although no agreement between them, nor provision in the deed, dealt with curtesy.-Hull v. Hull, 202 S. W. 914. Damages bility Act is virtually compensation statute, and fixes liability for defective appliances, regardless of negligence.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. 10 (Tenn.) At common law, tenancy by the Co. v. Hopkins, 202 S. W. 222. curtesy initiate was an estate which became 132(1) (Mo.App.) vested at the birth of issue, and had no basis of natural or moral right.-Day v. Burgess, 202 S. W. 911. 11(4) (Tenn.) Where husband bought lands, and the deed ran to the wife, and they later joined in a trust deed for money borrowed, the husband, on the wife's death intestate, could not establish tenancy by curtesy consummate without personally discharging the mortgage for protection of their minor children.-Hull v. Hull, 202 S. W. 914. See Divorce, 299; Parent and Child. CUSTOMS AND USAGES. 17 (Tex.Civ.App.) Incidents sought to be imported into contract by custom must not be inconsistent with its express terms or any necessary implication therefrom.-Planters' Oil Co. v. Gresham, 202 S. W. 145. Where contract for sale of cotton oil did not provide for washing-out process, custom of washing out such sales could not be set up to vary contract.-Id. DAMAGES. awarded boy of 15, who sustained cut over Verdict for $5,400, left eye, leaving bright red scar, and deep wound under left eye, leaving scar, gashes and lacerations on nose and chin, weakening of one eye, an injury to his back, and nervousness, was not excessive.-Newton v. Harvey, 202 S. W. 249. 132(1) (Mo.App.) against receivers of railroad in favor of their Verdict for $7,500 servant, for personal injuries while tightening plug in boiler, held not excessive.-Anderson v. Lusk, 202 S. W. 304. 132(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) $6,500 was not excessive damages where arm was rendered useless, head and face were scarred, and brain affected, and 48 days were spent in hospital.St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Webber, 202 S. W. 519. 132(8) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where servant was a healthy man of 29 years, earning $90 a month, and had his right hand and arm to elbow crushed and rendered worthless, was confined to the hospital four months, undergoing three operais not excessive.-Farmers' Petroleum Co. v. tions, at cost of $1,000, a verdict of $15,000, Shelton, 202 S. W. 194. 132(9) (Tex.Civ.App.) Verdict of $20,000 in favor of railroad switchman injured so that amputation of foot and three subsequent amputations nearly up to knee became necessary, held not excessive.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Hopkins, 202 S. W. 222. 90-134(3) (Ky.) For injuries causing many months of suffering and loss of time and resulting in a "frail joint" which would "knuckle" when plaintiff attempted to go down steps, and which decreased plaintiff's earning capacity about one-half, a verdict of $2,000 held not exS. W. 489. cessive. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Boone, 202 See Carriers, 229; Costs; Death, I. NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GEN (A) Direct or ERAL. 6 (Mo.) Damages cannot be denied merely because the exact amount is difficult or impossible of ascertainment; it being only the measure which must not be uncertain.-City of Kennett v. Katz Const. Co., 202 S. W. 558. III. GROUNDS AND SUBJECTS OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. Remote, Contingent, Prospetive, Consequences or Losses. 22 (Mo.) Where city contracted for sewer construction at stipulated price and contractor defaulted, the city's damages by increased cost of completion were not speculative.-City of Kennett v. Katz Const. Co., 202 S. W. 558. (B) Aggravation, Mitigation, and Reduction of Loss. 62(2) (Ky.) Plaintiff servant injured while moving a piano was not required to undergo a serious surgical operation in order to maintain an action for compensatory damages for pain and suffering and impairment of earning capacity. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Boone, 202 S. W. 489. While it is not, as a matter of law, duty of injured servant to submit to serious surgical operation for purpose of effecting cure, he must exercise ordinary care not to aggravate injury or increase his damage.-Id. VII. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. 148 (Mo.App.) In action for personal injuries governed by laws of sister state, necessity of pleading medical expenses is governed by lex fori, and in Missouri there can be no recovery of such expenses, unless pleaded.-La Duke v. Dexter, 202 S. W. 254. injury actions should correspond with allega158(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Proof in personal tions of the complaint, and material injuries not alleged should not be proven.-Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Crouch, 202 S. W. 781. 158(3) (Mo.App.) In action for personal ining injury held not outside petition alleging juries, evidence of vaginal hemorrhage followback, spine, spinal cord, and muscles, nerves, ligaments, and blood vessels connected therewith were torn and injured.