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prominent part. In her legislative halls, the question, "whether the Union ought to be continued or dissolved by a total separation of the States, was freely discussed, and either side of it was maintained, not only without reproach, but with uncompromising fearlessness of consequences. Here Mr. Marshall, side by side with Madison, stood forth on all occasions an inflexible and enlightened advocate for union. It was here that he learned and practised those profound doctrines of rational, limited, constitutional liberty, from which he never shrunk, and to which he resolutely adhered to the end of his life. * It was here that he learned to love the Union with a supreme, unconquerable love-a love which was never cooled by neglect, or alienated by disappointment: a love which survived the trials of adversity, and the still more dangerous trials of prosperity: a love which faltered not, fainted not, wearied not on this side the grave."

* *

In 1788, Mr. Marshall was a member of the Virginia Convention, assembled for the ratification of the Federal Constitution. In the debates of that body he took an active part. His speeches on the power of taxation, the powers of the judiciary, and that on the power over the militia, evince many of those sagacious and statesmanlike views which characterized his subsequent life. After the adoption of the constitution, he was elected to the State legislature, where he remained until 1792, when he once more returned to the practice of his profession, and soon became engaged in many of the leading causes in the State and national tribunals. Again in 1795, he was returned to the State legislature, where he greatly distinguished himself by his ability and power in the discussions relating to the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay.

During the winter of 1796, he visited Philadelphia, to argue an important case before the United States Supreme Court. It was during this sojourn that he became acquainted with many of the most celebrated men of the northern States, who were then in Congress. "I then became acquainted," said he, "with Mr. Cabot, Mr. Ames, Mr. Dexter, and Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, Mr. Wadsworth, of Connecticut, and Mr. King, of New York. I was delighted with these gentlemen. The particular subject, the British Treaty, which introduced me to their notice, was at that time so interesting, and a Virginian who supported, with any sort of reputation, the measures of the government, was such a rara avis, that I was received by them all with a degree of kindness which I had not anticipated." About this time he was invited by Washington to accept the office of Attorney General of the United States, but he declined, on account of its interference with the practice of his profession. He was offered the position of Minister to France, on the recall of Mr. Monroe. This he also declined. "I then thought," said he, "my determination to remain at the bar unalterable. My situation at the bar appeared to me to be more independent, and not less honorable than any other; my preference for it was decided.”

General Pinckney, of South Carolina, who was subsequently appointed to succeed Mr. Monroe, being refused an audience at the Court of France, Mr. Adams, (who was then President,) desirous of an amicable and honorable adjustment of the differences between that nation and his own country, in 1797, appointed Mr. Marshall, Mr. Gerry, and General Pinckney, envoys extraordinary to France; but the envoys were not accredited, and in the summer of 1798, Mr. Marshall returned to the United States. The next year, yielding to the wishes of General Washington, he consented to become a candidate, and after a spirited political contest, was elected to Congress. His services in the memorable session of the winter of 1799 and 1800, were zealous and untiring. His masterly speech in the case of Thomas Nash alias Jonathan Robbins, delivered during this session, will be found in the subsequent pages of this volume.

In May, 1800, he was appointed by President Adams to the office of Secretary of War, but before he entered upon the duties of that station, he was transferred to the head of the department of State. On the resignation of Chief Justice Ellsworth, in 1801, Mr. Marshall was appointed as his successor, and continued on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, "with increasing reputation and unsullied dignity," until his death, on the sixth day of July, 1835.

