new charter under the laws of the state of Flores, Pauline Ramos, Emelio Munez, CoTexas passed in 1913, authorizing cities of nardo Barreda, Desedirio Cavazos, Oscar more than 5,000 inhabitants to adopt or Gennett, M. Y. Dominguez, and J. L. Bradamend their charters; that defendants A. shaw are its police; that all of said defendA. Browne, C. H. More, R. B. Rentfro, W. H. ants reside in Cameron county, Tex.; that Putegnat, and E. C. Garcia are the duly the city of Brownsville is a municipal corpoelected commissioners of said city; that the ration, incorporated in 1875, under the generother defendants named in said petition are al laws of 1875; that said city adopted a officers of said city duly appointed as provid-new charter in 1915, under the laws of 1913, ed by said charter; that on October 20, 1916, and retained all its former powers in its an ordinance was enacted by the city of adopted charter; that said adopted charter Brownsville establishing a saloon district in provides that said city can levy a fine of the city of Brownsville; that the location of $200 for violations of its ordinances; that plaintiff's saloon is outside of said saloon said charter provides that said city can esdistrict, and that said ordinance establishing tablish a saloon district for the sale of intoxa saloon district is void and unreasonable in icating liquors, and can forbid the location that it does not provide a penalty to secure of saloons or the sale of such liquors outside its enforcement; that the charter of the city the limits of such district; that on October of Brownsville does not confer upon said city 20, 1916, said city established such a saloon power to enforce said ordinance; that the district; that said district leaves out half of charter of the city of Brownsville provides a the business section of the city of Brownspenalty not to exceed $200 for violation of ville, and includes numerous residence blocks; its ordinances; that said established district that policing would be easier if the district does not include all of the business section had been confined to the business section of of said city; and that it includes blocks hav- the said city; that said district runs down a ing more residence houses than business back alley to cut plaintiff's location out of houses and leaves out blocks that have more the district; that said adopted charter canbusiness houses than residence houses. not confer power upon said city to enforce Plaintiff prays for an injunction to re- any ordinance; that said ordinance and disstrain the city officers of the city of Browns-trict are unreasonable and are void; that ville from interfering with plaintiff and for appellee was engaged in the business of rewrit of mandamus to compel the city mana- tail liquor on said location when said ordiger, F. H. Williams, or other officers, to is-nance was passed; that his license expired sue to him an occupation tax receipt and a permit to pursue his business on lots 11 and 12, in block 57, as a retail liquor dealer. on the 10th day of July, 1917; that he applied to the comptroller of the state for a permit to continue to engage in said business on said location, and said permit has been On August 25, 1917, the court made an order in chambers requiring all of the defend-granted and issued to him; that appellee ants to appear on August 29, 1917, to show cause why plaintiff should not be granted his occupation tax receipt and license as prayed for and to show cause why plaintiff should not be granted his injunction and mandamus as prayed for and provided the character of notice to be served. At the request of the defendants this hearing was reset for September 3, 1917, and on September 5, 1917, after hearing evidence, an order was made and entered by the court declaring the ordinance void and unreasonable and granting the plaintiff's prayer for injunction and for writ of mandamus and further ordered the clerk of the county court to not issue said writs until this appeal should have been passed by the Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth supreme judicial district of San Antonio, Tex. has applied to the county judge of Cameron county, Tex., for a state and county license to continue to do business as a retail liquor dealer on said location, and said judge has granted him said state and county license; that defendants refuse to issue him a city license and occupation tax receipt as such liquor dealer; that said location is out of said saloon district, but is in the heart of the business section of said city; that appellee tenders in court the full amount of his li cense fees for his state, county, and city license, and demands such license, and tenders. in court his liquor dealer's bond; that plaintiff has spent $400 for saloon fixtures on said location, and unless he is granted the relief prayed for these fixtures will be worthless, and he will be damaged in the said sum of $400; that plaintiff wishes to continue to Appellee's petition for injunction and man- engage in his said business, but is afraid of damus alleges that plaintiff is a resident of defendants, and fears he will be arrested and Cameron county, Tex.; that C. H. More, R. humiliated and forced to employ counsel, and B. Rentfro, W. H. Putegnat, A. A. Browne, that his business will be injured if these and E. C. Garcia are the commissioners of things are done; that he has no adequate