(249 U. S. 152) er, and dissenting employé has no other remedy MIDDLETON v. TEXAS POWER & LIGHT than withdrawing from the employment. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 MASTER AND SERVANT 347-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) does not deny the equal protection of the laws, in that it excludes from operation of the act domestic servants, farm laborers, employés of railroad carrier, laborers working cotton gin, and employés of persons, etc., employing no more than five; there being sufficient reasons as to each class for their exclusion. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NATION-PRESUMPTION. 48-DISCRIMI There is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 209 PROTECTION CLAUSE-CONSTRUCTION. EQUAL The equal protection clause of the federal Constitution does not require that state laws shall cover the entire field of proper legislation in a single enactment. 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48 OF ACTS-BURDEN OF PROOF. In Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas. Action by Charlie Middleton against the Texas Power & Light Company. From a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (188 S. W. 276), affirming on rehearing, after answer to certified questions (108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556), a judgment dismissing the action, which judgment had been previously reversed (178 S. W. 956), plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Mr. Charles B. Braun, of Waco, Tex., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Harry P. Lawther and Alexander Pope, both of Dallas, Tex., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court. Alleging that in the month of December, 1913, he was in the employ of the Texas Power & Light Company in the state of Texas, and while so employed received VALIDITY serious personal injuries through the bursting of a steam pipe due to the negligence of his The burden is on him who attacks a law for employer and its agents, Middleton sued the unconstitutionality. 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 EQUAL PROTECTION-TEXAS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) does not deny the equal protection of the laws, in that discrimination results from operation of act as between employés of different employers engaged in the same work, where one employer becomes a subscriber and another does not. 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) does not deny the equal protection of laws, because option to become a subscriber rests with employ company in a district court of that state to recover his damages. The defendant interposed an answer in the nature of a plea in abatement setting up that at the time of the accident and at the commencement of the ac tion defendant was the holder of a policy of liability and compensation insurance, issued in its favor by a company lawfully transacting such business in the state, conditioned to pay the compensation provided by the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, which was approved April 16, 1913, and took effect on the 1st day of September in that year (chapter 179, Acts of 33d Legislature, [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) of which fact the plaintiff had proper and timely notice as provided by the act; and that no claim for the compensation provided in the act with respect to the alleged injury had been made by plaintiff, For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 153 but on the contrary he had refused to receive [ suits for damages based on negligence for such compensation, with other matters suffi- injuries to employés or for death resulting cient to bring defendant within the protection | therefrom, and are deprived of the so-called of the act. Plaintiff took a special exception "common-law defenses" of fellow servant's in the nature of a demurrer, upon the negligence and assumed risk, and also of ground (among others) that the act was in contributory *negligence as an absolute deconflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to fense, it being provided that for contributhe Constitution of the United States. The tory negligence damages shall be diminished exception was overruled, the plea in abate- except where the employer's violation of a ment sustained, and the action dismissed. On statute enacted for the safety of employés appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals it was contributes to the injury or death; but that at first held that the judgment must be revers- where the injury is caused by the willful ed (178 S. W. 956); but upon an application intention of the employé to bring it about for a rehearing the constitutional questions the employer may defend on that ground. were certified to the Supreme Court of the Every employer becoming a subscriber to the state. That court sustained the constitution-insurance association is required to give ality of the law (108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556); and in obedience to its opinion the Court of Civil Appeals set aside its former judgment and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Thereupon the present writ of error was sued out under section 237, Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). *Thus we have presented, from the stand-There are administrative provisions, includ point of an objecting employé, the questioning procedure for the determination of diswhether the Texas Employers' Liability Act puted claims. By section 2 of part 1 (Veris in conflict with the due process and equal non's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5246hh) protection provisions of the Fourteenth it is enacted as follows: Amendment. The act creates an employers' insurance association, to which any employer of labor in the state, with exceptions to be mentioned, may become a subscriber; and out of the funds of this association, derived from premiums on policies of liability insurance issued by it to subscribing members and assessments authorized against them if necessary, the compensation provided by the act as due on account of personal injuries sustained by their employés, or on account of death resulting from such injuries, is to be paid. This is a stated compensation, fixed with relation to the employé's average weekly wages, and accrues to him absolutely when he suffers a personal injury in the course of his employment incapacitating him from earning wages for as long a period as one week, or to his representatives or beneficiaries in the event of his death from such injury, whether or not It be due to the negligence of the employer or his servants or agents. Such compensation