1; People v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N. W. 21; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 2 Sup. Ct. 391, 27 L. Ed. 431; Jonesboro v. Railway, 110 U. S. 192, 4 Sup. Ct. 67, 28 L. Ed. 116; Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 115 U. S. 135, 5 Sup. Ct. 371, 28 L. Ed. 954; Carter v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 7 Sup. Ct. 650, 30 L. Ed. 701; Battle v. Howard, 13 Tex. 345; Robinson v. State, 15 Tex. 311; Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Tex. 535; Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex. 330. It has been held that the word "subject," used in our present Constitution, is less restrictive than the word "object," used in former Constitutions, and it is held that the test under the present Constitution is: "Does the title fairly give such reasonable notice of the subject-matter of the statute itself as to prevent the mischief intended to be guarded against? If so, the act should be sustained." Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex. 330. In the case of Fahey v. State, 27 Tex. App. 146, 11 S. W. 108, 11 Am. St. Rep. 182, a law was attacked as being unconstitutional, in that it embraced more than one subject, and the court held, through Judge Hurt: "Most clearly the subject of these acts is the regulation of the sale of spirituous, vinous, and malt liquors and medicated bitters. Now, if there be but one subject in the act, but more than one object, the act would not be obnoxious to the Constitution. We could concede, for the argument, that the objects of these acts are to regulate the sale of these liquors, to collect revenue, and divers other purposes and objects; still, unless there was more than one subject in the act, it would be valid-constitutional. Again, suppose that there be more than one subject mentioned in the acts. If they be germane or subsidiary to the main subject, or if relative, directly or indirectly, to the main subject, have a mutual connection, and are not foreign to the main subject, or so long as the provisions are of the same nature and come legitimately under one general denomination or subject, we cannot hold the act unconstitutional." In addition to the Texas cases herein cited, Judge Hurt cites Breen v. Railway, 44 Tex. 306; Austin v. Railroad, 45 Tex. 267; | Webb v. Maxan, 11 Tex. 678; and Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. 792, 73 Am. Dec. 213. Under the authorities cited, as well as many others, we hold that the act of May 16, 1907, is not unconstitutional. That portion in regard to the appointment of an administrator to collect the taxes is in perfect harmony with the subject expressed in the title, and is not obnoxious to the constitutional provisions requiring the subject to be expressed in the title. There is but one subject treated in the act, and that is the collection of inheritance taxes. [3] Our statutes permit the appointment of a temporary administrator of estates, without notice to any one, and that power has never been questioned, and we fail to see that it would be unconstitutional to appoint an administrator of an estate as provided in the act under consideration, without notice, especially where the law definitely and clearly puts every one interested in an estate certain time, an administrator must be appointed. Certainly it cannot be reasonably contended that nonresidents are favored above the citizens of the state, and must have notice of the appointment of an administrator. The law gives all the notice that can be demanded. [4-6] No property under the provisions of the act can be sold for taxes until notice is given to the interested parties by the appraisers, when the parties notified can appear and | contest if they see proper. What would be proper or sufficient notice is a matter of construction. The statute says notice must be given, and the sufficiency of the notice would be a question to be addressed to a court. In regard to a similar law to this, it has been held: kind of notice, it may be personal or by mail." "The Legislature not having prescribed the Atty. General v. Roche, 219 Mass. 601, 107 N. E. 667. The Legislature had the right to provide for the appointment of appraisers, and no constitutional right of the appellants was infringed thereby. The appointment of an administrator is a part of the procedure in the county court prescribed for the collection of taxes, and it is not obnoxious to the due process clause of the federal Constitution. Due process of law has been exercised when the law of the state on the subject has been followed. White v. White (Sup.) 196 S. W. 508. [7, 8] The law in question is not a special, but a general, law, applying equally and uniformly to every class of persons affected by its terms. A spe bears on every part of the state and on evIt is a general law