years ago, the rank of cadet in the fervice of the Eaft-India company.-But, breathing fentiments of humanity and liberty, he would not have entered into that fervice, in which fo many gallant foldiers had been made the inftruments of cruelty and injustice, if the British legiflature had not fhewn a hearty defire to refcue the unhappy Hindoos from tyrannical oppreffion, and to reftore them to the enjoyment of property, liberty, and life. He would not have gone to India, if he had not imagined that he might, even in that climate, preferve his virtue, and act towards the natives of India in the character not of an enemy, but of a friend. His reafoning on that fubject we have from page 57, of the Adventures of a Rupee, to p. 60, both inclufive.

Being equipped by the bounty of the young ladies his fitters, he went to Portfmouth in 1779, and embarked on-board one of the ships bound for India; which having been long tofled off the coaft of Africa, and in fuch danger of perifhing, that the captain and all the failors had at different times defpaired of fafety, returned to Portsmouth a mere wreck.. Mr. Scott, in the jaws of death, (as Mr. Walker, an ingenious and worthy young man, now on-board the Naffau, who was in the fame terrible fituation, informed the writer of this narrative,) preferved an unfhaken and philofophical firmnefs. He was fo much matter of himself as to obferve the behaviour and the expreffion of the countenances of his fellow-paffengers. He was the only gentleman, the captain excepted, who did not evidently betray the greatest fymptoms of horror: the common failors were lefs affected by their fituation. But two men were fo much overpowered by terror, that their knees knocked against each other; and they cried and broke out into the moft doleful howlings and lamentations.. The fhip having returned to Portsmouth, Mr. Scott came to London, where he ftaid for fome months. It was at this period that he became acquainted with Anna, peerlefs Maid," whom he celebrates in that ode, page 233, and whom he has fince married.

The lovers having mutually exchanged vows of eternal fidelity, Mr. Scott fet out for the Continent, to purfue his deftination to India over land. He travelled as far as Venice, having ftaid however three months in the Auftrian Netherlands, and principally at Bruffels. He paffed through Germany, and went fometimes out of his direct road to vifit fome of the principal towns in that country.

He was particularly ftruck with the beautiful and rich plains of Hungary, and the fimple or rather rude state of manners in that kingdom. He waited with anxious impatience two months at Venice for a fupply of money from England, to enable him to purfue his journey to Bombay. That fupply never arrived, and our author, with a very fmall ftock of money, was obliged, once more, to return to Britain. He came by the way of Genoa, where an incident happened to him which fhall be here related.

He

The jealoufy of the Genoefe government admits not into its dominions any ftrangers, but fuch as are recommended to fome perfon of diftinction and credit in the state. Mr. Scott, who was not aware of this circumftance, went to Genoa without any recommendation. had not been two days in that city, when he was fummoned to appear before one of the magiftrates, who, with a ftern countenance, and in a threatening tone of voice, asked him if he was known to any perfon in the city? Being anfwered in the negative, he asked Mr. Scott, How he dared to be guilty of fuch prefumption? He pleaded his ignorance of the laws of Genoa, and gave a faithful account of his fituation. He was taken into cuftody that night, and imagined he was to be thrown into prifon, or perhaps to be fent on-board one of the Genoefe galleys among the Turkish flaves. That was the moft melancholy night he ever fpent in his life. But next day he received the agreeable information, that he was to be fet at liberty upon condition of departing inmediately from Genoa, a propofition to which he most readily agreed. He was fortunate enough to find a French fhip ready to fail to Marseilles, in which he went a paffenger to that city, and came to Oftend through France, having obtained a fafe conduct from the French refident at Venice. The remarks that Mr. Scott made in the countries through which he paffed, in this expedition, were fuch as might be expected from a man of high genius and cultivated education. Many of these we would willingly introduce in this sketch, for the entertainment of our readers, did the bounds of this publication admit of fuch digreffions. To one only we fhall here give place, because it goes a great way to overturn a theory of Mr. Hume's, which at prefent is very generally received in the world, that the national characters of men are very little, if at all, influenced by phyfical caufes.

Mr.

