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right, to be admitted to bail pending an appeal by him, even though a certificate of
probable cause for the appeal has issued; but bail in such cases is discretionary, and
where the court in which the conviction was had has, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, denied bail to a defendant pending an appeal by him, the appellate court will
not revise its action, where it is not plainly to be seen that the discretion has been
abused. Clawson's Case. Utah, 416.

4. HABEAS CORPUS-REVIEW ON OF ORDER DENYING BAIL.-Whether the appellate
court, in any event, can, by habeas corpus, review the action of the trial court in
denying bail, considered doubtful but not decided; for the writ is not one of re-
view, and confers no appellate jurisdiction. Id.

See CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT, 4, 5, 10.

BANKRUPTCY.

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1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-BANKRUPTCY LAW-PROVABLE CLAIM-WHEN ACTION
MAY BE MAINTAINED IN STATE COURT--UNREASONABLE DELAY OF BANKRUPT.-
The plaintiff brought this action to collect a promissory note. The defendant plead-
ed the statute of limitations. The replication averred that the defendant had been
adjudged a bankrupt by the United States district court for the northern district of
Illinois, in proceedings under the national bankruptcy act then in force; that the
note sued on was a claim provable in said proceedings; that the defendant had never
been discharged in bankruptcy, and that he had unreasonably delayed taking the
necessary steps to procure such discharge. Held, that the replication stated facts
sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations; that the plaintiff, not having proved
his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, within the meaning of section 5105 of the
revised statutes of the United States, was entitled to bring an action thereon with-
out first obtaining the consent of the bankruptcy court, after the bankrupt had un-
reasonably delayed his application for a discharge; and that the state court, in
which such action was brought, had jurisdiction to determine whether the bank-
rupt had been guilty of unreasonable delay in applying for his discharge. Brooks
v. Bates. Col. 463.

BIAS.

See JURY AND JURORS, 3.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

1. IRRELEVANT LANGUAGE ADDRESSED TO JURY-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.-Objections
taken to irrelevant language addressed to the jury by counsel will not be reviewed
by the appellate court unless the same are embodied in a bill of exceptions. State
v. Drake. Or. 574.

2. TRIAL BY REFEREE-EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS ON REPORT OF.-When no exceptions
are preserved to the rulings of the district court upon the issues presented by the
report of a referee and the exceptions thereto, or to the final judgment entered
thereon, the supreme court is precluded from reviewing such judgment upon the
evidence. People v. Rocky Mountain Transportation Co. Col. 557.

3. THE SAME BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-REVIEW OF EVIDENCE.-Where no bill of excep-
tions has been taken or preserved, and the evidence contained in the record is not
properly authenticated, the supreme court cannot consider any exceptions that may
have been saved at the trial to the admission or rejection of testimony, but must
presume that the findings of fact are correct. Id.

See INSTRUCTIONS, 8; JURY AND JURORS, 12.

BONDS.

1. COUNTY BONDS-FORM OF, AFTER ACT OF 1883.--One who has contracted to pur-
chase county bonds issued after the passage of the county government act of March
14th, 1863, cannot be compelled to take such bonds unless the same are in the form
prescribed by such act. County of Merced v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia. Cal. 186.

2. THE BONDS ISSUED UNDER THE ACT OF APRIL 4TH, 1864, ARE VALID, and the inter-
est due thereon must be paid by the state to the holders thereof. Bank of Califor-
nia v. Dunn, Controller, etc. Cal. 223.

3. PURCHASE OF BONDS FOR SCHOOL FUND-HOW TO BE PAID-HOW DETERMINED. —
In determining the amount to be paid by the commissioners for the purchase of ter-

ritorial bonds for the benefit of the school fund (under the statute of 1879, 15, sec-
tion 3), the method of computation is to take the bonds at the date of delivery,
calculate the interest thereon at nine and one-half per cent. per annum until March
1st, 1887, when the bonds would become due, add the interest to the principal, then
discount this amount by four and one-half per cent., and the balance is the amount
to be paid under the statute. To ascertain the true discount, divide the amount of
the principal and interest on the bonds by one dollar plus the product of the rate
multiplied by the time in years; the quotient is the sum to be paid by the state for
the bonds. Subtract this sum from the amount of the debt, and the true discount
remains. Subtract the principal sum, without interest, from the quotient, and the
premium remains. Livingston et al. v. The State. Nev. 31.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Boone's Law of Mortgages, 387.

