appealed to the county court, can not be taken to the supreme court on appeal. It must be taken, if at all, on writ of error. Such action does not involve any ques tion as to the title to land. Brandexburg v. Reithman (Col.), II, 774.

7. THE SAME-EJECTMENT.-The statutory action of forcible entry and detainer has not been enlarged by section 267 of the civil code. Such section does not abolish all distinctions between that action and the action of ejectment. Id.

8. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-PLEADING-NOTICE TO QUIT.-A complaint in an action of forcible entry and detainer which conforms to the requirements of chapter 3, section 23 of the act of 1872, is sufficient. Such complaint need not allege service of notice to quit on the tenant. Chung Yow v. Hop Chong et al. (Or.), IH, 325.

9. EVIDENCE HELD NOT TO SHOW A FORCIBLE ENTRY on the part of the defendant, or that the land in question was in the possession of the plaintiff. Alemany, Archbishop, etc., v. Ortega (Cal.), III, 51.

FORECLOSURE.

See MORTGAGE, 15-35; PARTIES, 5-7; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 5, 10; STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS, 18.

FORFEITURE.

See DEED, 3; FINES AND FORFEITURES.

FORGERY.

1. FORGERY-INDICTMENT, SUFFICIENCY OF.-Under the latter clause of section 775 of the general statutes, an indictment for forgery is sufficient which charges that the defendant did counterfeit and forge the handwriting of another to a certain promissory note, dated, etc., for the sum of, etc., with the intent to damage and defraud such person," etc. Such indictment need not set out a copy of the instrument upon which the forgery is predicated, nor charge the act to have been done falsely or feloniously. Cohen v. People etc. (Col.), II, 528.

2. THE SAME EVIDENCE OF PASSING FORGED INSTRUMENT-INTENT.-Under such indictment, evidence that the defendant uttered or passed the instrument forged, for the purpose of raising money thereby, is admissible, as tending to show the intent with which the handwriting was forged. Id.

3. THE SAME-INSTRUCTIONS.-The court instructed the jury "that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant signed the name, claimed to have been forged to the note in evidence, with the intention of obtaining money thereon, and did obtain money thereon, they should find him guilty." Held, that such charge was erroneous, because it omitted to instruct the jury that they must also believe that such signing was forged or counterfeited, and with intent to damage or defraud. Id. 4. FORGERY-INTENT-INSANITY FROM DRUNKENNESS.—In a prosecution for forgery of a promissory note, where the intent with which the act was done is an element of the offense, evidence is admissible showing that the defendant was afflicted with dipsomania; that from contracted habits of intemperance his mind had been impaired; that when he was under the influence of liquor he was insane, did not know what he was doing, could not distinguish right from wrong; and that he was in such state when he committed the act of which he was accused. People v. Blake (Cal.), III, 38.

See CANCELLATION, 3.

FORNICATION.

1. AN INDICTMENT FOR FORNICATION IS SUFFICIENT THAT CHARGES that the defendant and a certain woman "did then and there unlawfully live together in an open state of fornication." King v. The People etc. (Col.), II, 307.

2. EVIDENCE IN A PROSECUTION FOR FORNICATION REVIEWED and held to establish an overt act on the part of the defendant. Id.

FORWARDERS.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 5, 7.

FRANCHISE.

See CORPORATIONS, 47-49; FERRIES,

FRAUD.

1. DEED UNTAINTED BY FRAUD IS NOT IMPEACHABLE FOR FRAUD COMMITTED AFTERWARDS in the obtainment of another deed, for different premises, by the same grantee from the same grantor. Gutierrez v. Brinkerhoff (Cal.), I, 127.

2. ONE WHO IS A PARTICEPS CRIMINIS IN CERTAIN FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS to obtain land from the United States can not enforce a cause of action against his alleged partners in fraud, growing out of such transactions. Id.

3. EQUITY WILL NOT INTERFERE TO SET ASIDE A CONVEYANCE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD, at a suit of a general judgment creditor of the grantor, where the latter has other property subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment. In such action the complaint must allege the insolvency of the debtor, or facts sufficient to indicate that the judgment could not be collected without equitable aid. Emery v. Yount (Col.), I, 499.

Id.

4. FAILURE TO MAKE SUCH ALLEGATIONS CAN BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF at any time, and is not cured by evidence establishing the insolvency of the judgment debtor. 5. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE WILL NOT BE SET ASIDE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD on the grantor's creditors, unless it is averred and proved that the grantor was in debt at the time of such conveyance, or that the same was made with a view of contracting further obligations. Id.

