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PER CURIAM. The above opinion of RAILEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All concur, BOND, P. J., in the

result.

STATE ex rel. CITY OF MEMPHIS v.
HACKMAN, State Auditor.

(No. 20433.)

by publication in a newspaper, to such extent the board may delegate to the clerk the duty enjoined to select a newspaper and publish notice, under the general rule that powers conferred, but not specifically directed by the statute, are left, as to the manner of their performance, to the discretion of the governing body of the municipality.

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918 (4)-SPECIAL ELECTION BOND ISSUE POLLING PLACES-ORDINANCE.

That the board of aldermen of a city, in or(Supreme Court of Missouri. In Banc. March dering a special election on the proposition 5, 1918. Rehearing Denied whether bonds should be issued to erect a muMarch 12, 1918.) nicipal lighting plant, fixed the polling places as "the usual voting places in each ward of the city," which was small, and of less than 2,000 population, was a mere irregularity and immaterial, in the presence of a showing of fairness in the election, and the consequent absence of any pretense of fraud. 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(4)-SPECIAL ELECTION-BOND ISSUE-RETURNS.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 57, 58-Pow-
ERS-CONSTRUCTION.
Municipal corporations may exercise the
powers expressly granted them, those necessari-
ly or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted, and those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation; doubts concerning the
exercise of such powers are to be resolved
against the corporation; and the corporate
powers are to be strictly construed where the
power sought to be exercised is out of usual
range or imposes a public burden affecting the
common-law rights of citizens, a rule not ap-
plying to the course pursued or the mode adopt-
ed to carry into effect powers expressly or plain-
ly granted, which are left, when not subjected
to legislative restriction, to the reasonable dis-
cretion of the municipal authorities.
2. MUNICIPAL

918(2)

CORPORATIONS BONDS-ELECTION-ORDINANCE-STATUTE. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 9545, providing that to test the sense of the voters of any incorporated city, etc., on a proposition to become indebted, etc., the council, etc., shall order a special election, of which they shall give not less than 15 days' previous notice, etc., an ordinance of the board of aldermen calling a special election to test the sense of voters on the proposition of issuing bonds to erect a municipal lighting plant, which was in substantial compliance with the law, fully met the requirements of the statute, though an ordinance was not necessary, an order of the board being sufficient. 3. MUNICIPAL

918(3)

CORPORATIONS BONDS-ELECTION-ORDINANCE-STATUTE. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 9545, requiring that the board of aldermen shall give not less than 15 days' previous notice, by publication in some newspaper published in the city, of such proposed election, the ordinance of the board ordering election on the proposition of issuing bonds to erect a municipal lighting plant was not defective in not designating the newspaper in which the notice was to be published. 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(3) BONDS ELECTION PUBLICATION OF NoTICE-STATUTE.

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Where the board of aldermen of a city adopted an ordinance calling a special election on the proposition whether bonds should be issued to erect a municipal lighting plant, and notice was published in a weekly paper of the city for three successive weeks, beginning the 10th and ending the 24th of February, the special election being held February 26th, the publication was sufficient as to time under Rev. St. 1909, § 9545, requiring that the board give not less than 15 days' previous notice by publication in a newspaper.

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Mere irregularities in the manner in which returns were made, in the absence of fraud, will not vitiate a city's special election on the proposition of issuing bonds to erect a municipal lighting plant.

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8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(4) SPECIAL ELECTION-BOND ISSUE-OPENING POLLS.

In the absence of any injury resulting from failure to open at the time designated in the statute, 6 a. m., the polls for a city's special election on the proposition of issuing bonds to erect a municipal lighting plant, the polls actually having been opened at 7 a. m., the requirement of the statute was directory, not mandatory, and the election valid. 9. APPEAL AND ERROR 176- CONCESSION OF FACTS BELOW-EFFECT.

A litigant cannot formally and in writing concede facts below, and then seek to controvert them in the Supreme Court, particularly where there is no showing the agreement was improperly made or that its approval will obstruct substantial justice. 10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS SPECIAL ELECTION STATUTE.

