am JAPAN VERSUS RUSSIA 107 the Russians definite rights in the coveted Province, and also established papers certain responsibilities. During the troubles of 1900 Russia was looked Ia to as the natural preserver of order in Manchuria. It was only when her actions became so equivocal as to warrant a suspicion that she intended to find national advantage in the situation that the other Powers showed antagonism. By th av II From what has just been said it is clear that the interests of Japan and Russia in the Far East were diametrically opposed. The Japanese required a foothold in Manchuria, or at least in Korea, fully as much as did Russia. The national intuitions of each Power covered the disputed territory. Russia had an advantage of position by her occupation of Port Arthur and by her Manchurian railroad. As to the feeling of Japan, it can best be made clear by quoting that leading Japanese statesman, the Marquis Ito, who visited the United States during 1901. Speaking at a dinner given in his honor while he was in New York, he argued that the great question in the relations between China and the rest of the world would come out of the contact of two entirely different civilizations. "It is not," he said, "the transient contact of conflicting rulers and armies, but it is the contact, and ever increasingly dense contact, of millions with millions in their daily life." But how could this dangerous contact be continued without conflict? Was not some mediator necessary to reconcile the antagonistic forces of East and West? "Reasoned thus far," continued the Marquis Ito, " I believe it is not too much to say that we are the only people in the Orient who can fully understand the import and significance of the two civilizations, and I consider it a noble mission of our country to try to play a part in the future maintenance of the peace of the Orient. I feel it our duty to play the 'honest broker' in the coming contact of opposed cultures. We have sometimes been described as a warlike people, but those who know our history will assure you that since some thousand years we have only three times come in conflict with foreign nations: once when we repelled the army of Kubla Khan, some seven hundred years ago; next when we had war with Korea some three hundred years ago; and then for the third time in the last Chinese war." That war between Russia and Japan did not come in 1901 was not accepted as evidence that it would not come in the future. The ultimate struggle seemed to be merely postponed. A study of diplomatic tendencies made it hard not to believe that before very many years had gone by the relations between the two governments would be strained past the breaking point and a war would follow in which a half-dozen nations might become involved. The failure of the Manchurian treaty and the announced intention of Russia to let matters rest marked the beginning of a quiescent period in the inter-relations of the Powers as to China. Nevertheless, a little later in the year Russia made a new attempt to negotiate a Manchurian treaty with China, offering terms which did not differ very materially from the former ones. Again the venerable Li Hung Chang lived up to his diplomatic reputation, and tried to secure the consent of his Government to support the Russian scheme. But before the treaty could be signed Li Hung Chang died, on November 7, and the negotiations came to an end. The provincial viceroys, especially those who ruled the valley of the Yangtze-kiang, now had a larger voice in the affairs of the Empire, and their influence appeared to be anti-Russian. Moreover, Yuan Shih-kai, who succeeded Li Hung Chang as Viceroy of Chi-li, was even more deeply imbued with Western ideas than his predecessor, and he seemed opposed to Russian monopoly in the exploitation of his country. Li Hung Chang and Yuan Shih-kai Li Hung Chang, when he died, had rounded out a long and very active career. In judging him there is need to take account of the strange complexity, the bewildering inconsistency, of Chinese character. At times he appeared to be animated by motives of pure and lofty patriotism. Again, it would be evident that he was using his high position to fill his own purse. He was not averse to playing a wily double game, or even to accepting a bribe. Yet he was not unwilling to let the light of Western civilization shine upon his country. Born in 1822, he distinguished himself in the literary examinations which were requisite to official advance in China. But he remained comparatively obscure until the Tai Ping Rebellion brought him his opportunity. He threw in his lot with the Manchu dynasty, though himself a Chinese, and came to command the imperial forces, being asso THE OLD VICEROY AND THE NEW 109 ciated with the foreign-led army first headed by Ward, the American, and later by "Chinese Gordon." He possessed the esteem of Gordon until he connived at the massacre of the rebel leaders to whom Gordon had promised protection. So outraged were Gordon's feelings at this despicable treachery that he is said to have pursued the agile Li with a loaded gun. China's coming statesman escaped, however, and made so satisfactory a report to his Government that he was weighted with honors. When the rebellion had been finally put down Li was created an Earl and appointed Viceroy of the capital Province of Chi-li, a position which he held, with slight interruptions, until his death. He was popular with the Chinese Government, but unpopular with the people. His broad back had to bear a tremendous burden. The odium of China's defeat in the war with Japan was all his. Though he was disgraced by China's defeat, he was the only man available to negotiate the treaty of peace, the inevitably hard terms of which did not increase his popularity at home. In order that he might be kept in hand he was alternately honored and degraded. One day it would be announced that Earl Li had been given a new decoration; the next day the news might come that he was in disgrace for some breach of court etiquette. In 1896 Li went to Moscow as China's representative at the coronation of the Russian Czar. He was made much of in Europe, and also in the United States, which he visited on his way back to China. He was a novelty, a new type. He interviewed his interviewers with astonishing facility, showing himself more of a Yankee than the Yankees by his habit of answering a question with a question. He asked people how old they were; whether they were married, and, if not, why not; or how much money they had. And he maintained in all the fêtes of which he was the central figure a cunning oriental inscrutability. Back in his own country he resumed his position as buffer between China and the rest of the world. The diplomatic corps at Peking regarded with complacency the selection of Yuan Shih-Kai to succeed Li Hung Chang. Yuan's rising star had brought him to the front earlier in life than was usual in China. He was only forty-three years old in 1901. His personality had first attracted notice while he was serving as Chinese Resident in Korea. At the time of the coup d'état of 1898 he was in command of the only efficient military force within reach of Peking, and had he elected to support the cause of the Emperor against the Empress-Dowager, the change in the control of the Government would hardly have been accomplished. But Yuan stood by the Empress-Dowager. As a reward he was made Viceroy of Shantung. When the anti-foreign outbreak of 1900 fired the country he opposed his Government to the extent of defending foreigners and preventing attacks upon them in his Province, siding with the progressive Viceroys of the Yangtze Provinces. After the capture of Peking by the Allies he was called to assist Prince Ching and Li Hung Chang in the peace negotiations. The "Yellow Peril" The work of the Powers in China in 1900 and 1901 brought out two significant facts: first, that China, despite her teeming millions, was almost helpless against foreign attack; second, that the difficulties in the way of agreement upon a concerted policy as to China's future were almost insurmountable. The small army of the Allies fought its way from Taku to Peking and dictated terms to the most populous of all nations, to the oldest civilization in the world. But in the remoter districts the disturbance was not felt. In fact, the people of the western and southwestern Provinces for the most part did not know that there had been any fighting, or if they heard anything it was the false news that the foreigners had been expelled from the country. The secret of this ignorance was the secret of China's backwardness and helplessness. It could be traced to the native apathy which had hindered the provision of any adequate means of communication between the different parts of the vast Empire. What would be the effect of opening up the country by means of railroads and telegraph lines could scarcely be surmised. It might result in the orderly regeneration of a great people. It might awaken the Chinese to a truer conception of their own strength, and thus create the "yellow peril." As to the aims of the foreign Powers who were ambitious to exploit Chinese territory, they could be defined only in a general way. Their purposes were often as shadowy as their control of the regions in which they desired to operate. But it was clear that unless some common factor could be found for all the interests represented, the future offered only the depressing threat of international conflict, |