is a total loss "when she has sustained such extensive damage that it would not be reasonably practicable to repair her." The ordinary measure of proofs which the courts have adopted is this: "If the ship when repaired will not be worth the sum which it would be necessary to expend upon her, the repairs are, practically speaking, impossible, and it is a case of total loss."5 "584 The American cases follow the same principle stated by the English cases, but they fix a different amount of expense in giving the right of abandonment. The rule adopted by the American courts is that "if the expense of repairs will exceed half the value of the ship or property when repaired, she is considered a total loss, and may be abandoned."585 Where a vessel is insured against actual total loss only the insurers as a rule are not liable where after a disaster she remained a vessel and as such reached her place of destination afloat." 586 § 2442. Deviation.-An insurer may defeat an action on the policy by showing that there was a deviation from the usual course of Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 272, 75 Am. Dec. 331; Wallerstein v. Columbian Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 204, 4 Am. R. 664; Bryan v. New York Ins. Co., 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 618; Buchanan v. Ocean Ins. Co., 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 318; Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 50; Pennsylvania &c. Ins. Co. v. Drackett, 63 Ohio St. 41, 81 Am. St. 698, note; Grainger v. Martin, 2 Best & Sm. 467; Burnett v. Kensington, 7 T. R. 210; Dyson v. Rowcroft, 3 B. & P. 474; Cologan v. London &c. Co., 5 M. & S. 447; Roux v. Salvador, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 266; Adams v. McKenzie, 13 C. B. N. S. 442; Moss v. Smith, 9 Man. & G. & S. 94, 103; Rosetto v. Gurney, 11 C. B. 186. 594 Wallerstein v. Columbian Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 204, 4 Am. R. 664; Moss v. Smith, 9 M. G. & S. 94, 103; Irving v. Manning, 1 M. G. & S. 176; Rosetto v. Gurney, 11 C. B. 186; Adams v. McKenzie, 13 C. B. N. S. 442; Grainger v. Martin, 2 Best & S. 467. 585 Wallerstein v. Columbian Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 204, 4 Am. R. 664; 86 Murray v. Hatch, 6 Mass. 465; De Peyster v. Sun &c. Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 272, 75 Am. Dec. 331; Burt v. Brewers' &c. Ins. Co., 78 N. Y. 400; Carr v. Security Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. 504, 17 N. E. 369; Maggrath v. Church, 1 Caines (N. Y.) 196; Le Roy v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 226; Wadsworth v. Pacific Ins. Co., 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 33; Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 50. 588 the voyage. The reason of this is that where a vessel is insured for a particular voyage, or where the insurance is for a stated time for the navigation of particular waters, these are regarded as warranties to the effect that for that particular voyage, the vessel will travel the usual and ordinary route; or that for the stated time she will navigate the particular waters named. Any material deviation is at the risk of the insured; and if a loss ensues thereby, there can be no recovery.587 Thus where a boat in ascending the Mississippi River was shown to have left the main channel and attempted to shorten the voyage by running through a cut-off where boats ran at high water, was grounded and the cargo injured, it was held that the insurer was discharged." But it has been held that in case of time policies for the navigation of particular waters, that the insurer is not relieved where the proof shows that the vessel did leave the prohibited waters, but within the life of the policy returned to such waters and was there lost. But it was conceded that such a rule did not apply to insurance for a particular voyage, as the insurance was forfeited the instant the deviation occurred.589 Yet this rule is held not to apply where the policy expressly prohibits the navigation of other waters.590 But it has been held that a mere intention to deviate is not sufficient; the vessel must have entered upon the forbidden or unusual course of voyage to constitute a deviation.591 And where an intention to deviate is proved it is not sufficient to defeat the action, if the evidence shows that the 587 Dodge v. Essex Ins. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.) 65; Burgess v. Equitable &c. Ins. Co., 126 Mass. 70, 30 Am. R. 654; Amsinck v. American Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 185; Fernandez v. Great Western Ins. Co., 48 N. Y. 571; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Algeo, 32 Pa. St. 330; Hume v. Providence &c. Ins. Co., 23 S. Car. 190; Hearn v. New England &c. Ins. Co., 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 318; Middlewood v. Blakes, 7 Term R. 162; Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241; African Merchants v. British Ins. Co., L. R. 8 Exch. 154. 589 Jolly v. Ohio Ins. Co., Wright (Ohio) 539. 