Pierce's Fraudulent Mortgages of Merchandise, 388.
Peeler's Law and Equity, 386.

Sedgwick & Wait on Trial of Title to Land, 441.
Taylor on Private Corporations, 442.

BOUNDARIES.

L BOUNDARIES-PAROL EVIDENCE-INTENTION OF GRANTOR.-In a legal action for the
recovery of land, the boundary of which is described in the deed as commencing at
a given point, and running thence to a point on a small creek about two hundred
varas south, and thence, etc., parol evidence is inadmissible to show that the grantor
intended the line to run to a creek one thousand eight hundred and fifty varas in the
same direction. If there was no such creek in that direction nearer than one thou-··
sand eight hundred and fifty varas, the reference to "a small creek" should be re-
jected. Irving v. Cunningham et al. Cal. 136.

See DEEDS.

BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See CONTRACT, 1-3, 5; MASTER AND SERVANT.

BROKER.

See SALE, 2.

CAUSE OF ACTION.

See ABATEMENT, 1.

CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.

See APPEAL, 16.

CERTIORARI.

1. CERTIORARI-OBJECT OF THE WRIT-NO REHEARING PERMISSIBLE AFTER JUDGMENT.—
An error or irregularity committed in the exercise of a court's jurisdiction is not re-
viewable on certiorari. A rehearing after judgment on a writ of review cannot be
had in the lower court. The case is heard there upon the return made to the writ;
and the only question upon the return is, whether the court, whose judgment or
order is the subject-matter of review, pursued its jurisdiction. The judgment ren-
dered on that question is reviewable only on appeal, Alexander v. Municipal Court
of Appeals. Cal. 299.

2. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL BY MUNICIPAL COURT OF APPEALS-NOTICE OF TO APPEL-
LANT.-The municipal court of appeals of the city and county of San Francisco had
jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal from the justices' court taken on questions of law
and fact, after the same has been placed on the calendar by stipulation of the parties,
if the appellant fails to appear at the trial, although no notice of the motion to dis-
miss had been given. Such dismissal, even, if irregular, is not reviewable on cer-
tiorari. Id.

3. CERTIORARI-JUDICIAL OFFICER-MINISTERIAL ACTS OF.-The action of a judicial
officer in regard to matters which are exclusively executive or legislative in their
nature, even when the statute requiring the performance of such matters is uncon-
stitutional, cannot be removed by certiorari. State ex rel. Esmeralda County v.
Third District Court. Nev. 597.

4. THE SAME-APPORTIONMENT OF DEBT OF ESMERALDA COUNTY-ACTS OF DISTRICT
JUDGE.-The acts required to be performed by the district judge in determining the
amount of the indebtedness of Esmeralda county to be assumed and paid by Lyon
county, under the act of 1883, are not judicial in their nature, and cannot be re-
viewed by certiorari. Id.

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The county

5. COUNTY COURT-CERTIORARI TO JUSTICE'S COURT-PETITION FOR.
court is expressly authorized, by section 1992 of the general statutes, to review the
action of a justice's court on certiorari, where, without fault on his part, the peti-
tioner is unable to take his appeal in the usual way. The petitioner for such appeal
must allege, first, that the judgment before the justice was not the result of negli-
gence on his part; second, that the judgment, in his opinion, is erroneous and unjust,
stating wherein such error and injustice consist; and third, that it was not in his
power to take an appeal in the ordinary way, setting forth the particular circum-
stances which prevented him from so doing. Small et al. v. Bischelberger. Col. 558.
6. ON A MOTION TO QUASH Such Writ of ČERTIORARI, the averments of the petition
therefor must be taken as true. They cannot be contradicted by affidavits. Id.
7. THE SAME WHEN DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WRIT.-The plaintiff in an action
in the justice's court, promised the defendant, for a valuable consideration, to dismiss
such action. Relying upon such promise, the defendant failed to attend at the trial.
Instead of dismissing, the plaintiff procured a judgment, but withheld the levy of
the execution until after the time for appeal had expired. The defendant was igno-
rant of the judgment until the execution was levied. Held, upon a petition showing
the above facts, that the defendant was entitled to a writ of certiorari from the
county court to review the action of the justice. Id.

8. A JUDGMENT WHICH IS SATISFIED IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF REVIEW BY CERTIORARI. —
The judgment of an inferior court, though entered without jurisdiction, which is
paid by the party against whom the judgment is rendered, and satisfaction of judg
ment entered, is not the subject of review by certiorari. Madsen v. Kenner. Utah,

415.

