54-57 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. section six of the Act of 1864, to the effect | accepted this grant, and thus impliedly under- But it is a rule of equal, if not higher, significance that every Act of Congress making a grant is to be treated both as a law and a grant, and the intent of Congress when ascertained is to control in the interpretation of the law. "The solution of these questions depends, of course, upon the construction given to the acts making the grants; and they are to receive such a construction as will carry out the intent of Congress, however difficult it might be to give full effect to the language used if the grants were by instruments of private conveyance. To ascertain that intent we must look to the condition of the country when the Acts were passed, as well as to the purpose declared on their face, and read all parts of them together." Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U. S. 618, 625 [28: 1109, 1111]. See also Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co. 97 U. S. 491, 497 [24: 1095, 1097]; United States v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 146 Ú. S. 570, 597 [36: 1091, 1098]; United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 150 U. S. 1 [37: 975]. In order to determine the intent of Congress we must look at the situation at the time the Act of 1864 was passed. The alternate sections within the six and fifteen mile limits of the Bayfield road were not granted by the Act of 1856. They were simply withdrawn from pre-emption and sale by the action of the land department in order that the beneficiary of the grant might, in case the full amount of lands granted was not found within the place limits, select therefrom enough to supply the deficiency. We do not mean that they were not reserved lands; on the contrary, as stated Such is the uniform ruling above, they were. of this court in interpreting like action on the part of the land department. Nevertheless, not being granted lands, they were still within the disposing power of Congress. There would be no question of the title of one to whom "Until Congress had in terms granted them. selection was made the title remained in the government, subject to its disposal at its pleasure. Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 112 U. S. 414, 421 [28: 794, 797]; St. Paul & 8. C. R. Co. v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 56]112 U. S. 720, *732 [28: 872, 876]; United States v. McLaughlin, 127 U. S. 428, 450, 455 [32: 213, 221, 222]; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Price County, 133. S. 496, 511 [33: 687, 694]: United States v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 141 U. S. 358, 374 [35: 766, 771]. The land was, therefore, subject to the full taken to construct the road. It made the La Crosse & Milwaukee Railroad Company the beneficiary of this grant. Subsequently, with the assent of the state, that company had transferred to the St. Croix & Lake Superior Railroad Company so much of the grant as was designed to aid in the construction of that part of the road from the St. Croix river or lake northward to Lake Superior, with the branch to Bayfield. Eight years had passed, and only two years more remained until the expiration of the time fixed for the completion of the road. Only a short distance had in fact been built, to wit, 61 miles from Portage to Tomah, and that by the St. Croix & Milwaukee company in the spring of 1858. It was evident that the inducement of six sections per mile had not been sufficient to secure the construction of the road in the comparatively uninhabited portions in the northwestern part of the state, and so Congress determined to enlarge its grant in order to secure the accomplishment of the desired end. At the same time it perceived that the public interests required an additional road running through the central portion of the state northward to the two termini on Lake Superior, named for the road from St. Croix lake or river. And so it passed the Act of 1864. This made a grant to the same grantee, to wit, the state of Wisconsin, but expressed the terms and purposes in three separate *sections. [57 Congress evidently knew that at the time two companies had been named by the state of Wisconsin as the parties to construct the road provided for by the Act of 1856. So, in the first section, it made a grant of ten sections per mile to aid in the construction of a road from St. Croix river or lake to the west end of Lake Superior, with a branch to Bayfield; in the second, a grant in substantially like terms for a road from Tomah to the St. Croix river or lake; and in the third, a grant also of ten sections per mile to aid in the construction of a road from Portage City, Berlin, Doty's Island, or Fond du Lac, as the state should determine, in a northwesterly direction to Bayfield, and then to Superior, on Lake Superior. In each of these three sections it named the state of Wisconsin as the grantee. Although it knew that the state had made two separate companies the beneficiaries of the Act of 1856, it made no grant to those companies. It dealt in all three sections with the state, relying upon the state as the party to see that the roads were completed, and to use its own The Act of 1864 was therejudgment as to the manner of securing such construction. fore a mere enlargement of the Act of 1856, was made to the same grantee, was in pari materia, and is to be construed accordingly. It is not to be treated as an independent grant to a different party, and, therefore, liable to come in conflict with the rights of the first grantee. For whose benefit was the withdrawal of the lands within the indemnity limits