580 Wilkins v. Tobacco Ins. Co., 30 Ohio St. 317, 27 Am. R. 445; Coffin v. Newburyport &c. Ins. Co., 9 Mass. 436; Capen v. Washington Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 537; Greenleaf v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 37 Mo. 25; Union Ins. Co. v. Tysen, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 118; Keeler v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 3 Hill (N. Y.) 250; Palmer v. Warren Ins. Co., 1 Story (U. S.) 364; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch (U. S.) 335; Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Co., 12 Pet. (U. S.) 378. 590 Stevens v. Connecticut &c. Ins. Co., 6 Duer (N. Y.) 594; Cobb v. Lime Rock Ins. Co., 58 Me. 326; Odiorne v. New England Ins. Co., 101 Mass. 551, 3 Am. R. 401; Whiton v. Albany City Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 24; Burgess v. Equitable Ins. Co., 126 Mass. 70, 30 Am. R. 654; Parker v. China &c. Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 237, 41 N. E. 267; Birrell v. Dryer, 9 App. Cas. 345. 501 Arnold v. Pacific &c. Ins. Co., 78 N. Y. 7; Thatcher v. McCulloh, 23 result and is therefore presumed. In other cases they are only actionable, as a rule, where special injury or damage is averred and proved in the particular case. 3 § 2448. Questions of law or fact.-What constitutes libel or slander in the abstract is a question of law where the language used is clear and unambiguous, the question as to whether it is actionable and the question as to whether the words in themselves or as explained by the inducement or colloquium, are reasonably susceptible or the meaning attributed to them by the innuendoes, are questions of law for the court, but where the words in the particular case are ambiguous and fairly susceptible of two meanings, the question as to the meaning in which they were used and understood in the particular case and under the particular circumstances is usually a question for the jury.* So whether or not there was a publication of the alleged libel or slander, by the defendant, as a matter of fact, is for the jury. So it is usually for the jury to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the words were spoken or written concerning the plaintiff, and whether they were spoken of him in a particular capacity. And if the evidence is con 2 For classification, see, Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, 226. 3 Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 Atl. 411, 51 Am. St. 446; Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26 N. E. 91; Carter v. Carter, 62 Ill. 439; Robertson v. Edelstein, 104 Wis. 440, 80 N. W. 724; Gibson v. Williams, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 320; Price v. Conway, 134 Pa. St. 340, 19 Am. St. 704; Collins v. Dispatch Pub. Co., 152 Pa. St. 187, 25 Atl. 546, 34 Am. St. 636; Hunt v. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. 54. 4 Alcorn v. Bass, 17 Ind. App. 500, 46 N. E. 1024; Donaghue v. Gaffy, 54 Conn. 257, 7 Atl. 552; Bridgman v. Armer, 57 Mo. App. 528; Twombley v. Monroe, 136 Mass. 464, 468; Chiatovich v. Hanchett, 88 Fed. 873, 876; Witcher v. Jones, 137 N. Y. 599, 33 N. E. 743, 43 N. Y. S. 151; Sloan v. Gilbert, 12 Bush (Ky.) 51, 23 Am. R. 708; Thompson v. Sun 6 Pub. Co., 91 Me. 203, 39 Atl. 556; Blagg v. Sturt, L. R. 10 Q. B. 899, 59 E. C. L. 899; Australian &c. Co. v. Bennett, L. R. (1894) A. C. 284, 63 L. J. C. P. 105. McCoombs v. Tuttle, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 431; Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445, 25 N. E. 919; McGeever v. Kennedy, (Ky.) 42 S. W. 114; Loranger v. Loranger, 115 Mich. 681, 74 N. W. 228. But it may be for the court to say what is necessary in law to constitute a publication. Boehmer v. Detroit Free Press Co., 94 Mich. 7, 53 N. W. 822, 34 Am. St. 318; People v. McDowell, 71 Cal. 194, 11 Pac. 868; Lawrence v. Newberry, 64 L. T. N. S. 797, 39 W. R. 605; Butler v. Barrett, 130 Fed. 944. 'Skinner v. Grant, 12 Vt. 456, unless it is clear; Hay v. Reid, 85 Mich. 296, 48 N. W. 507. 8 flicting, it is proper to instruct the jury as to what constitutes a privilege and leave it to them to say from the evidence whether or not the essential facts are proved, but when the words are actionable per se, it is the duty of the court to so instruct, and if there is no dispute as to the facts and no extrinsic evidence of malice, it is usually for the court to say, as a matter of law, whether or not the words were privileged.10 If, however, there is evidence of malice, the question must usually be left to the jury.11 11 9 § 2449. Burden of proof.-"The plea of the general issue," says Greenleaf, "will require the plaintiff to prove: (1) The special character and extrinsic facts, when they are essential to the action; (2) the speaking of the words, or the publication of the libel; (3) the truth of the colloquium; (4) the defendant's malicious intention, where malice in fact is material; (5) the damage, where special damages are alleged, or more than nominal damages are expected." The question as to the burden of proof under special pleas, such as justification and the like, will be considered in the sections devoted to such defenses. It may be well to note in this connection, however, that if a communication alleged to be libelous is privileged the burden is generally upon the plaintiff to show that it was maliciously made.18 If the words are actionable per se, proof of their publication by the de Norfolk &c. Co. v. Davis, 12 App. 20 Atl. 774, 25 Am. St. 575; Hewitt Cas. (D. C.) 306; Howland V. George F. Blake &c. Co., 156 Mass. 543, 31 N. E. 656; Nord v. Gray, 80 Minn. 143, 82 N. W. 1082. • Gottbehuet v. Hubachek, 36 Wis. 515; Filber v. Dautermann, 28 Wis. 134. 