because it ery person coming within its terms. cial law is one operating upon one or a portion of a class instead of upon all of a class. The law under consideration operates alike upon all brothers or sisters of the deceased, or a lineal descendant of such brother or sister, alike on all uncles or aunts or their lineal descendants, and alike upon any other persons, natural or artificial, that may inherit the property. The statute empowers the county court to appoint the administrator and gives authority to the county judge, upon the filing of the report of the appraisers, to calculate the amount of the taxes. The law fixes the rate of taxation, and it is only a matter of calculation for the county judge to ascertain the taxes. administered. From the time the adminis- | [14] While in Texas the rule as to the trator appointed by the county court is in applicant for injunction having an adequate charge, every step in the proceeding is tak-legal remedy has been greatly relaxed, still en under its supervision and review of a court. After the administration is opened every step taken to collect the taxes is a part and parcel of the administration. It is the ruling in all the states that the jurisdiction as to the tax proceedings is based on the authority to grant administration. Gleason & Otis, Inh. Tax. pp. 404, 405, 406. it will not be granted to revise the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction, wheu the applicant has a legal remedy by appeal or certiorari. No decision has held that the judgment of a court can be reviewed through a writ of injunction when there is a plain and efficacious remedy by appeal or certiorari. with the county judge. The interested person could contest the valuation before the county judge and could appeal from his order fixing the amount of the taxes, because such decision would be a proceeding of the county court from which appeal or certiorari would lie. Clearly the interested parties would have their day in court. [10-12] No personal judgment against any The inheritance tax law provides that the one is contemplated or provided for in the appraisers shall give notice to all persons inheritance statute. It is purely a proceed- known to have a claim or interest in the ing in rem, and we think that the inheritance property appraised, and there could be but law, while not in terms so stating, intended one reason for such notice, and that would that the administrator under its provisions be to give such persons the opportunity to should administer the estate in the same be heard as to the valuation of the property manner as any other administrator would, and file objections to the report when filed and that the rules provided in the general statutes as to administrations would apply to the administrator provided for in the inheritance tax law. He would take possession of the property belonging to the estate, would allow or reject claims, and perform all other duties required of other administrators or executors. This would appear from the fact that in the law he is [15] Although the law in question gives placed on the same footing as the executor the authority to the executor, administrator, or trustee or administrator appointed under or trustee, after due notice to persons entithe general law. He would be compelled to tled to the property, to sell the property or take the required oath, would give the re- so much thereof as may be necessary, still quired bond, and be governed in all par- we hold that such sale would be made under ticulars as would any other administrator the terms and requirements as to sales of or executor. In article 7494 the administra- property of decedents provided in the gentor, executor, or trustee is required to de-eral statutes as to administration, that is, duct the amount of the tax from any money by order of the court, on the terms and in that comes into his hands, in article 7495 provision is made for payment of legacies, in article 7497 provision is made for suits for the taxes against the executor, administrator or trustee, and in article 7501 provision is made as to final accounts by the executor, administrator, or trustee. It was evidently the intention of the Legislature that the act for the collection of inheritance taxes should be read into and become a part of the law of administration of estates. If this construction of the law is tenable, then, if any one interested in the estate be aggrieved by any of the proceedings, whether of the appraisers or the county judge, he could appeal to the district court and have the matter reviewed. [13] Appellants could have applied to the district court for a writ of certiorari to the county court in order that any proceedings in the county court might be revised and corrected. Article 733, Revised Stats.; Williams v. Steele, 101 Tex. 382, 108 S. W. 155. As said in the