of the Bayfield road made? Obviously, as often declared, for the benefit of the grantee. It is as though the United States had said to the grantee: we do not know whether, along the line of road, when you finally locate it, there 159 U. S. will be six alternate sections free from any pre-emption or other claim, and therefore so situated that you may take title thereto, and so we will hold from sale or disposal to any one else an additional territory of nine miles on either side that within those nine miles you may select whatever lands may be necessary to make the full quota of six sections per mile. When Congress, by a subsequent Act, makes a new and absolute grant to the same 58] *grantee of lands thus held by the government for the benefit of such grantee, upon what reasoning can it be said that such grant does not operate upon those lands? was entitled to the full benefit of the three pany the beneficiary; and yet can there be any Kansas City, L. & S. R. R. Co. v. Brewster, 118 U. S. 682 [30:281], is in point. On July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. at L. 289), Congress passed an Act granting to the state of Kansas five alternate sections per mile to aid the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, in constructing a railroad from Fort Riley, upon the valley of the Neosho river, to the southern line of the state of Kansas. This corporation (its name having been changed to that of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad Company) constructed the road, and received patents for the land. The object of that suit was to vacate and declare void these patents, and the principal ground relied on for main-if it had seen fit, have made some other com, taining it was that, by an Act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. at L. 772) and a supplemental Act of July 1, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 339), the lands had been appropriated to aid another company in building a road along the same line. The Act of 1866 had the ordinary reservation clause, similar to that found in section six of the Act of 1864 before us, and the contention was that the effect of this reserving clause was to except all the lands covered by the grants of 1863 and 1864 from the operation of the grant of 1866. It was conceded that if the intent of Congress was to aid in the construction of two separate lines of road the contention would have to be sustained, the court saying: "As the lands granted by the prior acts of 1863 and 1864 had, by the act of the legislature of Kansas, been granted to the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railroad Company, a then existing corporation of that state, for the purpose of building a road, with the same general description as to its course down the valley of the Neosho river, which might have run through these same lands if it had been built by the latter company, it is argued with great earnestness that these lands were necessarily reserved, under this clause of the Act of 1866, from the grant, as being reserved by the authority of Congress for the purpose of aiding in that object of internal improvement. If the A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. had built a line of road along the same general course and through the same lands, twenty 59]miles in *width, that the M. K. & T. R. R. Co. has occupied with its road, and asserted a claim to these lands, or to any of them, the argument would be almost irresistible." But it was held, in view of certain arrangements made between the two companies (not then ratified by the state of Kansas, but expected to be, and, in fact, subsequently so ratified) that it was the intent of Congress simply to aid in the construction of one road, and that the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad Company *When Congress makes a grant of a spe- [60 cific number of sections in aid of any work of internal improvement, it must be assumed that it intends the beneficiary to receive such amount of land, and when it prescribes that those lands shall be alternate sections along the line of the improvement, it is equally clear that the intent is that if possible the beneficiary shall receive those particular sections. So far as railroads are concerned, it is the thought, not merely that the general welfare will be subserved by the construction of the road along the lines indicated, but further that such grant shall not be attended with any pecuniary loss to the United States; for the universal rule is to double the price of even sections within the granted limits. The expectation is that the company receiving the odd sections will take pains to dispose of them to settlers, and thus by their settlement and improvement increase the value of the even sections adjoining and so justify the added price. To fully realize this expected benefit it is essential that the lands taken by the company shall be as near to the line of the road as possible; and so, while selection of remote lands is permitted, it is only when and because there is a necessity of such selection to make good the amount of the grant. Obviously, therefore, an act must be construed to realize, so far as is possible, this intent and to accom, plish the desired result. Still again, it must be noticed that the state of Wisconsin, the grantee named in both the Acts of 1856 and 1864, the plaintiff within whose place limits the land in controversy is situated, and the Omaha company, within whose indemnity limits it is, all three long since agreed that the land passed by this grant, and dealt with it as belonging to the plaintiff. Both roads have been constructed, and, undoubtedly largely through the instrumentality of their