is the statutory substitute for damages otherwise recoverable because of injuries suffered by an employé, or his death occasioned by such injuries, when due to the negligence of the employer or his servants; it be Ing declared that the employé of a subscribIng employer, or his representatives or beneticiaries in case of his death, shall have no cause of action against the employer for damages except where a death is caused by the willful act or omission or gross negligence of the employer. Employers who do not become subscribers are subject as before to written or printed notice to all his employés that he has provided for the payment by the association of compensation for injuries re ceived by them in the course of their employment. Under certain conditions an employer holding a liability policy issued by an insurance company lawfully transacting such business within the state is to be deemed a subscriber within the meaning of the act. "The provisions of this act shall not apply to actions to recover damages for the personal injuries or for death resulting from personal injuries sustained by domestic servants, farm laborers, nor to the employés of any person, firm or corporation operating any railway as a working for a cotton gin, nor to employés of common carrier, nor to laborers engaged in any person, firm or corporation having in his or their employ not more than five employés." Following the order adopted in the argument of plaintiff in error, we deal first with the contention that the act amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. This is based in part upon the classification resulting from the provisions of the section just quoted, it being said that employés of the excepted classes are left entitled to certain privileges which by the act are denied to employés of the non-excepted classes, without reasonable basis for the distinction. [1] Of course plaintiff in error, not being an employé in *any of the excepted classes, would not be heard to assert any grievance they might have by reason of being excluded from the operation of the act. Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 534, 30 Sup. Ct. 594, 54 L. Ed. 868; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 550, 32 Sup. Ct. 784, 56 L. Ed. 1197; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 271, 33 Sup. Ct. 27, 57 L. Ed. 212, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 544, 34 Sup. Ct. 359, 58 L. Ed. 713; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576, 35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364. But plaintiff in error sets up a griev 158 ance as a member of a class to which the act in its reach (New York Central R. R. Co. v. is made to apply. [2] However, we are clear that the classification cannot be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Texas in sustaining it said (108 Tex. 110, 111, 185 S. W. 561): "Employés of railroads, those of employers having less than five employés, domestic servants, farm laborers and gin laborers are exIcluded from the operation of the act, but this was doubtless for reasons that the Legislature deemed sufficient. The nature of these several employments, the existence of other laws governing liability for injuries to railroad employés, known experience as to the hazards and extent of accidental injuries to farm hands, gin hands and domestic servants, were all matters no doubt considered by the Legislature in exempting them from the operation of the act. Distinctions in these and other respects between them and employés engaged in other industrial pursuits may, we think, be readily suggested. We are not justified in saying that the classification was purely arbitrary." [3, 4] There is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appre ciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds. The equal protection clause does not require that state laws shall cover the entire field of proper legislation in a single enactment. If one entertained the view that the act might as well have been extended to other classes of employment, this would not *amount to a constitutional objection. Rosenthal V. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 271, 33 Sup. Ct. 27, 57 L. Ed. 212, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539; Missouri, Kan. & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 649, 650, 34 Sup. Ct. 678, 58 L. Ed. 1135; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 215, 34 Sup. Ct. 859, 58 L. Ed. 1276, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 525; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227, 34 Sup. Ct. 856, 58 L. Ed. 1288; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 59 L. Ed. 628, L. R. A. 1915F, 829. [5] The burden being upon him who attacks a law for unconstitutionality, the courts need not be ingenious in searching for grounds of distinction to sustain a classification that may be subjected to criticism. But in this case adequate grounds are easily discerned. As to the exclusion of railroad employés, the existence of the federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), as amended by act April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291, applying exclusively as to employés of common carriers by rail injured while employed in interstate commerce, establishing liability for negligence and exempting from liability in the absence of negligence in all cases with Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045, L. R. A. 1918C, 439, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139; Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662), and the difficulty that so often arises in determining in particular instances whether the employé was employed in interstate commerce at the time of the injury (see Pedersen v. Del., Lack. & West. R. R., 229 U. S. 146, 151, 152, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153; North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 259. 260, 34 Sup. Ct. 305, 58 L. Ed. 591, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 159; Illinois Central R. R. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 478, 34 Sup. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 163; New York Central R. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260, 263. 