That event created the deepest regret in the public mind throughout the country. Eulogies upon his character and judicial services were pronounced by the most eminent members of the

profession to which he belonged, all of which evince the highest sentiments of respect and admiration. One of the most carefully prepared and elaborate of these was a discourse delivered at the request of the Suffolk Bar, at Boston, by Mr. Justice Story, which has been freely used in the preparation of this sketch, and to which the reader is referred, as the best and most complete estimate of his life, character, and services.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.*

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gentleman, Mr. Henry, has said.* He has expatiated on the necessity of a due attention to certain maxims to certain fundamental principles, from which a free people ought never to depart. I concur with him in the propriety of the observance of such maxims. They are necessary in any government, but more essential to a democracy than to any other. What are the favorite maxims of democracy? A strict observance of justice and public faith, and a steady adherence to virtue. These, sir, are the

MR. CHAIRMAN: I conceive that the object of the discussion now before us is, whether democracy or despotism be most eligible. I am sure that those who framed the system, sub-principles of a good government. No mischief, mitted to our investigation, and those who now support it, intend the establishment and security of the former. The supporters of the constitution claim the title of being firm friends of the liberty and the rights of mankind. They say that they consider it as the best means of protecting liberty. We, sir, idolize democracy. Those who oppose it have bestowed eulogiums on monarchy. We prefer this system to any monarchy, because we are convinced that it has a greater tendency to secure our liberty and promote our happiness. We admire it, because we think it a well regulated democracy: it is recommended to the good people of this country: they are, through us, to declare whether it be such a plan of government as will

establish and secure their freedom.

Permit me to attend to what the honorable

*So general was the conviction that the public welfare required a government of more extensive powers than those vested in the General Government by the Articles of Confederation, that in May, 1787, a convention composed of delegates from all the States in the Union, with the exception of Rhode Island, assembled at Philadelphia, to take the subject into consideration. This convention continued its sessions with closed doors, until the seventeenth of the following September, when the Federal Constitution was promulgated. The convention resolved, "That the Constitution be laid before the United States, in Congress

assembled, and that it is the opinion of this convention that it should afterwards be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each State by the people thereof, for their assent and ratification; " and in conformity with this recommendation, Congress, on the twenty-eighth of the same month, passed a resolution directing that the Constitution should be submitted to conventions to be assembled in the several States of the Union. The conventions subsequently assembled, and the expediency of adopting the Constitution was ably and eloquently discussed.

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no misfortune, ought to deter us from a strict observance of justice and public faith., Would to Heaven that these principles had been observed under the present government! Had this been the case, the friends of liberty would not be so willing now to part with it. Can we maxims? Can we pretend to the enjoyment boast that our government is founded on these of political freedom or security, when we are told that a man has been, by an act of Assembly, struck out of existence without a trial by jury, without examination, without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses, without the benefits of the law of the land? Where is our safety, when we are told that this act Socrates? What has become of the worthy was justifiable, because the person was not a it be a maxim that a man shall be deprived of member's maxims? Is this one of them? Shall

his life without the benefit of law?

Shall such

a deprivation of life be justified by answering, that the man's life was not taken secundum artem, because he was a bad man? Shall it be a maxim that government ought not to be empowered to protect virtue?

The honorable member, after attempting to vindicate that tyrannical legislative act to which I have been alluding, proceeded to take a view of the dangers to which this country is exposed. He told us that the principal danger arose from a government which, if adopted, would give away the Mississippi. I intended to proceed regularly, by attending to the clause under debate; but I must reply to some observations which were dwelt upon to make impressions on our minds unfavorable to the plan upon the table. Have we no navigation in, or do we

See the speeches of Patrick Henry, at pages 13-39 of the first volume of this work.

derive no benefit from, the Mississippi? How shall we retain it? By retaining that weak government which has hitherto kept it from us? Is it thus that we shall secure that navigation? Give the government the power of retaining it, and then we may hope to derive actual advantages from it. Till we do this, we cannot expect that a government which hitherto has not been able to protect it, will have the power to do it hereafter. Have we attended too long to consider whether this government would be able to protect us? Shall we wait for further proofs of its inefficacy? If on mature consideration, the constitution will be found to be perfectly right on the subject of treaties, and containing no danger of losing that navigation, will he still object? Will he object because eight States are unwilling to part with it? This is no good ground of objection.

