V. ROUSSEAU, BENTHAM, AND KANT

The eighteenth century saw the culmination of an individualism that had been developing since the beginning of the Renaissance. We have observed the unreality of this individual; that detachment had made him a mere abstraction. Also that the organic idea allows of a truer conception of the individual, that of a personality, a being which has no meaning apart from the whole and which yet, as an individual, has a nature to be realized, and must be assumed to have absolute worth. This modern doctrine of personality is, however, very largely the result of the work of the three writers we have considered. Each directs attention to the individual and emphasizes his worth and his claim to consideration. It is true that they differ in opinion as to where the real good of man is found. The significant fact is, however, that the good of the individual in some form is taken as the thing of fundamental importance. Rousseau's doctrine of natural rights is meant to be an ethical conception. The right to life, liberty, and participation in sovereignty is based in human nature itself. Bentham believed that the individual's supreme wish was for happiness; therefore let him have happiness. Happiness became the end of morality, religion and politics. To Kant however the greatest debt is owed, because by making man a member of a kingdom of ends he approaches the nearest to an organic conception.

What we think the individual to be will largely determine for us what the state ought to be. The most difficult problem we have to face is to secure an adequate conception of the individual self. The conception of the isolated individual has its corollary in that of an atomistic society. Having given the individual, how are we to build up the social union? Rousseau's answer is by means of a social compact, a theory which became known through Hobbes and popularized in a different form in the eighteenth century. In the Social Contract the members of the prospective society recognize that each has interests both different and the same as those of others. They agree to cancel where necessary the diverse interests in order to make secure the common good.

In this way freedom and protection is guaranteed to each through the power of the whole. The nineteenth century has decried the social compact in favor of the organism; but there is much truth in the agreement theory and much that is wanting in the organic conception. The term organism as applied to society has not yet been well defined. The superiority of the latter term is in showing that society is not a mere aggregate of individuals brought together in an artificial manner; that it throbs with life and tendencies; that it possesses continuity and growth. The analogy with the animal organism whose actions are determined from a common center is, however, very imperfect and indeed misleading. The parts or organs of an animal have no other than a functional existence; they are nothing more than a means for carrying out the purpose of the whole; they are without individuality of their own. The members of society, on the other hand, are individuals, they are ends in themselves. Society has no power to think or will apart from its members. Though society is conceived as in some sense an organism the individual must remain the prominent fact; he is by nature a being of independent self-activity. It is possible however that future writers on political philosophy will discard this term in favor of a better. An organism requires at least that its parts play freely one into the other and co-operate in the attainment of a certain end. Mutual helpfulness and not antagonism would characterize the relations between its members. Capital and labor are recognized as necessary factors in modern industrial life. They are necessary to each other, and they cooperate in the attainment of the common end of production. Moreover, the whole society is vitally concerned in this production. A coal strike in Pennsylvania is an injury to the entire country. So far we have the conception of an organism. On the other hand, society presents us with a picture of struggle. Group is arrayed against group. Strong and bitter tension is the order of the day. A stable society is maintained through the mutual compromise of group interests; or, in other words, through the agreement to sacrifice certain diverse interests for the sake of a common good. Representatives of capital and labor come together to agree The thirteen colonies entered into an agreement which was believed to be for the general welfare. But in each case the common good is prior to the agreement. Were it not first recognized the agreement would not have been made. Therefore some

degree of organization must be prior to any contract. But agreements consciously entered into by groups within society are a necessary means to completer social organization. Society appears to be in a process of organization. The only way in which society can be regarded as a real organism is as an ethical ideal towards which the process tends. The ideal, however, cannot mean that there will ever be cessation of antagonism between the members. Antagonism makes for progress; opposition is an instrument of realization. Without opposition society becomes static and dead. The ideal will leave a field for individual activity and initiative. Progress has come largely from the organization of advanced ideas in individual centers, which have become clarified and woven into the social woof through opposition.

Rousseau did not mean the social compact to be regarded as historical. It is a figure to illustrate the formation of a just state. The notion of a social compact would have received far more sympathy in the nineteenth century if it had been an agreement not between individuals but between groups. It is said at once, "Man is a social creature; he has an instinct that impels him to the company of others; it is not his nature to be considered in isolation; he has always been one of a group." This is true; but my social instinct and interest is satisfied by association with my own group. It does not impel me to fraternize with the whole of society. It is evident then that there is still a place for the application of the contract theory if we take, as we must, the group as the social unit.