918(4) FORM OF BALLOT

No.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 9546, providing that
the ballot to be used at a city election submit-
ting the proposition of an increase in indebted-
ness shall be in the form: "For increase of
debt. Yes. For increase of debt. No.," where
notice of an election on the proposition of is-
suing bonds to erect a municipal lighting plant,
and the ballots, read: "For incurring indebted-
ness. Yes. For incurring indebtedness.
The former of which shall be taken as a vote
assenting to increasing said debt and the latter
as dissenting therefrom," the election was valid,
the form of ballot used being in substantial
compliance with the law, since, where a statute
provides specifically that a ballot not in a pre-
scribed form shall not be counted, it is manda-
tory, but where it provides that certain ballots
shall be used, and does not prescribe what re-
sults shall follow if they are not used, it is di-
rectory, and the test as to legality of the
ballot is whether or not voters were afforded
opportunity to and fairly did express their will.
11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(4) —

SPECIAL ELECTION-BOND ISSUE-DUTY OF
CLERK-STATUTE.

A city's special election on the proposition to issue bonds for the erection of a municipa lighting plant was not invalidated because the janitor of the courthouse was permitted to deliver the pollbooks, ballot boxes, and tally sheets to the election officials, in place of their being delivered by the city clerk, under Laws 1915, p. 360, which, by reference to sections of the

general law, designates him as the proper per- | (J. M. Jayne, of Memphis, of counsel), for reson, the statute in regard to the duty of the spondent. clerk being in no sense mandatory. 12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(4) SPECIAL ELECTION - BOND ISSUE-SWEARING IN OF JUDGES.

Failure to administer the oath to judges of a city's special election on the proposition of issuance of bonds did not render their acts as such invalid, particularly in the absence of an imperative statute requiring that to be done, and declaring the acts of the officials invalid if

not sworn to.

WALKER, J. Mandamus is sought to compel respondent to register $25,000 of the bonds of relator. The alternative writ was waived, and return made to the petition as and for the writ.

On February 7, 1916, relator, a city of the fourth class, adopted an ordinance providing for the calling of a special election for Feb

13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(4) SPECIAL ELECTION - BOND ISSUE-POLL-ruary 28, 1916, to enable the qualified voters

BOOKS-SIGNATURE BY JUDGES-STATUTE.

The fact that some of the pollbooks of a city's special election on the proposition to issue bonds were not signed by the judges of the election and attested as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 5907, will not invalidate the election, in the absence of fraud, unless the statute is mandatory.

14. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 918(4) SPECIAL ELECTION-ISSUANCE OF BONDS POLLING PLACE.

A city's special election on the proposition to issue bonds to erect a municipal lighting plant was not invalidated because in one ward it was held in the janitor's instead of the surveyor's office in the courthouse, both rooms being on the same floor, fronting on the same hallway, in effect in the same location, and there being nothing to indicate any voter had difficulty in finding the voting place, or that any one was prevented from voting.

15. BONDS 11-DATE-DELIVERY.

of said city to vote on a proposition which if carried would authorize the issuance of $25,000 of bonds to defray the expenses of erecting a municipal electric lighting plant. The ordinance in question is as follows:

"Be it ordained by the board of aldermen of the city of Memphis, Missouri, as follows:

"Section 1. That a proposition to incur an indebtedness and issue bonds therefor by said city of Memphis, Missouri, to the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), for the purpose of erecting an electric lighting plant for said city to be owned and operated by said city, be submitted to the qualified voters of said city; that an election be held at the usual voting places in each ward of said city on the 28th day of February, 1916, to vote on said proposition; that notice of such election be given as required by section 9545 of the Revised Statutes of 1909; and that tickets or ballots be prepared and printed to be used at such

The true date of a bond is the date of its election which shall be in the following form: delivery.

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The mere nonaction of a municipality, in respect to issuing bonds for the erection of a municipal lighting plant after its voters had authorized the issue, in the absence of any countervailing cause, will not relieve the state auditor of his statutory duty to register the bonds.

18. MANDAMUS 5. PENDENCY OF OTHER SUIT-ISSUANCE OF BONDS BY CITY.

Pendency, against a municipality whose citizens had voted to issue bonds for the erection of a municipal lighting plant, of a private lighting company's suit to enjoin issuance of the bonds, and thus to forestall competition, was no defense to the state auditor, against whom the municipality sought mandamus to compel performance of his statutory duty to register the bonds.

Bond and Faris, JJ., dissenting.

Mandamus by the state of Missouri, on relation of the city of Memphis, against George E. Hackman, State Auditor. Peremptory writ ordered to issue.

