power to give such consent, quære. If such assignment is void, the right to object to the same, and to the exercise of the franchise by a party to whom it was not originally granted, can only be exercised by the state officers in an appropriate proceeding. Id.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 4.

FICTITIOUS GRANTEE.

See BONA FIDE PURCHASER, 2; CANCELLATION, 1; DEED, 9-11; Evidence, 4.

FINDINGS.

1. FINDINGS MUST BE OF THE ULTIMATE FACTS PUT IN ISSUE by the pleadings, and not argumentative. Coglan v. Beard (Cal.), I, 862.

2. THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT ON THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS MUST STATE separately the facts found and the conclusions of law, in such a manner that the appellate court may see that the conclusions of law follow as a deduction from the facts found. Tested by such rule, certain findings of the lower court, to the effect that no assessments for taxes during certain years were made on a portion of the property in controversy, and certain judgments rendered for such taxes were void, held insufficient. Emeric v. Alvarado (Cal.), I, 708.

3. FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT A SUBSEQUENT UNDERTAKING WAS GIVEN in the place of a former one, which was required upon the issuance of a preliminary restraining order, is erroneous, when the complaint alleges, and the undertaking recites, that the same was given "as a condition to the further continuance of the said injunction.' California Farmers' etc. Ins. Co. v. Schindler (Cal.), I, 122.

4. FINDINGS OF FACT CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL, unless they are embodied in the statement of the case. Simpson v. Ogg (Nev.), I, 303.

5. APPELLANTS CAN NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS of fact, within the time required by the statute, when all of such findings were favorable to them. Smith v. Logan (Nev.), I, 391.

6. THE FINDINGS SHOULD BE CONFINED to the contested facts, and determined from the evidence. Findings as to facts admitted by the pleadings are unnecessary. Miles v. McCallan (Ariz.), II, 689.

7. FINDING OF FACT, WHEN ESSENTIAL.-Under section 180 of the practice act in trials of issues of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated, must be made and filed before any judgment can be entered. Such findings are the foundation for the judgment, and are as necessary to precede it as a verdict in case of trial by a jury. In the absence of findings, there is no presumption that the judgment is sustained by the evidence, when the issues are tried by the court. Reich v. Rebellion S. Min. Co. (Utah), II, 451.

8. JUDGMENT REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO FIND ON A MATERIAL ISSUE.

Green (Cal.), II, 367.

Hawes v.

9. FAILURE TO FIND UPON A MATERIAL ISSUE IS GROUND FOR REVERSAL.-IN THE ABSENCE OF FINDINGS, the appellate court will presume that the same were waived, unless the contrary appears by a bill of exceptions. This presumption can not arise where the lower court filed a writing designated as its "decision," and intended to be a finding upon a material issue. Kimball v. Stormer (Cal.), II, 371. 10. FAILURE TO FIND ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES can not be taken advantage of in the appellate court, unless there has been a motion in the court below to make additional findings to meet the omitted issues. Eakin v. McCraith (Wash.), II, 785. 11. FINDINGS-SUFFICIENCY OF.-In an action to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud, where the court finds enough to avoid the sale, it is unnecessary to find more, although everything alleged in regard to such transfer is not found on. Ohleyer, Assignee, etc., v. Bunce (Cal.), II, 142.

12. FINDINGS OF A JURY ON SPECIAL ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THEM, in an action for the reformation of a deed for an alleged mistake, are merely advisory to the court. If, in such action, the court files findings as to all the facts in issue, in which, after reciting that a jury had been impaneled to try special issues, and had rendered a verdict, it is stated "now, from said verdict and the testimony adduced in said cause, after due consideration the court finds the following facts," a judgment entered upon such findings will not be reversed for an erroneous instruction to the jury as to the character of the evidence necessary to warrant the relief asked. Sweetser v. Dobbins (Cal.), II, 145.