case cited: "The orders of the county judge made in this estate constitute proceedings of the county court,' which the district court may review by certiorari. The fact that a proceeding is void does not prevent the district court from exer the manner prescribed by the court, upon a written application of the executor or ad ministrator in the form provided by law, and in full compliance with all of the provisions of title 52, c. 22, Revised Statutes of Texas. We think that the administration provided for in the law of inheritance taxes, whether it be one inaugurated to collect such taxes, or one already existing, will be governed by the same laws as all other administrations of estates, and that the same opportunity to be heard will be extended in the one case as the other. [16] If the county judge approved an unconscionable contract for attorney's fees, the district court could by certiorari review the order of the county judge and prevent the exploitation of the estate. Appellants had a full, complete, and adequate remedy for everything of which complaint is made by means of a writ of certiorari, and did not show themselves entitled to an injunction. [17] When the will is probated, the ex ecutors will supersede the administrator appointed by the court. Article 3289, Rev. Stats. The will in this case had not been probated when the application for injunction was made. BOESE et al. v. PARKHILL et al. (No. 7253.) (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston. March 7, 1917. On Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 9, 1918. Second Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1918.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 139-PARTIES ENTITLED TO APPEAL-NOMINAL PARTY. A husband having no interest in the subjectmatter, being joined with his wife to meet the requirements of law that in suits by a married woman the husband shall be joined, is only a nominal party, and where he alone executes an appeal bond the appeal will not be considered. On Motion for Rehearing. 2. JUDGMENT 688-BETWEEN SAME PARTIES-RES JUDICATA. In suit by an only son of deceased's first wife against the administrator of deceased's estate, deceased's third and surviving wife, and all the children of his second and third wives, to recover such part of the estate as belongs to his deceased mother, decree setting aside to such son one-fourth of the property and to the administrator and the other defendants the other three-fourths will be held to have no other effect than to partition the interest of the son from the interest belonging to the estate of deceased; there being no adjudication of the rights of defendants as between themselves. 3. PARTITION 77(1) — JURISDICTION-SUIT BY ADMINISTRATOR. The district court had jurisdiction of a suit by an administrator with will annexed to have partitioned and set aside to the estate for pur pose of administration, as against children of deceased's second wife, the interest of the estate in certain land, and authority to render decree establishing the interest of the parties, decreeing the land incapable of partition, and ordering it sold by a special commissioner, in view of Rev. St. 1911, art. 1836, providing that suits for possession of lands may be instituted by executors or administrators in like manner as they could have been by their testator or intestate, and the judgment rendered therein shall be as conclusive as if rendered in favor of or against such testator or intestate, and article 6111, providing that if the court is of the opinion that a fair and equitable division cannot be made it shall order a sale, etc. 4. PARTITION 48-SUIT BY ADMINISTRATOR -PARTIES. In view of Rev. St. 1911, art. 1836, it was not necessary, in suit by administrator with will annexed to partition land of the estate in which children of deceased's second wife had a certain interest, to make the children of deceased's third and surviving wife parties, to bind them by decree entered; heirs not being necessary parties in suits by administrator of an estate in which they have an interest. 5. ADVERSE POSSESSION 41-SUFFICIENCY UNDER TEN-YEAR STATUTE. Where commissioner, pursuant to decree in partition suit, conveyed land by deed dated December 11, 1896, and the grantee who took immediate possession and those holding under him down to and including defendant have had continued adverse and uninterrupted possession of the land, using and cultivating the same from the date of purchase until November 9, 1914, defendant would have title under ten-year statute. Appeal from M. G. Cox, of Cameron, and Thos. C. Hall, of Temple, for appellants. R. J. Alexander and W. M. Hilliard, both of Caldwell, for appellees. LANE, J. For a better understanding of the opinion to follow, we at the outset deem it advisable to make a statement of the nature of the case and the proceedings