construction, population has poured into that part of the state, and the value of all real estate so increased that this particular tract is found by the jury to be worth $8000. After years have passed, and all the parties interested in the matter, other than the United States, have treated it as the property of the plaintiff, the defendant, relying upon a techni61] cal construction of the statutes, *seeks to enter the tract, and thus, for no more than the paltry sum of $400, two dollars and a half per acre being the double minimum price of land within the limits of railroad grants, to obtain title to property worth, as we have seen, at least $8000. The railroad company, under this construction, loses the land it supposed it was entitled to, which it has treated as its own, and has helped to make valuable; the government does not receive the $8000, nor indeed anything if the land be entered under the homestead laws, but a stranger comes in, who has done nothing to create that value, and appropriates it to his own benefit. The iniquity of such a result is at least suggestive. title has been determined in the land depart. But further, it is urged that this question of ment adversely to the claim of the plaintiff. This is doubtless true, but it was so determined, not upon any question of fact, but upon a construction of the law; and such matter, as we have repeatedly held, is not concluded by the decision of the land department. Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 72 [20: 485]; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 380 [23:424]: Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420 [26:800]; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 624 [31:844, 846]; Lake Superior Ship Canal, R. & I. Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354 [39: 183]. Defendant also claims an estoppel by reason of these facts set up as a third defense in his answer, the truth of which was on the trial admitted by the plaintiff. The final decision of the Secretary adversely to the claim of the plaintiff was on or about the 10th day of January, 1890. The testimony in this case shows that it was made on January 24, 1890. Subsequent to that decision the defendant entered upon the premises, built a residence, and made other improvements, at a cost of more than $200. The plaintiff knew of his possession and of the making of such improvements, but took no action until the commencement of this suit, on April 9, 1890. It seems to us that the claim of an estoppel can hardly be seriously made. The plaintiff had been contesting for these lands in the land department for a series of years. Some time after the final decision therein the defendant enters upon the land and commences making improve 62] ments, and in making such improvements expends the paltry sum of $200, and the plaintiff fails to file a complaint in ejectment for two months and a half after the decision of the land department, and perhaps, nearly that time after the defendant had entered into possession. Surely the defendant had no reason to believe that the plaintiff had abandoned its claim to the land. Both the time of plaintiff's delay and the amount of his expenditures suggest the rule de minimis non curat lex. The title of $8,000 worth of land is not lost, in such a way. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the circuit court erred in its decision, and its judgment is therefore reversed and a new trial ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration and decision of this case. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. States for the Western District of Wisconsin to review a judgment for defendant in an action of ejectment. Reversed and new trial ordered. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Louis D. Brandeis, Edward H. Abbot, Howard Morris, and William H. Dunbar for plaintiff in error. Messrs. George G. Greene and A. B. Browne for defendant in error. *Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the [63 opinion of the court: This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Wisconsin, to recover possession of the east half of the southwest quarter and the east half of the northwest quarter of section number seven (7), in township number forty-seven (47) north, of range number four (4) west, in the county of Ashland and state of Wisconsin. The land, found by the jury to be worth sixteen thousand dollars, is situated within the limits of the city of Ashland, more than six and less than ten miles from the Bayfield branch of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railroad Company, and also within ten miles of the Wisconsin Central Railroad Company. The title of the plaintiff rests upon an agreement between the two railroad companies settling all differences between them NOTE. As to pre-emption rights, see note to United States v. Fitzgerald, 10: 785. As to errors in surveys and descriptions in patents for lands, how construed, see note to Watts v. Lindsay, 5: 423. 159 U. S. selves as to the lands within the place limits of | each road, a patent from the state of Wisconsin to the Omaha company in pursuance of such agreement, and a deed from the latter to himself. The same questions arise in this case as in that just decided, and it is unnecessary to enter into any detailed statement of the facts concerning the two land grants, or a discussion of the questions arising thereon. Obviously, as the land in controversy was within the place limits of each road, it either passed wholly to the Omaha company or in equal moieties to the two, and in the latter event the agreement referred to transferred all rights to the Omaha company. 