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cern more especially the welfare of the state, and the peace and happiness of society; that if he shall fail in a faithful discharge of them he shall be called to account as a criminal; but that in order that he may not be annoyed, disturbed and impeded in the performance of these high functions, a dissatisfied individual shall not be suffered to call in question his official action in a suit for damages."82 Where the justice has jurisdiction of the subject matter, he cannot be held liable for an erroneous exercise of judgment or a wrong decision. But, it is held that where a justice of the peace issues a warrant which he has no power to issue, that he and the ministerial officer executing it are liable. So, a justice was held liable for false imprisonment where he imprisoned the person for non-payment of a fine for contempt where the judgment imposing the fine did not provide for the imprisonment.85 And a justice has been held liable where he committed a person to prison where the crime was committed out of his jurisdiction.86 And such officers are held liable where they commit persons on charges which do not constitute crimes. So, as to a police judge who committed a person in the absence of a charge and warrant.88 This protection to judicial officers applies only to acts which are judicial; but where the act is ministerial and its performance does not involve the exercise of judgment, such officers are liable for their wrongful, malicious or corrupt acts.89

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§ 2114. Corporations-Liability.-It is now the universally accepted rule that corporations are liable for false imprisonment, as well as for other torts.90 As to the liability of corporations in cases

82 Cooley Torts, 408.

83 Austin v. Vrooman, 128 N. Y. 229; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378; Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576; Gifford v. Wiggins, 50 Minn. 401; Robertson v. Parker, 99 Wis. 652; Goodwine v. Stephens, 63 Ind. 112.

84 Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Allen v. Gray, 11 Conn. 95; Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N. Y. 538; Wright v. Hazen, 24 Vt. 143; Muzzy v. Howard, 42 Vt. 23; Carleton v. Taylor, 50 Vt. 220; Vaughn v. Congdon, 56 Vt. 111; Church v. Pearne, 75 Conn. 350.

83 Lanpher v. Dewell, 56 Iowa 153.

86 Bell v. McKinney, 63 Miss. 187; Dietrichs v. Schaw, 43 Ind. 175.

87 De Courcey v. Cox, 94 Cal. 665; Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. L. 654; Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St. 186; 1 Kinkead Torts, § 228.

8 Glazar v. Hubbard, 102 Ky. 68; Simmons v. Vandyke, 138 Ind. 380; State v. McDaniel, 78 Miss. 1.

Noxon v. Hill, 2 Allen (Mass.) 215; Way v. Townsend, 4 Allen (Mass.) 114; Jones v. Werden, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 133.

"Owsley v. Montgomery &c. R. Co., 37 Ala. 560; American Ex. Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 430.

of torts, Mr. Beach says: "The doctrine that an action will not lie against a corporation for a tort is exploded. The same rule applies to corporations as to individuals. They are equally responsible for injuries done in the course of their business by their servants." And corporations are now held liable even where motive or malicious intent is necessary. "It is now well settled that a corporation may be liable in tort, even though a malicious intent is necessary to be proved. The malice of the agent is imputable to the corporation."92

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§ 2115. Damages. In an action for false imprisonment in the absence of malice, the injured party is entitled to recover for loss of time, interruption to business, the bodily and mental suffering which may have been occasioned by the wrong, and the expenses reasonably incurred to procure his discharge from the imprisonment." 93 It is held that in such an action the plaintiff may recover

1 Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Sanders, 98 Ala. 293; Beach Priv. Corp.,

455; Owsley v. Montgomery &c. R. Co., 37 Ala. 560; Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530; Board &c. v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116; Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; American Ex. Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 430; Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 471; Cody v. Adams, 7 Gray (Mass.) 59; Reed v. Home Sav. Bank, 130 Mass. 443; Krulevitz v. Eastern R. Co., 140 Mass. 573; South &c. R. Co. v. Chappell, 61 Ala. 527; Jordan v. Alabama &c. R. Co., 74 Ala. 85; McDougald v. Bellamy, 18 Ga. 411; Wheeler &c. Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kans. 350; Woodward v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 142; Carter v. Howe &c. Co., 51 Md. 290; Childs v. Bank, 17 Mo. 213; Bloodgood v. Mohawk &c. R. Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9; First Baptist Church v. Schenectady Co., 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 79; Lynch v. Metropolitan &c. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 77; Balti more &c. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317; Pittsburg &c.

R. Co. v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 157; Atlantic &c. R. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162; Goddard v. Grand Trunk R., 57 Me. 202; Boogher v. Life Asso. &c., 75 Mo. 319; Wheless v. Second Nat. Bank, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 469; Goff v. Great Northern R. Co., 3 El. & El. 672; Eastern Counties R. Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314; 2 Beach Priv. Corp., § 447.

92 Wachsmuth v. Merchants' &c. Bank, 96 Mich. 426; Carter v. Howe &c. Co., 51 Md. 290; Williams v. Planters' Ins. Co., 57 Miss. 759; Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202.

93 Ocean &c. Co. v. Williams, 69 Ga. 251; Blanchard v. Burbank, 16 Ill. App. 375; Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51; Wheeler &c. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kans. 350; Wentz v. Bernhardt, 37 La. Ann. 636; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; Rown v. Christopher &c. R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.) 471; Blythe v. Tompkins, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 468; Abrahams v. Cooper, 81 Pa. St. 232; Hays v. Creary, 60 Tex. 445; Parsons v. Harper, 16 Gratt.