6. COMPLAINT IN AN ACTION BY A JUDGMENT CREDITOR, HAVING A SPECIFIC LIEN by attachment upon a particular parcel of his debtor's land, need not aver the fact of the debtor's insolvency, where the object of the action is to have a subsequent conveyance of such land declared fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff, and that, as to the extent of his lien upon the same, his right to obtain satisfaction of his judgment therefrom be recognized and enforced. Id.

7. FORECLOSURE SALE, HOW ATTACKED FOR FRAUD.-A sale by the trustees of a railroad mortgage, under a decree of foreclosure, and in strict compliance with the terns thereof, will not be set aside on motion of a bondholder not a party to the record. If the trustees combine with others to defraud the bondholders, or any of them, or if they did not act in good faith, relief may be had in a suit properly brought for that purpose, in which all the persons interested are joined as parties. Meyer et al., Trustees etc., v. Utah etc. Railway Company (Utah), II, 471.

8. VOIDABLE PATENT TO MINING CLAIM, ATTACK ON.-A patent from the United States to a mining claim may be avoided in equity for fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation practiced upon the government. The validity of such patent, however, can not be questioned unless the facts constituting the fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation are stated in the pleadings. Whether the United States government is a necessary party to an action to set aside a patent on such grounds, quære. Purley's Park Silver Mining Company v. Kerr (Utah), II, 432.

9. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-RESULTING TRUST-DISMISSAL OF SUIT.-A voluntary conveyance from an insolvent debtor to his wife does not create the latter a trustee of the creditors of the former. Such conveyance may be set aside at the instance of the creditors on the ground of fraud. A bill in equity against such grantee to have her declared a trustee for the creditors, and for an accounting of the rents and profits of the land conveyed, should not be dismissed. An amendment to the prayer of such bill should be allowed, and the appropriate relief granted. Perea et al., Ådministrators etc., v. Gallegos (N. M.), II, 423.

10. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER EVIDENCE HELD SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY the finding that the sale under which the plaintiff claims title was fraudulent and void as to his vendor's creditors. Wideman v. Franks (Cal.), II, 376.

11. NOTE OBTAINED BY FRAUD-ASSIGNMENT.-The note which it is the object of this suit to have delivered up and canceled, held to have been obtained through fraud, of which the defendant had notice before it was assigned to him. McDaniel et al., Adm'r etc., v. Marchbanks (Or.), III, 339.

12. WHETHER A CONVEYANCE WAS INTENDED TO HINDER, DELAY, OR DEFRAUD THE GRANTOR'S CREDITORS is a question of fact, and not of law. Read v. Rahm (Cal.), III, 150.

13. FRAUD, ALLEGATIONS OF-PLEADINGS-CANCELLATION OF DEED.-In an action to annul a deed on the ground of fraud, where the fraud consists in making such deed

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run in the name of a married woman as grantee, instead of to her husband, an alle. gation that, subsequent to the execution of the deed, the plaintiff has discovered that the deed, "as it appears upon the record," runs in the name of the wife as the grantee, is no allegation that such deed was obtained by fraud; and an allegation that the plaintiff does not know whether the husband obtained said deed in his wife's name by misreading the same to plaintiff, or by obliterating the name and putting in hers," is not an allegation that it was done in either way, or that there was any fraud on the part of either the husband or wife. Rasmussen et al. v. MeKnight et al. (Utah), III, 670.

14. THE SAME.-Fraud is a conclusion of law derived from facts, and is not to be presumed; it can be found only when the facts make it apparent. The facts constituting the fraud must be pleaded; a general allegation of fraud is not sufficient on demurrer. Id. 15. Bill to Set Aside Decree-Parties-DemURRER. —A bill in equity to set aside a decree for the partition of land, on the ground that the same was obtained by fraud, should join as defendants all the parties to the original bill on which such decree was rendered, and all persons claiming through or under any or either of them. Such bill is not demurrable, for the reason that another suit is pending between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants, relating to the same subject, unless the suit already pending will afford the plaintiffs the same relief as they would have been entitled to under the bill demurred to. Bent et al. v. Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Co. et al. (N. M.), III, 8.

