already indebted for not having been annihilated in the present war, will protect us in the future war and permit us to assure the welfare of the Empire and at the same time spare the blood of the people." The future The same theme has been developed even more fully by Dr. J. Reichert of Berlin in an article which appeared in Weltwirtschaft and has been translated and commented upon by the distinguished French historian and economist, Henri Hauser (6, 7, 8). Says Reichert: war will come in twenty years "Picture now the future, can Germany in a future war resist the French menace in Briey-Longwy? [The iron ore district of French Lorraine. W. H. H.] And can the economic position of Germany in the advance of the world be reestablished if Germany depends on foreign iron? This is equivalent to saying: 'Can Germany later make once more a war like this one?'" With Briey German wars could Reichert expresses his conviction that the enemies of Germany could not make war again on an adequate scale before 1940, and then only in the event that there was no interference with their assembling of the materials of war. It is his belief also that unless Germany is permitted continue many decades |