35 Sup. Ct. 780, 59 L. Ed. 1298; Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239 U. S. 50, 36 Sup. Ct. 4, 60 L. Ed. 139; Shanks v. Del., Lack. & West. R. R., 239 U. S. 556, 559, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797; Louisville & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 13, 37 Sup. Ct. 4, 61 L. Ed. 119; Erie R. R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303, 306, 37 Sup. Ct. 116, 61 L. Ed. 319; Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 573, 37 Sup. Ct. 703, 61 L. Ed. 1321, Ann. Cas. islature to the view that it would be unwise 1918B, 69), reasonably may have led the Legto attempt to apply the new system to railroad employés, in whatever kind of commerce employed, and that they might better be left to common-law actions with statu*tory modifications already in force (Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civ. Stat. 1914, arts. 6640 6652), and such others as experience might Ishow to be called for. The exclusion of farm laborers and domes tic servants from the compulsory scheme of the New York Workmen's Compensation Act was sustained in New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 208, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, upon the ground that the Legislature reasonably might consider that the risks inherent in those occupations were exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar. The same result has been reached by the state courts generally. Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 610, 96 N. E. 308; Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N. E. 1; Hunter v. Colfax Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 287, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 490-492, 96 Atl. 340. Similar reasoning may be applied to cotton gin laborers in Texas; indeed, it was applied to taem by the Supreme Court of that state, as we have seen. And the exclusion of domestic servants, farm laborers, casual employés, and railroad employés engaged in interstate commerce was sustained in Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 293, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412. $159 1918) BUTTE & SUPERIOR COPPER CO. v. CLARK-MONTANA REALTY CO. 231 the payment of compensation to the injured | rules of conduct, are subject to legislative employés or their dependents should be ren- modification. And a plan imposing upon the dered secure, and the losses to individual em- employer responsibility for making compenployers distributed, by a system of compensation for disabling or fatal injuries irresation insurance, in which it was deemed im- spective of the question of fault, and requirportant that all employés of a given employer ing the employé to assume all risk of damshould be treated alike. Still further there ages over and above the statutory schedule, are reasons affecting the contentment of the when established as a reasonable substitute employés and the discipline of the force, ren- for the legal measure of duty and responsidering it desirable that all serving under ability previously existing, may be made comcommon employer should be subject to a pulsory upon employés as well as employers. single rule as to compensation in the event N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. of injury or death arising in the course of 188, 198-206, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, the employment. These and other consider- L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629; ations that might be suggested fully justified Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. the legislative body of the state in determin- S. 219, 234, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685, ing that acceptance of the new system should Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642. rest upon the initiative of the employer, and that any particular employé who with notice of the employer's acceptance dissented from the resulting arrangement should be required to exercise his option by withdrawing from the employment. The relation of employer and employé being a voluntary relation, it was well within the power of the state to permit employers to accept or reject the new plan of compensation, each for himself, as a part of the terms of employment; and in doing this there was no denial to employés of (Argued Jan. 10 and 13, 1919. Decided March the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposes of all contentions made under the equal protection clause. [8,9] It is argued further that there is a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law in requiring employés, willingly or unwillingly, to accept the new system where their employer has adopted it. Of course there is no suggestion of a deprivation of vested property *in the present case, since the law was passed in April and took effect in September, while the plaintiff's injuries were received in the following December, after he had been notified of his employer's acceptance of the act. What plaintiff has lost, therefore, is only a part of his liberty to make such contract as he pleased with a particular employer and to pursue his employment under the rules of law that previously had obtained fixing responsibility upon the employer for any personal injuries the plaintiff might sustain through the negligence of the employer or his agents. But, as has been held so often, the liberty of the citizen does not include among its incidents any vested right to have the rules of law remain unchanged for his benefit. All objections to the act on constitutional grounds being found untenable, the judgment under review is Affirmed. (249 U. S. 12) BUTTE & SUPERIOR COPPER CO., Limit- 3, 1919.) No. 598. 1. COURTS 382(5)-FEDERAL JURISDICTION -STATEMENT OF GROUNDS IN PLEADINGSCONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. Plaintiffs' statement of grounds of suit in federal District Court, founded on Montana statute relating to determination of adverse claims, which showed that controversy was over extralateral rights in mining claim and involved more than $3,000, and the construction of Rev. St. §§ 2322, 2324, 2325, and 2332 (Comp. St. §§ 4618, 4620, 4622, 4631), which are foundation of rights to mining claims, held to sufficiently show that jurisdiction of District Court was not rested on diversity of citizenship, and heuce decision of Court of Appeals was not final. 2. MINES AND MINERALS 29(5)—MINING LOCATION-DEFECTS-PARTIES ENTITLED TO OBJECT. Locator of mining claim, claiming rights conflicting with adjoining claim having priority of location, but subsequent patent, could no having knowledge of the possession and work ing of the claim, base any rights on failure of prior locator to comply with a Montana territorial statute relating to declaratory stateThe law ment. of master and servant, as a body of rules of conduct, is subject to change by legislation in the public interest. The definition of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, the effect to be given to them, the rule of respondeat superior, the imposition of liability without fault, and the exemption from liability in spite of fault-all these, as Priority of right in mining claims is not determined by date of entries or patents of the respective claims, but by discovery and locatior, which may be shown by testimony other than the entries and patents. