obvious that where a party has a right of appeal given him by law, "he has a right to demand the conscientious judgment of the appellate court on every question arising in the cause," and so it was once held.1 Later decisions have, however, practically made it useless to appeal on questions of fact to the Supreme Court of the United States, when both the district and circuit courts have agreed. And on appeals from the district court to the circuit sufficient for the action of this court. An appeal should not be a mere speculation on chances." See also The Cuba, Lush. Adm. 14. In The Constitution, Brow. & L. Adm. 324, the Privy Council said: "We must either affirm or alter a sentence on appeal, and those who call upon us to alter it, must impress us with a reasonable conviction that it is wrong." 1 Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150, 160. See also The Thetis, 3 Hagg. Adm. 14, 2 Knapp, 390; The Messenger, Swabey, Adm. 191. 1 In Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How. 491, 495, Grier, J., said: “We have frequently said that appellants should not expect this court to reverse a decree of the circuit court merely upon a doubt created by conflicting testimony." In The Marcellus, 1 Black, 414, 417, the same learned judge said: "In this, as in all other cases of the kind, there is great discrepancy and conflict in the testimony of the witnesses, as to every averment in the pleadings. We have had occasion to remark more than once, that when both courts below have concurred in the decision of questions of fact under such circumstances, parties ought not to expect this court to reverse such a decree, merely by raising a doubt founded on the number and credibility of witnesses. The appellant in such case has all presumptions against him, and the burden of proof cast on him to prove affirmatively some mistake made by the judge below, in the law or in the evidence. It will not do to show that on one theory, supported by some witnesses, a different decree might have been rendered, provided there be sufficient evidence to be found on the record to establish the one that was rendered." In The Water Witch, 1 Black, 494, 500, the same learned judge said: "The weight of the testimony, as decided by the judges of both courts, inclined in favor of the libellant, and we see no reason to differ from them. The weight of testimony is not always with numbers, and this court should not have their time spent in hearing arguments whether the eleven deponents on one side ought to be believed rather than ten on the other. In such cases, the concurrent finding of two courts ought to satisfy the losing party." See also Newell v. Norton, 3 Wallace, 257, 268; The Hypodame, 6 id. 223. So in Virden v. The Brig Caroline, U. S. C. C. Del., 1857, 6 Am. Law Reg. 222, 228, Taney, C. J., stated the law as follows: "It is, therefore, the practice of appellate courts, where its opinion approximates to the one entertained by the court below, not to disturb its judgment, although it may not fully concur in the propriety of the sum awarded. But where it is otherwise, it is undoubtedly the duty of the appellate tribunal to decide the case upon its own judgment as to the right and just claims of the parties." In The Clarisse, Swabey, Adm. 129, 134, a case of salvage, the Privy Council said: "It is a settled rule, and one of great utility, particularly with reference to cases of this description, that the difference ought to be court, it has been held that where the evidence is nicely balanced and the case depends altogether upon the credibility of witnesses, the circuit court is not inclined to interfere with the decision below.1 Appeals must be from final decrees.2 Some controversy has arisen as to what is a final decree, but the following points may now be considered as settled. A decree dismissing a libel in rem for want of prosecution is not a final decree. If the court decree that the libellant is entitled to recover damages, and the cause is sent to an assessor to determine the amount, this decree is not final; and, generally, if a case is sent to a master, the decree is not final.5 And if the report of the master determining the amount is accepted by the court, and a decree passed that such an amount is due, but no order is made for the payment of the money because there are other cases against the vessel, and the amount in court may not be large enough to pay all, there is no final decree.6 So if the property libelled is ordered to be restored with costs and damages, no appeal lies until the amount of the damages is very considerable to induce a court of appeal to interfere upon a question of mere discretion." See also The Cuba, Lush. Adm. 14. 1 The Sampson, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 28; The Florida, id. 470. * See Canter v. American Ins. Co. 3 Pet. 307, 317. Mr. Justice Story in this case said: "It is of great importance to the due administration of justice, and is in furtherance of the manifest intention of the legislature, in giving appellate jurisdiction to this court upon final decrees only, that causes should not come in fragments, upon successive appeals." The Merchant, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 105. up here * Chace v. Vasquez, 11 Wheat. 429. In Mordecai v. Lindsay, 19 How. 199, the case was decided in favor of the libellants in the district court, and then ordered to be sent to an assessor to report the amount. Without further proceedings being had, the respondents appealed to the circuit court, where the case was heard on its merits, and the decree of the district court reversed. The libellants then appealed to the Supreme Court, where the counsel moved that they might be permitted to amend the record by consent, by inserting in it what might be agreed upon by them as a final decree. But the court held, that as the case never came properly before the circuit court, it could not come before the Supreme Court, and the case was sent back to the circuit court that the appeal might be dismissed by it for want of jurisdiction, leaving the parties to obtain the final decree in the district court. 'Beebe v. Russell, 19 How. 283; Farrelly v. Woodfolk, 19 How. 288; Humiston v. Stainthorp, 2 Wallace, 106. • Montgomery v. Anderson, 21 How. 386. ascertained. The word "final" has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States to apply to all judgments and decrees which determine the particular cause; and it is not necessary that the subject-matter in dispute should be finally decided. Thus, if after the decree is pronounced, merely ministerial duties are to be performed, as the sale of mortgaged property on a decree ordering a sale, the decree is considered as final.2 So if the decree directs. costs to be taxed.3 A decree in a cause of prize which disposes of the whole matter in controversy, upon a claim filed by particular parties, which is final as to them and their rights, and final also, so far as the claimants and their rights are concerned, as to the United States, and which awards execution against the claimants, is a final decree from which an appeal lies.1 A decree adjudging that the defendant pay a certain sum into court within a limited time, or in default thereof the court will appoint a receiver, is a final decree. And if the jurisdiction of the inferior court is objected to, it would seem that the decision of the court upon this question would be a final decree which might be appealed from under the 25th section of the judiciary act.6 1 The Palmyra, 10 Wheat. 