16. THE SAME CONSENT DECREE, IMPEACHMENT OF.-An original bill in equity lies to set aside and annul a decree purporting to have been made and entered by consent, if such consent was obtained by fraud, imposition, or false representations. Id. 17. MORTGAGE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-POSSESSION BY MORTGAGOR-FRAUD.-A mortgage of the stock in trade of a merchant, by the terms of which the mortgagor is to remain in possession of the goods, to sell and dispose of the same as the owner, and remit the proceeds of the sales to the mortgagee, is a fraudulent transfer as against other creditors of the mortgagor. Speigelberg et al. v. Hersch & Co, et al. (N. M.), IV, 129.

18. CONVEYANCE TO HINDER, DELAY, AND DEFRAUD CREDITORS-PURCHASER WITH NOTICE-ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY. FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED.-A conveyance of property made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of the grantor is void, both as against the grantee and a subsequent purchaser with notice, although the latter may have paid a valuable consideration. The property so conveyed may be levied upon and sold at the instance of the creditors of the fraudulent grautor as if no conveyance had ever been made. Bull v. Ford (Cal.), IV, 527. 19. ALLEGATION OF FRAUDULENT INTENT SPECIAL DEMURRER.-An allegation that a conveyance was made "with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors" of the grantor is a sufficient averment of fraudulent intent to sustain a judgment. Whether the same would be sufficient if objected to by special demurrer, quare. Id.

20. FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS-SALE-RIGHTS OF DEFRAUDED VENDEE. -One who has been induced by false and fraudulent representations to purchase a business and stock in trade need not, upon discovery of the fraud, take steps to rescind the contract. He may retain the property and prosecute his claim for damages either by an original action or as a counter-claim to an action against him for the purchase price, brought by the party committing the fraud. If such contract of purchase was an entirety, the separate value of the stock, aside from the value of the good will of the business, need not be alleged in the answer. Herefort v. Cramer (Col.), IV, 229.

21. FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS-SALE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-PLEADINGS.-The measure of damages in an action for fraudulent representations in the sale of both real and personal property is the same. It is the difference between the value of the property as it actually existed on the day of sale and its value as it was represented to be. Such damages need not be separately pleaded. Id.

See ACCOUNTING, 1, 6; ARREST AND BAIL, 1, 3, 4; ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 4; ATTORNEYS, 1; BONA FIDE PURCHASER, 2, 8; CANCELLATION; CHATTEL MORTGAGE; CONSIDERATION, 4; CORPORATIONS, 29; DECEIT; Deed, 11; EVIDENCE, 17, 20; FINDINGS, 11; INFANTS, 5; INJUNCTION, 4; INSOLVENCY, 10; JUDGMENT, 20; MEXICAN GRANT, 8; MORTGAGE, 38, 39; PATENTS, 6; PLEADING AND PRAC TICE, 31, 32; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1; REPLEVIN, 3; VENDOR AND Vendee, 2, 3.

FRUIT TREES.

See INJUNCTION, 17; TAXATION, 68.

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

1. CUSTODIAN OF A PRISONER HELD UNDER AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST, issued by the governor of California, upon the requisition of the governor of another state, may be compelled, upon the application of the prisoner for a writ of habeas corpus, to produce the body of such prisoner before a court of the state in which he is detained, so that the cause of his imprisonment and detention can be inquired into; and upon a failure so to do, such custodian is guilty of contempt. In re Robb (Cal.), I, 255.

2. WARRANT OF EXTRADITION.-A warrant for the arrest and return of a fugitive from justice must recite or set forth the evidence necessary to authorize the state executive to issue it; and unless it does, it is illegal and void. In re Doo Woon (U. S. Dist. Ct., Or.), I, 333.

3. HABEAS CORPUS, JURISDICTION OF.-A person arrested under a warrant of extradition from one state of the Union to another "is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States," and the national courts have jurisdiction to inquire by habeas corpus into and determine the legality of the same. Id.

4. FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE ARRESTED AND RETURNED UNDER LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. The governor of a state in issuing a warrant for the arrest of a fugitive from justice, the officer who makes the arrest, and the party commissioned to receive the fugitive and deliver him to the authorities of the state where the offense is charged to have been committed, in pursuance of the provisions of sections 5278 and 5279 of the revised statutes of the United States, act under the authority of the laws of the United States, and pro hac vice are officers or agents of the United States. In re Robb (U. S. Cir. Ct., Cal.), I, 439.

5. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION.-Where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus presented to a state judge or court by a party in the custody of one claiming, in good faith, to be authorized to deliver him to the authorities of another state, as a fugitive from justice, in pursuance of the provisions of said sections, shows upon its face that the petitioner is so held in custody, under such claim made in good faith, the state judge or court has no jurisdiction to issue the writ. The jurisdiction, in such case, is exclusively in the courts of the United States. Id.

6. ID.-DUTY OF CUSTODIAN.-Where a writ of habeas corpus has been issued by a state judge or court, and been served on the party having the custody of such alleged fugitive, it is the duty of such custodian to make full return to the writ as to the authority under which he holds the prisoner, and to exhibit to the court the original papers evidencing his authority, and respectfully decline to produce the body of the prisoner; and if it appears from said return, or said petition and return, that the prisoner is claimed to be held in good faith, in pursuance of the provisions of said statute, the judge or court issuing the writ has no jurisdiction or authority to proceed further, and no jurisdiction or authority to compel the production of the body of the prisoner, or to commit the party holding him for contempt in thus respectfully declining to produce the prisoner. Id.

7. THE EFFECT OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE PRISONER Would be to place him in the physical control of the court, and to deprive himself of all power to execute the superior commands of the laws of the United States, to which he owes obedience.

Id.

8. WHERE THE RETURN TO A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, SUED OUT BY A PRISONER held under requisition proceedings, shows a substantial compliance with the act of congress concerning fugitives from justice, the prisoner will be remanded. Ex parte Bailey (Cal.), I, 485.

9. A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE CHARGED WITH A FELONY has no right to be heard on any appeal made in his behalf. People v. Tremayne (Utah), II, 207.

10. NEITHER AN ORDER FORFEITING A DEFENDANT'S BAIL for failure to appear at the trial, nor an order refusing to entertain a motion to set aside the same while the defendant was still a fugitive from justice, nor an order directing the payment of the forfeited bail money into the treasury, is appealable. Id.

FUTURE ADVANCES.

See MORTGAGE, 46, 48.

GAMING.

1. GAMING-Act of 1876 DEFINING.-Section 1 of the act of 1876 (Ses. L. 39) includes not only the games therein enumerated, but also any game played for anything of value with any device or means suitable and convenient for that purpose; and in which the game depends largely on chance, or more on chance than skill. In re Lee Tong (U. S. Cir. Ct., Or.), I, 35.

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2. THE CHINESE GAME OF "TANTAN" is a game of pure chance, and when played for anything of value, constitutes gambling within the inhibition of said statute. Id. 3. POWER TO SUPPRESS" WHEN NOT POWER "TO PUNISH."-A grant of power to a city to suppress gaming and gambling-houses," includes the power to suppress gaming," but when the crime of gaming is defined, and the punishment therefor prescribed by the law of the state, the city is not authorized to suppress any game not prohibited by such law, nor to punish any person playing thereat; but it is confined to the use of such means as may be within its power to enforce the state law within its limits. Id.

GARNISHMENT.

See ATTACHMENT; JUDGMENT, 14.

GENERAL AVERAGE.

See ADMIRALTY, 20.

GEORGETOWN, CHARTER OF.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

GIFT.

1. A GIFT CAN NOT BE CONSUMMATED WITHOUT DELIVERY, and consequently, the subject thereof must be in esse. Read v. Rahm (Cal.), III, 150.

2. CONVEYANCE-GIFT FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE.-A conveyance made to a wife, in consideration of a debt due to the community from the grantor, with the consent of the husband, and with the intent that the property conveyed should become the wife's separate property, will operate as a gift to her. Id.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 20.

GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED.

1. ACTION FOR GOODS SOLD ANd Delivered-EVIDENCE-VARIANCE.-A complaint for certain cattle sold and delivered is not sustained by evidence that such cattle were delivered to the defendant to be slaughtered and the meat sold on commission. Evans v. Bailey et al. (Cal.), IV, 427.

GRAND JURY.

See JURY.

GRANT,

See BOUNDARIES; DEED.

GRANTOR AND GRANTEE.

See DEED.

GROWING CROPS.

1. MORTGAGE-GROWING CROPS-RENTS, ISSUES, AND PROFITS.-A mortgage of land, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, attaches as a lien to the crop growing on such land at the time of foreclosure. The proceeds of the sale of such crop should be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt. Montgomery v. Merrill et al. (Cal.), III, 375.