of the trial thereof as follows: One H. H. Massey, under whose will appellants claim their right to recover in this suit, was married three times. His first wife was named Jane, by whom he had one child, to wit, James F. Massey. The name of his second wife was "Frances," by whom he had seven children-Mack, Homan, Cassandra, Gus, Eugene, George, and Andrew. His third wife was named Fannie, by whom he had three children-Ruth, Ethel, and Mart; the last three known in these proceedings as the "young set." On the 25th day of October, 1894, said H. H. Massey died and left surviving him his third and last wife, Fannie, the mother of Ruth, who married Claude Vinton; Ethel, who married R. L. Boese; and Mart. All his children hereinbefore named also survived him. He left a will, in which is to be found the following: first by my executors hereinafter named be paid "All my last debts and funeral expenses shall out of my estate as soon after my deceased has shall by them be found conviant." es "I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved sune James Massey, five dollars of my tate, and all so my interest in my land estate in Missipuy. I want to presant wife to hav her part intrust in my undervided half of my old homestead. trust in Miss. The young set to have in thare Jim to have 5.00 and my inmothers intrust in my homestead the balance of my real estat to go to my decease wife, F. E. Massey, children to be rented and kept together until Gus and Baby becomes of age then to be equally divided between F. E. Massey's children, and I want the Ned Hill place to be equally divided between Mack, Homan, Cassey and Gus, and I want Gene to cultivate the Hill place, and take care of the four children, and to take charg of all my 6 head of horses, wagon, bugga, farm implements and household goods. I want Faney children by me to have three cows and calves and also a reasonable suply of corn and meat for tulve month suply. I want Gene to make deed to Lexington place if the negro comes with paymen in Oct. which 47.00 too notes, 50.00 each, due 1895 and 1896, this to fill contract I made. If payment is not made in Oct. 1894 to be nul and void, then then I want it to be rented for the suport of Myne and F. E. Masseys children and want the balance of my cattle to be kept on the place for the suport of family $387.00 to be pad Gene Massey, then the Millard place to want the Cort to make Gene a deed to 40 acres none as the Mialard place, of which the money to go to mine and F. E. Massey children." At the time of his death, said H. H. Massey was purported to be the owner of some propDistrict Court, Burleson erty in Mississippi, and five tracts of land County; Ed R. Sinks, Judge. in Texas, a lot in the town of Lexington, and Suit by Ethel Boese and others against some personal property. Some of this propNettie Massey Parkhill and others. From erty, however, belonged to the community of decree rendered, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. one marriage, and some to another; none, however, to the third marriage, so far as of land and that the other parties, plaintiffs the record discloses. The will of H. H. Massey was duly probated, and M. L. Womack qualified as administrator of the estate of said Massey with the will annexed. and defendants, were the owners of the other one-half thereof; each owning an equal portion thereof. The suit was for partition of said 178% acres and for commissioners of partition. The court sustained the allegations of the petition, and relief as prayed for upon a finding that said land was the com and his second wife, and therefore one-half undivided interest therein was in the possession of M. L. Womack, as administrator of the estate of H. H. Massey, and that the other one-half was owned by the children of suit. Judgment was accordingly rendered, and commissioners of partition appointed to partition the land, who later reported that said land was incapable of fair and equitable partition in kind. Said report was approved, and later one E. B. Bell was appointed special commissioner to sell said land for the purpose of making a partition of the proceeds arising from such sale among those entitled thereto. The land was sold by Bell on the 11th day of December, 1896, to one G. W. Price for $1,000. Bell made a report of such sale to the court, which was by the court approved, and upon proper orders or the court Bell, as such special commissioner, by proper deed, conveyed the land to G. W. Price. The proceeds of such sale were dis James Massey, son of the first wife, refused to accept under the will of his father, H. H. Massey, and brought suit in the dis-munity property of H. H. Massey, deceased, trict court of Burleson county against M. L. Womack, administrator, Fannie Massey, the third wife of H. H. Massey, deceased, and all the children of the second and