502. 2 Ray v. Law, 3 Cranch, 179. Craig v. Steamer Hartford, 1 McAll. C. C. 91. In Withenbury v. United States, 5 Wallace, 819, several libels were filed for the condemnation as prize of war of large quantities of cotton and other goods. On motion these libels were consolidated, and various claims were interposed in the consolidated suit for portions of the property libelled. Among others was that of Withenbury, who denied the validity of the capture and claimed a certain number of bales. Upon a hearing of the cause, an order was made dismissing the claim with costs, for which an execution was ordered. On appeal a motion was made to dismiss, on the ground that there had been no final decree, because no disposition had been made of the libel or of the cotton or its proceeds. The court held that the decree was final, Clifford, J., dissenting. 6 Wabash Canal v. Beers, 1 Black, 54. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 464. This case was brought before the court on a writ of error to the highest State court in South Carolina, under the 25th section of the judiciary act which provides "that a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, . . . .where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or law of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity, . . . . may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States." In the court of common .... If the decree is rendered in respect to any subject which is merely within the discretion of the court, no appeal lies, as in respect to costs,1 amendments,2 a petition to open a decree,3 to reinstate a cause which has been dismissed, to grant a new trial,5 or to dissolve an injunction, unless the bill has been finally disposed of.6 When an order is made which is intended merely to carry out a decree, this cannot be said to be a final decree from which an appeal lies, as an order of sale in execution of an original decree; 7 or an attachment against a party who refuses to obey a decree of the court.8 Where a provisional decree was entered for the libellant for $4,000 and interest and costs, with liberty to either party, within twenty days, to take an order of reference to a commissioner to ascertain and report the amount due, and on the coming in of the report, either party to be at liberty to move the court to frame the decree in correspondence therewith, this was held not to be a final decree.9 In causes of seizure for the breach of the revenue laws, the right of appeal depends upon the value of the property at the time of seizure, and not on the net proceeds, after expenses, charges, duties, etc., are deducted.10 pleas it was decided that a certain ordinance of the city of Charleston was unconstitutional; but on application to the highest court in the State the decision was reversed, and the writ of error was then brought; and it was held that the decree was a final one, and that the writ of error would lie. See also Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540. 1 Canter v. American Ins. Co. 3 Pet. 307; Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210; United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 237. * Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206; United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 12; Walden v. Craig, 9 Wheat. 576; Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 id. 280. Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238. Welsh v. Mandeville, 7 Cranch, 152. See Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wallace, 97. McCollum v. Eager, 2 How. 61; Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat. 448; Verden v. Coleman, 18 How. 86. See also, generally, Smith v. Trabue, 9 Pet. 4; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 648; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; Evans v. Gee, 14 Pet. 1; Barton v. Forsyth, 5 Wallace, 190. Carr v. Hoxie, 13 Pet. 460. The Yuba, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 314. 10 United States v. 84 Boxes of Sugar, 7 Pet. 453. CHAPTER IV. OF JURISDICTION IN CASES OF SEIZURES. THE district court is the primary court of revenue, having original jurisdiction in all cases of seizures under the statutes of the United States concerning imposts, navigation, or trade; it may try all questions and entertain all suits, either for the condemnation or acquittal of the property seized; and may decree restoration and compel delivery of the property or of its proceeds or value, into the possession of those whom it finds ultimately to be entitled thereto;1 and may do this as well by summary decree or decretal order, if the case be already before the court, as upon original proceedings. It does not derive its jurisdiction from any possession, actual or supposed, of its officers, but from the act and the place of the seizure for the forfeiture;2 and if it once acquire jurisdiction, it seems that this is not avoided by any subsequent irregularity.3 The Abby, 1 Mason, 360. * The libel should, therefore, aver that the vessel has been seized in the district where suit is brought, and that the seizure still subsists. The Washington, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 101. The Bolina, 1 Gallis. 75. On p. 81, Story, J., said: "In the admiralty, in all proceedings in rem, the court has a right to order the thing to be taken into the custody of the law, and it is presumed to be in the custody of the law, unless the contrary appears; and when once a vessel is libelled, then she is considered as in the custody of the law, and at the disposal of the court; and monitions may be issued to persons having the actual custody, to obey the injunctions of the court. The jurisdiction of the admiralty, however, is not founded on that circumstance.” And on p. 83, "The district court of the United States derives its jurisdiction, not from any supposed possession of its officers, but from the act and place of seizure for the forfeiture. Act 24th September, 1789, c. 20. And when once it has acquired a regular jurisdiction, I do not perceive how any subsequent irregularity would avoid it. It may render the ultimate decree ineffectual in certain events, but the regular results of the adjudication must remain. I do not apprehend that an accidental destruction by fire would prevent the court from protecting its officers from prosecution by pronouncing, if just, a regular condemnation." In the case of Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch, 2, the principles of admiralty law |