siastical and political powers, and also all laws by which ministers of religion could be maintained from the public treasury, or receive pay for their religious services, but from the private purse and voluntary contributions of those who chose to employ them.

It will be proper here to observe, that the 13th section of the 7th article of the new constitution, which, in concurrence with the above quoted article of the former constitution of this State, declares that "all such parts of the common law, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New-York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the nineteenth day of April one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five; and the resolutions of the congress of the said colony, and of the convention of the State of New-York, in force on the twentieth day of April one thousand seven hundred and seventyseven, which have not since expired, or been repealed or altered; and such acts of the legislature of this State as are now in force, shall be and continue to be the law of this State, subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the same: But all such parts of the said common law, and such of the said acts or parts thereof, as are repugnant to this constitution, are hereby abrogated.” Thereby leaving in statu quo, where the declaration of independence and the constitution of 1777 had left them, "abrogated and rejected," all those laws "which might be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of christians or their ministers," as well as all others tending to amalgamate ecclesiastical and political powers, or in any way to infringe the religious liberty of the people, or of any individual within this State.

In the same spirit and with the same view to religous liberty, it is declared in the first and the present constitution, that "no minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall, at any time hereafter, under any pretence or description whatever, be eligible to, or capable of holding any civil or military office or place within this state."

Yet, notwithstanding so much care had been taken to guard against ecclesiastical encroachments, we find, in a very few years after the adoption of the first constitution of this State, priests were ushered into the halls of political legislation, not only, (as we shall show,) without legal authority, but in direct opposition to the spirit and express provisions of that instrument. This incipient step towards a union of religion and political legislation, is a measure but of recent date, and seems to have been introduced when the principles of our

free republican government and the provisions of the constitution were not kept in view. Before the revolution, while New-York was a colony to a nation governed by a union of church and state powers, no provision was made by the provincial legislature for the support of chaplains, nor were any ever employed to officiate before that body. Such continued to be the case for a few years after the adoption of the constitution of 1777, no chaplain being appointed by either branch of the Legislature. The precise time when they first received a legislative call to mingle religion and politics together, is not fully ascertained. But is well understood that the practice was never authorized by any provision of the constitution; and for many years was destitute of any statutory enactment to sanction it: nor was it ever based on higher authority than the naked resolutions of the two branches of the Legislature, each acting independently of the other, until the year 1829, when by the Revised Statutes, first part, page 161, section saventh, chapter seventh, title sixth, the pay of chaplains was first prescribed by law, and priests thus recognized as if they were legitimate and necessary appurtenances to the legislative department of the State.

The history of the incipient and successive measures, which resulted in the above mentioned statutory union of ecclesiastical and political concerns, is another illustration of the truth, that the least participation of clerical with civil authority, is dangerous to the liberties of the people; and proves the wisdom of the celebrated Junius, who strongly admonished his fellow-citizens, "never to suffer an invasion of their political constitution, however minute the instance might appear, to pass without a determined, persevering resistance. One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute law. What yesterday was fact, to day is doctrine. Examples are supposed to justify the most dangerous measures, and when they do not exactly suit, the defect is supplied by analogy. This is not the cause of faction, or of a party, or of an individual; but the common interest of every man in the community."

The adoption and continuance of the practice under consideration, after the nullification of all laws uniting church and state, "and after the adoption of a constitution of civil government repugnant to it, both in its spirit and provisions, is no sufficient reason for its further continuance; proof of its harmless influence on the religious liberties of the people. So intimate an association of official legislative duties, with religious forms and ceremonies, is a practical approxi

mation to a union of church and state. The facility which it affords for the exercise of clerical influence in the legislative department of the government," militates against the equal rights of conscience, and also accounts for the existence and continuance of several other laws on our statute books, which actually trench on religious liberty, in contravention to those provisions of the constitution which were intended to repress the evil spirit of religious intolerance and per

secution.

Your committee will now proceed to show that the Legislature possess no legitimate authority to associate religious prayers with legislative proceedings, nor to appoint legislative chaplains, nor to appropriate the public money to pay for any religious service: and because,

1st. No such authority has been delegated to them: and,

2d. Because the exercise of such powers is not only repugnant to the constitution, but expressly interdicted by it.

