is, its meaning in American parlance and politics—and this is anything done by authority of government, or by enterprise of individuals acting in concert, or by a single individual, and intended to be permanent. It is admitted that slavery is sought to be established in the territories as an institution. In February, 1858, the President of the United States, in communicating the Lecompton constitution to Congress, after quoting the opinion of the Supreme Court, that, "by virtue of the Constitution of the United States, slavery existed in Kansas," said, in that special message, that, "Kansas was, therefore, at that moment" (in his opinion, of course), "as much a slave State as Georgia or South Carolina." The author of the essay insists that the declaration, that slavery "exists" in Kansas by virtue of the Federal Constitution, is equivalent to, as though convertible with, the declaration that slavery is established there by virtue of that Constitution. The truth hinges on the idea which is conveyed by the word "exists." The negro is carried, as a slave, into Kansas, by his master, by authority of the Constitution, which gives to any citizen of every State equal privileges with any and all others; and so it is, that by that authority, slavery exists in Kansas. As property, it is entitled to the protection of law. The Constitution of the United States, and all laws "in pursuance thereof," and "not inapplicable," are, by the act by which the territory was organized, expressly made the local law. How can any pre-existing law, or at the time existing, in conflict, be now in force there? Yet, slavery is not, as yet, established there as an institution, because the master (not his government) may take him away, or may emancipate him to-morrow. Therefore, though slavery does exist there to-day, it is not as yet,an institutional existence. It is there by virtue of the Federal Constítution, only as a property. If there were no such constitutional provisions as have already been referred to, and which will be again presently specified, still the property would be in the potential protection of the fudamental principle on which free government, as contradistinguished from absolutism, is founded. Of that principle, the constitutional provisions (I now again specify) that no person shall be deprived of his property, except "by due process of law," or "with compensation, for public use," are only appropriate expressions, without which, the potentiality of the principle ought to exist and be observed by all civilized men and all regular governments. Yet, I repeat, slavery is only existing there, as a property. As such it was carried there, by the

voluntary act of the owner, and not by any coercion or institutional fiat of the government which was established and exists by the Constitution which gives permission to the master to introduce into Kansas the existence of slavery. It may be removed by him, at his will. If it become an institution, it will be the result of the permitted act to and of the owner. It will not have been established by any institutional act of the government, whose constitution is the local law, only affording protection of slavery as a property. And the logical constitutional conclusion is, that the only power any government, in our system, intelligible, though it is complex, has over the ownership of the property, except it be taken for debt, or for public use, is, in the words of the Supreme Court of the United States, "the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights" of property; he, with others in the same right, individually, by virtue of the authority on them severally conferred, by the Constitution of the United States, having, in the territory, and in the new State, established the institution.

It is deemed not inappropriate in this reply, which hinges on the expression, in the Kansas act of 1854, that the territorial people must form their institutions, "subject to the Constitution of the United States," and which finds its strength, more in the principle than in that or any other occasional expression of it-to̟ bring in aid of the reply, and as shedding light on the subject, a fact repellant of popular sovereignty in the territories over the ownership of slavery a fact having such strength, not in its actual occurrence at the time of it, and, therefore, shedding such light, but in the essential nature of its having inherent relevancy to direct and explicit legislation, which, alone, is suitable to free government, and consistent with popular institutions, claiming the affectionate loyalty of the citizen. The significant fact is, that to the words, "subject only to the Constitution of the United States," as they are now found in the Kansas act, Senator Chase moved to add these words, to wit: "under which the people of the territory, through their appropriate representatives, may, if they see fit, prohibit the existence of slavery therein;" and the motion was negatived by a vote of thirty-six to ten, in the Senate of the United States. If it was intended, by the rejection, to deny that the power exists in the territorial people, through their appropriate representatives," which means no less their delegates in convention to form a constitution, than their delegates in the territorial legislature,

then the doctrine has already been endorsed by the Senate, that it is in the competency of Congress to refuse to admit a territorial people as a State, under a constitution prohibiting among them the existence of slavery. If such prohibition, in the judgment of the Senate, is not within the constitutional competency of a territorial people, when forming a constitution to become a State, it is difficult to see why the Senate did not add an amendment, in lieu of that of Senator Chase, so as to define what they meant by "subject to the Constitution of the United States." If the amendment was rejected, and its converse was not proposed, on purpose to refer the rights of property in slaves, in the territory, to the decision. of the courts, then it looks very much like intentional dodging of a legislative function, and referring its fulfilment, where it less belongs, if, indeed, it be not in this judicial sphere, where the laws are expounded, utterly inappropriate. In either view or any, it can only best be said for the Senate, that they have left it in doubt and disputation, what is meant by the expression "subject to the Constitution of the United States," in the Kansas act. It is submitted to the candid judgment of the country, that the expression does mean, in direct conflict with the views of the author and advocate of " popular sovereignty," that the incoming State must conform its constitntion to the federal pattern, or be rejected if in conflict.