-Bergfeld v. Dunham, 202 S. W. 253. In action for personal injury, to justify evidence of disabling effects of menstruation, and natural bodily function, resulting from the injury, and to authorize their consideration in estimating damages, such effects should have been specially pleaded.-Id. 158(4) (Tex. Civ.App.) In action for damages sustained by minor while attempting to board defendant's street car, statement by 128 (Tex.Civ.App.) Public policy does not her, that she "had bells in her head" was not minor, in describing how her injuries affected demand that verdict in railroad servant's action. for injuries should not be as large as $20,000 head had not been pleaded.-Northern Texas rendered inadmissible, although injury to the on any grounds, though federal Employers' Lia-Traction Co. v. Crouch, 202 S. W. 781. (B) Evidence. it showed that father was in such condition as 189 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence of damages to require services of son.-Id. suffered from breach of contract to furnish moving picture films held not to warrant_recovery, being too speculative.-Mutual Film Corp. v. Pastime Theater, 202 S. W. 972. (C) Proceedings for Assessment. 215(1) (Mo.App.) Instruction, permitting punitive damages if casting mine water on plaintiff's land was done willfully or recklessly "or to the discomfort and annoyance of plaintiff," held erroneous. Dickensheet v. Chouteau Mining Co., 202 S. W. 624. Instruction, permitting punitive damages if the act was "willful, that is, without lawful excuse, ,"held erroneous, as improperly defining willful, and including a basis for actual damages only. Id. 216(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Where charge as to measure of damages was correct, special charge with reference thereto, which would merely have had effect of explaining that "reasonable probability" did not mean "mere possibility," was properly refused.-Fisheries Co. V. McCoy, 202 S. W. 343. DEATH. (E) Damages, Forfeiture, or Fine, 90 (Mo.App.) In action for wrongful death of pedestrian struck by an electric car owing to the motorman's failure to give warning or to keep an adequate lookout, it was permissible for the jury to consider in fixing compensatory damages facts attending the killing constituting aggravated negligence, if pleaded and proved.-Kamoss v. Kansas City & W. B. Ry. Co., 202 S. W. 434. 91 (Tex. Civ.App.) That children have an older sister, who might nurture and care for them as their deceased mother would have done, is not to be considered in mitigation of damages.-El Paso Electric Ry. Co. v. Benjamin, 202 S. W. 996. 99(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) $20,000 was not excessive damages for the death of a stout, healthy man 29 years old, who was earning $125 a month, had a life expectancy of 36 years, and was in line for promotion to locomotive engineer.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 202 S. W. 358. 99(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) Damages awarded to two minor children, in respective sums of $3.000 and $6,000, for wrongful death of their II. ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH. mother, held not excessive.-El Paso Electric Ry. Co. v. Benjamin, 202 S. W. 996. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. 18(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for death of adult son, financial condition of parents was no bar to right of recovery.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hicks, 202 S. W. 778. 99 (5) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for death of adult son by surviving parents, respectively 65 and 63 years old, verdict for $2,750 held not excessive.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hicks, 202 S. W. 778. (F) Trial, Judgment, and Review. 21 (Tenn.) The law of self-defense in a civil suit is the same as that governing in criminal prosecutions, except the cause must be decided on a preponderance of testimony. Hunt-103(3) (Tenn.) In an action for wrongful Berlin Coal Co. v. Paton, 202 S. W. 935. (D) Pleading and Evidence. 55 (Ky.) Where death action went to trial only on the issue of negligence, an offered amendment that the injury occurred on government land and state law did not apply was a separate and distinct defense, filing of which rested in the sound discretion of the trial court. -Henry Bickel Co. v. Wright's Adm'x, 202 S. W. 672. Where action for death of servant went to trial on the simple issue of negligence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defendant to amend to show that the accident occurred on government property, where there could be no recovery for death.-Id. 58(1) (Ky.) In action for death of servant occurring within the borders of the state, which gives right of action for wrongful death, the burden is on the defendant to plead and prove facts showing that accident occurred on government property, and that state laws did not apply.-Henry Bickel Co. v. Wright's Adm'x, 202 S. W. 672. death, evidence as to self-defense held to present a question for the jury.-Hunt-Berlin Coal Co. v. Paton, 202 S. W. 935. 