13. FINDINGS OF JURY IN EQUITABLE ACTION-SETTING ASIDE VERDICT.-The fin l. ings of a jury on issues submitted to them in an equitable action are advisory only. The court may set aside such verdict and find the facts itself. Johnson et al. v. Powers (Cal.), II, 740.

14. VERDICT IN EQUITY CASE-FINDINGS-INSTRUCTIONS.-Both before and since the adoption of the code, the verdict of a jury, with respect to controverted facts arising in an equity case, is not conclusive upon the questions submitted, but merely advis ory to the court. The court may set aside the verdict and order a new trial, or may qualify or alter any of its special findings, or disregard it in whole or in part, and find the facts for himself, or it may approve them in whole or in part, and if ap proved, they become, by adoption, the findings of the court. If the last method is followed, and the findings are supported by the evidence, the judgment will not be reversed for erroneous instructions to the jury. Sweetzer et al., Executors, etc. v. Dobbins (Cal.), III, 616.

15. FAILURE TO FIND UPON AN IMMATERIAL ISSUE IS NOT ERROR. Allenberg v. Zellerbach (Cal.), I, 777.

16. FINDING OF THE COURT WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY RESPONDS TO THE ISSUES made by the pleadings is sufficient. Jones v. Meyer (Cal.), I, 348.

17. WHERE ONLY PART OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS are submitted to the jury in a proceeding to set aside the probate of a will, the refusal of the court to hear testimony and make findings as to the remaining issues is error. Sanders v. Simcich (Cal.), I, 868.

18. FAILURE OF A REFEREE TO FIND UPON AN IMMATERIAL ISSUE as to fraud is not error. Williams v. Gallick (Or.), II, 537.

19. ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE COURT ON AN IMMATERIAL ISSUE will not warrant a reversal. Sweetser v. Dobbins (Cal.), II, 145.

20. FINDING OF JURY-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.-A verdict of a jury will not be disturbed, on the ground that it is contrary to the weight of evidence, although the testimony of the greatest number of witnesses was opposed to such verdict, unless it appears that the jury acted so unreasonably in weighing the testimony as to suggest a strong presumption that their minds were swayed by passion or prejudice, or that they were governed by some motive other than that of doing justice. Green, Adm'x, v. Taney (Col.), III, 531.

21. FINDINGS CONFLICT OF EVIDENCE.-If the record discloses a substantial conflict of testimony upon a material issue, the appellate court will not interfere with the finding of the jury thereon, although they accepted the testimony of one witness as against those of two. Where, however, such finding is unsupported by the testimony of any witness, the judgment will be reversed. Rankin v. Thompson et al. (Col.), II, 873.

22. FINDING OF A REFEREE WILL NOT BE REVIEWED on appeal when there is evidence to sustain it. Williams v. Gallick (Or.), II, 537.

23. FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT WILL NOT BE DISTURBED when there is evidence to support it. Baker et al. v. McAllister (Wash.), II, 690.

24. FINDING OF THE JURY WILL NOT BE DISTURBED when the evidence is conflicting. Coffman v. Brown (Col.), II, 98; Kelly v. Fitzele (Cal.), II, 132; Halleck v. Brisnahen (Wy.), II, 60.

25. WHERE THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A FINDING AS TO THE MENTAL CAPACITY of a grantor to make a deed is conflicting, such finding will not be disturbed by the appellate court. Emeric v. Alvarado (Cal.), I, 708.

26. FINDING OF THE JURY THAT A TESTATOR WAS INDUCED TO EXECUTE A CERTAIN WILL by the undue influence and threats of his wife, held unsupported by the evidence. Estate of Lang (Cal.), I, 773.

27. FINDINGS CONFLICT OF EVIDENCE.-A finding of a jury upon a disputed question of fact, in connection with which there is a material conflict in the testimony, will not be reversed, unless such finding is so unreasonable as to create a strong presumption that the jury were misled, or were controlled by improper motives, or influenced by passion or prejudice. Leitensdorfer v. King (Col.), III, 135.