He then stated the necessity and probability of obtaining amendments. This we ought to postpone until we come to that clause, and make up our minds whether there be any thing unsafe in this system. He conceived it impossible to obtain amendments after adopting it. If he was right, does not his own argument prove that in his own conception, previous amendments cannot be had? for, sir, if subsequent amendments cannot be obtained, shall we get amendments before we ratify? The reasons against the latter do not apply against the former. There are in this State, and in every State in the Union, many who are decided enemies of the Union. Reflect on the probable conduct of such men. What will they do? They will bring amendments which are local | in their nature, and which they know will not be accepted. What security have we that other States will not do the same. We are told that many in the States were violently opposed to it. They are more mindful of local interests. They will never propose such amendments as they think would be obtained. Disunion will be their object. This will be attained by the proposal of unreasonable amendments. This, sir, though a strong cause, is not the only one that will militate against previous amendments. Look at the comparative temper of this country now, and when the late Federal Convention

met.

We had no idea then of any particular system. The formation of the most perfect plan was our object and wish. It was imagined that the States would accede to, and be pleased with, the proposition that would be made them. Consider the violence of opinions, the prejudices and animosities which have been since imbibed. Will not these operate greatly against mutual concessions, or a friendly concurrence? This will, however, be taken up more properly another time. He says, we wish to have a strong, energetic, powerful government. We contend for a well-regulated democracy. He insinuates that the power of the government has been enlarged by the convention, and that we may apprehend it will be enlarged by others. The convention did not, in fact, assume any power.

They have proposed to our consideration, a scheme of government which they thought advisable. We are not bound to adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in this community a right to tender that scheme which he thought most conducive to the welfare of his country? Have not several gentlemen already demonstrated that the convention did not exceed their powers? But the Congress have the power of making bad laws, it seems. The Senate, with the President, he informs us, may make a treaty which shall be disadvantageous to us; and that, if they be not good men, it will not be a good constitution. I shall ask the worthy member only, if the people at large, and they alone, ought to make laws and treaties. Has any man this in contemplation? You cannot exercise the powers of government personally yourselves. You must trust to agents. If so, will you dispute giving them the power of acting for you, from an existing possibility that they may abuse it? As long as it is impossible for you to transact your business in person, if you repose no confidence in delegates, because there is a possibility of their abusing it, you can have no government; for the power of doing good is inseparable from that of doing some evil.

We may derive from Holland lessons very beneficial to ourselves. Happy that country which can avail itself of the misfortunes of others-which can gain knowledge from that source without fatal experience! What has produced the late disturbances in that country? The want of such a government as is on your table, and having in some measure, such a one as you are about to part with. The want of proper powers in the government, the consequent deranged and relaxed administration, the violence of contending parties, and inviting foreign powers to interpose in their disputes, have subjected them to all the mischiefs which have interrupted their harmony. I cannot express my astonishment at his high-colored eulogium on such a government. thing be more dissimilar than the relation between the British government and the colonies, and the relation between Congress and the States? We were not represented in Parliament. Here we are represented. Arguments which prove the impropriety of being taxed by Britain, do not hold against the exércise of taxation by Congress.

Can any

Let me pay attention to the observation of the gentleman who was last up, that the power of taxation ought not to be given to Congress. This subject requires the undivided attention of this House. This power I think essentially necessary; for without it there will be no efficiency in the government. We have had a sufficient demonstration of the vanity of depending on requisitions. How, then, can the general government exist without this power? The possibility of its being abused is urged as an argument against its expediency. To very little purpose did Virginia discover the defects

in the old system; to little purpose, indeed, did she propose improvements; and to no purpose is this plan constructed for the promotion of our happiness, if we refuse it now, because it is possible that it may be abused. The confederation has nominal powers, but no means to carry them into effect. If a system of government were devised by more than human intelligence, it would not be effectual if the means were not adequate to the power. All delegated powers are liable to be abused. Arguments drawn from this source go in direct opposition to the government, and in recommendation of anarchy. The friends of the constitution are as tenacious of liberty as its enemies. They wish to give no power that will endanger it. | They wish to give the government powers to secure and protect it. Our inquiry here must be, whether the power of taxation be necessary to perform the objects of the constitution, and whether it be safe, and as well guarded as human wisdom can do it. What are the objects of the national government? To protect the United States, and to promote the general welfare. Protection, in time of war, is one of its principal objects. Until mankind shall cease to have ambition and avarice, wars will arise.

