§ 1591. Best and secondary evidence.-The proper evidence to support a plea of another action pending is the record or a duly authenticated copy or transcript thereof.73 But secondary evidence is admissible, upon a proper showing, where the record is lost or destroyed. And, under proper pleadings, where it cannot be satisfactorily determined from the record whether the parties and the causes of action are the same, parol evidence has been held admissible for that purpose.75

416; Walker v. Heller, 73 Ind. 46; Bond v. White, 24 Kans. 45; Althen V. Tarbox, 48 Minn. 18, 50 N. W. 1018, 31 Am. St. 616; Municipal Court v. McDonough, 24 R. I. 498, 53 Atl. 866; but compare, Rieden v. Kothman (Tex. Civ. App.), 73 S. W. 425.

"Smiley v. Dewey, 17 Ohio 156; Walker v. Heller, 73 Ind. 46; Kellogg v. Sutherland, 38 Ind. 154; Bond v. White, 24 Kans. 45; Craig V. Smith, 10 Colo. 220, 15 Pac. 337; People v. De la Guerra, 24 Cal. 73; Parmelee v. Tennessee &c. R. Co., 13 Lea (Tenn.) 600; Commonwealth v.

Churchill, 5. Mass. 174; Parker v.
Colcord, 2 N. H. 36.

Suggett v. Bank, 8 Dana (Ky.) 201; Tolle V. Alley (Ky.), 24 S. W. 113; Dean v. Massey, 7 Ala. 601; see also, Woodward v. Stark, 4 S. Dak. 588, 57 N. W. 496; see, Vol. I, § 618.

75 Davis v. Dunklee, 9 N. H. 545; Damon v. Denny, 54 Conn. 253, 7 Atl. 409; see also, Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105; Morris v. State, 101 Ind. 560; Bain v. Bain, 10 U. C. Q. B. 572; but compare, Wright v. Maseras, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 521; see, Vol. I, § 618.

must be proved.

1598. Documentary and parol evidence.

1595. Satisfaction as well as accord 1599. Range and sufficiency of evi

1596. Liquidated and unliquidated

claims or demands.

dence.

§ 1592. Generally.-Accord and satisfaction is defined in a recent case as "the discharge of a contract, or cause of action or disputed claim arising either in contract or tort, by the substitution of an agreement between the parties in satisfaction of such contract, cause of action, or disputed claim, and the execution of that agreement.”1 The issue, it has been said, on a plea of accord and satisfaction, is upon the delivery and acceptance of something in satisfaction of debt or damages demanded.2 At common law evidence of accord and satisfaction was admissible under the general issue in assumpsit, case, and debt, on simple contract. Greenleaf states that substantially the same rules prevail in the United States, but both in England and America the general rule now is that accord and satisfaction must be specially · pleaded. Such a plea is a plea in confession and avoidance, and pro

1 Hennessy v. St. Paul City R. Co., Brodhead, 70 N. Y. S. 43; Alexander 65 Minn. 13, 67 N. W. 635.

22 Greenleaf Ev., § 28.

* 2 Greenleaf Ev., § 29.

'Coles v. Soulsby, 21 Cal. 47; Ingram v. Hilton &c. Co., 108 Ga. 194, 33 S. E. 961; Covell v. Carpenter (R. I.), 51 Atl. 425; Barnum v. Green, 13 Colo. App. 254, 57 Pac. 757; Parker v. Lowell, 11 Gray (Mass.) 353; Combs v. Smith, 78 Mo. 32; Jacobs v. Day, 25 N. Y. 763; Randall v.

v. Strong, 9 M. & W. 733. Or, in some jurisdictions, due notice of the defense must be given when pleading the general issue, in order to let in such evidence: Seaver v. Wilder, 68 Vt. 423. It is inadmissible under a plea of payment: Smith v. Elrod, 122 Ala. 269, 24 So. 994; Hamilton v. Coons, 5 Dana (Ky.) 317; see also, Friermuth v. McKee, 86 Mo. App. 64; Owens v. Chandler, 16 Ark. 651;

ceeds on the theory that although the plaintiff once had a cause of action it has been discharged by some subsequent act or matter; but where it is established, the accord and satisfaction will operate as a bar to the cause of action covered by it in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake, as effectually as if the plaintiff never had any such cause of action.3

6

$1593. Burden of proof.-The defendant has the burden of proof upon the issue of accord and satisfaction raised by his plea. But in a suit or in an action to set aside an accord and satisfaction on the ground of fraud or mistake, the burden is upon the plaintiff. So in jurisdictions and cases in which the plaintiff may set up fraud or mistake in the same action in which the accord and satisfaction is pleaded to his original claim, if he admits the accord and satisfaction but seeks to avoid it for fraud, mistake, or the like, the burden of doing so is upon him. And when, in making out his own case, the plaintiff shows an accord, it seems that he has the burden of showing * that there was no satisfaction."