9. WRIT OF REVIEW-DOES NOT LIE AFTER EXPIRATION OF TIME FOR APPEAL.-A
writ of review does not lie to bring up the record of the proceedings of a county
court in a civil action after the right of appeal has expired by the lapse of more than
thirty days since the rendition of the judgment. Broback v. Huff. Or. 339.
10. CERTIORARI-ORDER MADE AFTER JUDGMENT-DELAY IN APPLYING FOR WRIT. ——
A writ of certiorari will not lie to review an order made after final judgment, when
the right of appeal therefrom is barred, unless extraordinary circumstances are made
to appear justifying the delay in applying for the writ. Kimble v. Superior Court.
Cal. 509.

CESTUI QUE TRUST.

See TRUSTS.

CHALLENGE.

See JURY AND JURORS, 3, 4.

CHANGE OF PLACE OF TRIAL.
See VENUE,

CHARGE TO JURY.

See INSTRUCTIONS.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

See FRAUD, 1; Mortgage, 1, 4.

CHINESE.

See CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT; CITIZENSHIP, 1; 4.

CHINESE RESTRICTION ACTS.

1. CHINESE RESTRICTION ACTS CONSTRUED-CERTIFICATE OF COLLECTOR ESSENTIAL-
CUSTOM HOUSE TAG.-A Chinese laborer, who left the United States after the
restriction act of May 6th, 1882, went into operation, without obtaining the certificate
provided for in such act, cannot be permitted to re-enter after the amendatory act
of 1884 went into operation, upon the presentation of a tag given to him by the
custom-house officials, prior to his departure, authorizing the issue of such certificate
to him. In re Ah Kee, on Habeas Corpus (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal. 19.

2. THE SAME NOTHING ELSE TAKEN AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CERTIFICATE. The provi
sion of the amendatory act of 1884, that such "certificate shall be the only evidence
permissible to establish" the right of re-entry, is as applicable to the certificate
issued under the act of 1882, as to that issued under the act of 1884. No evidence
can be taken as an equivalent or substitute for the certificate. Id.

3. THE SAME-REMOVAL OF CHINESE UNLAWFULLY IN UNITED STATES.-Parties un-
lawfully bringing Chinese persons to the United States, who are prohibited by such
acts from landing, must take them back to the country from which they are brought,
or at least beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. A steamship company
which brings such persons cannot escape from this duty by the departure of the
vessel on which they are brought, or by any change in its officers or management.
Id.

4. HABEAS CORPUS-CUSTODY OF COURT.-Where a return is made to a writ of habeas
corpus, accompanied by a production of the petitioner, the court, pending the pro-
ceedings on the writ, may, if deemed proper, continue him in the custody of the
party detaining him, commit him to the custody of the marshal, or admit him to
bail.-SAWYER, J. Id.

5. RESTRICTION ACT-CUSTODY OF COURT.-Where a party, detained on board a steam-
ship, and not permitted to land, under the provisions of the Chinese restriction act,
has been produced in court, on habeas corpus, and admitted to bail pending the pro-
ceedings, he is in the custody of the law, and in contemplation of law he has not
been landed.-SAWYER, J. Id.

6. REMANDING PRISONERS.-In such case, if, pending the proceeding, the steamship on
which he came departs, he may be remanded to the custody of the master, when
she returns to port, whether the master be the same one who produced him, or an-
other; and a refusal to receive the party so remanded, would, in law, constitute a
permitting, or aiding and abetting an unlawful landing, within the meaning of the
restriction act.-SAWYER, J. Id.

7. CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT-WIFE OF LABORER-CERTIFICATE. -The wife of a Chi-
nese laborer, who left China after the restriction act of 1884 went into operation,
cannot enter the United States without furnishing the certificate required by section
6 of that act. She cannot enter upon the certificate of her husband authorizing his
entry. In re Ah Moy, on Habeas Corpus (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal. 25.

8. CHINESE LABORER'S WIRE.-The wife of a Chinese laborer, she being herself a Chi-
nese laborer, in fact, who has never before been in the United States, cannot now
lawfully enter the United States on her own personal right, under the provisions of
the restriction act; nor can she be introduced by the husband, who is himself en-
titled to enter, upon any right pertaining to him, under the provisions of the treaty,
and the said restriction act.-SAWYER, J. Id.