1846, Congress granted to the territory of Iowa five alternate sections of the public lands, on each side of the Des Moines river, to aid in improving its navigation. It was a disputed question whether the grant terminated at the mouth *of the Raccoon Fork, or extended along [65 the whole length of the river to the northern boundary of the state. The land department ordered that lands the whole length of the river within the state should be withdrawn from sale. In the course of subsequent litigation it was decided by this court that the grant terminated at the mouth of the Raccoon river. But in the case cited it was held that the withdrawal by the land department of lands above the mouth of the Raccoon river was valid, and that a subsequent railroad grant, with the ordinary reservation clause in it, did not operate upon lands so withdrawn. If a withdrawal of land beyond the terminus of a grant can be sustained, as it was in that case, equally so should be one made in anticipation of the locations of two lines of road, which locations were as yet undetermined, and might be such as to bring almost any portion of the lands withdrawn within the idemnity limits of the grant. As against this, the defendant offered evidence that on May 3, 1858, and June 16, 1858, respectively, two pre-emption declaratory statements were filed in the local land office, one in respect to one half of the tract and the other in respect to the remainder, and contends that up to those dates there had been no valid withdrawal of any lands by the land department, and, as a consequence, that these pre-emption claims attached to the land and excluded it from the operation of the grant. It may be re- The order of June 12, 1856, was never set marked, in passing, that it does not appear that aside. The letter of October 26, 1856, simply 64]*any attempt was ever made to prove up gave authority for a reduction in the area of or acquire title under and in accordance with the withdrawn territory upon the filing of a these declaratory statements. But the con- map of definite location, and that of March 1, tention is that, by the simple filing of the state-1859, forwarded a diagram showing the line of ments, the land was excluded from the operation of the grant made by either act. definite location of a part of one of the roads aided, and directed the continued withdrawal of land within the indemnity limits as disclosed thereby, but neither of them set aside the withdrawal of June 12, 1856, or in any other way affected it. These declaratory statements were of no validity; the land was then withdrawn from pre-emption or other sale, and withdrawn for the purpose of satisfying the grant to the state of Wisconsin. We are unable to assent to this contention. On May 29, 1856, the Commissioner of the General Land Office telegraphed to the local land officers of the district in which the land is situated to suspend from sale and location all lands in the district. This was prior to the passage of the act of 1856. On June 12, nine days after its passage, the Commissioner wrote to the same officers, referring to his telegraphic despatch, and saying that the object of the withdrawal thus ordered was to protect from sale the lands granted to the state by a bill which had passed both Houses of Congress, though not then approved by the President. But, it having been approved on June 3, he directs the continuance of the withdrawal. October 26, 1856, he again wrote to the local THE TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY [66 On land officers that upon the filing in their office of a duly certified map of the line of route as definitely fixed they "will, without waiting for further instructions from this office, cease to permit locations by entries or pre emption, or The judgment of the circuit court will, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration and decision of this case. COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. ROBERT N. SMITH ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 66-73.) for any purpose whatever of the lands within Title by prescription-notice of condition of fifteen miles of said route," and on March 1, 1859, which was after the filing of these de 2. land-receiver's receipt. constitutes a "just title" which is sufficient as the beginning of a right by prescription under the Louisiana Code, if possession under it is taken in good faith. claratory statements, he sent a letter, inclosing 1. A receiver's receipt under a pre-emption entry a diagram of the lands in their district with the line of route as definitely selected desig nated thereon, and again notified them to withbold from sale all lands within the indemnity limits. The only objection which can be made to the order of June 12, 1856, which was after the passage of the act, is that the Commissioner withdrew too much land, to wit, all land in the district, but that was a matter for the determination of the land department, and cannot be revised or disregarded by the courts. Wolcott v. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 681 [18: 689], is in point. In August, One who makes a pre-emption entry of public land, pays the government price, and receives a final receipt therefor, is not chargeable with notice of the fact that it was twenty years before swamp land granted to the state by Congress where it had not been selected or patented as such. NOTE. As to pre-emption rights, see note to United States v. Fitzgerald, 10: 785. 