said city, Amos Rich is its attorney, F. H. remedy at law, and will be irreparably damWilliams is its business manager, Elmores aged; that he cannot be granted relief by inGrider is its tax collector, Santiago Garza junction alone; that Elmores Grider and Sanis its secretary and clerk, and W. B. Linton, tiago Garza have heretofore issued such liHenry Gordon, Francisco Villareal, Joaquin cense an occupation tax receipt, but now Trevenio. Fred Tate, Roy H. Weller, Manuel claim they have no such authority; that F. H. Williams is business manager of said city, and he or said Grider and Garza have such power and authority, and the court can determine who of them has such power and authority and compel him to issue such license and occupation tax receipt. Plaintiff prayed for a writ of injunction against the city of Brownsville, its commissioners, attorney, and police, restraining them from interfering with plaintiff in engaging in said business on said location, and prayed for a writ of mandamus against F. H. Williams, Elmores Grider, and Santiago Garza, and the officer among these three who had such power and authority, and compel such officer to issue said license and occupation tax receipt. This petition was sworn to. that said city can establish a saloon district for the sale of intoxicating liquors, and forbid the location of saloons or the sale of such liquor outside of such district; that on the 20th day of October, 1916, said city established such a saloon district; that the style of ordinance creating such district was, "Be it ordained by the city of Brownsville"; that said district includes 242 blocks; that said district leaves out at least half of the actual business section of said city, and that 16 blocks, out of a total 241⁄2 are residence blocks; that appellee's location is out of the district, but is the main business section of the city; that appellee has applied to the comptroller of the state for a permit to engage in the business of a retail liquor dealer Appellants presented general demurrers on lots 11 and 12, in block 57, in the city of and special exceptions, directed to the juris- Brownsville, and said permit has been grantdiction of the court, and a special exceptioned and issued to appellee; that appellee has directed to the point that the defendants were applied to the county judge of Cameron counrequired to perform an act that requires the ty for a state and county license, and has exercise of judicial discretion. Appellants been granted his state and county license; then filed a general denial, admitting their re- that appellee has tendered in court the full fusal to issue the license and occupation tax amount of his state, county, and city license, receipt, but denying that appellee had been also his liquor dealer's bond, and has deinjured or that his location was in the main manded his license; that appellee owns the business section of the city. They also set up business on said location; that he has placed that they were required to perform an act fixtures for saloon purposes there, of the that requires the exercise of judicial discre- value of $450, and he owns these fixtures; tion. Grider and Garza plead their lack of that unless he is granted the relief prayed authority to perform the acts in question, and for these fixtures will be rendered worthless, prayed that the suit be dismissed as to them. and he will be damaged in the said sum of The trial court set the case for hearing on $450; that the defendants refuse to issue the 29th day of August, but at the request of him a city license and occupation tax reappellants postponed the hearing till the 3d ceipt, permitting him to engage in said day of September. The case was not closed business in said city; that F. H. Williams, and a judgment rendered until the 6th day of business manager of said city, is the proper September. The court overruled all of appel- person to issue such license and occupation lants' exceptions, to which ruling they except- tax receipt, which he refuses to do; that ed and tendered their bill, which was allow- plaintiff cannot be granted complete relief by ed. The appellants also filed a motion to injunction alone, as the plaintiff cannot endismiss the application on the ground that gage in said business without his said city appellee did not prove that he was damaged, license, except in violation of law. In his which the court overruled. conclusions of law the court held the ordinance to be void, because the style of it was, "Be it ordained by the city of Brownsville," and because the adopted charter provides that said city can levy a fine of $200 for violations of its ordinances. The court held the ordinance to be unreasonable and void, because it leaves out half of the business section of the city and takes in 16 residence blocks out of a total of 24%. The court also held that an ordinance or law must in fact be enacted by the body to which lawmaking power is delegated, and that the enacting clause must show that the proper lawmaking body has, in fact, enacted it. At the request of appellee the trial court filed his findings of facts and conclusions of law. The court found that the city of Brownsville was incorporated in 1875, under the laws of 1875; that it adopted a new charter in 1915, under the laws of 1913, and retained all its former powers in its adopted charter; that the laws of 1875 have never been repealed; that