and climate, and watered by numerous rivers, some of them navigable for thousands of miles from their source; bounded on the north by lakes which are indeed inland seas; with inexhaustible mines of coal, iron, lead, copper, and zinc stored up within its limits; with an endless supply of forest timber, and immense tracts of unbroken land, it would seem that here at least might industry be suffered to take a free course without let or hindrance from meddling legislation. And yet, strange to say, it is here, amidst this profusion of natural advantages, that the false policy of protection has made its home, and even appropriated to itself the doubtful honour of being called "the American System."

The Morrill tariff, the latest and worst specimen of this system, was however passed after secession had commenced, and cannot therefore be regarded as one of its causes. Mr. Spence has descanted with extreme fervour upon its complications and absurdities. The task is unfortunately but too although Mr. Cary, the well-known American economist, has shown that, in this respect,

easy,

it is exceeded by the late French treaty.1 But far too much has been made of the Southern grievance of manufacturing protection. All taxes on commodities fall upon the consumer; and, as consumption has always been heavier among the vast thriving population of the North, than among the slaveowners and mean whites of the South (the consumption of slaves hardly entering into the calculation), it is the former who have been the principal sufferers. It is also a recognized truth in political economy, that protective duties, though they are paid sometimes twice over by the consumer, but seldom go into the pockets of the producer. When actually necessary to ensure production, they are lost in its extra cost; and when not so, the constant tendency to equalization of all profits soon sweeps away the temporary advantage. We see this clearly enough now, and it is equally amusing for those who have borne the burden and heat of the controversy, to note how oracular some men have become upon a subject which, only a few years ago,

divided even the statesmen of Our own

country.

The power to regulate foreign commerce is an attribute of sovereignty, and no state can properly be called sovereign which does not possess it. Under the Confederation it had, as we have seen, been retained by the separate States, only to be used for mutual injury and restraint. High countervailing duties in one State had co-existed with low duties on the same articles in another, the smuggler receiving a large proportion of the difference, and each State had consulted its own supposed interest without the slightest regard to the welfare of the others. But in the ratification of the Constitution, this vicious power was surrendered to the National Government: the immediate effect was, and the convention so intended it to be, to unite the American people as one nation, instead of a Confederation of States, and as such they are known to the nations and governments of Europe. Where would be the security for their public loans, and for the observance of their commercial treaties, if every State had the right

upon her own judgment of nullifying an Act of Congress, and of seceding from her responsibility, if that act were not repealed? And yet this is the conservative view of the sacredness of a Constitution solemnly ordained and established! How could such right co-exist with that clause which prescribes uniformity as essential for every tax, since one single State objecting would, thereby destroy that uniformity, and by thus compelling a repeal might override the decision of all the other States?

American tariffs have been passed by Legislatures fairly elected by the People, on the widest possible suffrage in the North, and by a suffrage in the South which gives to every slave State an additional power equal to threefifths the number of its slaves. No pretence can, therefore, be set up that they inflict taxation without representation. Erroneous

as they are, they have fulfilled the conditions of their enactment, that the duties they have levied should be "uniform throughout the United States."

114

VIII.

NATIONAL DEFENCE.

ARTICLE I.

SECTION VIII.-10. Congress shall have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations:

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water :

12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years: 13. To provide and maintain a navy :

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces :

15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions:

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the Officers and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress :

17. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings:-And,