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It is, then, necessary to give the government that power, in time of peace, which the necessity of war will render indispensable, or else we shall be attacked unprepared. The experience of the world, a knowledge of human nature, and our own particular experience, will confirm this truth. When danger shall come upon us, may we not do what we were on the point of doing once already—that is, appoint a dictator? Were those who are now friends to this constitution less active in the defence of liberty, on that trying occasion, than those who oppose it? When foreign dangers come, may not the fear of immediate destruction, by foreign enemies, impel us take a most dangerous step? Where, then, will be our safety? We may now regulate and frame a plan that will enable us to repel attacks, and render a recurrence to dangerous expedients unnecessary. If we be prepared to defend ourselves, there will be little inducement to attack us. But if we defer giving the necessary power to the general government till the moment of danger arrives, The prosperity and happiness of the people we shall give it then, and with an unsparing depend on the performance of these great and hand. America, like other natics, may be eximportant duties of the general government. posed to war. The propriety of giving this Can these duties be performed by one State? power will be proved by the history of the Can one State protect us, and promote our hap- world, and particularly of modern republics. piness? The honorable gentleman who has I defy you to produce a single instance where gone before me, Governor Randolph, has shown requisitions on several individual States, comthat Virginia cannot do these things.* How, posing a confederacy, have been honestly comthen, can they be done? By the national gov-plied with. Did gentlemen expect to see such ernment only. Shall we refuse to give it power punctuality complied with in America? If to do them? We are answered, that the they did, our own experience shows the conpowers may be abused; that, though the Con- trary. gress may promote our happiness, yet they may prostitute their powers to destroy our liberties. This goes to the destruction of all confidence in agents. Would you believe that men who had merited your highest confidence would deceive you? Would you trust them again after one deception? Why then hesitate to trust the general government? The object of our inquiry is, Is the power necessary, and is it guarded? There must be men and money to protect us. How are armies to be raised? Must we not have money for that purpose? But the honorable gentleman says that we need not be afraid of war. Look at history, which has been so often quoted. Look at the great volume of human nature. They will foretell you that a defenceless country cannot be secure. The nature of man forbids us to conclude that we are in no danger from war. The passions of men stimulate them to avail themselves of the weakness of others. The powers of Europe are jealous of us. It is our interest to watch their conduct, and guard against them. They must be pleased with our disunion. If we in

* See the speech of Governor Randolph, at page 165 of

the first volume of this work.

We are told that the confederation carried us through the war. Had not the enthusiasm of liberty inspired us with unanimity, that system would never have carried us through it. It would have been much sooner terminated had that government been possessed of due energy. The inability of Congress, and the failure of States to comply with the constitutional requisitions, rendered our resistance less efficient than it might have been. The weakness of that government caused troops to be against us which ought to have been on our side, and prevented all resources of the community from being called at once into action. The extreme readiness of the people to make their utmost exertions to ward off solely the pressing danger, supplied the place of requisitions. When they came solely to be depended on, their inutility was fully discovered. A bare sense of duty, or a regard to propriety, is too feeble to induce men to comply with obligations. We deceive ourselves if we expect any efficacy from these. If requisitions will not avail, the government must have the sinews of war some other way. Requisitions cannot be effectual. They will be productive of delay, and will ultimately be inefficient. By direct taxation, the necessities

of the government will be supplied in a peaceable manner, without irritating the minds of the people. But requisitions cannot be rendered efficient without a civil war- -without great expense of money, and the blood of our citizens. Are there any other means? Yes, that Congress shall apportion the respective quotas previously, and if not complied with by the States, that then this dreaded power shall be exercised. The operation of this has been described by the gentleman who opened the debate. He cannot be answered. This great objection to that system remains unanswered. Is there no other argument which ought to have weight with us on this subject? Delay is a strong and pointed objection to it.