It has been said that these discussions of the territorial question, are mere speculations of no practical value. I have recently heard an eminent divine make a remark which is worthy of a record. The remark was, that it is often erroneously said, and by well-meaning and intelligent men, that controverted points in Christianity, are mere speculations, and so put aside. "Grave mistake that," he said; "for it is always, and at every point, of practical importance, to strive to inculcate, and to have a correct understanding of the Bible." The attribute of discussion, which never fails to give it practical attractiveness, is, that the discussion be conducted in the right spirit. And so it is of the political discussion in hand. A right understanding of the constitutional powers of our governments, whether State, territorial or federal, is ever practical, and if aimed at by discussions, conducted in the right spirit, would, very soon, be practicable.

ART. VI.-MACKAY'S TRAVELS IN AMERICA,

THE DUAL FORM OF LABOR.

[The following able article is from the pen of Wm. J. Grayson, of South Carolina, which has often adorned our pages. We take it from the October number of Russell's Magazine. It will be read advantageously, in connection with Mr. Fitzhugh's article on the same subject, which appeared in our November number.-ED.]

THE Southern States receive annually, with their woollens and negro shoes, a large supply of morbid sentiment, volunteer advice, malignant abuse, and misplaced commiseration. The anti-slave producers of these commodities are indefatigable. A single fact will indicate their weight and influence in Southern opinion. While slavery is attacked, the slave rises in value. The property assailed, is estimated more and more highly every day. The confidence of the garrison steadily increases under the enemy's fire. The supposed sick man grows hourly stronger in spite of the evil prognostics and sinister practice of the doctor.

But although this fact is the most conclusive of answers, it may not be amiss to review the subject occasionally, to state the argument anew, to correct falsehood, and intimate to intermeddlers of all degrees and temper, that when no reply is made they must not construe careless or contemptuous silence into acquiescence or conviction.

For this reason, we offer to our readers a few remarks on the vital question of labor. We shall use without reserve the facts and reasonings of those who have gone before us. The topic admits of little novelty. Something perhaps in the mode of statement, nothing more. While doing this, we shall attempt to soothe the sorrows of a learned traveller, who lately mourned over us in prose and verse, and strive to convince him that his sympathies and sensibilities are somewhat superfluously expended in our country, and may find an ample field for exercise in his own; that other rivers besides the 'Mississippi" are witnesses of the laboring man's griefs and privations; that even on the banks of the Thames, and within the limits of London, Dr. Mackay may find, if he pleases, evils more intolerable to humanity than any the negro in America has ever been forced to endure.

Philanthropy, like other fashions, has its cant and slang. Its finest dress is a flimsy rhetoric, which is getting seedy. It began with Mr. Clarkson. We are told by his biographer, that he took slavery as a subject for rhetorical exercise at school, and was so well pleased with its capabilities that he made it a standing topic for a lifelong declamation. What chance was there for fairness or moderation? How could he hope to escape exaggeration, distortion, injustice, falsehood? He makes slavery a monster, a new infernal machine, never before heard of in the world's history. It is, in truth, a form of labor only--one of the two forms of labor which have been known and used in all ages.

The laborers of the world may be distributed into two classes— hired men and bondsmen. These two classes have always existed, among all nations, under every form of civil government. They are essentially the same. They perform the same indispensable functions in the state, those of hewers of wood and drawers of water. Labor takes one or the other of these forms, according to circumstances of climate, productions, race. The evils and advantages of their conditions are similar. We will proceed to compare them.

The comparison may give offence to fastidious gentlemen, or to demagogues, in search of political capital. In reply to a speech of Mr, Hammond, in the Senate, Mr. Banks, of Massachusetts, was angry and indignant with our distinguished Senator, for asserting that the "mud sill" of society is essentially the same, whether the material be white or black.

The phrase "mud sill" is not elegant, perhaps, but it is very expressive. It indicates forcibly the two forms or classes of labor. In this country, these two forms are composed of different races and different colors one of African, and the other of European descent. Negroes only, with us, are slaves. Hired men are whites. The negro is an inferior race. The black mud sill is not made from as good stuff as the white. This is admitted, and this is the ground of offence. But the inferiority of race being admitted, why may we not, for all that, compare the darker with the lighter colored? Moralists are accustomed to compare the highest condition of life with the lowest-the prince with the peasant-and to estimate their relative chances for happiness; why not weigh the good and ill attendant on the two humblest stations of society-on the hired man and the slave?

Is Mr. Banks offended, because the hired men of his constituents are compared to slaves? Why should he or they be offended? Both kinds of laborers are hard-working men. Both live by daily toil. All honest labor is entitled to reverence; that of the slave not less so than any other. Who despises it? Not the Supreme Judge, who is no respecter of persons, and weighs all alike in the same balances. Not right-thinking men, among whom the faithful slave has an admitted claim to all honor and respect, a far juster claim than his idle or profligate brother laborer, who may boast of his freedom. The honest slave is worthy to take any man by the hand. He is accustomed to be so received by slaveholders. It is not among them that contempt for the upright slave is the prevailing sentiment.. sentiment prevails among the professed friends of the slave, with sentimental travellers and clerical abolitionists and anti-slavery politicians, with Mr. Banks, especially, the mouth-piece of the sympathizing party.

The

But it is not by slaveholders only, that comparisons are made between hired laborers and slave laborers. The parallel is obvious to all eyes. It is seen among States of hired labor as plainly as in slave States. It is pointed at frequently by British journals, authors, and official reports.

VOL. III.-NO. I.

4