See, also, 196 S. W. 1113.

Hudson V. Smoot, of Memphis, and Charles & Rutherford, of St. Louis, for relator. Frank W. McAllister, Atty. Gen., and John T. Gose and S. P. Howell, Asst. Attys. Gen.

"For incurring indebtedness. Yes. For incurring indebtedness. No.

"The former of which shall be taken as a vote assenting to the creation of such debt and the latter as dissenting therefrom.

"Sec. 2. That said ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval."

The notice of the election conforms to the requirements of the ordinance. After publication of the same, as required by the statute (section 9545, R. S. 1909), and the ordinances of February 7, 1916, and March 25, 1912, the election was held, and upon a canvass of the votes it appeared that 468 votes had been cast at said election, of which 315 were in favor of the incurring of the indebtedness and the consequent issuance of the bonds, and 153 were against same. Upon ascertaining the result of said election, the board of aldermen on February 29, 1916, adopted an ordinance declaring the result of said election in the words following:

"Be it ordained by the board of aldermen of the city of Memphis, Missouri, as follows:

"Section 1. That it is hereby declared that the called election for the purpose authorized has been held in accordance with the provisions of section 9545, Revised Statutes 1909, and that more than two-thirds of the legal voters voting at ring the indebtedness and issuing bonds to the said election voted for the proposition of incuramount of $25,000.00 for the purpose of building and erecting an electric light plant in said city, to be owned and operated by said city, to wit: That at said election 468 votes were cast; 315 of said votes were cast in favor of incurring said indebtedness, and 153 votes were the number of votes for the incurring of such cast against the incurring of said indebtedness; indebtedness also being more than two-thirds

of the qualified voters of said city voting at such election.

"Passed and approved February 29, 1916,"

etc.

After formally pleading the facts as above set forth, with allegations as to the official character of the respondent and his duty under the law in such cases, relator in its petition filed herein avers that, the premises considered, it was and is authorized and ered to issue said bonds for the purpose aforesaid and to have them registered by respondent. It further alleges as reasons why the writ should issue herein:

bill in equity, and respondent now refuses to register such bonds for said reasons, and because said last-named suit is now pending in the circuit court of Scotland county.

10, 1917, there was adopted by the relator an Relator states, in addition, that on September ordinance again declaring the result of said election, and further providing for the issuance of its bonds to the amount of $25,000 for the purpose aforesaid, which bonds were to be dated as of September 1, 1917, to bear interest at the empow-rate of 6 per centum per annum, payable semiannually on the 1st days of March and September of each year, and that to that end interest coupons shall be attached to said bonds, and be of the denomination of $1,000 each, numbered from 1 to 25, both inclusive, payable to bearer, and to mature as set forth in relator's petition. This ordinance repealed all prior ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict therewith. That in obedience to and in pursuance of said ordinance of September 10, 1917, the bonds of said city were prepared and executed and presented to respondent for registration, together with the sum of $25 in payment of the fees due therefor, but that respondent refused, and still refuses, to register said bonds for the reasons stated in said Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company's second bill in equity. That, because of the pending litigation aforesaid, relator has been unable to sell its bonds subject to registration by respondent, and will not be able to sell same until this court has adjudicated the validity of the ordinances herein set out, the regularity of the election, and the legality of said bonds. That the total assessed valuation after equalization of all of the taxable property in said relator city, based upon ownership as of June 1, 1913, for taxes payable in 1914, was the sum of $876,469.54. That the total outstanding indebtedness of relator (the city of Memphis) of every kind, character, and description, exclusive of this proposed bond issue of $25,000, was, on the 28th day of February, 1916, the sum of $10,000. That relator is without remedy in the premises, save and except by the writ of mandamus. Wherefore this relator prays the court to issue and direct to respondent its alternative writ of mandamus, requiring and commanding him to accept the sum of $25 as and for his fee for registering said bonds, which relator now here tenders in court, and to require and command him to register the aforesaid bonds.

