liable for all the natural and proximate consequences of his wrongful act, and the plaintiff, if entitled to recover, is usually entitled to such damages as will fairly compensate him for the injury received, including such as are alleged and proved to be reasonably certain to be suffered in the future as a proximate cause of such wrongful act as well as those sustained to the time of the trial.100 In many jurisdictions, exemplary, vindicative, or punitive damages are also allowed in some instances, as, where the assault and battery was committed wantonly, maliciously, or the like.101 Damages that are the natural and immediate consequence of the act complained of may usually be shown under a general averment on the subject,102 but special damages should be specifically alleged.103 Evidence of the extent of the injury, pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and medical expenses, proximately caused by the act complained of, is usually admissible to show the general damages;104 and, under a proper complaint, evidence of mental suffering because of circumstances of insult and indignity accompanying the assault has also been held admissible.105 Failure to prove 200 Morgan v. Kendall, 124 Ind. 454, 24 N. E. 143, 9 L. R. A. 445; Gronan v. Kukkuck, 59 Iowa 18, 12 N. W. 748; Fetter v. Beale, 1 Ld. Raym. 339, 2 Salk. 11; Moore v. Adam, 2 Chitty 198; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89; Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W. 403, 27 Am. St. 47, 14 L. R. A. 226; Brownback v. Frailey, 78 Ill. App. 262; Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Tracey, 109 Ill. App. 563; Newell V. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 38 Am. R. 763. 1 Sutherland Dam., §§ 393, 401; 3 Cyc. 1108, 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 993, 41 Cent. L. J. 308, 12 Cent. L. J. 529, 554, 577, notes in 27 Am. Dec. 684-689, 50 Am. Dec. 765-775, 28 Am. St. 870-883. Many of the authorities to the effect that punitive damages cannot be assessed are cited in Borkenstein V. Shrack, (Ind. App.) 67 N. E. 547; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 16 Am. R. 270. Hutts v. Shoaf, 88 Ind. 395; Morgan v. Kendall, 124 Ind. 454, 24 N. E. 143, 9 L. R. A. 445; Hawes v. O'Reilly, 126 Pa. St. 440, 17 Atl. 642; 104 Hawes v. O'Reilly, 126 Pa. St. 440, 17 Atl. 642; Lunsford v. Walker, 93 Ala. 36, 8 So. 386; Ward v. Blackwood, 48 Ark. 396, 3 S. W. 642; Martin v. Murphy, 85 Iowa 669, 52 N. W. 662; Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 61 Am. Dec. 96, and note; Bagley v. Mason, 69 Vt. 175, 37 Atl. 287; Morgan v. Curley, 142 Mass. 107. 103 Uertz v. Singer Mfg. Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.) 116; Robinson V. Stokely, 3 Watts (Pa.) 270; see also, Kuhn v. Freund, 87 Mich. 545, 49 N. W. 867. 105 Van Reeden v. Evans, 52 Ill. App. 209; Hutts v. Shoaf, 88 Ind. 395; Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552; Stuppy v. Hof, 82 Mo. App. 272; Goucher v. Jamieson, 124 Mich. 21, 82 N. W. 663; Craker v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. R. 504; Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574; Beck v. Thompson, 31 W. Va. 459, 7 S. E. 447, 13 Am. St. 870; Root v. Sturdivant, 70 Iowa 55, 29 N. W. 802; matters of aggravation will not preclude a recovery of damages shown to have been actually and proximately caused by the wrongful act of the defendant complained of ;106 and upon proof of the unlawful assault or battery alleged nominal damages may be recovered, although no appreciable damages are shown.107 Testimony as to the wounds, pain, loss of sleep, and poor health after the injury is not inadmissible as opinion evidence. 108 Matters of aggravation, such as circumstances of outrage and insult attending an assault and battery which wound the feelings, and the like, may be given in' evidence under a proper pleading, to increase the damages,109 at least where exemplary damages are allowed, and proper evidence to show malice and the like, is also admissible in such cases.110 Evidence of pecuniary condition and standing of the defendant is likewise admissible where exemplary damages are allowed,111 and in some cases evidence of the standing or condition in life of the plaintiff is admissible to augment his damages or show the extent thereof;112 but the wealth of the defendant113 or the Leach v. Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 699, 33 S. W. 703; Wolf v. Trinkle, 103 Ind. 355, 3 N. E. 110; Kelley v. Kelley, 8 Ind. App. 606, 34 N. E. 1009. In the last two cases it is held that humiliation and loss of reputation and social position may be considered. Atkins v. Gladwish, 25 Neb. 390, 41 N. W. 347. 100 Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 49, 20 Am. R. 668. 107 Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492; Tatnall v. Courtney, 6 Houst. (Del.) 434; Lewis v. Hoover, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 407; Crosby v. Humphreys, 59 Minn. 92, 60 N. W. 843; Andrews v. Stone, 10 Minn. 72. 108 Hamm v. Romine, 98 Ind. 77. 100 Root v. Sturdivant, 70 Iowa 55, 29 N. W. 802; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89; Shafer v. Smith, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 67; Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240, 82 Am. Dec. 670; Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128, 44 Am. R. 152; Dickey v. McDonnell, 41 Ill. 62; see also, Maisenbacker v. Concordia Soc., 71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67, 71 Am. St. 213; Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553. 