104(2) (Tenn.) A charge on self-defense that, if the jury should find that the situation or happenings were such as to lead a "prudent and cautious" man to believe he was in danger. though he were not, the law would not hold him liable, held reversible error for not qualifying the quoted words by the word "reasonably."-Hunt-Berlin Coal Co. v. Paton, 202 S. W. 935. Statement of a charge that, if decedent was not making an assault on defendant which led him necessarily and reasonably to believe his life was imperiled, he had no right to fire, was erroneous in using the word "necessarily."—Id. 104 (6) (Tex. Civ.App.) In an action by minor children for the death of their mother, an instruction on the measure of damages for loss of nurture, care, and education held proper.— El Paso Electric Ry. Co. v. Benjamin, 202 S. W. 996. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. 58(1) (Tenn.) In an action for wrongful death due to intentional act, burden is on plain- See Bankruptcy; Fraudulent Conveyances. tiff to establish his case by sufficient proof, but defendant must sustain his plea of self-defense.-Hunt-Berlin Coal Co. v. Paton, 202 S. W. 935. DECEDENTS. See Executors and Administrators. 64 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for death of adult son, evidence that son had stated that he was going away to work a few weeks for spending money because he received no pay from See Fraud. plaintiffs, and that he intended to stay with plaintiffs, parents, until their death, was admissible on issue of parents' expectancy of future aid from son.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hicks, 202 S. W. 778. DECEIT. DECLARATIONS. See Criminal Law, 274; Homicide, 418; Evidence, 272, 203-221. In suit by parents for death of adult son, evidence that father was suffering with ty- DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST. phoid fever nine years before, from which he DEDICATION. II. OPERATION AND EFFECT. 53 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where land was sold and conveyed with reference to alley, purchaser acquired by dedication easement in such alley, which became charged with incidental servitude, and purchaser could have alley kept open. --Barclay v. Dismuke, 202 S. W. 364. Where land was sold with reference to alley which seller dedicated as inducement to purchaser, such purchaser, suing to keep alley open, is not required to plead and prove special injury to his property.-Id. DEEDS. See Acknowledgment; Covenants; Estoppel, 27, 37; Fraudulent Conveyances; Mortgages; Taxation, 760. (F) Loss or Relinquishment of Rights. 181 (Mo.) Insertion by grantor in deed conying to a daughter and heirs of her body, at time it was acknowledged and long after its delivery, that guardian of daughter's only son born at the time of acknowledgment should pay taxes, would in no wise affect its validity.Elsea v. Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. IV. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE. 190 (Mo.) Heirs of intestate who sought to set aside deeds on ground that they were not to take effect until his death had burden of proving delivery as a part of their case, since they alleged delivery.-Whiteley v. Babcock, 202 S. W. 1091. 196(1) (Ky.) If grantor, who is old and physically infirm, transfers his property to one sustaining confidential relation, and who has custody of or resides with him, burden is on grantee to show that transaction was devoid of any vice rendering it inequitable or unfair. I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyanc--Davidson v. Davidson, 202 S. W. 493. es in General. (A) General Rules of Construction. 93 (Mo.) A deed is to be construed as nearly as possible in harmony with purpose of grantor, to be determined from terms of strument.-Elsea v. Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. in 200 (Mo.) That the grantor in a trust deed thereafter gave deeds to right of way for a pipe line was admissible on the issue of wheth er the trust deed was intended to take effect during his life.-Whiteley v. Babcock, 202 S. W. 1091. 206 (Mo.) Much stricter proof is required to overthrow by parol evidence a deed properly signed, acknowledged, and delivered than is required to prove a nondelivery of a deed.Whiteley v. Babcock, 202 S. W. 1091. 208 (1) (Mo.) Evidence held to sustain claim of delivery of deed.-Elsea v. Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. 208 (7) (Mo.) Mere fact that grantor of trust deed was seen about the land, collected rents, paid taxes, and made improvements and repairs until his death, did not show that the deed was not intended to be effective until his death, where he had orally agreed with the grantee to make repairs, and that he would collect the rents, though such agreement was cock, 202 S. W. 1091. never written into the deed.-Whiteley v. Bab Evidence of plaintiffs, in action to set aside (C) Estates and Interests Created. Ideed on the ground that it was not intended to take effect until grantor's death, held not 127(1) (Mo.) A deed by a father to a of such character as to satisfy the mind of the daughter and to heirs of her body, containing chancellor beyond a reasonable doubt that such provision as to reverting of land in case of death of daughter or such heirs without issue,208 (7) (Tex. Civ.App.) In action on fire was the intention of the parties.