That afterwards, in the 24th day of March, 1916, there was adopted by the board of aldermen of said city an ordinance which in terms provided for the issuance of $25,000 electric light bonds of the city, and the levy and collection of an annual tax to pay the principal and interest thereon, and which said ordinance recited all of the prior proceedings had by said board relative to the issuance of said bonds, the rate of interest on same, and their maturities, denominations, and date, and prescribing the form of bond and the coupons to be attached thereto, and authorizing the execution of the bonds by the signatures of the mayor and the city clerk indorsed thereon, and the execution of the coupons by the facsimile signature of the clerk of said board. That after the adoption and approval of the ordinance of March 24, 1916, relator contracted with a broker for the sale of said bonds at par, plus a premium of $290, and accrued interest from date of bonds to date of delivery to said purchaser. That on April 7, 1916, the Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company, a corporation, filed its bill in equity in the circuit court of said county against this relator and its board of aldermen and mayor, seeking to restrain the issuance of said bonds, that it then having a plant in said city, had a contract with relator to furnish it and its inhabitants with electric light at a reasonable price, and was ready and willing so to do; and, further, that relator had obligated itself to purchase its plant; and praying that relator be enjoined from constructing a plant in said city until relators comply with their said contract. That upon application of said Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company, plaintiff in said suit, the venue was changed to the circuit court of Marion county, where, after some delay occasioned by the plaintiff, a trial was had resulting in the dismissal of its bill, and from this judgment plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, where said judgment was on July 14, 1917, affirmed. 196 S. W. 1113. That, by reason of the aforesaid suit, relator was prevented from consummating its contract for the sale of said bonds. That afterwards, on July 27, 1917, said Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company filed a second bill in equity in the circuit court of Scotland county, Mo., seeking to restrain the issuance of said bonds, alleging the adoption of the ordinances hereinbefore pleaded, and that the notice of the election was not the same as the notice ordered to be given, and that the ballots furnished and cast were not in the form required by section 9546, R. S. Mo. 1909, and making in addition thereto numerous other averments as to the irregularity of said election, its consequent illegality, and the lack of authority of relator to issue the bonds here in controversy. (These allegations are not set out at length, because they are in substance, if not in form, all incorporated in respondent's return herein.) Relator further avers that said Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company has protested to respondent, the State Auditor, against registering any bonds of the relator authorized by said election for

Respondent for his return, after formal waiver of the issuance of an alternative writ, admits his own official character; the corporate nature of the relator; the division of the latter into wards; the issuance of the bonds here in question; that the Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company heretofore filed a bill in equity in regard to the issuance of said bonds which was determined adversely to its contention, and that it has since commenced a like proceeding in the circuit court of Scotland county, which is now pending; that respondent has been tendered the proper fee for registering said bonds, but has refused so to do. For further return respondent says that this writ should be denied for the reasons following:

(1) Because the polls of said election were not open at 6 o'clock in the morning and kept open till 7 o'clock in the evening.

(2) Because the election in the First ward of said city was not held at the usual voting place in said ward, but in the janitor's room of the courthouse, when preceding elections had been held in the surveyor's office in said courthouse.

(3) Because the voting places for the election

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(5) Because said ordinance calling said election and the notice given for same did not contain the form of ballot to be used at said election.

(6) Because the notice published by the clerk of said city notifying the voters of the calling of said election did not follow the notice required by the ordinance nor contain the form of ballot specified in said ordinance.

(7) Because the form of the ballot used and set out in the notice is not that required by law. (8) Because the notice published by the clerk of said city did not state the time the bonds were to run or the rate of interest thereon.

(9) Because the judges and clerks at said election selected by said city. as provided by said ordinance, did not serve at said election, but those who did serve were not qualified voters or residents of said city.

(10) Because the ordinance or notice of said election did not designate how said notice should be given, nor the newspaper in which same should be published.

(11) [Subdivision 11 is a repetition of the foregoing.]

(12) Because the judges and clerks who acted at said election were not competent under the law to act as such.

(13) Because said ordinance or notice did not state when said interest should be paid.

(14) Because the pollbooks, ballot boxes, tally sheets, and tickets used at said election were not delivered to the judges and clerks appointed by the city for said election, but were delivered to a janitor of the courthouse, and that the city clerk never gave the judges and clerks of said election the pollbooks, ballot boxes, tally sheets, and tickets.

(15) Because the judges and clerks at said election were not chosen by resolution or ordinance passed by the board of aldermen.

(16) Because the judges and clerks at said election were arbitrarily selected by the mayor, and without any resolution or ordinance passed by said city, and that said judges and clerks were not sworn by the clerk of said city before entering upon their duties nor by any one authorized to administer oaths.

