down, as a general principle, that, in the distribution of powers among our federal and State governments, those which are of a municipal character are to be considered as appertaining to the State governments, and those which relate to external affairs, to the general government. If I may be allowed to throw the argument of the gentleman into the form of a syllogism, (a shape which I presume will be quite agreeable to him,) it amounts to this: Municipal powers belong exclusively to the State governments; but the power to make internal improvements is municipal; therefore it belongs to the State governments alone. I deny both the premises and the conclusion. If the gentleman had affirmed that certain municipal powers, and the great mass of them, belong to the State governments, his proposition would have been incontrovertible. But, if he had so qualified it, it would not have assisted the gentleman at all in his conclusion. But surely the power of taxation-the power to regulate the value of coin -the power to establish a uniform standard of weights and measures to establish post-offices and post-roads-to regulate commerce among the several States-that in relation to the judiciary-besides many other powers indisputably belonging to the federal government, are strictly municipal. If, as I understood the gentleman in the course of the subsequent part of his argument to admit, some municipal powers belong to the one system, and some to the other, we shall derive very little aid from the gentleman's principle, in making the discrimination between the two. The question must ever remain open-whether any given power, and, of course, that in question, is or is not delegated to this government, or retained by the States?

The conclusion of the gentleman is, that all internal improvements belong to the State governments; that they are of a limited and local character, and are not comprehended within the scope of the federal powers, which relate to external or general objects. That many, perhaps most internal improvements, partake of the character described by the gentleman, I shall not deny. But it is no less true that there are others, emphatically national, which neither the policy, nor the power, nor the interests of any State will induce it to accomplish, and which can only be effected by the application of the resources of the nation. The improvement of the navigation of the Mississippi furnishes a striking example. This is undeniably a great and important object. The report of a highly scientific and intelligent officer of the engineer corps, (which I hope will be soon taken

up and acted upon,) shows that the cost of any practicable improvements in the navigation of that river, in the present state of the inhabitants of its banks, is a mere trifle in comparison to the great benefits which would accrue from it. I believe that about double the amount of the loss of a single steamboat and cargo, (the Tennesse,) would effect the whole improvement in the navigation of that river which ought to be at this time attempted. In this great object twelve States and two Territories are, in different degrees, interested. The power to effect the improvement of that river is surely not municipal, in the sense in which the gentleman uses the term. If it were, to which of the twelve States and two Territories concerned does it belong? It is a great object, which can only be effected by a confederacy. And here is existing that confederacy, and no other can lawfully exist; for the constitution prohibits the States, immediately interested, from entering into any treaty or compact with each other. Other examples might be given to show that, if even the power existed, the inclination to exert it would not be felt, to effectuate certain improvements eminently calculated to promote the prosperity of the Union. Neither of the three States, nor all of them united, through which the Cumberland road passes, would ever have erected that road. Two of them would have thrown in every impediment to its completion in their power. Federative in its character, it could only have been executed so far by the application of federative means. Again: the contemplated canal through New Jersey; that to connect the waters of the Chesapeake and Delaware; that to unite the Ohio and the Potomac, are all objects of a general and federative nature, in which the States through which they may severally pass cannot be expected to feel any such special interest as will lead to their execution. Tending, as undoubtedly they would do, to promote the good of the whole, the power and the treasure of the whole must be applied to their execution, if they are ever consummated.

I do not think, then, that we should be at all assisted in expounding the constitution of the United States, by the principle which the gentleman from Virginia has suggested in respect to municipal powers. The powers of both governments are undoubtedly municipal, often operating upon the same subject. I think a better rule than that which the gentleman furnished for interpreting the constitution, might be deduced from an attentive consideration of the peculiar character

of the articles of confederation, as contrasted with that of the present constitution. By those articles, the powers of the thirteen United States were exerted collaterally. They operated through an intermediary. They were addressed to the several States, and their execution depended upon the pleasure and the co-operation of the States individually. The States seldom fulfilled the expectations of the general government in regard to its requisitions, and often wholly disappointed them. Languor and debility, in the movement of the old confederation, were the inevitable consequence of that arrangement of power. By the existing constitution, the powers of the general government act directly on the persons and things within its scope, without the intervention or impediments incident to an intermediary. In executing the great trust which the constitution of the United States creates, we must, therefore, reject that interpretation (of its provisions which would make the general government dependant upon those of the States for the execution of any of its powers; and may safely conclude that the only genuine construction would be that which should enable this government to execute the great purposes of its institution, without the co-operation, and, if indispensably necessary, even against the will of any particular State. This is the characteristic difference between the two systems of government, of which we should never lose sight. Interpreted in the one way, we shall relapse into the feebleness and debility of the old confederacy. In the other, we shall escape from its evils, and fulfil the great purposes which the enlightened framers of the existing constitution intended to effectuate. The importance of this essential difference in the two forms of government, will be shown in the future progress of the argument.