the laws of 1875 provide that the style of all ordinances shall be, "Be it ordained by the city council of the city of," and provide that no city can levy a greater fine than $100 for violations of its ordinances; that the city of Brownsville is not given power to enact ordinances by the law or its charter, but such power is given to the commissioners; that the adopted charter provides that the style of all ordinances shall be, "Be it ordained by the city of Brownsville," and provides that said city can levy a fine of $200 for violations of its ordi The first assignment insists that the county court had no jurisdiction over the cause of action alleged in the present case, because not ancillary to an alleged cause of action, and because the amount in controversy fails to show jurisdiction. [1] The injury threatened to property is fer jurisdiction upon the county court. Con- sufficient to establish that the ordinance is unreasonable. Section 22 of the charter authorizes the city of Brownsville to provide for the establishment of districts or limits wherein saloons may be located, and authorizes the city to prohibit the location of saloons The proposition asserted under the second outside these established districts. The foreassignment is: "Where the duty to be performed by a public official is judicial in its nature or involves the exercise of discretion upon the part of an official and no appeal is permitted by law, courts will not undertake by mandamus, or otherwise, to control or review the action of such official.' going provision of the charter authorized the ordinance herein attacked. The fact that the district created for saloons has more residences than business houses, and the fact that the limits without the district contain more business houses than residences, do not warrant the legal conclusions that the ordinance is void. [2, 3] If the action of the city manager of the city of Brownsville is arbitrary and unreasonable, the courts will review and con- Appellee relies upon the case of Cohen v. trol such action. City of Brenham v. Holle, Rice, 101 S. W. 1052, to support the judgment 153 S. W. 345; Zucht v. San Antonio School that the ordinance is void because unreasonBoard, 170 S. W. 840. Appellee, objecting able. In that case the ordinance attacked to consideration of this assignment, urges was passed by the city of Marshall which rethe law announced in Dunnagan v. Wing-ceived a special charter from the Legislature. field, 141 S. W. 288, that no appeal is allow- Section 16 of article 11 of the charter of the ed from an order made in vacation, granting city of Marshall was as follows: a mandamus. The present case is before us on an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction, and under these circumstances we must consider all the orders of the court presented for consideration. Turner v. Turner, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 105 S. W. 237; Gulf Nat. Bk. v. Bass, 177 S. W. 1019; Swearingen v. Swearingen, 165 S. W. 16. The trial court had jurisdiction to grant the mandamus if the action of the city manager was unreasonable. The second assignment is overruled. "The city council shall have the power to prescribe by ordinance that no intoxicating liquors shall be sold or given away within the corporate limits of said city in any certain prescribed district in said corporation in which there are more residence than business houses, said districts to be accurately defined by said ordinance." It will be observed that the Marshall charter itself requires that the prohibited district be a district containing more residence than business houses, and that the Brownsville charter contains no such requirement. The case of Cohen v. Rice, supra, is not applicable to the case at bar. The fourth assignment presents a question similar to that submitted in the second as- We are of the opinion that the facts pleadsignment, and the fourth is also overruled. ed are not sufficient to show that the ordiThe fifth, eighth, ninth, and tenth assign- nance is void because unreasonable, and it ments contend that the trial court erred in follows that the evidence also fails to prove granting the temporary injunction and hold-it unreasonable. Austin v. Cemetery Associaing that the ordinance establishing the saloon district was void. [4-6] It seems that the trial court found that the said ordinance was void for three reasons: Because the ordinance began with the words "Be it ordained by the city of Brownsville," instead of "Be it ordained by the council of the city of Brownsville"; because no penalty was enacted for the enforcement of the ordinance; and because the ordinance is unreasonable. The Legislature granted the charter under which the city of Brownsville operates; and section 3 of that charter expressly requires that the ordinances begin with the words "Be it ordained by the city of Brownsville." The court erred in its first reason for holding the ordinance void. The objection that no penalty was provided is without merit, and requires no discussion. The court was also in error in its conclusion that the ordinance was void because unreasonable. If all the facts recited in the petition in support of the allegation of unreasonableness were true, it cannot tion, 87 Tex. 330, 28 S. W. 528, 47 Am. St. Rep. 114; City of Brenham v. Holle, 153 S. W. 345; M., K. & T. Ry. v. Matherly, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 604, 81 S. W. 589; H. & T. C. Ry. v. Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 84 S. W. 648, 70 L. R. A. 850; Zucht v. San Antonio School Board, 170 S. W. 840. The fifth, eighth, ninth, and tenth assignments are sustained. The sixth and seventh assignments complain of the judgment because there was no evidence that appellee was a citizen of Texas, or that he had procured a permit from the state comptroller, or that he had been granted an order from the county judge for a license to pursue the business of a retail liquor dealer, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff had paid the license fee to the state of Texas and to the county of Cameron. The court found all the above facts in favor of appellee and there is evidence to support the court's findings. The sixth and seventh assignments are overruled. The judgment granting temporary injunc DODGE et al. v. YOUNGBLOOD et al. (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio. 1. STATUTES 109-TITLE-SUFFICIENCY. 2. STATUTES 121(4)-TITLE-SUFFICIENCY— TRANSFER TAX. Act May 16, 1907 (Acts 30th Leg. [1st Called Sess.] c. 21), entitled "An act to tax property passing by will or by descent or by grant or gift; taking effect on the death of the grantor or donor," does not unconstitutionally extend beyond the title's scope because providing for the appointment of an administrator to collect inheritance taxes. 3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 20(4) -APPOINTMENT-INHERITANCE TAX. Rev. St. 1911, art. 7491, authorizing the county court to appoint an administrator in inheritance tax proceedings without notice if no application for letters has been made within three months, etc., is not invalid because not requiring that notice be given, especially as the property cannot be sold to satisfy inheritance tax claims until after notice. 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~67 JUDICIAL APPRAISERS. INHERITANCE TAX GROUNDS - LEGAL Although Act May 16, 1907, authorizes the 17. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 31 Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 3289, providing that an executor under a foreign will filed in Texas should supersede an administrator previously appointed there, an inheritance tax ad859(1)—INHERITANCE TAX-7491, is superseded by the executors under a ministrator appointed under Rev. St. 1911, art. probated foreign will. Act May 16, 1907, providing for the appointment of appraisers in inheritance tax proceedings, is constitutional. 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 283 - DUE PROCESS INHERITANCE TAX-ADMINISTRATOR. Rev. St. 1911, art. 7491, authorizing appointment of an administrator in inheritance tax proceedings, does not deny due process of law contrary to the federal Constitution. 7. STATUTES 95(1)—GENERAL OR "SPECIAL LAW"-INHERITANCE TAX. Act May 16, 1907, imposing inheritance taxes, is not a special, but a general, law, apply ing equally and uniformly to every class affected by it. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Special Law.] class. Appeal from District Court, Real County; R. H. Burney, Judge. Suit by N. P. Dodge, Jr., and Greenville D. Montgomery, as executors and trustees, against T. A. Youngblood, C. L. Bass, and D. D. Thompson, County Judge. Decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. W. D. Love and L. Old, both of Uvalde, for appellants. C. L. Bass, of San Antonio, and E. F. Vanderbilt, of Leaky, for appellees. FLY, C. J. Appellants, N. P. Dodge, Jr., and Greenville D. Montgomery, describing themselves as executors and trustees of the estate of G. M. Dodge, deceased, brought this suit to restrain T. A. Youngblood, C. L. Bass, and D. D. Thompson, county judge of Real 9. TAXATION 895(9)—INHERITANCE TAX-county, Bass and Youngblood from collecting ATTACKING APPRAISAL. The appraisers' report to the county court in inheritance tax proceedings may be attacked before such court, although the inheritance tax law of May 16, 1907, does not provide for an appeal from the report. 10. TAXATION_~905(1)—INHERITANCE TAXNATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. Under Act May 16, 1907, inheritance tax proceedings are purely in rem, and no personal judgment can be obtained. 11. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 91 INHERITANCE TAX. An administrator appointed under the inheritance tax law of May 16, 1907, is governed by the general statutes relating to the administration of estates. any money or other thing of value belonging to the Dodge estate and from serving notice on tenants on the land of such estate or from canceling any lease or attempting to make any lease of said lands, and the county judge from granting any further orders or decrees in cause number 11 in the county court, wherein Youngblood was appointed administrator. It was alleged in the petition that appellants had been duly appointed executors and trustees of the estate of G. M. Dodge in Pottawattamie county, state of Iowa, and had qualified as such; that administration of the estate was pending; that in their capacity Tex.) ors. In the act of 1907, appearing in the Revised Statutes of Texas as chapter 10, arts. 7487 to 7502, inclusive, provision is made for the collection under certain conditions of an inheritance tax. In the title to the act it is described as: "An act to tax property passing by will or