Mr. Scott obferved, that in the Netherlands not only men and women, but the very children, feemed reftive and inanimated. As he approached nearer to the equator, he found them more lively, even in governments as defpotic as that of the Netherlands ; nay, in other parts, under the fame government, that of Auftria. But in Italy, inen, women, and children, are all animation. The children, particularly, are ever in motion: running, fighting, wrestling, leaping, talking, finging, &c. &c. A Venetian and a Genoefe failor, he obferved, handled his ropes with greater alertnefs than even an Englithman; and he thinks, that, were this natural alacrity encouraged, and heightened by the animating impulfe of freedom, the Italians would undoubtedly be the firft failors in the world. The world has indeed had a confpicuous proof of the juftnefs of Mr. Scott's opinion; for, in the times of the republic, what wonders were not performed by Roman activity, affeci. ated with Roman freedom? Mr. Scott, having returned to London, flew to his beloved Anna. His mind, roufed and agi. tated by a variety of adventures, and filled with various paffions, was on that account the more foft and pliant to the imprefhions of beauty and love. The lovers were privately married; and, having with little difficulty obtained forgiveness from indulgent parents, they lived together for this last year in all the blifs of the most tender and mutual affection. Mr. Scott,

with his Anna, has now, as hath already. been obferved, fet out a third time for India; and may HE, who rides on the whirlwind, and directs the storm, send a fafe and profperous voyage!

Our author is now in his 25th year. He is of a middle ftature, and of a mufcular conftitution. His countenance expreffes nothing of that fire and genius which he undoubtedly poffeffes: but his deportment is eafy and manly, and the tone of his voice noble and affecting.

This account of the author of the Adventures of a Rupee may appear to our readers in the light of a panegyric rather than a faithful narrative and defcription; nevertheless it is strictly true. The only foible, that the writer of this paper could ever perceive in this gentleman's charac. ter, proceeds from an excefs of delicacy of fentiment, which difpofes him fometimes to take offence where none is intended, and in truth without reafon. His moft intimate friends are obliged to manage this delicate fenfibility a ftudy which is amply repaid by a fincere return of glowing friendthip. Mr. Scott has a manufcript on a curious fubject, which, had he remained much longer in London, he would have given to the world. He has carried it with him on-board the Naffau, that he may, in his confinement at fea, amufe his leifure by correcting and improving it. If he find an opportunity of tranfinitting it to London, it may by and by appear in print.

:

HE defign of this work is benevolent

the civil power to a due fenfe of its duty; to apprize the legislature that it will diffufe honour and profit throughout the nation, by blotting, from the criminal code, the punishment of death for offences of human inftitution; to oppofe thofe notions of liberty that are inconfiftent with government; to diftinguish between virtue and vice as morally conftituted; to difcover how far man is punishable by the hand of man; to point out the caufes inevitably producing thofe effects which states endeavour to prevent; and to explain the

difference of reftraint and toleration, as

evil thefe are the honourable purposes for which this author has been active. But, in carrying them into execution, he difcovers not the penetration and the learning which are requisite for fuch inquiries. His work is not regular, and does not rife into a fyitem; and he wanders into differtations concerning topics of religion, which have little or no connection with the subject-matter of his book. He gives the pompous name of commentaries to the controverfial parts of his volume, in which he glances at the fenti

ments of fome eminent writers; and he feldom establishes the fuperiority of his own opinions. But, while we make thefe remarks, it is fit that we fhould bestow upon him the praife which he deferves. He fhews a patriotic attention for the improvement of the laws of his country; and there runs throughout his performance a ftrain of philanthropy and a high admiration of virtue.

It is one of his favourite opinions, that the punishment of death fhould not take place but in cafes of murder.

"The power, fays he, to punish, being inherent in all individuals who affociated together for the protection of all, they all became vefted of that power; and by equality the right to punih is founded on the neceflity of defending all againt all and the public: it is allo veted in all, but transferred to the fovereign power, and punishment may be called juft, fo far as the liberty and welfare of the public, preferved by the fovereign, is inviolable: but, feeing that that liberty and welfare are initcure, we lament its feverity and its cruelty; as the confequences of a government, in which, as a principle, virtue does not equally prevail; the punifhment of death challenges the utmolt efforts of human reafon to justify it. If all our actions be inevitable, and their motive be only influenced by the fear of punishment, or the force of precept and power of example, all punishments, though devited for a good purpose, but not fucceeding, mult be regretted; particularly when they take away the life of another for doing what was not in his power from the certainty of cause and effect between bis volition and action to avoid. It is true, that, when we entered into fociety, we fubmitted and confented to laws which reprefent the general will; but none of us giving to others a right to take away our lives, however that right may be inherent in ourselves to be exercited by our own hands, that legiflature which affumes it is particularly anfwerable for it, as an exertion of unwarranted power, although it be pretended that, as they are the reprefentatives of the whole community, they do nothing but, by the confent of each individual in it. Have the many abject wretches who have been put to death, and who never had any intereft or fhare in the legislature, confented that they fhould be deprived of life? Certainly not: and even thofe, who pretend the contrary, know little of the tyranny they practife in taking life away, becanfe they know little of the nature of thofe over

whom they tyrannize. They expe that men, against whom the punishment of death is awarded, fhould be as wife and fenfible as themfelves, or, forgetting their ignorance and incapacity, impofe death as a punishment. In no inftance whatever can there be a neceffity for taking away the life of a fubject, except for murder; we may open the folios of history, and turn our attention to the example of the Ruffians, under Elizabeth and Catharine, for a proof that the welfare and happiness of a itate may be maintained without the lofs of human blood.