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for loss of work occasioned by such imprisonment not only, up to the time of the suit, but also for time lost thereafter, if by reason of the arrest complained of he was deprived of work he otherwise would have obtained. In an action by a seaman against the master of a vessel, for unauthorized imprisonment until his effects were lost or sold, it was held that he was entitled to recover for the time of the imprisonment, the value of the articles lost or sold, with interest on the amount and the price of his passage home; but that no vindictive damages could be added in the absence of proof of bad motive of the master.95 In such an action there can be no recovery from loss resulting from sickness after the imprisonment has ceased, unless the pleading and the proof show, or the law will imply, that such sickness was caused by the defendant's wrong. But it has been held that the plaintiff may prove the filthy condition of the jail in which he was imprisoned or he may show any other discomfort or deprivation to enhance the compensatory damages for mental anguish and bodily suffering.97 Where an arrest was made after the action had been begun, it was held that the expense of the defense of the suit in which the arrest was made, not caused by the refusal of bail, should not be included in the damages.98 Proof of actual malice is not required in order to submit the question of exemplary damages to the jury. "Where such an arrest is made under circumstances that indicate wanton disregard of the rights of the person arrested, the jury will be warranted in giving punitive damages. There need be no evidence of hatred or ill will in order to authorize the submission of the question of exemplary damages in such cases to the jury." In this class of cases exemplary or punitive damages may be allowed where the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression are made to appear from the evidence.100 But where

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9 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Rice, 36 300; Livingston v. Burroughs, 33 Kans. 593.

Mich. 511; Johnson v. Bouton, 35

the circumstances indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of the person arrested the jury will be warranted in giving punitive damages. 101 When there is no possible way of measuring damages with any certainty, the sound discretion of the jury under all the circumstances is held to be the only measure practicable.102 Where the recovery of damages depends on the existence of malice and would. be enhanced by proof of it, any proof which negatives or denies the malice is proper for the purpose of reducing the damages. Under this rule evidence of good faith is generally admissible in mitigation; but the mitigation will be limited to the damages it tends. to controvert, and will not be extended to reduce the actual damages.103

§ 2116. Justification-Burden of proof.-As shown by a former section,104 the plaintiff makes a prima facie case when he proves the arrest or restraint. This prima facie case is sufficient until overcome by the defendant, and when the defendant attempts to justify the arrest the burden of proof is on him to establish his defense by a preponderance of the evidence; if he attempts to justify on the ground that the person arrested committed a breach of the peace, or other offense in his presence, the burden is on him to establish that fact by satisfactory evidence. In such a case proof of his motive in making the arrest on information he received from others would be immaterial and improper.105 In actions for false imprisonment the burden is on the defendant to prove justification.106. The rule is that where a private person induces an officer to arrest another without a warrant, where the offense has not been committed in the view of the officer, such person will be liable, and in an action

Neb. 898; Brown v. Chadsey, 39
Barb. (N. Y.) 253, 262; Neall v.
Hart, 115 Pa. St. 347; McConnell v.
Kennedy, 29 S. Car. 180; Herzog v.
Graham, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 152; Par-
sons v. Harper, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 64;
Sorenson v. Dundas, 50 Wis. 335.

101 Pearce v. Needham, 37 Ill. App. 90.

102 Reno v. Wilson, 49 Ill. 95; Montross v. Bradsby, 68 Ill. 185; Cudahy v. Powell, 35 App. 29; Pearce v. Needham, 37 Ill. App. 90; Farman v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568; Brushaber

v. Stegemann, 22 Mich. 266; Harris v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 35 Fed. 116.

103 Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 253, 262; Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344; Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313; Barnes v. Viall, 6 Fed. 661.

104 See, ante, § 2103.

105 Shanley v. Wells, 71 Ill. 78. 106 St. John v. Eastern R. Co., 1 Allen (Mass.) 544; Bassett v. Porter, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 418; Jackson v. Knowlton, 173 Mass. 96; Blake v. Damon, 103 Mass. 199; Sellman v. Wheeler, 95 Md. 751; Edger V. Burke, 96 Md. 715.

for false imprisonment can only justify by showing that the charge made by him was well founded.107 As a matter of defense a defendant must either prove that he did not imprison or restrain the party against his will, or he must justify the imprisonment.108 An answer of justification need only admit the imprisonment and the manner thereof as charged in the complaint; it should not admit that the imprisonment was wrongful and unlawful, as this would amount to a confession.1 109 And an answer justifying an arrest either with or withcut a warrant on the ground that a crime had been committed, and that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting the plaintiff, should set forth the grounds of suspicion in order that the court may determine whether or not they afford probable cause and so that the plaintiff may be advised in advance of the nature of the defense.110 But where the defendant failed to plead the facts constituting justification, it was held that they were nevertheless entitled to introduce any evidence under the general denial which tended to show that they acted in good faith and without malice in making the arrest for the purpose of mitigating the damages, though such evidence might tend to prove a complete justification.111

§ 2117. Probable cause-Definition. The courts recognize the difficulty of giving an accurate or comprehensive definition of the term "probable cause." The reason for this is that in a certain sense it is a relative term not depending on the actual state of any given cause, but rather upon the honest and reasonable belief of the person instituting the proceedings under all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. One definition as given is that it is "such suspicion as would induce a reasonable man to commence a prosecution;"112 by another court, as, "a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant a cautious

107 Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535; Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; Lark v. Bande, 4 Mo. App. 186; Taaffe v. Slevin, 11 Mo. App. 507; McGarrahan v. Lavers, 15 R. I. 302; Barker v. Graham, 2 W. Bl. 866; Collett v. Foster, 2 Hurl. & N. 356; Griffin v. Coleman, 4 Hurl. & N. 265.

108 Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43.
109 Ocean &c. Co. v. Williams, 69

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