Before I proceed to comment on those parts of the constitution which appear to me to convey the power in question, I hope I shall be allowed to disclaim, for my part, several sources whence others have deduced the authority. The gentleman from Virginia seemed to think it remarkable that the friends of the power should disagree so much among themselves; and to draw a conclusion against its existence from the fact of this discrepancy. But I can see nothing extraordinary in this diversity of views. What is more common than for different men to contemplate the same subject under various aspects? Such is the nature of the human mind, that enlightened men, perfectly upright in their intentions, differ in their opinions on almost

every topic that can be mentioned. It is rather a presumption in favor of the cause which I am humbly maintaining, that the same result is attained by so many various modes of reasoning. But, if contrariety of views might be pleaded with any effect against the advocates of the disputed power, it is equally available against our opponents. There is, for example, not a very exact coincidence in opinion between the President of the United States and the gentleman from Virginia. The President says, (page 25 of his book,)

J

"The use of the existing road, by the stage, mail-carrier, or post-boy, in passing over it, as others do, is all that would be thought of; the jurisdiction and soil remaining to the State, with a right in the State, or those authorized by its legislature, to change the road at pleasure."

Again, page 27, the President asks:

"If the United States possessed the power contended for under this grant, might they not, in adopting the roads of the individual States, for the carriage of the mail, as has been done, assume jurisdiction over them, and preclude a right to interfere with or alter them?"

They both agree that the general government does not possess the power. The gentleman from Virginia admits, if I understood him. correctly, that the designation of a State road as a post-road, so far withdraws it from the jurisdiction of the State, that it cannot be afterwards put down or closed by the State; and in this he claims for the general government more power than the President concedes to it. The President, on the contrary, pronounces, that "the absurdity of such a pretension" (that is, preventing, by the designation of a postroad, the power of the State from altering or changing it) "must be apparent to all who examine it!" The gentleman thinks that the designation of a post-road withdraws it entirely, so far as it is used for that purpose, froin the power of the whole State; whilst the President thinks it absurd to assert that a mere county court may not defeat the execution of a law of the United States! The President thinks that, under the power of appropriating the money of the United States, Congress may apply it to any object of internal improvement, provided it does not assume any territorial jurisdiction; and, in this respect, he claims for the general government more power than the gentleman from Virginia assigns to it. And I must own, that I so far coincide with the gentleman from Virginia. If the power can be traced to no more legitimate source than to that of appropriating the public treasure, I will yield the question.

The truth is, that there is no specific grant, in the constitution, of the power of appropriation; nor is any such requisite. It is a resulting power. The constitution vests in Congress the power of taxation, with but few limitations, to raise a public revenue. It then enumerates the powers of Congress. And it follows, of necessity, that Congress has the right to apply the money, so raised, to the execution of the powers so granted. The clause which concludes the enumeration of the granted powers, by authorizing the passage of all laws, "necessary and proper" to effectuate them, comprehends the power of appropriation. And the framers of the constitution recognise it by the restriction that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in virtue of a previous appropriation by law. It is to me wonderful how the President could have brought his mind to the conclusion, that, under the power of appropriation, thus incidentally existing, a right could be set up, in its nature almost without limitation, to employ the public money. He combats with great success and much ability, any deduction of power from the clause relating to the general welfare. He shows that the effect of it would be to overturn, or render useless and nugatory, the careful enumeration of our powers; and that it would convert a cautiously limited government into one without limitation. The same process of reasoning by which his mind was brought to this just conclusion, one would have thought, should have warned him against his claiming, under the power of appropriation, such a vast latitude of authority. He reasons strongly against the power, as claimed by us, harmless, and beneficent, and limited as it must be admitted to be, and yet he sets up a power boundless in its extent, unrestrained to the object of internal improvements, and comprehending the whole scope of human affairs! For, if the power exists, as he asserts it, what human restraint is there upon it? He does, indeed, say, that it cannot be exerted so as to interfere with the territorial jurisdiction of the States. But this is a restriction altogether gratuitous, flowing from the bounty of the President, and not found in the prescriptions of the constitution. If we have a right, indefinitely, to apply the money of the government to internal improvements, or to any other object, what is to prevent the application of it to the purchase of the sovereignty itself of a State, if a State were mean enough to sell its sovereignty-to the purchase of kingdoms, empires, the globe itself? With an almost unlimited power of taxation, and, after the revenue is raised, with a right to apply it under no other limitations than those which the President's