"Certainly the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the jole and principal object of the legislature; confequently the lefs happiness of the lefs number mult give way to it; and as fuch it is a mistortune more than a crime, that the latter, by unavoidably breaking the criminal laws, incur their pains and penalties. It being then their misfortune, it ought equally to be the study of the legislature not to impofe death as a punishment except for murder, because it puts an entire end to the criminal, and deprives him of future amendment in the change of his vicious inclination, and of a poffible benefit to himself and fociety. The punishment of death is juftifiable but in the cafe of murder, though not always inflicted for infe-. rior offences. It is enjoined by the Levitical law; but, to award it, in all cri minal cafes, is to fport with power, and raife offences, in proportion to its enor mity, inftead of preventing them. The right to punish is founded on the neceflity of preferving life, liberty, and limb: it may extend to imprisonment, forfeiture, fine, banishment, and infamy; and general confent may warrant it, as tending to the good of the community: but death is a punishment to which no man has a right or power to confent; he cannot confer even a right, he may have to commit it on himself, on another. A right to flaughter is one thing to repair and correct, another. To lay is tyranny; to repair and correct is a duty; because men feek fociety to be guarded against the evils they experienced out of it. Laws of retaliation would but be equitable, where punishments are applied to the intention, and they are only practifed in the cafe of murder; it is there life for lez and the murderer, by following the perfon he has murdered, is difabled from repeating a crime of fo black and horrid a nature; his life would be injurious to himself and others; no atonement could be made for his crime; he may feel com

punction,

punaion, but never can repair his of ince; imprisonment would be ufcleis, and, loft to all pleasures, death is his relief. It necellary, as it prevents both the mifery of his living an example of bis own wretchedness, without benefiting by his life, and his committing murder a fecond time. Befides, de th being momentary, the imprettion of it made on others, for whofe fake it is principally indicted, may be violent, but it is not durable; it excites compattion for the perfon iffering it more than an abborvence of the alt which is past for which he fufius; and, as it is confeffedly inflicted for the fake of the spectators not the criminal, it is regarded as to the cffect, which, if trifling, as it really is, proves infufficient, while a punithinent lefs fevere and more certain, either by fine, imprisonment, forfeiture, banifhment, or infiny, by a greater continuance, will make a deeper impreffion on others, be more lafting, and of courfe go farther to anfwer the end propofed.

"An excess of clemency and forbearing to put in execution criminal laws, in cafes where the offences committed are injurious to the public at large, is a very great evil. In matters that concern the reformation or internal amendment of fouls, rigour is not only ufel fs, but prejudicial, because the fear of temporal punithment does not make penitents but hypocrites; it only checks the external execution of vice, and concentrates the evil intention within the foul, where it produces a new fin in the hatred it excites against the magiftrate.

"But, notwithstanding the certainty of punishment may tend more to leffen crimes than its feverity, there are reafons why clemency fhould prevail in the executive branch of the legiflature, as a fort of equity to mitigate the rigour of the law's ftrict letter. Many men have fuffered death, whofe antecedent virtues and intrinfic merit made them valuable to government and the community; their punithment therefore, by being certain, was alio fevere. It is the quantity of general good, more than the pecic evil we find In men, that pleads for clemency, however deferving they may be of rigid punishment for the latter; for which reafon it should never accompany the certainty of it. If the circumftances of a crime, or the cafe of a fuppofed criminal, do not afford motives for departing from the letter of the law, no plea for clemency remains, becaufe fach departure would be rather injuftice; and it is impoffible

that the fame action should be both good and bad at the fame time. An incorrigible offender, who by a constant round of criminal actions, after frequent pu nifhment under death, deferves punishe ment for life; he fhould be deprived of that liberty he always abuses to the injury of others, and fuch punishment is a public good. Father Feyjoo, a Spaniard, relates that the Auftrian hero, Pedro Menendes, governor of Florida, difobeyed the exprefs orders of his king, and violated his commiffion; for which, according to law, he deferved death. But the king (Philip II.) pardoned him in a manner that his crime became his reward. His fignal merits had long been known and long been neglected; he had fuffered numerous diftrees and inconveniences. The clemency therefore of the king was a mark of political grace and favour; it would have been cruel to punish him, after fo long neglecting to reward his public merits, and the itate would have loft a profitable fubject, to the injury of itself and the detriment of others, who would have avoided public trusts."