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes #160 The exclusion of employés where not more [ Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, than four or five are under a single employer 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173, Ann. Cas. 1918B, is common in legislation of this character, 627; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., and evidently permissible upon the ground 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, that the conditions of the industry are dif- 412; Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 144 ferent and the hazards fewer, simpler, and Pac. 249; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 96 more easily avoided where so few are em- Atl. 340; Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, ployed together; the Legislature, of course, 186 S. W. 648, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 604; Hunter being the proper judges to determine precise- v. Colfax Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. ly where the line should be drawn. Classifi- 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. cation on this basis was upheld in Jeffrey Cas. 1917E, 803. The Ohio law was sustained Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576-577, by this court against special *attacks in Jef35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364, and has been frey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576, 35 sustained repeatedly by the state courts. Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364, and the Iowa State v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 404, 405, law in Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 213, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694; Borg- et seq., 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 678, Ann. nis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 355, 133 N. W. Cas. 1917D, 637. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489; Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 259, 144 Pac. 249; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 491, 493, 96 Atl. 340. [6] The discrimination that results from the operation of the *act as between the employés of different employers engaged in the same kind of work, where one employer be comes a subscriber and another does not, furnishes no ground of constitutional attack upon the theory that there is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. That the acceptance of such a system may be made optional is too plain for question; and it necessarily follows that differences arising from the fact that all of those to whom the option is open do not accept it must be regarded as the natural and inevitable result of a free choice, and not as a legislative discrimination. They stand upon the same fundamental basis as other differences in the conditions of employment arising from the variant exercise by employers and employés of their right to agree upon the terms of employment. And see Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 354, 133 N. W. 209, 37 LA R. A. (N. S.) 489; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 294, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412. [7] Stress is laid upon the point that the Texas act, while optional to the employer, is compulsory as to the employé of a sub. scribing employer. Our attention is not called to any express provision prohibiting a voluntary agreement between a subscribing employer and one or more of his employés taking them out of the operation of the act; but probably such an agreement might be held by the courts of the state to be inconsistent with the general policy of the act. The Supreme Court, in the case before us, did not intimate that such special agree ments would be permissible; and hence it is fair to assume that all who remain in the employ of a subscribing employer, with notice that he has provided for payment of compensation by the association or by an authorized insurance company, will be bound by the provisions of the act. But a moment's reflection will show the impossibility of giving an option both to the employer and to the employé and enabling them to exercise it in diverse ways. The provisions of the act show that the legislative purpose is that it shall take effect only upon acceptance by both employer and employé. The former accepts by becoming a subscriber; the latter by remaining in the In recent years many of the states have service of the employer after notice of such passed elective workmen's compensation laws not differing essentially from the one here for holding that there is a denial of the equal acceptance. And we see in this no ground in question, and they have been sustained by protection of the laws as between employer well-considered opinions of the state courts and employé. They stand in different relaof last resort against attacks based upon all tions to the common undertaking, and it was kinds of constitutional objections, including permissible to recognize this in determining alleged denial of the equal protection of the how they should accept or reject the new syslaws; usually, however, from the standpoint tem. The employer provides the plant, the of the employer. Sexton v. Newark District organization, the capital, the credit, and Telg. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 85, 86 Atl. 451; Id., necessarily must control and manage the 86 N. J. Law, 701, 91 Atl. 1070; Opinion of operation. In the nature of things his conJustices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308; Young tribution has less mobility than that of the v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1; employé, who may go from place to place) Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327; State v. seeking *satisfactory employment, while the Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 employer's plant and business are comparaL. R. A. (N. S.) 694; Diebeikis v. Link-Belt tively, even if not absolutely, fixed in posiCo., 261 Ill. 454, 104 N. E. 211, Ann. Cas. tion. Again, in order that the new scheme of 1915A, 241; Crooks v. Tazewell Coal Co., 263 compensation should be a success, the LegisIll. 343, 105 N. E. 132, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 304; | lature deemed it proper, if not essential, that 1133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489. *161 |