110 Sledge v. Pope, 3 Hayw. (N. Car.) 402; Joice v. Branson, 73 Mo. 28; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177, 13 Atl. 688; Elfers v. Woolley, 116 N. Y. 294, 22 N. E. 548; Worford v. Isbel, 1 Bibb. (Ky.) 247, 4 Am. Dec. 633; Pratt v. Ayler, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 448; Klein v. Thompson, 19 Ohio St. 569. 111 Belknap v. Boston &c. R. Co., 49 N. H. 358; Cockran v. Ammon, 16 Ill. 315; Jones v. Jones, 71 Ill. 562; Gore v. Chadwick, 6 Dana (Ky.) 477; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177, 13 Atl. 688; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89; Pendleton v. Davis, 1 Jones L. (N. Car.) 98; Rowe v. Moses, 9 Rich. L. (S. Car.) 423, 67 Am. Dec. 560; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N. W. 527, 50 Am. R. 143; Brown v. Evans, 17 Fed. (U. S.) 912. 112 Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361; Eltringham v. Earhart, 67 Miss. 488, 7 So. 346, 19 Am. St. 319; Heneky v. Smith, 10 Ore. 349, 45 Am. R. 143; McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432. 113 Hare v. Marsh, 61 Wis. 435, 21 N. W. 267, 50 Am. R. 141; Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 61 Am. Dec. 96; poverty of the plaintiff11 cannot, ordinarily, be shown where only actual compensatory damages are allowed. A further treatment of the rules as to the measure and evidence of damages in such cases will be found, with a citation of the authorities supporting them, in the chapter in this volume on the subject of damages. Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469, 33 114 Marsh v. Bristol, 65 Mich. 378, 32 N. W. 645; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89. § 1704. Scope of chapter-Generally.-It is not the purpose in this chapter to consider what may or may not be assigned, nor to consider the manner or nature of assignments in general. It is the purpose, however, to treat of certain rules and matters of evidence in cases in which assignees are parties, either as plaintiffs or defendants. In so doing it will be necessary, or at least proper, to consider some matters of evidence in cases under state insolvency laws, and voluntary general assignments for the benefit of creditors, as well as in cases of ordinary assignments of choses in action, or the like, not made for the benefit of creditors under such laws. The subject, so far as it relates to assignees in bankruptcy, under the act of Congress, will be treated in another chapter. § 1705. Right of assignee to sue-Burden of proof.-In some jurisdictions it is provided that in case of an assignment by written endorsement the assignor need not be made a party, but that if there is no such assignment he must be made a party to answer as to his own interest; and in many jurisdictions the assignee is allowed to sue, in a proper case, in the assignor's name. It is also the law in many jurisdictions that if there appears to be such a written assignment it can only be questioned and put in issue by the defendant by an answer under oath. In such a case it has been held that where the assignment of an account sued on by the assignee is not put in issue by an answer under oath, formal proof of the assignment is unnecessary, and that it is not necessary to show the plaintiff's acceptance of the assignment, nor to show demand of payment before the commencement of the action,' but that where the assignment is denied by an answer under oath, the burden is on the plaintiff to show a sufficient assignment by a preponderance of the evidence. In another jurisdiction, it has been held that where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the actual bona fide owner of the claim sued on, by written assignment, although a general denial admits the due execution and delivery of the written assignment, yet such denial puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to sue as the actual bona fide owner of the claim, and the burden is upon him to show that he is its owner for his own benefit, without accountability. Where, however, the plaintiff holds the cause of action as collateral security for a debt due him from a third person, the burden of proving a defense arising out of the state of dealings between the plaintiff and his principal debtor, such, for instance, as that the principal debt has been paid, or is not equitably enforceable as against the defendant, has been held to be upon the latter.** 3 § 1706. Evidence of assignee's right.—Where a statement of the account sued on was attached to the complaint, and an assignment of the account in writing appeared at the close thereof signed by the person who performed the services which the account was for, and he testified that the signature was genuine, this was held sufficient evidence of the assignee's right to sue. It was also held, in a recent case, that where one assigned a trade secret, but did not become the owner thereof until afterwards, his assignee took title by estoppel. In another case a promise by a son to his father, on receiving property from the latter, that, at the death of the father, the son would pay his sister a certain sum was held to be or create a chose in action, which, on being assigned to the sister, could be enforced by her. And it was also held that the agreement of the son with his sister, at the request of the |