28. FINDINGS WILL BE HELD SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE when the evidence is conflicting. Sweetzer v. Dobbins (Cal.), III, 616.

29. FINDINGS, SUFFICIENCY OF.-A finding that a party "was informed and understood" that he would have to pay a certain note is not an equivalent to a finding that he agreed to pay the same. Porter v. Muller (Cal.), III, 619.

30. JUDGMENT REVERSED FOR INDEFINITENESS AND INCONSISTENCY IN FINDINGS. Southmayd v. Berry et al. (Cal.), III, 29.

31. FINDINGS HELD TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. Capital Savings Bank v. Cronkete (Cal.), III, 479.

32. FINDINGS HELD SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE. Manor v. Davis (Cal.), III, 364. 33. FINDINGS-NEW TRIAL-APPEAL-STATEMENT MUST CONTAIN FINDINGS.-The

sufficiency of the findings of the trial court will not be reviewed on an appeal from an order denying a new trial, unless the same are embodied in the statement, notwithstanding such statement contains a recital that the findings are referred to and made a part thereof, and the transcript shows that they were referred to by the lower court on the hearing of the motion. Boyd v. Anderson (Nev.), III, 699. 34. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND FINDINGS HELD TO HAVE BEEN WAIVED by consent in open court. Schwegerle & Co. v. Mundell (Cal.), IV, 525.

35. FINDINGS HELD SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT. Stout, Executor, etc., v. Hastings (Cal.), IV, 588.

36. FINDINGS HELD TOO INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN to sustain the judgment. Paige v. Rocky Ford Canal and Irrigation Co. (Cal.), IV, 522.

37. CLERICAL ERROR IN CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-IMMATERIAL ERROR.-The use of the word "defendant" instead of "defendants," in the conclusions of law found by the court, is a mere clerical error, and entitled to no regard. Doolan et al v. Cunningham, Administrator, etc. (Cal.), IV, 613.

38. AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS.-When trial is by the court, the court may at any time before judgment amend its findings of facts, notwithstanding a motion for a new trial has been made. Calhoun v. Gilliland, Adm'r, etc. (Wash.), II, 285.

39. SUPREME COURT CAN NOT INFER ONE FACT FROM OTHER FACTS FOUND.--The only inferences which it can draw from the findings are inferences of law. De Celis et al. v. Porter et al. (Cal.), II, 144.

40. JUDGMENT IN DE CELIS V. PORTER, 1 WEST COAST REP. 575, MODIFIED as to the date from which interest should be allowed. Id.

41. A FINDING THAT AN ACTION WAS COMMENCED, AND THAT JUDGMENT therein was "duly given and made," includes a finding of facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. Wetmore v. Rupe (Cal.), II, 885.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 3, 8; BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 9; CONVERSION, 1; EJECTMENT, 9; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 9; JUDGMENT, 62; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 6; MORTGAGE, 20; NEW TRIAL, 18, 20, 35; NUISANCE, 20; SUPREME COUrt, 2.

FINES AND FORFEITURES.

See CONTEMPT, 2, 35; Deed, 3; JUSTICES' COURTS, 7; LARCENY, 14.

FIRE INSURANCE.

See INSURANCE.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

1. AN ACTION OF FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER DOES NOT LIE TO ENFORCE AN INCORPOREAL RIGHT OF WAY, although an action on the case might be maintained for its obstruction, or a suit in equity to restrain an interference therewith. Roberts v. Trujillo (N. M.), I, 519.

2. ACTION OF FORCIBLE DETAINER CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED when the facts and circumstances indicate no purpose or determination upon the part of the defendant to resist the entry of the plaintiff by force. Harrington v. Watson (Or.), I, 59.

3. NEITHER THE LEGAL TITLE TO LAND NOR THE RIGHT TO THE POSSESSION can be determined in an action of forcible entry and detainer. Romero v. Gonzales (N. M.), I, 160.

