furnish an accurate and complete transcript and exhibition of all estates, titles, interests, claims, encumbrances, and charges, both legal and equitable, in and upon every parcel of land which has come into private ownership within the territorial limits over which the particular record extends; and that a person about to deal with respect to any parcel of land, should be able to discover, or find the means of discovering, every existing outstanding estate, title, or interest in it which could affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser. The ideal of the system is, that a person about to purchase a parcel of land should be able, from an accurate search of the records, to find everything which could possibly affect the validity of the title; so that, if the title of his intended grantor appeared on the records to be perfect, then as a matter of fact it necessarily would be perfect. This is the theory of the legislation as established by judicial interpretation; and the general design has, as far as possible, been carried into effect by the courts.1

In New York, and many other states where the common law dower still exists unaltered as a part of the law of real estate, an objection is sometimes urged against the continuance of this dower right, because titles apparently good on the record, may be, and often are, invalidated or impaired by claims for dower not appearing on the record, but resting upon and established by facts entirely dehors the record, and of which the record gives no notice, and could not give any. For example, the record shows a complete chain of conveyances vesting the title to a certain parcel of land in Samuel Brown; it also shows a deed of the same parcel from Samuel Brown, and other subsequent conveyances, regularly connected from grantor to grantee, and finally conveying the land to the present owner, Peter Jones. When Jones purchased, the record showed what was apparently a perfect, valid, unincumbered title in his immediate grantor; and, relying upon such apparently perfect record title, he purchased the land, took a conveyance of it, and paid a price equal to its full value. And yet the land in his hands is liable to a claim of dower in favor of Samuel Brown's widow,-a claim of which the records give, and could give, no intimation. At the time of the conveyance to him Brown was married; as his wife did not join in his deed of the land, her inchoate right of dower still attached to it and followed it in the hands of all subsequent grantees, and, finally, when her husband died, leaving her as his widow, her dower right became consummate, and could be enforced upon the land in the hands of its then owner-Jones. The claim of dower would thus depend upon the fact of Brown's marriage, and of his death, leaving a widow surviving him,-facts which would not

1 This general intent of the recording system was well stated by the court in United States Ins. Co. v. Shierer, 3 Md. Ch. 381, as follows: The legislative intent was "that all rights, incumbrances, or conveyances, touching, connected with, or in any way concerning land, should appear on the public records."

and could not appear on the records, unless the whole record system should be supplemented by the additional requirement that all marriages, divorces, and deaths of husbands and wives, should be registered. Such legislation would be a very great improvement of the whole system of recording, and would remove nearly all the obstacles to the absolute perfection of record titles in all those states where the community property system does not prevail. It would not, however, in the slightest degree obviate or remove the uncertainties resulting from the existence of community property. In this country, in pursuance of the design of the system, as above described, it has become the general practice of purchasers, mortgagees, and other incumbrancers, to rely upon the titles as shown by the record. If a search properly made discloses a title apparently perfect on the record as held by the intended grantor, or mortgagor, or other owner, then, as a general rule, and according to the general practice, reliance could be placed upon the title thus exhibited by the records, as being actually valid, and no further inquiry or investigation would be made into its validity. A reliance thus reposed upon the validity of titles as appearing on the records, has become habitual with all persons dealing with land in this country. If the system of recording is so perfect and complete that it always justifies such reliance, then no more admirable system could be contrived. If, on the other hand, the system of recording frequently fails to justify such reliance; if, for any reason, persons dealing with land are liable to be misled by the records; if, through imperfections of the method, titles apparently valid and perfect on the record may, to any considerable extent, be actually invalid; if the actual validity of titles apparently perfect on the record may, in numerous instances, depend upon facts entirely outside of the record, facts which are not, and cannot be, disclosed by the record, but which must be established by extrinsic and perhaps verbal evidence; then a system so imperfect and misleading might be more injurious in its practical effects, and might be productive of greater inconvenience, than an entire absence of any system of recording. In such a case, it might be better to abolish the whole system of recording, and to return to the methods which still prevail in England.

The uncertainties of record titles resulting from claims of dower in New York and many other states, are serious, and the objections thence arising to the continued existence of dower in those states, are certainly weighty; but, in my opinion, the uncertainties, discrepancies, and even contradictions among record titles which may, and it would seem necessarily must, arise in this state from the community property system, are much greater in number and importance than those which can possibly result from the common law dower. Among these uncertainties I will mention the following:

1. In certain instances of acquiring and conveying community property, there must of necessity be a break or interruption in the chain of record title. That is, a continued chain of conveyances on record will show the title to a parcel of land as vested in a certain person A., and will there end; while a second chain of conveyances of the same parcel will start from another person B., and the record will not necessarily disclose anything showing the existence of any legal relation between these two persons,-a legal relation by virtue of which B. could convey the title which had thus been vested in A. The excellency of the recording system, as a means of protection to intended purchasers and incumbrancers, consists chiefly in this, that a chain of title can be traced unbroken on the records from the present owner up through each grantee and grantor to the original source of title. Anything which interrupts or breaks this chain, which prevents a party from tracing it throughout its whole length until it reaches its original source of titleany link left out-may destroy the entire benefit of the records as a notice; that is, may interrupt and mislead a party in making a search This result must or may always happen whenever land, being community property, is acquired by and conveyed to a wife during the marriage. The deed to her put on record shows a perfect chain from the original source of title to her. There is no deed on record from her; the record chain of title ends in her. A deed of the same parcel of land is afterwards given by the husband alone, in his own name, and from this deed when recorded begins a new chain of record title. The records do not, or need not disclose the existence of the marriage relation between them; and from the mere fact of their having the same name, no presumption arises that they are husband and wife. If the husband conveys the land, and through subsequent conveyances it comes into the ownership of a certain person, and an intended purchaser from such owner should make a search, he could trace the title up to the husband, Mr. A.; and then, so far as the records show, the title would stop. The records would give no intimation that the land was community property, and no intimation of where the title came from to Mr. A. The records would not show that A. was married; and even if by chance the intended purchaser should see the deed to Mrs. A., the records might give no intimation that she was the wife of Mr. A. In such cases, unless the deeds themselves contained the proper explanatory recitals, there would necessarily be an interruption and break in the chain of record title.