3. Where a receiver's receipt is upon its face sufficient to transfer the full equitable title to a preemptor, and it does not disclose when his rights to the land were initiated, his vendees are not chargeable as matter of law with knowledge that the land was not subject to pre-emption or homestead because it was within an incorporated town at the date of the receipt. [No. 183.] court on May 1, 1886, by the defendant in error, as heirs of William W. Smith to recover possession of the land. Among the defenses set up by the railway company was that of the statute of limitations, or prescription as it is called in the legislation of Louisiana. The case came on for trial on February 28, 1891, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. Thereupon the defendant sued out Argued and Submitted December 19, 1894. De- this writ of error. cided June 3, 1895. 7 Messrs: Wm. Wirt Howe, John F. Dil IN ERROR to the Circuestern District of lon, and Winslow S. Pierce for plaintiff in United for Louisiana to review a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Robert N. Smith et al., against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, for the possession of lands. Reversed and a new trial ordered. error. It is unnecessary to consider any questions other than those which arise upon the instructions of the court in respect to the matter of prescription. The possession of the defendant and its grantors had continued from the [68 spring of 1872 until the commencement of this action,-about fourteen years,-four years long. er than the time named in the statute. And the title under which this possession commenced was under instruments in legal form, executed by the proper officers of the United States, and apparently conveying full title. The receiver's receipt issued to Wylie was in these words: "No. 17,830. "Receiver's Office at Natchitoches, La., Oct. 19, 1872. } Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: The facts in this case were as follows: On May 14, 1853, William W. Smith purchased from the state of Louisiana a tract known as Cross Lake, in section 25, township 18, range 14, containing twenty-one and eighteen one hundredth acres. The title of the state rested on the claim that the land was swamp and overflowed, and passed to it under the acts of Congress granting such lands to the states. On December 3, 1857, the state filed a petition in the district court of the parish of Caddo to set aside such purchase and cancel the certificate of entry. While this action was pending, and before any trial, William W. Smith died, and the action was revived in the name of John W. Smith, administrator of his succes- Received from William D. Wylie, of sion. Such administrator appeared and Caddo Parish, Louisiana, the sum of fortyanswered. The heirs of William W. Smith seven dollars and forty cents, being in full for were not made parties, but upon the petition the lot No. 15 south of the bayou, of section of the state and the answer of the administra- No. 25, in township No. eighteen (18) of range tor the action was tried before a jury, and a No.fourteen (14) west, containing eighteen acres verdict returned in favor of the state, annull- and ninety-six hundredths, at $2.50 per acre. ing the sale and canceling the certificate. A "$47.40. J. Jules Bossier." judgment was, on November 20, 1860, entered upon this verdict, from which the administrator took an appeal to the supreme court of the state, but such appeal was afterwards and on Aug. 11, 1869, dismissed by consent of counsel. On February 24, 1872, at the local land of fice of the United States, W. D. Wylie entered 67] as a homestead the same tract under the description of lot 15, in section 25, etc. On October 19 of that year he changed his homestead to a pre-emption entry, paid the government price for the land, and received a final receipt therefor. This receipt was recorded in the recorder's office of the parish of Caddo on November 20, 1872, and on the same day he conveyed a two-thirds interest in the land to Hotchkiss & Tomkies. On December 1, 1874, a United States patent was issued to Wylie for the land. Prior to his homestead entry, and on April 27, 1871, an act was passed by the state of Louisiana incorporating the city of Shreveport, and the tract in controversy was within the boundaries of that city as defined in the act of incorporation. In the spring of 1872 Wylie went into actual possession of the premises, and such possession has continued in him and his grantees up to the present time. By sundry mesne conveyances the title of Wylie passed to plaintiff in error. This action was commenced in the circuit There is nothing on the face of this receipt or in the deed made on November 20 following by Wylie to Hotchkiss & Tomkies to indicate that the land was swamp or overflowed, or that it was within the corporate limits of the city of Shreveport, or tending to show when Wylie first entered upon it and initiated the right of homestead or pre-emption. And the same is true of the patent issued two years thereafter. Such a title is the "just title" which, within the terms of the Louisiana statutes, is the beginning of a right by prescription. And this is true whether we regard simply the receiver's receipt or the patent. Indeed, a patent from the United States is the highest evidence of title. As said by Mr. Justice Catron, in Hooper v. Scheimer, 64 U. S. 23 How. 235, 249 [16:452, 454]: "This court held, in the case of Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 450 [10: 242], 'that Congress had the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of a patent issuing from the United States; that a patent carries the fee, and is the best title known to a court of law.' Such is the settled doctrine of this court.” There may be a question whether the patent in this case was not something more than the "just title" needed in prescription, and [69 whether it was not conclusive as to the full title upon all the parties to this litigation. But that |