1594. Questions of law or fact.-It is a general rule that the construction of written instruments is for the court, and where the agreement is in writing, it would seem, ordinarily at least, to be a question for the court, to determine whether it constituted an accord. So, if there is no conflict in the evidence, and if but one reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom, the question is one of law for the court.11 But in other cases, where the question as to whether

10

Barnum v. Green, 13 Colo. App. 254, 57 Pac. 757; but compare, Howe v. Mackay, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 44; First Nat. Bank v. Kimberland, 16 W. Va. 555; Ligon v. Dunn, 6 Ired. L. (N.

Car.) 138.

Alden v. Thurber, 149 Mass. 271, 21 N. E. 312; Oliver v. Phelps, 20 N. J.L. 180; Harrison v. Close, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 448, 3 Am. Dec. 444; Guldager v. Rockwell, 14 Colo. 459, 24 Pac. 556; Hosler v. Hursh, 151 Pa. St. 415, 25 Atl. 52; Lane v. Applegate. 1 Stark. 78; Nicklin v. Williams, L. R., 10 Exch. 259.

Simmons v. Oullahan, 75 Cal.

Browning v. Crouse, 43 Mich. 489, 5 N. W. 664.

10 Sanford v. Abrams, 24 Fla. 181, 2 So. 373.

"Hinkle v. Minneapolis &c. R. Co.,

508, 17 Pac. 543; Oilwell Supply Co. 31 Minn. 434, 18 N. W. 275; Gibbs V.

there has been an accord and satisfaction is disputed, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine.12 So, where fraud or mistake is in issue the question is generally one of fact; and where the evidence is conflicting as to whether the claim constituting the cause of action is included in the accord and satisfaction, the question is generally one of fact for the jury.18

§ 1595. Satisfaction as well as accord must be proved.-In order to constitute a bar the accord must be executed; or, in other words, satisfaction as well as accord must be proved.14 There are some authorities which hold that an accord with tender of performance and refusal to accept is sufficient, and this doctrine seems to be approved by Greenleaf;15 but the better rule, which is sustained by the weight of authority, is that mere readiness to perform, without acceptance or execution of the accord, is insufficient to make it a bar,16 unless the

Wall, 10 Colo. 153, 14 Pac. 216; Logan v. Davidson, 45 N. Y. S. 961; Washburn v. Winslow, 16 Minn. 33; Helling v. United Order of Honor, 29 Mo. App. 309; see also, Truax v. Miller, 48 Minn. 62, 50 N. W. 935; Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 257.

12 Oilwell Supply Co. v. Wolfe, 127 Mo. 616, 30 S. W. 145; Perin v. Cathcart, 115 Iowa 553, 89 N. W. 12; Robinson v. Railroad Co., 84 Mich. 685, 48 N. W. 205; Stone v. Miller, 16 Pa. St. 450; Brenner v. Herr, 8 Pa. St. 106; Frick v. Algeier, 87 Ind. 255; see also, Mortlock v. Williams, 76 Mich. 568, 43 N. W. 592; Rosenfeld v. New, 10 N. Y. S. 232.

13 Madden v. Blain, 66 Ga. 49. Where the whole is in writing, however, the question as to what is included may be merely a question of the construction of the writing for the court to determine.

14 Slover v. Rock, 96 Mo. App. 335, 70 S. W. 268; Burgess v. Denison &c. Co., 79 Me. 266, 9 Atl. 726; Alexander Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 70 Ark. 215, 66 S. W. 921; Arnett v. Smith, 11 N. Dak. 55, 88 N. W. 1037; Her

mann v. Orcutt, 152 Mass. 405, 25 N. E. 735; New York &c. R. Co. v. Martin, 158 Mass. 313, 33 N. E. 578, 579; Roger v. City of Spokane, 9 Wash. 168, 37 Pac. 300; Cobb v. Malone, 86 Ala. 571, 6 So. 6; Holton v. Noble, 83 Cal. 7, 23 Pac. 58; Jacobs v. Mark, 183 Ill. 533, 56 N. E. 154; Anderson v. Scholey, 114 Ind. 553, 557, 17 N. E. 125; Jackson v. Olmstead, 87 Ind. 92; Bradley v. Palen, 78 Iowa 126, 42 N. W. 623; Bank v. De Grauw, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 342, 35 Am. Dec. 569; Russell v. Lytle, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 390.