third marriages for such portion of the entire estate, real and personal, held by his father | the second wife, who were parties to said at the time of his death, as belonged to the estate of his mother, Jane, the first wife of said H. H. Massey. This suit was styled James F. Massey v. M. L. Womack et al., No. 2547, and is referred to hereinafter as suit No. 2547. A decree was entered in said suit No. 2547, on the 20th day of November, 1895, adjudging to James F. Massey onefourth of all of said property, and to the administrator, Womack, and the other defendants, as heirs of H. H. Massey, deceased, the remaining three-fourths of said property. The court also appointed commissioners to partition said property in accordance with said decree, setting aside to James Massey a specific one-fourth thereof, and to the defendants Womack and others in bulk the remaining three-fourths thereof. There-tributed in accordance with the decree of the after said commissioners made partition of said land and made their report of said partition to the court, which was by the court approved. In the decree approving On the 23d day of March, 1898, M. L. Wosaid report the following language appears: mack, administrator, filed his final account "And it further appearing to the court that and showing in the probate court of Burlesaid commissioners have set apart to the de- son county and asked for his discharge, and fendant heirs the 1782 acres, a part of the S. C. Robertson league, 40 acres, a part of the on the 20th day of August, 1898, the court N. W. Thornton survey, and 160 acres, a approved said final account and showing, dispart of the Edward Hill survey, all in Burle- charged the administrator, and closed the adson county, Tex., it is therefore ordered, ad- ministration of said estate. judged, and decreed that all of the rights, title, and interest of the said James F. Massey in and to that property so set apart to the defendants be and the same is hereby divested out of him and vested in the defendants forever," etc. This judgment became final and has never been appealed from, nor otherwise vacated. Thereafter, and while M. L. Womack was administering the estate of said H. H. Massey, as such administrator, joined by James Massey, guardian of the minors, Mack Massey, Homan Massey, Gus Massey, and Cassandra Massey, four of the children of Frances, the second wife of H. H. Massey, brought suit in the district court of Burleson county against Eugene, George, and Andrew Massey, three other children of said second wife, for a partition of the 1781⁄2 acres of land in controversy in this suit. This suit was styled M. L. Womack et al. v. Eugene Massey et al., No. 2596, and will be referred to hereinafter as suit No. 2596. It is alleged in the petition in said suit No. 2596 that the estate of H. H. Massey was the owner of a one court, one-half thereof being paid to M. L. Womack, as administrator of the estate of H. H. Massey. It may be here stated that the only answer filed by defendants in suit No. 2547, James Massey v. M. L. Womack, Administrator, et al., was a general demurrer, and that there was no answer filed in suit No. 2596, so far as shown by the record. Mrs. Fannie Massey, the third and last wife of H. H. Massey, deceased, the mother of plaintiffs Ethel Boese, Ruth Vinton, and Mart Massey, was put in possession of 100 acres out of the 160 acres of land, a part of the Ed Hill survey, owned and occupied by said Massey and family, at the time of his death, as the homestead of herself and children. She was also paid out of the effects of the estate of H. H. Massey the sum of $350, together with other property delivered to her. Mrs. Fannie Massey resided upon her said homestead within a few miles of the tract of land in controversy in December, 1896, at the time Special Commissioner Bell sold and conveyed said land to G. W. Price, and continued to so reside until her death in G. W. Price had his said deed recorded shortly after his purchase in December, 1896, and he and those holding under him, down to and including the present owner, O. V. Massey, have since said purchase held and used the same continuously to the date of this suit, on November 19, 1914, and have paid all taxes due thereon. Whatever title G. W. Price had to the land in controversy passed by mesne conveyances to, and is now in, appellee O. V. Massey. of the tract of land in controversy was in defendant O. V. Massey, and they further pleaded the three, five, and ten year statutes of limitation in bar of plaintiffs' right to recover in this suit. Plaintiffs by supplemental petition pleaded their disabilities as minors in avoidance of defendants' plea of limitation. The case was submitted to the court without a jury, who upon the pleadings and evidence found every issue in favor of defendants, and rendered judgment that plaintiffs take nothing