-Id. would, in absence of statute, create an estate tail.-Elsea v. Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. 127 (2) (Mo.) Although a deed to a daughter and heirs of her body provided that, in case of death of daughter without issue, lands should revert to grantor or his heirs, grantee's only son became vested with a fee on her death, making attempted reversion to grantor or his heirs of no effect in view of Rev. St. 1909, § 2872, abolishing estates tail.-Elsea v. Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. 132 (Mo.) An estate in fee having been created, a remainder cannot be limited thereon. -Elsea v. Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. 134 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2874, where land has been conveyed to a first taker for life, with limitations over fee created in second taker cannot be cut down by a defeasance or executory interest, but upon death of first taker becomes absolute.-Elsea Smith, 202 S. W. 1071. V. policy wherein insurer claimed policy was avoiddeed back to plaintiff, executed by husband and ed by change in title, evidence held to show wife to whom he had sold, became effective Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Morgan, conveyance when delivered to plaintiff.— 202 S. W. 784. as 211(1) (Ky.) In suit by grandchildren to cancel deed of their grandmother to her sons on ground of mental incapacity, evidence held to warrant judgment for plaintiffs.-Davidson v. Davidson, 202 S. W. 493. 211(4) (Ky.) In suit by grandchildren to cancel deed of their grandmother to her sons on ground of undue influence. evidence held to warrant judgment for plaintiffs.-Davidson v. Davidson, 202 S. W. 493. DE FACTO DEPUTIES. DEFAMATION. (E) Conditions and Restrictions. 155 (Ark.) Deed granting land for stated consideration provided that if the vendee fail- See Libel and Slander. ed to pay the sums named the conveyance should be void and all rights thereunder cease, the estate was on condition subsequent subject DEFAULT. to forfeiture on failure to pay.-Swaim v. Beak- See Appeal and Error, 957; Judgment, ley, 202 S. W. 476. 137-162. See Appeal and Error, 628; Equity, 69- See Estoppel, ~71. 84; Telegraphs and Telephones, 38. DELEGATION OF POWER. See Constitutional Law, 60, 61. DELIVERY. See Deeds, 61, 200–208; Escrows. DEMURRER. 108; See Elections, 287; Estoppel, DE NOVO. See Appeal and Error, 893; Justices of the See Escrows. DEPOSITARIES. 9 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a county depositary credits to the county the amount of a check drawn by county tax collector and deposited by county treasurer, it cannot be charged back to the county upon dishonor of the check, under Rev. St. 1911, arts. 1485, 1505, 1509, 2440-2444, 2447, 2449.-Watson v. El Paso County, 202 S. W. 126. DEPOSITIONS. DISCOUNTS. See Licenses, 39. DISCOVERED PERIL. See Street Railroads, 163. DISCRETION OF COURT. New See Appeal and Error, 957-981; Criminal DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT. See Appeal and Error, 781; Corporations, 519; Criminal Law, 1131. DISORDERLY HOUSE. 4 (Mo.) Rev. St. 1909, § 4758, making it an offense to display the sign of an honest business on a house ordinarily used as an assignation house, one who permits the sign to be exposed, although he does not put it up, is guilty of the offense.-State v. Griffin, 202 S. W. 542. 12 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 4758, defining offense of displaying sign of honest business on house ordinarily used as assignation house, indictment need not allege that any person was deceived by the sign; offense being complete when the sign is displayed which may inveigle innocent persons into the house.-State v. Griffin, 202 S. W. 542. writ-17 (Mo.) Evidence held to show that defendant was the manager and in charge of a building used commonly as an assignation house on which a hotel sign was displayed.-State v. Griffin, 202 S. W. 542. 70 (Tex.Civ.App.) A witness whose deposition is to be taken in writing in answer to ten interrogatories need not be sworn before his answers are reduced to writing, such requirement applying only on oral examination.-Zeiger v. Woodson, 202 S. W. 164. 103 (Mo.App.) Objection to question and answer in a deposition that the time of stated conversation between witness and defendant company's president was not fixed was properly overruled, where other answers therein fixed the date.-Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Merchants' & Consumers' Market House Ass'n, 202 S. W. 596. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 4758, making it an offense to permit display of sign of honest business on building commonly used as assignation house, evidence that sign was on house for several months, during which defendant conducted the unlawful business, supported finding that he permitted the display of such sign.-Id DISQUALIFICATION. See Judges. DISSOLUTION. See Partnership, 327; Religious Societies. DISTRIBUTION. See Fraudulent Conveyances, 318. DITCHES. See Drains; Waters and Water Courses, 179. DIVORCE. See Constitutional Law, 277. II. GROUNDS. 