4. UNLAWFUL ENTRY, UNACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL FORCE, IS INSUFFICIENT to sustain an action of forcible entry and detainer, under the statute of this territory, on the ground of such entry being constructively forcible. Id.

5. OBJECT OF THE STATUTE OF FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER is to prevent persons from disturbing the public peace, or perpetrating gross and willful wrongs, by maintaining by actual fraud or force what they claim as private rights in the possession of land. Id.

6. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT.-An action under the forcible entry and detainer act, originally brought in the justice's court, and thence

appealed to the county court, can not be taken to the supreme court on appeal. It must be taken, if at all, on writ of error. Such action does not involve any ques tion as to the title to land. Brandexburg v. Reithman (Col.), II, 774.

7. THE SAME-EJECTMENT.-The statutory action of forcible entry and detainer has not been enlarged by section 267 of the civil code. Such section does not abolish all distinctions between that action and the action of ejectment. Id.

8. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-PLEADING-NOTICE TO QUIT.-A complaint in an action of forcible entry and detainer which conforms to the requirements of chapter 3, section 23 of the act of 1872, is sufficient. Such complaint need not allege service of notice to quit on the tenant. Chung Yow v. Hop Chong et al. (Or.), III, 325.

9. EVIDENCE HELD NOT TO SHOW A FORCIBLE ENTRY on the part of the defendant, or that the land in question was in the possession of the plaintiff. Alemany, Archbishop, etc., v. Ortega (Cal.), III, 51.

FORECLOSURE,

See MORTGAGE, 15-35; PARTIES, 5-7; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 5, 10; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 18.

FORFEITURE.

See DEED, 3; FINES AND FORFEITURES.

FORGERY.

1. FORGERY-INDICTMENT, SUFFICIENCY OF.-Under the latter clause of section 775 of the general statutes, an indictment for forgery is sufficient which charges that the defendant "did counterfeit and forge the handwriting of another to a certain promissory note, dated, etc., for the sum of, etc., with the intent to damage and defraud such person," etc. Such indictment need not set out a copy of the instrument upon which the forgery is predicated, nor charge the act to have been done falsely or feloniously. Cohen v. People etc. (Col.), II, 528.

2. THE SAME EVIDENCE OF PASSING FORGED INSTRUMENT-INTENT.-Under such indictment, evidence that the defendant uttered or passed the instrument forged, for the purpose of raising money thereby, is admissible, as tending to show the intent with which the handwriting was forged. Id.

3. THE SAME-INSTRUCTIONS.-The court instructed the jury "that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant signed the name, claimed to have been forged to the note in evidence, with the intention of obtaining money thereon, and did obtain money thereon, they should find him guilty. Held, that such charge was erroneous, because it omitted to instruct the jury that they must also believe that such signing was forged or counterfeited, and with intent to damage or defraud. Id. 4. FORGERY INTENT-INSANITY FROM DRUNKENNESS.-In a prosecution for forgery of a promissory note, where the intent with which the act was done is an element of the offense, evidence is admissible showing that the defendant was afflicted with dipsomania; that from contracted habits of intemperance his mind had been impaired; that when he was under the influence of liquor he was insane, did not know what he was doing, could not distinguish right from wrong; and that he was in such state when he committed the act of which he was accused. People v. Blake (Cal.), III, 38.

See CANCELLATION, 3.

FORNICATION.

1. AN INDICTMENT FOR FORNICATION IS SUFFICIENT THAT CHARGES that the defendant and a certain woman "did then and there unlawfully live together in an open state of fornication." King v. The People etc. (Col.), II, 307.

2. EVIDENCE IN A PROSECUTION FOR FORNICATION REVIEWED and held to establish an overt act on the part of the defendant. Id.

FORWARDERS.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 5, 7.

FRANCHISE.

See CORPORATIONS, 47-49; FERRIES,

FRAUD.

