cing their fall from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion in favor of despotism would very satisfactorily follow! I demand what there is in the nature and construction of maritime power to excite the fears that have been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend that a body of seamen will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their apprehensions?

But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear that if we provide a marine it will produce collisions with foreign nations— plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision, you had better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels of that statesman be deemed wise who would recommend that the nation should be unarmed-that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited—who should declare, in the language of Othello, that the nation must bid "farewell to the neighing steed, and the shrill trump, the spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife, and all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war"-and that the great body of the people should be taught that the national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet every argument in favor of a power of protection on land applies, in some degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or the enactment of new edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon that element where we must operate, and where, in the end, they must be resisted.

For my part, I do not allow myself to be alarmed by those apprehensions of maritime power which appear to agitate other gentlemen. In the nature of our government I behold abundant security against abuse. I would be unwilling to tax the land to support the rights of the sea, and am for drawing from the sea itself the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be no danger

of runing into the folly and extravagance which so much alarm gentle. men; and whenever it is abandoned-whenever Congress shall lay burdensome taxes to augment the navy beyond what may be authorized by the increase of wealth, and demanded by the exigences of the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. For these reasons I can see no just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It is, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing armies. And the genius of our institutions-the great representative principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently distinguished, affords the best guarantee against the ambition and wasteful extravagance of government. What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean-a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. I admit it is impossible at this time, perhaps it never will be desirable, for this country to establish so extensive a navy. Indeed, I should consider it as madness in the extrome in this government to attempt to provide a navy able to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.

The next species of naval power to which I will advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. My friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) have satisfactorily shown that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one-third of that which the maintenance of such a squadron must require, would be sufficient-that if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships of the line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships of the line, one-third in port repairing, one-third on the passage, and one-third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted navy, could not spare for the American service, whilst she is engaged in the present contest. I am desirous of seeing such a force as I have described, that is, twelve ships of the line, and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but I admit that it is unattainable in

the present situation of the finances of the country. I contend, however, that it is such a force as Congress ought to set about providing, and I hope in less than ten years to see it actually established. I am far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen behold it. I cannot allow myself to be discouraged at a prospect of even her thousand ships. This country only requires resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils to which any squadron would be exposed while stationed off our coasts, there can be no doubt that the force to which I have referred would ensure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive sea-board and numerous harbors, everywhere affording asylums, to which it could safely retire from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of my colleague, (Mr. McKee,) who appears to think that it is vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, I would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connexion, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe.

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[Here Mr. C. read certain parts of a work written by Col. Daviess, in which the author attempts to show, that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could in the same manner be best retaliated that the force of about twenty or thirty frigates would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our sea-ports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, just as the French were assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.]

The third description of force, worthy of consideration, is that which would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, and laying under contribution our cities-a force competent to punish the insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our own jurisdiction the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means, at this time. Is there a reflecting man in the nation who would not charge Congress with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force, a single ship were to bombard one of our cities! Would not every honorable member of the Committee inflict on himself the bitterest reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our little gallant navy, a single British vessel should place New York

under contribution! Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect, in not providing engines and water buckets. If we are not able to meet the wolves of the forest, shall we put up with the barking impudence of every petty cur that trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible danger, shall we provide against none? I hope not. I hardly expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson was so soon to be forgotten which was taught us in the murder of Piercethe attack on the Chesapeake—and the insult offered in the very harbor of Charleston, which the brave old fellow who commanded the fort in vain endeavored to chastise. It is a rule with me, when acting either in a public or private character, to attempt nothing more than what there exists a prospect of accomplishing. I am therefore not in favor of entering into any mad projects on this subject, but for deliberately and resolutely pursuing what I believe to be within the power of the government. Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the principles maintained by the opposition at that time. I have no doubt of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were contemplated for an unnecessary war into which the nation was about to be plunged I have always admired and approved the zeal and ability with which that opposition was conducted by the distinguished gentleman now at the head of the treasury. But the state of things is totally altered. What was folly in 1798 may be wisdom now. At that time we had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions The population of the country too is greatly increased, nearly doubled, and the wealth of the nation is perhaps tripled. Whilst our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessary maritime protec tion is proportionably augmented. Independent of the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798 we have had an addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine-a weak and defenceless accession, requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the protecting arm of government.

The groundless imputation, that those who are friendly to a navy are espousing a principle inimical to freedom, shall not terrify me. I am not ashamed when in such company as the illustrious author of the

Notes on Virginia, whose opinion on the subject of a navy, contained in that work, contributed to the formation of my own. But the principle of a navy is no longer open to controversy. It was decided when Mr. Jefferson came into power. With all the prejudices against a navy which are alleged by some to have been then brought into the administration-with many honest prejudices, I admit the rash attempt was not made to destroy the establishment. It was reduced to only what was supposed to be within the financial capacity of the country. If, ten years ago, when all those prejudices were to be combated, even in time of peace, it was deemed proper, by the then administration, to retain in service ten frigates, I put it to the candor of gentlemen to say, if now, when we are on the eve of a war, and taking into view the actual growth of the country, and the acquisition of our coast on the Gulf of Mexico, we ought not to add to the establishment.

I have hitherto alluded more particularly to the exposed situation of certain parts of the Atlantic frontier. Whilst I feel the deepest solicitude for the safety of New York, and other cities on the coast, I would be pardoned by the Committee for referring to the interests of that section of the Union from which I come. If there be a point more than any other in the United States demanding the aid of naval protection, that point is the mouth of the Mississippi. What is the population of the Western country, dependant on this single outlet for its surplus productions? Kentucky, according to the last enumeration, has 405,511, Tennessee 261,727, and Ohio 230,760. And when the population of the western parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, and the territories which are drained by the Mississippi or its waters, is added, it will form an aggregate equal to about one-fifth of the whole population of the United States, resting all their commercial hopes upon this solitary vent! The bulky articles of which their surplus productions consist, can be transported no other way. They will not bear the expense of a carriage up the Ohio and Tennessee, and across the mountains; and the circuitous voyage of the lakes is out of the question. Whilst most other States have the option of numerous outlets, so that if one be closed resort can be had to others, this vast population has no alternative. Close the mouth of the Mississippi and their export trade is annihilated. I call the attention of my Western friends, especially my worthy Kentucky friends (from whom I feel myself with regret constrained to differ on