29 (Mo.App.) Where husband twice coerced wife into taking drugs calculated to cause miscarriage, which twice took place, drugs being procured on husband's prescription, and thereby health of wife was undermined and she had to undergo operation, she was entitled to divorce.-Cunningham v. Cunningham, 202 S. W. 420. IV. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, (D) Evidence. See Accord and Satisfaction; Appeal and Er-130 (Ky.) In husband's action for divorce, ror, 1227; Bills and Notes, 437; evidence held to sustain wife's countercharge Compromise and Settlement; Indemnity; of cruel and inhuman treatment justifying di (G) Appeal. 184(12) (Ark.) In divorce action, husband cannot complain that there was no evidence as to ownership of land, interest in which was decreed to wife under Kirby's Dig. § 2684.-Hegwood v. Hegwood, 202 S. W. 35. V. ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY. 240(2) (Ky.) $1,000 alimony payable in five yearly installments should be allowed; wife, who was mistreated, having no property, and the husband, 37 years old, having farm of 142 acres and other property worth $4,500, and only trifling indebtedness.-Johnston v. Johnston, 202 S. W. 869. 240(5) (Ky.) Where husband, whose wife secured divorce, with custody of two children, was worth $20.000, alimony of $3,800, with allowance of $20 a month for support of children, was not excessive.-Burris v. Burris, 202 S. W. 906. 253 (Ark.) Pleadings in divorce case need not set forth property of husband, under Kirby's Dig. § 2684, giving wife one-third of property of husband on decree of divorce.-Hegwood y. Hegwood, 202 S. W. 35. VI. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF 299 (Ky.) Instead of ordering the dependent wife, to whom divorce was granted and custody of the children awarded, to deliver them, at intervals, to the husband, for opportunity to see them, he should be required to send for them.-Johnston v. Johnston, 202 S. W. 869. 4(1) (Ky.) Where a resident of another state, having formed an intention of becoming rations.-Birmingham Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. 404. 15 (Mo.) Legislature may, from its own information, fix boundaries of incorporated drainage district.-Birmingham Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. 404. 18 (Mo.) Drainage districts organized pursuant to Laws 1913, p. 232, exercise granted powers within their territorial jurisdiction as fully and by same authority as municipal corporations.-Birmingham Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. 404. II. ASSESSMENTS AND SPECIAL TAXES. 66 (Mo.) Among powers which may be exercised by a drainage district organized pursuant to Laws 1913, p. 232, is that of taxation, which power so far as expressly granted is only limited by power of Legislature which grants_it.-Birmingham Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. 404. 69 (Mo.) The Legislature may, from its own information, fix the amount of special drainage assessments.-Birmingham Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. 404. 82(3) (Mo.) Laws 1913, p. 232, as to drainage districts, authorize only a limited appeal from assessments not so broad as jurisdiction invoked by writ of error.-Birmingham Drainage Dist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. 404. If writ of error would lie under provisions of general code for purpose of giving Supreme Court a jurisdiction which it could not exercise by virtue of appeal provided for by Laws 1913, p. 232, where there has been no attempt to bring in many landowners against whose property drainage benefits were assessed, writ will be dismissed in view of Rev. St. 1909, §§ 2054, 2058, 2071.-Id. 90 (Tex.Civ.App.) Although drainage districts are the owners of funds and may sue and be sued under Rev. St. 1911, art. 2584, the county may sue the county tax collector therefor, in view of Rev. St. 1911, arts. 2533, 2540, 2541, 2603, 2605, 2606, but a county cannot recover under allegations that such funds belonged to the county.-Watson v. El Paso County, 202 S. W. 126. DRAMSHOPS. See Intoxicating Liquors. DUEBILLS. a citizen of B. county, Ky., left her former See Bills and Notes, home, arrived in the state, but died before reaching B. county, the county court of such DUE PROCESS OF LAW. County had no jurisdiction to administer her See Constitutional Law, 277-318. DURESS. DYING DECLARATIONS. See Homicide, 203–221. See Dedication; Highways. I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND TERMINATION. 2(1) (Mo.) There is no constitutional or other reason why intention of Legislature, evident from Laws 1913, pp. 241, 253, §§ 16, 36, 7(2) (Ky.) To establish passway easement to confine right of review by Supreme Court by prescription the use must have been exercisin drainage proceedings to assessment of dam-ed under a claim of right continuously for 15 ages upon appeal and not by writ of error, years.-Godman v. Jones, 202 S. W. 662. should not be respected.-Birmingham Drainage 8 (2,3) (Ky.) Whenever the use of a passDist. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 202 S. W. way is interrupted or controlled by the land404. and control is evidence of permissive use.owner as a matter of right, such interruption Godman v. Jones, 202 S. W. 662. 13 (Mo.) Drainage districts organized pursuant to Laws 1913, p. 232, are public corpo |