9. STATUS OF WIFE.-A Chinese wife, who was not a Chinese laborer, in fact, prior to
her marriage, upon her marriage takes the status of the husband, as one of a class
whose entry into the United States is prohibited by the restriction act, and she can-
not lawfully enter.-SAWYER, J. Id.

10. CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT-ADMISSION TO BAIL OF REMANDED PRISONER.—A
Chinese person, prohibited by the restriction act from coming into the United
States, and who has been remanded to the custody of the marshal to be deported
therefrom, cannot be permitted to land upon giving bail for his appearance at the
time of the sailing of the vessel upon which he is ordered to be deported. In re
Ah Moy, on habeas corpus (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal. 75.
11. CHINESE RESTRICTION ACT-LABORER-EVIDENCE OF PRIOR RESIDENCE-CERTIFI-
CATE.-A Chinese laborer, who left the United States before the restriction act of
1882 went into operation, cannot re-enter the same, after the amendatory act of
1884 went into operation, without producing the certificate provided for in such
acts. Parol evidence of his former residence is inadmissible. In re Cheen Heong,
on habeas corpus (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal. 53.

12. CHINESE RESTRICTIVE ACT-CERTIFICATE-PRIOR RESIDENCE.-A Chinese laborer,
who left the United States after the passage of the restriction act of 1882, cannot
re-enter the same without producing the certificate required by such act. Such cer-
tificate is the only evidence permissible to establish his right of re-entry. He can-
not re-enter upon proof of having received a custom-house tag, entitling him to a
certificate, if he left without obtaining it. In re Kew Ock, on habeas corpus (U. S.
Cir. Ct.) Cal. 29.

See CITIZENSHIP, 4.

CITIZENSHIP.

1. CITIZENSHIP OF PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES OF CHINESE PARENTS.—A
person born within the United States, of Chinese parents, residing therein, and not
engaged in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, is a cit-
izen of the United States. In the matter of Look Tin Bing (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Cal.
71, 363.

2. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS "SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION THEREOF," IN FIRST CLAUSE OF
SECTION 1 OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.-Persons are subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under
the protection of their laws, with the consequent obligation to obey them when
obedience can be rendered; but only those who are thus subject by their birth or
naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these
latter must at the time be both actual and exclusive. Persons excepted from citi-
zenship, notwithstanding their birth or naturalization in the United States. Id.
3. ORIGIN OF THE CLAUSE IN THE AMENDMENT DECLARING WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE
UNITED STATES.-Previous to this amendment, the general doctrine, except as ap-
plied to Africans brought here and sold as slaves, and their descendants, was, that
birth within the dominions and jurisdiction of the United States, of itself created
citizenship. The amendment was adopted as an authoritative declaration of this
doctrine as to the white race, and also to do away with the exception as to the Af-
ricans and their descendants. Id.

4. THE RESTRICTION ACTS NOT APPLICABLE TO CITIZENS.-The acts of Congress of 1882
and 1884, restricting the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States, are
not applicable to citizens of the United States, though of Chinese parentage. No
citizen can be excluded from the United States except in punishment for crime. Id.
5. CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES RENUNCIATION OF.-A person born in the
United States, and a citizen thereof, has a right to expatriate himself, to renounce
his allegiance to the country of his birth, and to become a citizen of another state
or kingdom. Brown v. Dexter. Cal. 275.

6. THE SAME-CHILD BORN IN FOREIGN COUNTRY OF EXPATRIATED FATHER.-A child
born in a foreign country of a father who had previously renounced his citizenship
of the United States, and assumed allegiance to another power, is not a citizen of
the United States. Id.

CIVIL CODE.

TRUE METHOD OF INTERPRETING (editorial), 1, 49, 109, 145.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

1. CLAIM AND DELIVERY-VERDICT-JUDGMENT.-In an action to recover possession of
certain cattle, and for damages for their detention, when the answer denies all the
material averments of the complaint, a verdict for the defendants for one-half of
such cattle is not responsive to the issues, and should be disregarded by the court;
and a judgment for the defendants entered on such verdict is erroneous.
The jury
should have also found as to the other half of the cattle sued for. Muller v. Je
et al. Cal. 638.

See REPLEVIN.

COLLATERAL SECURITY.

See INSURANCE, 7.

COLLISION.

See NEGLIGENCE, 4–6.

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