Another common and valid objection to the contract theory is that it attempts to construct society anew. We may arrange some form of social union, i. e., we may construct a state; but we cannot construct society. Empiricism has taught us the great truth that we must accept what is given. Society in toto is a given fact. It follows that there can be no opposition between the individual and society; even though there may be between individuals and groups or between either and the state. Even the expression 'Individual and Society' has no meaning because there is no such relation other than that of the abstract whole and part relation. You cannot remove the individual from society to make him a distinct term in the relationship without destroying society. A particular stave may have a definite relation to any or all of the other parts of the barrel, but it is not related to the whole barrel except as a mere part. Remove the stave and the

barrel is destroyed. But we can speak of the individual and an ideal society because the given individual not being a part of that society can be put into definite relationship with it.

The bond of social union in Rousseau's doctrine is the recognition of a common good. Just what this common good is at any time must be declared by the general will which is always sovereign. All participate in the sovereignty not as a result of contract but by natural right. Though Hobbes had supposed otherwise, sovereignty cannot be alienated or even delegated. Rousseau does not prescribe any particular form of government other than republican, which means that the general will shall rule. The general will may desire the form of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. The general will expresses itself in the assembly of all the people. Here alone is heard the public voice. This is the method of a New England town meeting. Rousseau's lack of practicality let him assume it was possible in the case of a large nation. When the people are so assembled they are asked to vote on measures proposed for laws according to their conception of what the general will is. From the counting of the votes is deduced the declaration of the general will.

During the popular assembly the existing government in toto is considered as suspended in deference to the people. Apparently the right to the suffrage in the assembly is not restricted by sex or age or anything else. Sovereignty is a birth-right and carries with it the right to expression. Moreover, since all laws are for the time being abrogated, there would be no law operative to limit the voting qualifications.

By lodging the sovereign authority in the body of the people Rousseau emphasized the cardinal principle of democracy. In saying that every man by his very nature is born free and master of himself and cannot be enslaved against his will, he is giving expression to the inherent dignity of humanity. When, however, we look for practical suggestions in the formation of a state we find his doctrine insufficient. In fact, in the formation of his own state he passes away from the conception of an unhampered and free individual to the extreme of a communistic state, a state in which even a religious creed is prescribed and he who refuses to believe is punished with banishment. He furthermore leaves a loophole for continued tyranny by making the convocation of the

1Social Contract, Bk. IV, Ch. II.

peoples' assembly dependent upon the will of the existing govern

ment.

Movements for equality have taken different forms at different times, according to the idea that is uppermost in the public mind. The following are the principal forms in which equality as a social idea appears:

(1) Political equality, which usually means the almost unrestricted extension of the voting privilege.

(2) Civil or legal equality, i. e., equality before the law.

(3) Economic equality or equality in wealth, or at least in opportunity.

(4) Religious equality which allows to everyone the privilege to believe and worship as he chooses.

(5) Moral equality, which prescribes a uniform standard of morals for all classes and both sexes.

The realization of the idea of moral equality depends, for the most part, on the gradual education of the race. This form of equality might be said to include all the others. Religious equality has become for the most part a fact. The justice of legal equality is so obvious that it is usually taken as axiomatic.

The problem in Rousseau's day was to secure political equality. This ideal has since been realized to a high degree in the form of universal suffrage. Credit is due Rousseau for recognition of the intimate relation between economic interests and political government. To be king over a people one must be king over the territory which they inhabit. In brief, there cannot be in a good society conflict between property interests and the political power. In the formation of the contract each gives himself including his property. As with his liberty however, he gets it back, and his possession receives the sanction of the whole community. Only in this way do individuals obtain legitimate ownership. As owners, however, they are considered but as "depositories of the public property" and "the right which each individual has over his own property is subordinated to the right which the community has over all." Still, it can hardly be inferred from this that Rousseau is a communist; because he justifies the private ownership of the first occupant, provided however that he has only such a quantity 1Social Contract, Bk. I, Ch. IX.

2 Ibid.