1. DEED UNTAINTED BY FRAUD IS NOT IMPEACHABLE FOR FRAUD COMMITTED AFTERWARDS in the obtainment of another deed, for different premises, by the same grantee from the same grantor. Gutierrez v. Brinkerhoff (Cal.), I, 127.

2. ONE WHO IS A PARTICEPS CRIMINIS IN CERTAIN FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS to obtain land from the United States can not enforce a cause of action against his alleged partners in fraud, growing out of such transactions. Id.

3. EQUITY WILL NOT INTERFERE TO SET ASIDE A CONVEYANCE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD, at a suit of a general judgment creditor of the grantor, where the latter has other property subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment. In such action the complaint must allege the insolvency of the debtor, or facts sufficient to indicate that the judginent could not be collected without equitable aid. Emery v. Yount (Col.), I, 499.

Id.

4. FAILURE TO MAKE SUCH ALLEGATIONS CAN BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF at any time, and is not cured by evidence establishing the insolvency of the judgment debtor. 5. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE WILL NOT BE SET ASIDE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD on the grantor's creditors, unless it is averred and proved that the grantor was in debt at the time of such conveyance, or that the same was made with a view of contracting further obligations. Id.

6. COMPLAINT IN AN ACTION BY A JUDGMENT CREDITOR, HAVING A SPECIFIC LIEN by attachment upon a particular parcel of his debtor's land, need not aver the fact of the debtor's insolvency, where the object of the action is to have a subsequent conveyance of such land declared fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff, and that, as to the extent of his lien upon the same, his right to obtain satisfaction of his judgment therefrom be recognized and enforced. Id.

7. FORECLOSURE SALE, HOW ATTACKED FOR FRAUD.-A sale by the trustees of a railroad mortgage, under a decree of foreclosure, and in strict compliance with the terns thereof, will not be set aside on motion of a bondholder not a party to the record. If the trustees combine with others to defraud the bondholders, or any of them, or if they did not act in good faith, relief may be had in a suit properly brought for that purpose, in which all the persons interested are joined as parties. Meyer et al., Trustees etc., v. Utah etc. Railway Company (Utah), II, 471. 8. VOIDABLE PATENT TO MINING CLAIM, ATTACK ON.-A patent from the United States to a mining claim may be avoided in equity for fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation practiced upon the government. The validity of such patent, however, can not be questioned unless the facts constituting the fraud, mistake, or misrepre sentation are stated in the pleadings. Whether the United States government is a necessary party to an action to set aside a patent on such grounds, quære. Parley's Park Silver Mining Company v. Kerr (Utah), II, 432.

9. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-RESULTING TRUST-DISMISSAL OF SUIT.-A voluntary conveyance from an insolvent debtor to his wife does not create the latter a trustee of the creditors of the former. Such conveyance may be set aside at the instance of the creditors on the ground of fraud. A bill in equity against such grantee to have her declared a trustee for the creditors, and for an accounting of the rents and profits of the land conveyed, should not be dismissed. An amendment to the prayer of such bill should be allowed, and the appropriate relief granted. Perea et al., Administrators etc., v. Gallegos (N. M.), II, 423.

10. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER EVIDENCE HELD SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY the finding that the sale under which the plaintiff claims title was fraudulent and void as to his vendor's creditors. Wideman v. Franks (Cal.), II, 376.

11. NOTE OBTAINED BY FRAUD-ASSIGNMENT.-The note which it is the object of this suit to have delivered up and canceled, held to have been obtained through fraud, of which the defendant had notice before it was assigned to him. McDaniel et al., Adm'r etc., v. Marchbanks (Or.), III, 339.

12. WHETHER A CONVEYANCE WAS INTENDED TO HINDER, DELAY, OR DEFRAUD THE GRANTOR'S CREDITORS is a question of fact, and not of law. Read v. Rahm (Cal.), III, 150.

13. FRAUD, ALLEGATIONS OF-PLEADINGS-CANCELLATION OF DEED.-In an action to annul a deed on the ground of fraud, where the fraud consists in making such deed