(17) Because the ordinance calling said election did not provide for the voting places for same nor for the manner of making returns of

such election.

state the indebtedness of said city on September 10, 1917. Wherefore respondent prays that these proceedings be dismissed, etc.

made up of the following denials and admisRelator's reply to respondent's return is sions. First as to the denials:

Denial 1. That the polls were not opened as required by statute.

Denial 2. That the election in the First ward was not held at the usual place of voting; that the judges and clerks were irregularly selected and the returns improperly made. On the contrary, relator avers that said election was called, conducted, and the returns made in conformity with an ordinance of the city of Memphis adopted March 25, 1912, which is as follows:

"Section 1. That all elections hereinafter held in the several wards of the city, for the election of city officers, or to determine by vote any proposition to be submitted to the voters of such city, shall be conducted in all respects under the provisions of the General Election Law, Revised Statutes 1909, § 9302.

"Sec. 2. That the board of aldermen shall cause public notice to be given of the time and place of holding such elections and the purpose for which they are to be held, by publication in some newspaper published in such city for two weeks, or by ten handbills put up at public places in such city at least two weeks before such election.

"Sec. 3. The board of aldermen shall appoint two numbering judges, one counting judge, one counting clerk and one tallying clerk for each Iward in the city, who shall be legal voters of their respective wards, to serve at such election; and if any judge so appointed fails to serve, such vacancy may be filled by the remaining judges, and if none of the judges so appointed be present, any five bystanders who are qualified voters at such election, may appoint such judges from among their number, who shall have the power and be subject to the duties and penalties prescribed by state law in such case.

"Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of the officers of elections to proceed immediately after closing the polls to canvass the votes cast at such election without delay and certify the result thereof to the board of aldermen in the manner that state and county elections are certified to the county court.

"Sec. 5. That the board of aldermen shall within seven days after such elections meet at the mayor's office and canvass the returns of such election and ascertain and declare the result thereof and cause certificates of election to be issued and delivered to the parties entitled thereto.

"Sec. 6. All ordinances and parts of ordinances heretofore adopted by the board of aldermen of such city relating to elections are hereby repealed."

(18) Because a bond issued more than 18 months after an election cannot express or carry out the wishes and will of the voters. (19) Because the copy of the bond in relator's petition is dated September 1, 1917, and the Denial 3. Relator further denies that the noordinance authorizing the issuance of same was tice of said election did not follow the notice not passed by the board of aldermen until Sep-required by ordinance or that it did not contain

tember 10, 1917.

(20) Because said petition and writ and the matters and things stated in the petition of relator are not sufficient, in law or equity, to entitle the relator to the relief asked or to authorize the issuing of this writ.

(21) Because the ordinance of relator passed to pay the principal and interest on said bonds sought to be registered herein does not comply with the statute.

(22) Because the respondent is informed and believes that there is now pending in the circuit court of Scotland county, Missouri, a suit commenced by the Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company v. The City of Memphis, Mo., to test the validity of said election and the issue of said bonds.

(23) Because the affidavit of the treasurer of

the form of ballot required.

Denial 4. That the judges and clerks selected by the board of aldermen did not serve as such. On the contrary, relator avers the fact to be that all of same qualified, served, and are voters and residents of the city of Memphis.

Denial 5. That the ordinance did not state how the notice of election should be given, when in fact said notice was given as required by the

statute.

Denial 6. That the judges and clerks were incompetent and unauthorized to count and receive the votes cast. Relator avers the contrary to be the fact.

Denial 7. That the necessary paraphernalia for conducting an election, such as ballot boxes, pollbooks, tally sheets, and tickets, was not delivered to the judges and clerks, but to a janitor

Denial 8. That the judges and clerks were not | properly chosen by ordinance; that they were arbitrarily selected without resolution or ordinance; were not sworn by any one authorized to administer oaths; that the ordinance made no provision for voting places; that bonds more than 18 months after an election held therefor do not express the will of the voters. In addition to this denial, relator pleads affirmatively that the delay in the issuance of said bonds was caused wholly by the Memphis Electric Light, Heat & Power Company.

