Low himself, in various forms of philanthropic and charitable work. All the departments that have charge of matters affecting the lives of the poor and helpless,-tenement house construction and laws, charities and correction,—are in the hands of men who have been for several years at the head of organized charities, and have been the recognized leaders in such work. They come to the task of city government, therefore, not only with full knowledge of the needs of the masses of the people, but with trained experience in dealing with them and with keen but wise sympathy in ministering to their welfare and the amelioration of their condition. In fact, it is not too much to say that jealous care for those portions of the population that are least able to care for themselves, will be a dominating influence in Mayor Low's administration. Of what other municipal administration in any great American city, past or present, can this be said? Brutal indifference to the welfare of the poor, moral, intellectual, and physical, has distinguished every Tammany administration that the city has had, and especially that which immediately preceded Mr. Low's.

In more senses than one Mayor Low intends to be the representative and agent of the whole people in his administration. He has, from the outset, adopted a policy of " Publicity," that is, of taking the people into his full confidence, laying before them all matters which concern their best interests, and asking their coöperation. When rumors reached his ears of attempts to obtain Tammany control of the new Board of Aldermen by means of bribery, he published the facts to the world and defeated the plot. His first message to the Board of Aldermen was unique in the history of the city. It filled less than a column of the newspapers and was confined to a single subject, that of official blackmail. It stated clearly, and without either exaggeration or mitigation, what everybody knew to be true, that official blackmail under Tammany government had been well-nigh universal throughout the city service, and asked for the aid of the people in exposing all attempts to continue it, promising to use the whole force of his administration" continuously, aggressively, and in every possible

way to prevent and to punish this form of iniquity." His policy of "Publicity" in this field of reform will be of great use, for all offenders know that he will lay before the people the exact facts in every instance that comes within his knowledge.

Surely, government of this sort, under the direction of such a man, and with the aid of such assistants, is a unique experiment in this country. Politics has been defined as "the art of governing men by deceiving them," and the art has been practiced in the highest perfection in our large cities. Mayor Low has reversed the process completely. He has surrounded himself with expert ability, rather than with political ability, and instead of seeking by all methods to deceive the people, he is determined to take them into his confidence, and to conduct the affairs of the city entirely in the open, with no other object than the welfare of the community over which he has been placed as ruler. It is incredible that such an experiment as this should fail, that at the end of two years the people of New York should revert to Tammany rule. The eyes of the whole country are on the city of New York, and if rule of Mayor Low's kind, that is, government by the best intelligence and the morality of the people, becomes permanent there, the moral effect upon municipal government throughout the United States will be incalculable, for other cities will gird up their loins and join New York in ridding this country of the charge that popular government among us is a failure, because of the scandalous misrule of American cities.

THE MILITARY RULE OF OBEDIENCE

CAPT. ALFRED T. MAHAN, U. S. N.

The Military Duty of Obedience may be regarded either as a rule or as a principle; for it is both. The rule derives from the principle. It is the principle defined in precise and mandatory terms, as a law is the expression of the general will of the community, formulated by the legislature for the governance and control of individuals. The difficulty of such formulation, however, as that of definition generally, is well known, and has found proverbial recognition in phrases indicating that statutes, even when framed with great care by experienced hands, are very liable to offer loopholes through which the observance of them may be escaped. It is no less difficult to define the military rule of obedience, without, on the one hand, constituting fetters which would neutralize intelligence and palsy individuality in a sphere, and at instants, where both are preeminently needed, or, on the other hand, permitting a license which in practice would degenerate into anarchy. It is not a sufficient solution to so knotty and dangerous a question to damn obedience to orders, as a rugged veteran will occasionally be heard to suggest; while, on the other extreme, the saying of that eminent disciplinarian, Lord St. Vincent, "The whole of discipline is contained in the word 'Obedience,'" though safer in practice, is perhaps too absolute in its assertion.

The matter at stake is too intricate for such Gordian solutions. It is also too important, at once to the individual officer and to

Copyright, 1902, by Frederick A. Richardson,

the nation, the conduct of whose armed forces may at critical moments depend upon a correct understanding? In many instances, perhaps in the large majority, the propriety of literal obedience is plainly evident; in a few the inexpedience, folly, or impossibility of such compliance is for obvious reasons equally clear; but there remain, nevertheless, a number of cases, not merely possible, but copiously exemplified by history, which present serious difficulty. In these an officer finds himself confronted with conditions that make a large demand upon his moral courage as well as upon his judgment. His judgment then can be safely guided, and his resolution supported, only by a mastery of principles. No mere rule will here suffice. Military obedience when in subordinate post, and military initiative when in independent command, untrammeled by orders and free to follow the guidance of one's own judgment, are both governed by principles, the appreciation of which is the only sure light to one's footsteps. To them recurrence must be had in doubtful positions, where precise precedent and formal definition are wanting; in short when rules, however good in general use, fail to apply. It does not hence follow that rules, terse and positive embodiments of principles, such as that of obedience, are mostly useless because essentially narrow and unelastic. That all rules have exceptions is proverbial; and military rules are probably more liable to exceptions than most others, because of the emergency that characterizes war and the vast variety of situations to which a rule has to be adapted. No one proposes on these accounts to discard rules utterly. It is evident, however, that an officer who undertakes to violate the fundamental rule of obedience, upon the strict observance of which depends in general the success of combined operations, and who substitutes his own initiative for the directions of his superior, assumes a risk which urgently imposes a comprehension of the principles upon which rest respectively both the rule of obedience and the rules of war.

It may be asserted, as perhaps the most tenable general definition of the principle upon which the rule of obedience rests, that the spirit of obedience, as distinguished from its letter, consists in

faithfully forwarding the general object to which the officer's particular command is contributing. This finds expression in the well-known directive maxim, "March to the sound of the guns." In doubtful cases, however, and by doubtful I mean cases where action other than that prescribed in the orders seems expedient, liberty of judgment is conditioned by the officer's acquaintance with the plans of his superior. If his knowledge is imperfect, or altogether lacking, the doing that which at the moment seems wise to himself may be to defeat a much more important object, or to dissolve the bonds of a combined movement to which his coöperation is essential. If, under such circumstances of ignorance, relying only upon his own sagacity or surmises, he errs either in his reading of his commander's general purpose, or in his decision as to his own action, and through such error disobeys, he cannot complain if he receive censure or punishment. He has violated a recognized rule, without adequate reason. The rectitude of his intentions may clear him of moral blame, though not necessarily even this; for the duty of obedience is not merely military, but moral. It is not an arbitrary rule, but one essential and fundamental; the expression of a principle without which military organization would go to pieces, and military success be impossible. Consequently, even where the individual purpose may be demonstrably honest, not wilful, blame adheres and punishment may follow, according to the measure of the delinquency, though that be due to nothing worse than personal incompetency. Does this seem hard measure? It may be replied, In what pursuit is this not so? What is the profession, whether that of physician, lawyer, or Wall Street, in which a transgression of instructions by an inferior, or a departure from recognized methods, when not justified by the conditions, escapes punishment, either at the hand of events or of his employer? Is "I thought so," or "I did my best," accepted there as an excuse for disobedience?

In the question of military obedience there is involved, therefore, both a rule and a principle. In dealing with the matter, I shall have to consider both, but I have advisedly chosen the