(To be continued.)

J. N. P.

CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLORADO.

IRON SILVER MINING COMPANY v. REYNOLDS ET AL.

November 18, 1884.

LODE SITUATE WITHIN PLACER MINE-RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF.-As against a mere intruder the grantees under a placer patent are entitled to the possession of a lode situated within the placer grant, although at the time of the application for such patent the applicants knew of the existence of such lode.

ACTION for possession of specific real property. The instructions state the facts.

G. G. Symes, for the plaintiff.

Morrison, Wenzell, Thomas and Patterson, for the defendants.

HALLETT, D. J. (Instructing the jury.) The evidence tends to prove that the lode in controversy was known to Wells and Moyer, grantees of the United States, at the time they made application for the placer patent under which plaintiff claims title. Also that Wm. H. Stevens, one of the grantees of Wells and Moyer and a grantor of plaintiff, knew of the existence of the lode at the time application was made by Wells and Moyer for the placer patent, procured such application to be made with a view to acquire title to himself and his associates to the territory described, and probably with a view and an intention to acquire title to the lode now in dispute in this action. Assuming the placer patent to have been obtained with knowledge and intention on the part of the patentees, as stated, the question is whether any right or interest in the lode in controversy, was conveyed by the patent. That is a question of some difficulty when presented by or on behalf of one who has shown some right or interest in the lode, or an intention to claim the same according to local law and the acts of congress. But here the defendants show no title or right in the lode at the place in controversy. They assume the right to follow the lode and its dip without the side line of the Pinnacle location and under the Wells and Moyer placer location. So that it is essential that they have the top and apex of the lode within their location, in the general direction of the location. A small segment of the top and apex of the lode is shown within the Crown Point location; but it extends, not with the length of the location, but across it, so as to convert the side lines of the claim into end lines, and to limit the direction in which it may be pursued to the space enclosed by those lines. The place in controversy is not within the side lines of either of defendants' locations, nor within the extension of those lines. No other ground is perceived upon which defendants may assert title or right of possession to the place in controversy, and therefore they are to be regarded as naked intruders. And as to such intruders the plaintiffs' placer title may give a right of possession and recovery.

The jury is advised to find for plaintiff, with the value of the ore removed from the placer ground by defendants.

SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO.

HUGHES v. BREWER.

Filed October 31, 1884.

ACTION BY ASSIGNEE-ALLEGATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT-DENIAL OF ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF. In an action by an assignee of a judgment, allegations of assignment are material and proof thereof are essential to a recovery by the plaintiff. The facts connected with such assignment are not presumptively within the knowledge of the defendant. He may, there fore, specifically deny the allegations of assignment, basing his denials upon information and belief. An answer containing such denials should not be stricken from the files as sham. JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURT-AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY-AVERMENT OF.-A complaint in an action in the county court need not allege, in the very words of the statute, that the amount in controversy does not exceed two thousand dollars. It is sufficient if it affirmatively appears from the complaint that the value of the property in controversy, or the amount involved for which relief is sought, does not exceed that sum.

APPEAL from the county court of Arapahoe county. The opinion states the facts.

J. B. Brockway, for the appellant.

A. B. McKinley, I. N. Stevens and Allen & Furgeson, for the appellee.

BECK, C. J. This was an action upon a judgment rendered by the district court of Albany county, Wyoming territory, in favor of one John McLean and against the appellant Hughes.

The action was brought in the court below by the appellee Brewer, who alleged in his complaint: that said judgment had been assigned to him for a valuable consideration, and that no part of the judgment had been paid.

The questions of law involved arise upon the answer of the defendant Hughes, and the rulings and action of the county court therein.

The answer is as follows: "And now comes the said defendant, and for answer to the said plaintiff's complaint herein, says: that, as to the allegation in said complaint, 'That on the second day of December, A. D. 1880, for a valuable consideration, by said plaintiff, Brewer, unto the said McLean paid, the said John McLean did assign and convey unto plaintiff the judgment,' defendant has not and cannot obtain sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief, and, therefore, denies that said plaintiff paid said McLean anything whatever for said judgment, and denies that the said judgment was assigned by said McLean to said Brewer, and denies that said Brewer is the owner of said judgment; and avers that said McLean is now the real owner of said judgment; and avers that said McLean is the real party in interest in this suit : Wherefore, defendant demands that he be allowed to hence without day, and have judgment for his costs in this suit."

The answer was properly verified. The plaintiff moved the court to strike the answer from the files, and for judgment for want of an answer, on the ground that the answer was a sham pleading, and sought to raise an immaterial issue.