It will not be denied, and hence not necessary to prove that the Legislature is vested with civil powers only; and have not been clothed with spiritual jurisdiction. Nor will it be requisite to inquire into the utility of religious prayers, or the obligation to pray, as a religious duty. "Religion is a concern between a man's conscience and his God, with which no human tribunal has a right to meddle." If prayer be deemed an act of religious devotion, the Legislature have no authority officially to perform it, nor to require others to do so, or to attend its performance. The people have not delegated power to the Legislature to perform religious worship of any kind; and if prayers are acts of ecclesiastical character and of religious duty, legislative prayers are acts of supererogation; and legislative acts which transcend the powers delegated by the people to the Legislature, are an official exercise of "power beyond the law," and as unauthorized as they would be if expressly interdicted by those provisions of the constitution which are intended to prevent an alliance of political and ecclesiastical powers, and to preserve the unrestrained exercise and enjoyment of religious opinion.

But the absence of legal authority is not the only objection to which the practice under consideration is obnoxious. It often interferes with the legitimate business of the Legislature, and thus operates unpropitiously to the public interest. Some members of the Legislature, like many of their constituents, conscientiously dis

approve of prayers altogether; others are averse to legislative prayers; others again do not hold to prayers in public places; and amidst the congregated assembly of persons of various religious sects and adverse religious opinions, and who are elected without reference to their religious creeds, there are but few who can at any one time join heartily in the service. And the effect produced in the minds of such as are induced by courtesy, or are constrained by a species of legal coercion to attend legislative prayer meetings, is any thing but piety or "a praying spirit."

Mankind are generally averse to associate in religious devotion with any but those whose feelings and faith accord with their own; and although regard to the opinions of others may often induce some occasionally to listen with respectful attention to a sincere supplicant; yet being as many of the members of the Legislature frequently are, annoyed by the repeated annunciation of sentiments out of harmony with their own; and finding at length their courtesy greatly over taxed, their feeling constantly disobliged, and their convictions as often counteracted by attending prayers in which they have no faith, and with those with whom they cannot consistently with their own creeds, have any religious communion or fellowship, they usually absent themselves from the legislative chambers until after the ecclesiastical business of the house shall have been concluded. Hence it is, that during prayer time, there is seldom more than a lean quorum in attendance, and often less. It was doubtless owing to the extended operation of the same cause, that on one occasion during the present session the Speaker adjourned the House of Assembly for want of a quorum to transact legislative business, although a great majority of the members were in and about the Capitol, and appeared in the legislative chamber in a very few minutes after the adjournment.

Having shown that getting up legislative religious prayers are inconsistent with the authority delegated to the Legislature, unauthorized by the constitution, and hence an exercise of "powers beyond the law" it would seem superfluous to prove that the Legislature have no legitimate power to appoint legislative chaplains.

It is a self-evident and incontrovertible principle, that no person nor body of men have a right to empower others to do that which no one, nor any number, have a right to do themselves. The Legislature having no right to convert the legislative chambers into "re

ligious session rooms," nor to transform the legislative assemblies of the political delegates of the people into religious "prayer meetings;" nor any right to attempt, by official vote, to constrain the minority, against their religious opinions, to submit to such an incongruous intermixture of political and religious concerns: Consequently, they have no right to appoint others to do so; and hence, conclusively, have no right to appoint ministers of religion, nor priests of any denomination, to say prayers, or to perform any other kind of religious service for the Legislature.

See to what extreme absurdities, and to what revolting results a concession of the power in question would lead.

The exercise of power by the Legislature, to employ priests to perform religious worship, not being authorised by the constitution or constitutional law, is altogether an assumed power. Originating in the bare will of the Legislature, it has no limit of time, place nor extent. Dependent alone on the legislative will, it is as uncertain and unstable as the fluctuating opinions of mankind, and as undefined and undefinable as the future opinions of different men at different times, who might in their turn assume authority to legislate on religious matters. Being subjected to legislative will, it can be altered at any time, moulded to any shape, directed to any object, used for any purpose, and carried, under religious and moral pretences, to any extent to which the Legislature, according to their good will and pleasure, may from time to time think proper to dictate.

If the right of the Legislature to appoint chaplains to pray were to be admitted, the right to employ them to preach and sing psalms could not be denied. All are religious services, and are deemed by many to be religious duties. By the like assumed authority by which the Legislature employ chaplains to pray at one time, they could employ them to do the like, or any other religious service, at any other time; on Sunday as well as on any other day; and at one place as well as another. If in the halls of legislation, why not out of them? If in the form of prayer, why not in any other manner? What then could prevent their assuming authority to direct and regulate religious worship throughout the State? The precedent for such a measure is before them; and can be followed as legally, and with as much propriety as that which attaches to the example set by the State Executive, who, under his official proclamation, with the air of legality, the apparent forms of law, and the language of recom. mendation, prescribes the performance of religious worship on fast