We are told by the gentleman who spoke last, that direct taxation is unnecessary, because we are not involved in war. This admits the propriety of recurring to direct taxation if we were engaged in war. It has not been proved that we have no dangers to apprehend on this point. What will be the consequence of the system proposed by the worthy gentleman? Suppose the States should refuse?

The worthy gentleman who is so pointedly opposed to the constitution, proposes remonstrances. Is it a time for Congress to remonstrate or compel a compliance with requisitions, when the whole wisdom of the Union, and the power of Congress are opposed to a foreign enemy? Another alternative is, that, if the States shall appropriate certain funds for the use of Congress, Congress shall not lay direct taxes. Suppose the funds appropriated by the States, for the use of Congress, should be inadequate; it will not be determined whether they be insufficient till after the time at which the quota ought to have been paid; and then, after so long a delay, the means of procuring money, which ought to have been employed in the first instance, must be recurred to. May they not be amused by such ineffectual and temporizing alternatives from year to year, until America shall be enslaved? The failure in one State will authorize a failure in another. The calculation in some States that others will fail, will produce general failures. This will, also, be attended with all the expenses which we are anxious to avoid. What are the advantages to induce us to embrace this system? If they mean that requisitions should be complied with, it will be the same as if Congress had the power of direct taxation. The same amount will be paid by the people.

It is objected, that Congress will not know how to lay taxes, so as to be easy and convenient for the people at large. Let us pay strict attention to this objection. If it appears to be totally without foundation, the necessity of levying direct taxes will obviate what the gentleman says; nor will there be any color for refusing to grant the power.

The objects of direct taxes are well understood: they are but few; what are they? Lands, slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other arti

cles of domestic property. Can you believe that ten mer, selected from all parts of the State, chosen because they know the situation of the people, will be unable to determine so as to make the tax equal on, and convenient for, the people at large? Does any man believe that they would lay the tax without the aid of other information besides their own knowledge, when they know that the very object for which they are elected is to lay the taxes in a judicious and convenient manner? If they wish to retain the affections of the people at large, will they not inform themselves of every circumstance that can throw light on the subject? Have they but one source of information? Besides their own experience-their knowledge of what will suit their constituents

they will have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the State legislature. They will see in what manner the legislature of Virginia collects its taxes. Will they be unable to follow their example? The gentlemen who shall be delegated to Congress will have every source of information that the legislatures of the States can have, and can lay the taxes as equally on the people, and with as little oppression as they can. If, then, it be admitted that they can understand how to lay them equally and conveniently, are we to admit that they will not do it, but that in violation of every principle that ought to govern men, they will lay them so as to oppress us? What benefit will they have by it? Will it be promotive of their re-election? Will it be by wantonly imposing hardships and difficulties on the people at large, that they will promote their own interest, and secure their re-election? To me it appears incontrovertible that they will settle them in such a manner as to be easy for the people. Is the system so organized as to make taxation dangerous? I shall not go to the various checks of the government, but examine whether the immediate representation of the people be well constructed. I conceive its organization to be sufficiently satisfactory to the warmest friend of freedom. No tax can be laid without the consent of the House of Representatives. If there be no impropriety in the mode of electing the representatives, can any danger be apprehended? They are elected by those who can elect representatives in the State legislature. How can the votes of the electors be influenced? By nothing but the character and conduct of the man they vote for. What object can influence them when about choosing him? They have nothing to direct them in the choice but their own good. Have you not as pointed and strong a security as you can possibly have? It is a mode that seems an impossibility of being corrupted. If they are to be chosen for their wisdom, virtue, integrity, what inducement have they to infringe on our freedom? We are told that they may abuse their power. Are there strong motives to prompt them to abuse it? Will not such abuse militate against

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