Relator's admissions in his reply to respondent's return are as follows:

Admission 1. That the ordinance calling said election did not state the time the bonds were to run nor the rate of interest they were to bear. Admission 2. That said ordinance and notice of the election did not contain the form of ballot given in the statute, and did not contain the form heretofore set out, with instructions as to the meaning and purpose of same.

Admission 3. [Is to the same effect, but in different words, as that in the preceding paragraph.]

Admission 4. That the notice published by the clerk of relator did not state the time the bonds were to run or the rate of interest they were to bear.

Admission 5. That the ordinance for a notice of said election did not designate how said notice should be given nor the newspaper in which it was to be published.

Admission 6. That said ordinance or notice did not state how the interest should be paid. the issuance of such bonds was not passed by the board of aldermen until September 10, 1917. Admission 8. That the affidavit of the treasurer of relator attached to its petition herein does not state the city's indebtedness on September 10, 1917.

Admission 7. That the ordinance authorizing

After all of which specific denials and admissions relator prays that a peremptory writ of mandamus be issued herein directed to respondent as state auditor, commanding him to register said bonds, and certify thereon that the law in that regard has been complied with, and for its costs in this behalf.

The foregoing presentation of the material parts of the pleadings incorporates much of the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing before the special commissioner, Theo. L. Montgomery, Esq. At this hearing, in which the commissioner was authorized to take testimony and report upon the facts and the law, the parties entered into an agreed statement as to certain facts, in substance as follows:

(1) That the ordinances set out in relator's petition are true and correct copies of the originals passed by the board of aldermen of relator concerning the election and issuance of said bonds.

(2) That the polls for said election were not opened until 7 o'clock a. m. of the day of the election, to wit, February 28, 1916.

(3) That the judges and clerks who signed the pollbooks are the same as those who acted at said election, and that the names appearing on the pollbooks are those of the persons who acted as such judges and clerks.

(4) That the janitor of the courthouse delivered the pollbooks to the judges and clerks of said

election.

(5) That said election was held in the First ward in the janitor's and not in the surveyor's office in the courthouse; that both of said offices are in the same building, on the same floor, and on the same side of the hall on said floor.

(6) That the record in the case determined

1113), in which the Memphis Electric Light. Heat & Power Company was appellant and the city of Memphis was respondent, shall be considered in evidence in this cause so far as same may be relevant.

In addition to foregoing stipulation, documentary and oral evidence in relation to said election was introduced before said commissioner, and the same is set forth in succinct form in his findings of fact. A statement in detail of the testimony will be made in the opinion, where same is necessary to the intelligent discussion of controverted issues. We have been much aided in this involved transcript by the clear statement of facts by the commissioner and his cogent findings of the law applicable thereto.

[1] I. A strict construction of the powers

of a municipal corporation is urged as a preliminary objection underlying others to the

issuance of this writ. Text-writers, in deducing the rule from numerous cases, state that the powers authorized to be exercised by corporations are as follows: First, those granted by express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and, third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable. Doubts concerning the exercise of such powers are to be resolved against the corporation. These powers are applicable alike to all classes of corporations. 1 Dillon, Munic. Corps. (5th Ed.) §§ 237 et seq.; St. Louis v. Realty Co., 259 Mo. 126, 136, 168 S. W. 721; St. Louis v. Transfer Co., 256 Mo. loc. cit. 491, 165 S. W. 1077. As applied to municipalities, the construction of their corporate powers is not so strict as it is to those of private corporations, except where the power sought to be exercised is out of the usual range or imposes a public burden which affects the common-law rights of citizens. But even the rule as thus modified does not apply to the course pursued or the mode adopted to carry into effect powers expressly or plainly granted, the same being left, when not subjected to legislative restriction, to the reasonable discretion of the municipal authorities. 1 Dillon, Munic. Corps. (5th Ed.) § 239. The rule as thus announced is held to mean that where powers are granted in general terms, and the mode of exercise of same is not prescribed, that the board of aldermen may determine such mode. This is but a statement, in other words, of the familiar maxim that there inheres in a grant of power to a municipal corporation all the necessary incidentals to render the grant effectual. Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo. 540, 576, 31 S. W. 946; State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 24 S. In State ex W. 457, 41 Am. St. Rep. 663. rel. Mercer County et al. v. Gordon, 242 Mo. loc. cit. 624, 147 S. W. 795, we had occasion to make a concrete application of the fore

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