LATIN EUROPE AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM'

SCIPIO SIGHELE, Rome.

In the field of sociology two theories are at the present time contending for supremacy in the minds of scientists and in the feelings of the multitude. According to one of these theories, the life of nations is subject to the same laws that govern the life of man; that is to say, every nation, like every man, passes through a period of youth, glowing with ardor and giving promise for the future, then of virility, acting and grasping, and lastly of senility,-the period of decline, the fatal prelude to social death.

According to the other theory, nations cannot be compared to individual organisms whose course of life is inexorably traced out, like that of the sun, by the laws of nature. After the smiling morning comes the burning midday, after midday sad evening, and then dark night. Those homogeneous aggregations of men which are called nations show, instead, that they are immortal, or at least that they possess the power of resurrection; that is, that even ancient nations may continue without intermission to be prosperous and flourishing; or that after a period of decadence or apparent death they may revive and regain the splendor of the past. Which of these two theories is the true one?

An absolute answer to this question would be presumptuous. The previsions of scientists have so often, especially of late, been

(1) Translated by Salvatore Cortesi, Rome.

Copyright, 1902, by Frederiek A. Richardson.

negatived by the facts, that ordinary common sense warns us to turn from the prophets, and to trust no hypothesis as to the future. In my own humble opinion, each of these theories contains some fundamental truth, as is clearly demonstrated by history. Without a shadow of doubt, there are "decaying nations," as Lord Salisbury says, which show a constant phenomenon of social decadence that may be compared to the phenomenon of senile physical retrogression; such, for instance, is Greece, a country which, once the source of high civilization, has for centuries been one of the lowest among the nations. On the other hand, there are nations which, after periods of decadence, more or less long, rise suddenly, inspired by a new and youthful energy. Such is Italy which, after a long political and economic night, has dawned into a new day. Such, too, is England which, from 1838 to 1845, was so much harassed by bread riots raised by a starving people that certainly no one anticipated her present riches and power. Now, I ask, on what do these apparently contradictory phenomena depend? Why do some nations grow old and decay without possibility of resuscitation, and why have others, within themselves, the great privilege of awaking from sleep, and a capability of alternating, so to speak, periods of glory and power with periods of silence and misery, in the same way that certain countries have alternate years of fruitfulness and sterility?

The reason is perhaps easier to find, and the question to answer, than the gravity of the subject would lead one to suppose. We may clearly perceive the truth of my previous observation that these opposite theories are in a certain sense both true and both false, for we find in history instances by which they are both confirmed and both refuted. Their greatest and perhaps only fault is in their being too absolute.

As with proverbs, so it is with theories. Proverbs are created by many minds on the basis of a series of positive facts, and of them (proverbs) it has been justly observed that they represent and are crystallizations of popular wisdom. Let us, however, remember that for every proverb there is another of directly

opposite import. But this, instead of leading to the rigidly logical consequence that one of the two must be entirely false, rather teaches that the incidents of life are so varied that we may accumulate an immense number of facts to prove, for instance, that "he who works for himself, does the work of three," while as great a number go to prove that "four eyes see more than two."

By the same process of reasoning, before we conclude that one of two opposite theories contains all the truth, and the other all the error, let us not forget that each is based on a series of facts, and that the superiority or victory of one theory over the other can be only relative; for this victory must depend on whether a greater number of facts may be accumulated in support of the one rather than of the other. And it is this idea of relation which gives us without difficulty the answer to the above questions.

Enemies as we are of absolutism, moral, political, or scientific, we do not believe that there are in sociology any eternal and final laws that condemn to death certain nations and hold forth the hope of resurrection to others. We believe that the rise and fall of nations depend on a combination of circumstances often fortuitous, rather than on any internal development, or any atrophy either original or racial. In a word, as we believe that the facts of the life of man are determined not only by his anthropological and hereditary qualities, but also by his social surroundings, so we believe that the history of nations is determined not only by racial traits, by soil and climate, but also by those social influences which arise from chance and from fortune.

It is by this mysterious crossing of social influences that one nation which seemed to be slowly sinking into decay and death suddenly manifests the most vigorous vital forces, while another as suddenly declines before it has completed the cycle of its historic life.

What we have said up to the present point is a necessary pre

face to the discussion of that world-problem which is represented by the word imperialism. We are now passing through one of the decisive periods in the history of civilization. Passions which we thought had totally spent themselves ages ago have risen again in all their former violence. The raging mania for the great game of war and conquest, which we believed to be attributes only of the people of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, has awakened with tremendous vitality in the men of today. Progress was compared by Goethe to a spiral which, though ever turning back on itself, is still ever rising. It is clear that the world often retraces its steps, for England and the United States of America, possessed by their present ambition, like imperial Rome and the Spain of Charles V., are returning to a past condition, although undeniably rising as does the spiral. With the exception of a few barbarous episodes and some selfish aims, the imperialism of today is morally better, and socially more useful, than that spirit of conquest by which Rome and Spain became powerful.

To this modification by time may be added another remarkable feature of imperialism, namely, the fact that it has passed from one race to another. First, it was the prerogative and characteristic of the Latin race, now it is the new, the grandiose, and the unforeseen attribute of the Teutonic. Much as we may desire that war may cease, there is no denying that it is, and will be for a long period, one of the most positive indications of a nation's power. In later times we can point to proofs of this assertion. On one side, we have seen the Greek and Latin nations invariably defeated. First, Italy in 1896, in her African campaign, lost the battle of Adua, a disaster so great that its effects have not yet been measured. Next, Greece was defeated in her unhappy conflict with Turkey in 1897, and lastly, Spain in her short but tragic war in Cuba. These are facts which force even the most incredulous and optimistic to see some truth in the pessimist and fatalist theory of the decline of the Latin race. We have seen the other side also. We have beheld England, of all European nations the most liberal, the most advanced, and the most opposed to militarism, suddenly and violently seized by the fever

of conquest, and, departing from her former methods of commercial invasion and colonization, enter upon the war in the Transvaal. How this war will terminate is easily foreseen, yet, from the heroic resistance of the Boers, it is difficult to predict when that end will be reached.

The United States were by many sociologists held up as an example to the Old World for their anti-militarism, their civilization, and their riches, the fruit of industry. Almost contemporaneously with England, they suddenly became transformed into an aggressive power, conquering in a war for which they had to improvise soldiers as well as officers.

These facts, bursting on the world like a sudden tempest, have surprised and confused, not only the thinkers whose mission and pride it is to foresee the far off future, but also the politicians whose duty and trade lead them to study nearer probabilities, and to hold themselves ready for every development.

Anticipations of an unknown future arise to occupy the minds and agitate the patriotism of all, that unknown future which contains and mirrors in its many-sided aspects the eventualities to which humanity is hastening. Must we not boldly proclaim the worn-out condition of Latin Europe? Must we not believe that the Latin race will yield more and more before the Anglo-Saxon ? And must we not consider that Europe has less to dread from the yellow peril than she has from the Teutonic peril? And must we not consign to the moles and the bats that rose-water theory which declares that the world is to be conquered and ameliorated by the slow process of a peaceful civilization, and, instead, must we not resurrect from the arsenal of ancient and barbarous prejudices the theory that progress can be made only through force and martial exploits? Is the breath of imperialism that is now moving over the world but a passing return to atavistic conditions no more important or significant than certain morphological anomalies which are produced in normal individuals, without, however, affecting their organism? or is it a certain proof that the modern world, like the ancient, is leavened by the spirit of imperialism, and to obtain its conquests must employ the brutal methods which