Applied to the human world what we have given is the whole society. The whole society is the given fact, and to it each part is indispensable. Were it not indispensable and were dispensed with, we should have not this given whole but some other. The functions of the various parts are diverse and cannot be reduced to a basis of equality. Equality is found only in the indispensableness of each to the given whole. Of course the contribution of each should not be viewed merely as objective, i. e., from the standpoint of the state as is done in Plato's Republic. On the side of the individual there is implied the equal right of each organic constituent to realize in his own consciousness the meaning of the common good and to develop his capacities in accordance with it. This conception of self-realization which we shall have occasion to discuss later is not present in Rousseau's writings because he was not conscious of the organic character of society. Reviewing the successive steps of the argument we find: A general will implies the notion of a sovereign people and a sovereign people means a self-governing people. Self government necessarily includes the recognition of a common good. Examination into this common good leads us to the conception of society as an organized unity. Society is made up necessarily of diverse parts each with its specific function contributing to the life of the organism. The various functions cannot be brought to a level of equality except in the sense that each is indispensable to the existent whole, and has the equal right to realize himself in accordance with the common good. III. BENTHAM Throughout the writings of Bentham there is a consistency that is absent in the works of Rousseau. He scouted the notion of natural rights as so many abstractions. And because metaphysics, as he thought, deals with abstractions it held but little place in his regard. A doctrine of equality occupies an important place in his Civil Code, but the value of equality is derivative, not ultimate. It tends to increase the sum of happiness in the world; therefore it is good. That all men are "born and remain free and equal in respect of rights" is nonsense, says Bentham. On the contrary, men are born into a state of helplessness, and, according to the complaints we hear, grow up into one of slavery. Let us talk not about what is, but rather about what ought to be. We cannot say that men are free, but rather that they ought to be. And why? For the same reason as before. Freedom adds to the sum of happiness; therefore it is a good. Let us get away from the speculation of bare logic to an observation of the facts of human life. What do we find? Bentham found, in the opening words of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation that, "nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think." With this view in mind he formulates his principle of utility, "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question." Or, as it was later termed by the author, the greatest happiness principle. This principle becomes the apex of his system. It is the guide in all matters of morality and legislation. The civil and penal codes are made to conform to it. The worth of religion is tested by it. Morality, politics and religion can have only one common object, the attainment of happiness.1 In the Deontology we are told that interest and duty are identical. To obtain the greatest amount of happiness to himself is the object of every rational being. But a man can be happy only by obtaining the friendly affections of those on whom his happiness depends. Therefore certain social virtues are to be cultivated; but the motive is egoistic and nowhere does Bentham succeed in mediating between an individualistic and a social motive. Bentham was infested by the individualism of his age. He thinks of man as an individual standing apart from other individuals. The conception of an organic society and of moral sentiments which bind together individuals into an organic unity was unknown to Bentham. With him the business of the moralist was to educate, but to educate the individual man in seeing the consequence of his acts, with the end that he should obtain the maximum of his own happiness.2 In matters of legislation he teaches the doctrine of laisseznous-faire. Still the powers of government should not be too much restricted, because there are occasions when utility makes government interference desirable. Bentham adopted the laissezfaire principle not as did Herbert Spencer, because of certain supposed natural rights of the individual with which government might interfere; but because he believed it was the best means to secure the greatest happiness. But it is sometimes necessary that government should curtail liberty. It is the function of legislation to distribute among the community, rights and obligations, therefore curtailments of liberty are inevitable. "It is impossible to create rights, to impose obligations, to protect the person, life, reputation, property, subsistence, liberty itself, but at the expense of liberty."3 The sole object of government ought to be the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number of individuals, or as it is again stated, "the legislator should have for his object the happiness of the body politic."4 To secure this object we find given as means four subordinate objects, Subsistence, Security, Abundance, and Equality. 1Deontology, Vol. I. 4Ibid, Ch. II. Security is the principal object because it implies extension in point of time. But subsistence is equally important, and upon these two life itself depends. The other two are rather the ornaments of life. They should be had provided it is feasible. Liberty is not included separately in this group, but it is a branch of security. However, it must give way to the general security when necessary. Equality must not be favored when it injures security. A doctrine of absolute equality is absurd. It would render all legislation impossible. Distinctions that are the necessary outcome of differences in age, intelligence, position in the family, would disappear. It is true that capable men have advocated the doctrine of the equality of rights, but they intended merely certain restrictions and modifications. The blind multitude have misunderstood them. Then, in what sense is equality desirable? The steps in the argument are simple enough. Happiness is made to depend upon material wealth. Each portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding portion of happiness, and the greater one's wealth the greater are one's chances of happiness. It is to be noted, however, that happiness does not continue to increase in proportion to wealth, because from the constitution of human nature sensibility to felicity is limited. This principle has its psychological correlate in the law that the intensity of a sensation does not increase in direct ratio with an increase in stimulus. Therefore a given portion of wealth will create more happiness in one quarter than another. One man's wealth amounts to one thousand dollars, and that of another to ten thousand. The addition of a thousand dollars to the first man doubles his chances of happiness; to the second, happiness is increased only one-tenth. Or, take an instance of two competi tors of equal fortunes. One loses half of his wealth to the other and thereby decreases his happiness by one-half. The increase of happiness to the other is only one-third, so there is a diminution of happiness. The conclusion of the argument is that the more nearly the distribution of wealth approaches to equality the greater will be the sum total of happiness. Bentham does not overlook the fact that individuals according to temperament differ in their sensibility to happiness. The rules laid down will doubtless be inexact when applied to any particular case. But as general rules they are held to be true. Generally speaking, in the 1Civil Code, Ch. IV. laborer the sensibility to happiness is a maximum while the degree of sensibility in the monarch is likely to be a minimum.1 Equality in the distribution of the matter of wealth is seen to add to the sum of happiness, still it is but a subordinate object of legislation. It is not possible, says Bentham, to obtain the greatest good but by the sacrifice of some subordinate good.3 Therefore equality is to be sacrificed when it stands in the way of security. But the conflict between security and equality is not eternally fixed. In the course of time they may be brought to coincide. In a nation which is prosperous in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, there is a continual progress towards equality. A necessary condition is that the government maintain a policy of laissez-faire. Security and freedom are all that industry requires. In good time a high degree of equality will come as a result.3 That progress in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, have contributed to equality Bentham saw in the breaking up of feudal Europe. That prosperity combined with a laissez-faire policy of government need not make for equality, Bentham would perhaps have seen if he lived at the present day in the United States, where the most enormous aggregation of wealth the world has seen are being centered in the hands of private individuals.4 Bentham succumbed to a fallacy so common in his time, especially in France and America, and later maintained by Herbert Spencer, namely, the compatibility of liberty (in the commonly accepted laissez-faire sense) with social equality. Liberty and Equality are antithetical. A correct compromise between them would give us a correct conception of justice. In Hobbes' state of nature we have the doctrine of liberty carried to the extreme. The result was a bellum omnium contra omnes. In the adoption of the social compact, involving the unconditional 1 Constitutional Code. 2Principles of the Civil Code. 3 Civil Code. 4It might be justly argued of course by a Benthamite that the condition depicted in the United States is partly due to a protective tariff, which would be an instance of the class legislation which Bentham so strongly opposed. The tariff is intended in theory at least for the good of the majority of the people, and they could doubtless stand more regulation on the part of the government of the affairs which affect their industrial life than at present is assumed. |