responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future." (4, p. III.) Germany's specific policy with England It had unquestionably been Germany's policy under von Bethmann-Hollweg to so maneuver as to keep England out of the struggle until France and Russia had been disposed of, and the Chancellor's vexation over his failure is easily to be comprehended, particularly as he had to answer to his royal master. We may content ourselves for the present by citing the frank statement of General von Bernhardi: a trap "A pacific agreement with England, is, after all, a Will-othe-Wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow" (1). nowsky's charge against The startling revelations in the memoirs of Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, which were published in 1918, supply us with an Prince Lichexcellent summary of this entire period of the negotiations. They condemn Germany as the arch-culprit, guilty of planning and launching the war, and this with a certainty which no testimony from unfriendly sources could have done. The Prince's conclusions as to the question of guilt are: Germany "As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave selfaccusation: "1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us, whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference. "2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposal of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement upon the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply. "3. On July 30th, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31st we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march-so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement. "In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside of Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war." (7, pp. 80.) REFERENCES I. von BERNHARDI, F., Germany and the Next War, pp. 300, N. Y., Longmans, 1912. 2. Archer, WILLIAM, The Thirteen Days, July 23-August 4, 1914, pp. 244, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915. 3. BECK, JAMES M., The Evidence in the Case, pp. 200, N. Y., Putnams, 1914. 4. H. M. Stationery Office, Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, pp. 561, London, 1915. S. DILLON, E. J., A Scrap of Paper, pp. 220, London, Hodder, 1914. 6. Le mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 396, Paris, Payot, 1917. 7. LICHNOWSKY, PRINCE KARL, German Ambassador's Revelations, pp. 122, N. Y., Putnams, 1918. 8. SEYMOUR, CHARLES, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914, pp. 311, Yale University Press, 1914. 9. OSSIANNILLSON, K. G., Sven Hedin, Nobleman (Trans.), pp. 223, London, Unwin, 1917. 10. New York Times, "Why the war? The Official Documents and 11. STOWELL, E. C., The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, 2 vols., Boston, Houghton, 1915. 12. HEADLAM, J. W., A History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914, pp. 412, London, Unwin, 1915. 13. SCHMITT, B. E., England and Germany, 1740-1914, pp. 524, Prince ton University Press, 1916. 14. NYSTROM, ANTON, Before, During, and After 1914 (Trans.), pp. 368, New York, Scribners, 1916. 15. WILLMORE, J. S., The Great Crime and its Moral, pp. 323, London, Hodder, 1917. 16. ROSE, J. HOLLAND, The Origins of the War, pp. 201, New York, Putnams, 1915. 17. WYATT, HORACE, Malice in Kulturland (humorous and illustrated by Tell after Tenniel), pp. 84, New York, Dutton, 1917. 18. GAUVAIN, AUGUSTE, Les origines de la guerre, pp. 333, Paris, Colin, 1915. 19. WILGUS, HORACE L., The Tragedy of Thirteen Days in 1914, pp. 63, An address before the Mich. Bar Assoc., June 28, 1918. 1918. III THE PLOT AGAINST DEMOCRACY "The Kaiser and the Chancellor Were walking hand in hand; They wept like anything to see 'If this were only Germanized,' They said, 'It would be grand!'" Malice in Kulturland. "In reality, then, the endless concessions made to Germany by France, Russia, and Great Britain, with the best intentions, have simply tempted them to claim more and more. That is why it is just and reasonable to conclude that the concessions hitherto made by the present Allies, under the influence of the pacifists, have acted as a constant aggravation of German ambitions, from which the war has resulted. In the last analysis, pacifism created the peculiar atmosphere, indispensable to the growth and development of the poisonous plant, Pangermanism."-ANDRÉ CHéradame. IN Evidence of Germany's plot aside documents A. THE EARLIER STAGES N the last lecture was discussed the launching of the war as revealed in diplomatic documents which passed between the chancelleries of the Great Powers, chiefly during the twelve from official days between July 23 and August 4, 1914. The most cursory examination of these documents indicates that the attitude of Germany had not been in the direction of peace and mediation, as was claimed by her; and a careful study of them leads to a definite conviction that she did everything with reference solely to a realization of her ambitions for world power and conquest. Whatever seemed to point in any other direction must now be ascribed to her desire to mislead the world concerning her motives and intentions. So soon as we look deeper into the sources lying outside the official documents, we are met with such an accumulation of evidence indicating hypocrisy and naked depravity, as has perhaps never been equaled in the history of the world. It is therefore proper for us to treat the subject, even though it concerns the authorized official acts of a so-called "Christian state,' in the same way that one does the gruesome and but half-concealed details of common murder. Our attitude in unearthing the evidence must, therefore, be that of the detective in a murder case, who has no respect whatever for statements, assertions here solemnly made by Germany's rulers or by her duly authorized representatives, unless these statements are supported by the facts. In presenting the evidence I must assume the attitude of a prosecuting attorney supported by a large body of reputable witnesses, a considerable State's evi case mass of depositions, and three repentant dence in the defendants who have turned the state's evidence. These latter are no less important personages than the German Imperial Ambassador to Great Britain, the multimillionaire "steel king" and former friend of the Kaiser, and a former director of the great Krupp steel works at Essen, the largest in Germany. In addition to these witnesses, Herr Liebknecht, the German socialist leader, has added his confession. My brief in this case will of necessity be long in order to cover all the charges in the indictment. The subject of Germany's guilt can be approached |