10 Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504, 34 Atl. 865; Howland v. George F. Blake &c. Co., 156 Mass. 543, 31 N. E. 656; Kingsbury v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N. Y. 211, 22 N. E. 365; Ward v. Ward, 47 W. Va. 766, 35 S. E. 873; Cotulla v. Kerr, 74 Tex. 94, 11 S. W. 1058, 15 Am. St. 819; Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321, 326, 48 N. W. 555, 24 Am. St. 717; Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 583, 70 E. C. L. 583. v. Morley, 111 Mich. 187, 69 N. W. 245; Brown v. Vannaman, 85 Wis. 456, 39 Am. St. 860; Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. St. 406, 25 Atl. 613, 34 Am. St. 659. 12 2 Greenleaf Evidence, § 410. 13 Byam v. Collins, 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75, 7 Am. St. 726, and note; Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369; Henry v. Moberly, 23 Ind. App. 305, 51 N. E. 497; Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss. 168, 30 Am. St. 528; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. Car. 270, 13 S. E. 775; Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 573; Spill v. Maule, L. R. 4 Exch. 232. In cases of absolute privilege no action lies. But the burden may be upon the defendant to show that it is within the "Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 93, privileged class. fendant of the plaintiff is generally sufficient to make at least a prima facie case;1 but if they depend upon extrinsic facts to make them actionable the burden is generally upon the plaintiff to show such facts.15 The words must be proved substantially as alleged,10 but it is not necessary that every set of words alleged should be proved, nor that the identical words should be proved in all respects17 § 2450. Publication.-In order to make the charge actionable, it must be published by the defendant or some one for whom he is responsible.18 But whether there was a publication by the defendant, in the particular case, is generally for the jury to determine even though the evidence to that effect is merely circumstantial.19 "The publication of a libel by the defendant," says Greenleaf, "may be proved by evidence that he distributed it with his own hand or ma 14 Bullock v. Koon, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 30; see also, Cristie V. Cowell, Peake N. P. 4. 15 Nidever v. Hall, 67 Cal. 79, 7 Pac. 136; Carter v. Andrews, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 1, 6; Johnston v. Morrison, 3 Ariz. 109, 21 Pac. 465; Bond v. Brewster, 16 Daly (N. Y.) 82. 16 Gray v. Elzroth, 10 Ind. App. 587, 37 N. E. 551; Robbins V. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115; Desmond v. Brown, 29 Iowa 53, 4 Am. R. 194; Zimmerman v. McMakin, 22 S. Car. 372, 53 Am. R. 720; Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East 434, 438; Broughton v. McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Estes v. Estes, 75 Me. 478; Sanford v. Gaddis, 15 Ill. 228. 17 Nicholson v. Dunn, (Ky.) 52 S. W. 925; Brown v. Barnes, 39 Mich. 211, 33 Am. R. 375; King v. Sassaman, (Tex. Civ. App.) 54 S. W. 304; Miller v. Miller, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 74; McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 559; Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind. 31. 18 McGeever v. Kennedy, (Ky.) 42 S. W. 114, burden on plaintiff to show; Loranger v. Loranger, 115 Mich. 681, 74 N. W. 228; Warnock v. Mitchell, 43 Fed. 428; Mielenz v. Guasdorf, 68 Iowa 726, 28 N. W. 41; Kiene v. Ruff, 1 Iowa 482; Wennhak v. Morgan, 20 Q. B. Div. 635; Reg. v. Beere, 12 Mod. 219; Pullman v. Hill, L. R. (1891) 1 Q. B. 524; Cooley Torts (1st ed.), 193, 194; as to what is sufficient, see, Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265; Spaits v. Poundstone, 87 Ind. 522, 44 Am. R. 773; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202; Brunswick v. Harmer, L. R. 14 Q. B. 185; Croasdale v. Bright, 6 Houst. (Del.) 52; State v. Shaffner, (Del.) 44 Atl. 620; Storey v. Wallace, 60 Ill. 51; Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 55 Mich. 224, 54 Am. R. 372; Baldwin v. Elphinston, 2 W. Bl. 1037; Louisville Press Co. v. Tennelly, (Ky.) 49 S. W. 15; Mankins v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 950; Peterson v. Western U. Tel. Co., 72 Minn. 41, 74 N. W. 1022; Miller v. Johnson, 79 Ill. 58; Nicholson v. Rust, (Ky.) 52 S. W. 933. 19 McCoombs v. Tuttle, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 431, 432; Bent v. Mink, 46 Iowa 576; Rex v. Bear, 2 Salk. 417; see also, Swindle v. State, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 581, 24 Am. Dec. 515. |