We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that if a state wishes to protect its subjects against monopolistic abuses, as was done in past centuries, it must grapple with the difficult problem of determining through the agency of a special commission whether, and to what extent, monopolistic abuses exist in each particular case. In the United States legislation has hitherto been directed mainly against such corporations as seem powerful enough to pursue monopolistic tendencies. But this is a gross error, for, in the first place, there are no external characteristics distinguishing such corporations from others, as the development in the United States has well illustrated, and, furthermore, the concentration of enterprises has, also, its good features, which should not be lost sight of. Whenever the magnitude of an enterprise or a corporation seems to indicate monopolistic tendencies, all its business transactions should be subjected to constant supervision by specially qualified experts, as is now done in many states in the case of railroads, insurance companies, and other enterprises, particularly such as produce dutiable articles. If this investigation, or the statements published by the corporations themselves, or outside information establishes the presence of monopolistic tendencies, suitable steps must be taken to meet impending evils. The measures employed should not consist of immediate severe punishment, nor need the corporation or combination be at once dissolved, although even such drastic measures might be enforced to punish recalcitrance. But, above all, the plan to be pursued should be directed primarily toward a removal of the evils resulting from the monopolistic character of the enterprise. Such means may be found in regulations governing business transactions and particularly the scale of prices established by the consumers. All this, by the way, is no new scheme. Similar measures have frequently been employed in the case of railroads, steamship companies, light and water companies, without being regarded at all unnatural. We have here to deal with nothing more than a somewhat broader application of a wellknown experience, namely, that the monopolistic efforts of certain producers will always invite state interference and the regu

lation of lawful, that is, fixed prices, whenever the monopoly increases in extent and importance. Indeed, it may lead even to the expropriation of the establishment. In this field, also, the development will surely not be different, although extensive expropriations are scarcely to be anticipated within the near future, solely by reason of the late almost overwhelming growth in the functions of the state and of the great difficulty of creating satisfactory government commissions. On the whole, we are confronted here with the same natural relation between monopolies and state influence upon the scale of prices that Cardinal de Lugo noticed, as above quoted. This relation is not determined by the causes to which the monopoly owes its existence, that is, whether it was created by law, founded by agreement, or called into being by particular economic conditions. It arises naturally from the fact that most persons consider it improper for a small number of entrepreneurs by legislation to procure advantage to themselves at the expense of the general public.

Those

Simple as the condition of things seems, viewed in the light of mere theory, the practical difficulties arising in each individual case not in line with established decisions will be almost insurmountable. An equitable judgment can only be reached through a perfect acquaintance with actual existing conditions. inclined to monopoly will scarcely be inclined to countenance the necessary commissions. And yet we have here perhaps an indication of the only method by which effective results may be obtained, without at the same time sensibly injuring home production and related industries. Only by the employment of this plan can the regulations be made to conform to the exigencies of each individual case, and be so constructed as to abolish existing evils, without at the same time limiting the commercial freedom of the entrepreneur further than appears absolutely essential to the attainment of the object.

Very much depends, also, upon the personnel of the government commission entrusted with the solution of so important and difficult a problem, and I shall in conclusion pay some attention

to this phase of the discussion. No one will deny that such commissioners should be not only sufficiently qualified, but also impartial, and as far removed as possible from political influence. It would, therefore, seem inadvisable to impose the task upon the chiefs of the executive department. In states having a strictly parliamentary government, the ministers in the main serve only as an administrative board for the majority in power, and it would surely not be desirable to have such decisions affected by the interests of a majority. Experience has conclusively shown that the management and supervision of economic enterprises as well as legal interference should in no way be subjected to the influence of politics, even though a political party have a majority in the legislature. It is probably not an accident that states with a strictly parliamentary government as a rule refrain from the management of large and complicated economic industries, and when they interfere, they seldom attain particularly favorable results, in contradistinction to those states where such matters are removed more or less from legislative influence. Of course it would be even more undesirable that decisions as to the presence of monopolistic abuses should be subject to political influ

ence.

Το

This consideration would make it seem advisable, particularly in all states where the government is not entirely exempt from the influence of politics, to confer the decision as to the presence of monopolistic abuses, and as to the prohibitory regulations to be enforced, upon boards or commissions which are not only properly qualified, but independent and impartial as well. These qualifications at once suggest the analogy to a higher court. be sure, it has been said that decisions such as we are discussing are not solely of a declaratory nature, that is, they are not intended merely to determine existing legal relations, but also possess constitutive force, namely, the power to establish the correct proportion for the harmony of public and private interests and to consider the probable future economic development. However, the rendering of these decisions exceeds the function of a judge. I do not regard as final these considerations of principle. The

great desideratum is the creation of a sufficiently independent and impartial body to assume this difficult and weighty responsibility. It may seem more desirable to endow the office with judicial functions, just as in past centuries the decisions as to monopolistic abuses were left to the court. So-called scruples from principle are scarcely sufficient in themselves to check such actions. Of course we shall have to consider the question of the personnel of the commission and the course to be pursued as a guarantee of the greatest effectiveness, rapidity, and energy. In this connection I would emphasize the fact that it might be found advisable to give a hearing to both sides before the final authority, in order to secure a thorough consideration of all relevant conditions. Furthermore, the initiative in this proceeding should be vested in a special body, preferably that which in accordance with the previous discussion should have control also of the supervision of the various enterprises as well as of the required publications.

If I have succeeded in throwing some light upon the questions to be considered in eventual legislative regulations against monopolistic abuses, this article has attained its object.

EXPORT BOUNTIES ON SUGAR IN EUROPE'

R. HOTOWETZ, Prague, Austria.

The issue which at present most engages the attention of the European manufacturers of sugar is the question of the removal of the bounties on its export. The removal of this bounty, as is well known, has for a series of years been the subject of negotiations among the European States. So early as 1864, 1875, and 1876, negotiations were pending between England, Holland, France, and Belgium with reference to a uniform regulation of the sugar tax in the European States, and the granting of a mere tax-restitution on exported sugar. But the negotiations came to naught.

In 1888 a conference was held in London representing all the sugar-producing European States, at which it was agreed to do away with the bounties on the export of sugar, and at the same time to establish a uniform sugar tax; but in consequence of the opposition of France and Denmark this agreement was, after all, not ratified.

The international conference that assembled, for the same purpose, in 1898, in Brussels was also dissolved without results. In 1900, representatives from Germany, Françe, and Austria-Hungary met in Paris to discuss the methods by which a removal of the export bounties on sugar might be effected; and in fact they are said to have agreed that Germany and Austria-Hungary

(1) Translated by Professor A. L. Daniels of the University of Vermont. Copyright, 1902, by Frederick A. Richardson.