by descent or by grant or gift; taking effect on the death of the grantor or donor." In section 5 of the act, being article 7491, Revised Statutes, it is provided: as executors they had, on September 15, 1917, | itance tax law, and especially that part of it filed in the county court of Real county, Tex., | relating to the appointment of administrattheir application for the probate of the will of G. M. Dodge, as provided in articles 3278, 3288, and 3289 of the Revised Statutes of Texas, giving legal notice of the same, and that the hearing had been set down for November 5, 1917; that said estate owned a large amount of land in Texas, the larger portion of which was situated in Real county, the reasonable value of the same being $150,000, the reasonIt able annual rental value being $4,000. was further alleged that, without any notice, Youngblood had been appointed administrator of the estate of G. M. Dodge, in May, 1917; that he has attempted to qualify as such by giving a bond for $1,000, and is acting as administrator and taking control and management of said estate; that Bass is the attorney of record of Youngblood, and Thompson is the county judge; that Youngblood, has applied to the county court, and has been granted an order authorizing the employment of Bass and approving a contract between Bass and Youngblood for a large and exorbitant attorney's fee, and also ordering a suit to be filed to obtain a construction of the will of G. M. Dodge; that all charges were to come out of said estate, and that the same were wholly unnecessary and useless; that Bass and Youngblood had colluded with each other to damage and defraud the estate; that, in pursuance of the advice of C. L. Bass, Youngblood has served notice on the tenants of the estate that they must attorn to and pay the rents to him, or have their lease contracts set aside; and that Bass and Youngblood have offered to compromise large claims against the estate for small sums. A temporary restraining writ was granted, and the case set down for October 13, 1917. An amended petition was filed. On December 8, 1917, the cause was heard, and the temporary writ of injunction was dissolved, and the prayer for a permanent injunction denied. "If within three months after the death of a decedent leaving property subject to taxation under this chapter, no application for letters testamentary or of administration shall be made, it shall be the duty of the county court to appoint an administrator. It shall be the duty of the county attorney to report to the judge of the county court all such estates, whether the property passes by will or by laws of descent or otherwise." Article 7492 provides that the tax shall be assessed upon the actual or market value of the property, and that two appraisers, competent, disinterested persons, shall be appointed by the county judge to fix the value of property subject to the tax. It is also pro vided: That the appraisers, after being sworn, shall give notice to all persons "known to have a claim or interest in the property to be appraised, including the executor, administrator or trustee, and the collector of taxes of the county, of the time and place when they will appraise the same." [1, 2] The act in question is assailed as being unconstitutional, because it contains more than one subject, which is not expressed in its title. It is the rule that the requirement as to expressing the subject in the title to laws is to be liberally construed keeping in view the object to be attained and the end subserved by the constitutional provision. The object of such provisions is to prevent the grouping of diverse subjects of legislation under one head, with the view of combining advocates of any one subject, thus In the answer it was alleged that the ad- securing the passage of laws that would not ministration had been granted by the county stand on their own merits. Again, vicious judge on a report of the county attorney that legislation was often smuggled through legthe estate owed an inheritance tax to the islatures by means of misleading titles to state, and Youngblood had been appointed acts. Cooley, Const. Lim. pp. 203-205. The temporary administrator, and he had re-end desired is obtained when a law has but tained Bass as his attorney; that the court, upon the advice of Bass, had made Youngblood permanent administrator, without notice, and had appointed appraisers of the estate, who had not made a report, but had notified appellants of their appointment and duties. Without the petition being aided by the allegations of the answer, which placed the administration upon the provisions of the inheritance tax law alone, this case would be considered under the general provisions as to the administration of estates. This court is forced by the allegations in the answer to consider the constitutionality of the inher one general object, which is fairly indicated by the title. As said by Judge Cooley (Const. Lim. pp. 205, 206): * "To require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation * The generality of a title impossible. is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made to cover legislation incongruous in itself. and which by no fair intendment can he considered as having a necessary or proper connection." The test is well supported by good authority. People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill. 229, 21 N. E. |