15 2 Greenleaf Ev., § 31; Coit v. Houston, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 243. Heirn v. Carron, 11 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 361, 49 Am. Dec. 65; Bradshaw v. Davis, 12 Tex. 336; but see, Bank v. Curtis, (Tex.) 36 S. W. 911; Bradley v. Gregory, 2 Campb. 383; see also, Evans v. Powis, 11 Jur. 1043, 1 Welsh. H. & G. 601; Case v. Barber, T. Raym. 450; 1 Comyn Dig. Accord. B. 4; Goodrich v. Stanley, 24 Conn. 613; Babcock v. Hawkins, 23 Vt. 561.

16 Francis v. Deming, 59 Conn. 108, 21 Atl. 1006; Hearn v. Kiehl, 38 Pa.

new agreement or promise, instead of actual performance, is accepted as a satisfaction.17 Much depends, however, on the agreement in the particular case.18

$1596. Liquidated and unliquidated claims or demands. It is well settled in most jurisdictions, although the rule has met with much apparently just criticism, that the mere payment of a part of a debt or liquidated demand that is due is not an accord and satisfaction of the entire demand even though the creditor agrees to accept it as such.19 But this rule has been abrogated or modified by

St. 147, 80 Am. Dec. 472; Blackburn V. Ormsby, 41 Pa. St. 97; Noe v. Christie, 51 N. Y. 270; Kromer v. Heim, 75 N. Y. 574; Clark v. Hawkins, 5 R. I. 219; Pettis v. Ray, 12 R. I. 344; Carpenter v. Chicago &c. Co., ¡S. Dak. 584, 64 N. W. 1120; Harbor v. Morgan, 4 Ind. 158; Yazoo &c. R. Co. v. Fulton, 71 Miss. 385, 14 So. 1; Globe v. Bank, 46 Neb. 891, 65 N. W. 1062; Dudley v. Kennedy, 63 Me. 465; Gleason v. Allen, 27 Vt. 364. "Hosler v. Hursh, 151 Pa. St. 415, 25 Atl. 52; White v. Gray, 68 Me. 579; Smith v. Elrod, 122 Ala. 269, 24 So. 994; Morehouse v. Second Nat. Bank, 98 N. Y. 503; Whitney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 551; Allison v. Abendroth, 108 N. Y. 4701, 15 N. E. 606; Gulf e. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Tex. 73, 15 S. W. 556; Whitney v. Richards, 17 Utah 226, 53 Pac. 1122; Cartwright V. Cooke, 3 B. & Ad. 701; Evans v. Powis, 11 Jur. 1043, 1 Welsh. H. & G. 601; but see, Frost v. Johnson, 8 Ohio 393.

Spokane, 9 Wash. 168, 37 Pac. 300, 301, 302; Bennett v. Hill, 14 R. I. 322; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Tex. 73, 15 S. W. 556, 557. The acceptance of a note of third persons in lieu of the debtor's, without any agreement to accept it in satisfaction is held not to discharge the original debt; Mount v. De Haven, 29 Ind. App. 127, 62 N. E. 330.

19 Leading Article in 57 Cent. Law Jour. 244; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 55 Ark. 369, 18 S. W. 377; Miller v. Eldridge, 126 Ind. 461, 27 N. E. 132; Meyer v. Green, 21 Ind. App. 138, 51 N. E. 942, 69 Am. St. 349 and note; Jennings v. Durflinger, 23 Ind. App. 673, 55 N. E. 979; Hayes v. Massachusetts Co., 125 Ill. 626, 18 N. E. 322; Keller v. Strong, 104 Iowa 585, 73 N. W. 1071; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Davis, 35 Kans. 464, 11 Pac. 421; Leeson v. Anderson, 99 Mich. 247, 58 N. W. 72, 41 Am. St. 597; Robert v. Barnum, 80 Ky. 28; Rohr v. Anderson, 51 Md. 205; Twitchell v. Shaw, "Hosler v. Hursh, 151 Pa. St. 415, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 46, 57 Am. Dec. 80; 25 Atl. 52; Whitney v. Richards, 17 Wetmore v. Crouch, 150 Mo. 671, 51 Utah 226, 53 Pac. 1122; Sharp v. S. W. 738; McIntosh v. Johnson, 51 Mauston, 92 Wis. 629, 66 N. W. 803; Neb. 33, 70 N. W. 522; Murphy v. Gowing v. Thomas, 67 N. H. 399, 40 Kastner, 50 N. J. Eq. 214, 24 Atl. Atl. 184; Simmons v. Clark, 56 Ill. 564; Allison v. Abendroth, 108 N. Y. 96; Perdew v. Tillman, 62 Neb. 865, 470, 15 N. E. 606; Commonwealth v. 88 N. W. 123; Rogers v. City of Cummins, 155 Pa. St. 30, 25 Atl. 996;