by their suit and that defendants recover of plaintiffs all costs by them incurred. From this judgment, R. L. Boese, husband of Ethel Boese, alone has appealed. [1] It is apparent, from the brief filed in this court by counsel who represented the plaintiffs in the trial court, that they are laboring under the impression that all of the plaintiffs have perfected their appeal to this court. But such, we think, is not true. The only appeal bond found in the record is one executed by R. L. Boese alone, as principal, and Thos. C. Hall, M. G. Cox, and U. S. Hearrell, as sureties, which, after an attempt to describe the judgment rendered by the court, reads as follows: "Now, therefore, we, R. L. Boese, as principal, and Thos. C. Hall and M. G. Cox and U. S. Hearrell, as sureties, acknowledge ourselves bound to pay to Mrs. Nettie Massey Parkhill and other defendants (appellees herein) in the sum of two hundred and no/100 dollars; conditioned, however, that the said Ethel Boese and other plaintiffs (appellants herein) shall prosecute their appeal with effect, and shall pay all costs which have accrued in the court below and which may accrue in the Court of Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court. On November 19, 1914, appellants Mart Massey, Ruth Massey Vinton, joined pro forma by her husband, Claude Vinton, and Ethel Massey Boese, joined pro forma by her husband, R. L. Boese, brought this suit against O. V. Massey, the present owner of the land in controversy, and others not necessary to mention, to recover a one-half undivided interest therein, upon the theory: That by the terms of the will of H. H. Massey, deceased, one-half undivided interest therein passed to their mother, Fannie Massey, during her life. and that by the terms of said will the fee to said one-half interest passed to plaintiffs herein Ruth Vinton, Ethel Boese, and Mart Massey. That in cause No. 2547 the court construed the will of said Massey as now construed by plaintiffs, and by a decree in said cause adjudged one-half of the land in question to be the property of plaintiffs. That M. L. Womack, administrator of the estate of H. H. Massey with will annexed, had no authority to bring, nor the district court of Burleson county to entertain and try, said cause No. 2596, and grant the relief prayed for, as was done in said cause, because: First, at the time said suit was filed and disposed of in said district court "Witness our hands this the 26th day of Noan administration of the estate of H. H. Mas-Thos. C. Hall, M. G. Cox, U. S. Hearrell, Surevember, A. D. 1915. R. L. Boese, Principal. sey was pending in the probate court of Burleson county, and that said court had exclusive jurisdiction of said estate and was the only court which bud authority to order the sale of property belonging to said estate for any purpose, and that, as said district court had no authority to try said cause No. 2596 and to order the sale of said land as it did do, the sale made by E. B. Bell, special commissioner, by order of said district court, was and is void and of no force and effect, and therefore the deed of said Bell to G. W. Price did not have the effect to convey the title to said land tc said Price; second, that as plaintiffs were not parties to suit No. 2596, and as they were the owners of an undivided one-half interest in said lands under the will of H. H. Massey and also under the decree in cause No. 2547, the sale made under the decree in cause No. 2596, if other wise valid, did not have the legal effect to divest plaintiffs of their title to said land, and that they are therefore still the owners thereof. Defendants answered plaintiffs' allegations by specially pleading the facts set out in the preliminary statement herein, and further ties." It is apparent from the bond above mentioned that it is not an appeal bond executed by any one except R. L. Boese, as principal, and that he is the only one of the plaintiffs in the court below who has perfected an appeal to this court in this case. The pleadings of plaintiff and the undisputed evidence show that appellant R. L. Boese has no interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, except as the husband of his wife, Ethel Boese, and that he was joined with his wife in the suit only for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the law that in suits by a married woman she shall be joined by her husband. Appellant therefore is only a nominal party, without any interest in his own right in the subjectmatter of the litigation, and could not appeal. In the case of Hawley v. Whitaker, 33 S. W. 688, presenting practically the same proposition as here presented, it is said: "It appears from the foregoing facts that Hawley was a mere nominal party to the suit, as such interest in the land as was acquired by the conveyance from Cummings to Hawley was |