On the crime of a rape the author enters into long details; and it is the refult of his obfervations, that this offence thould not by any means be punifhed capitally. On the fubjects of theft and robbery, of forfeiture, and of imprisonment, labour, confifcation, and banishment, he is alfo fufficiently copious. The religious tenets with which he has interfperfed his treatife, while they are misplaced, feem alfo to be wild and fingular. This will be apparent from the following extract.

"The bulk of mankind, he obferves, are creatures of habit, and flaves to conftituted evil by cuftom, which with them is a fecond nature; it is hence that they fupply the criminal court with bufinefs, and being generally governed by a depraved confideration and judgement, they fall into actions which are morally punishable: if it be afked, whether a man, who did an act yefterday that he disapproves of to-day, cannot avoid doing the like to-morrow, it may be answered, that he freely may or may not, according as he may refolve; or, if he pofitively determines today that he will do otherwife to-morrow, cannot he act according to that determination? it may alfo be anfwered, that he freely may or may not: he is at full liberty to do either, and if that determination remain in his mind till the morrow, and he have the fame opportunity as yesterday, he will act accordingly, and not other wife; yet in both cales will the action be

inevitable,

inevitable, and as an effect, immediately be connected with its caufe, which is the determination. But how is the determination to be rightly directed? It is always, and in all cafes prefumed to be fo; and until things can be feen in their confequences, before they be committed, they will always be fo. Experience then will render a man virtuous; it certainly tends to make him improve his judgement; yet fo ftrong is prefent temptation over the weakness of a human being, that it drives away intermediate reflection, revives the determination of yesterday in his mind, and changes his refolution of to-day, not to determine the like to-morrow; but, when to morrow comes, his volition is the fame, and he neceffarily but freely acts as he acted yesterday. This is liberty and necellity, not fate, or predeftination, as fome would ignorantly have it. The caufe, meaning confideration and judgement, is always free; the effect, or the actions following the volition, is invariable, neceffary, and unavoidable.

"A man who commits a burglary acts under a will influenced by a bad confideration; while another, in an act of charity acts under a will influenced by the reverfe. The act of both was equally inevitable; and, had the confideration and judgement of both been the fame, either housebreaking or charity would have been the convertible effects: when it is faid that a burglary committed might not have been committed, the amount is, that, if the motive, or confideration and judgement, had been otherwife, it would not have produced it; or a reflection or regret in the agent after committing it, who may fee it then in a different view, and from its effects fubject him to punishment, may prevent fuch a motive in his mind for the future; but, let him refolve as he will, he cannot tell how he may or may not be determined, until the moment arrives when he is called upon to exert his volition. He may flatter himfelf, that, by an alteration of his future determinations, happier effects will fucceed, and that he will merit applaufe for them inftead of cenfure; but, if the fame confideration and judgement fhould ever influence him again, the fame action will certainly follow, unknown to him: it is contingent; it may or may not be what it will be, according to the contingency of the confideration and judgement. No action is fixed or fatal; it is only the effect that is fo, and that no otherwife than as relates to its immediate and known caufe. The contingency of caufation, or that confi

deration or judgement which determines human actions, by a power of proper felfdetermination, uncontrouled by the Deity, implies, that that caufation is no object of fore-knowledge to the Deity; it mult be certain before it can be seen to be fa. If feen certainly not to be, it is incompatible with its being even possibly not to be; nothing therefore, that may or may not be, can be previously known to be either one thing or another by the Deity, unless an event contingent in itself be certain to God, which is contrary to the nature and truth of things, because that would be making things certain to God antecedently, though uncertain in their events; confequently there being no prefcience in the divinity, there can be none in man, who, while he enjoys a promife to himfelf that he will determine his future actions by his part, cannot tell what they will be, however he refolves on what they shall be. certainty of their caufe, which is momentary in its operations, or temporary, makes them previously uncertain, though they will be certain eventually.

The un

"To explore therefore the cause of evil is to fearch out the cause of the motives to commit it, which is focial and factitious, not altogether natural, and depends on the principles of virtue and vice. The lefs men are habituated in the practice of conflituted good, or made fenfible, either internally or morally, that it is always preferable to constituted evil, the lefs tafte they will have for the one, and more inclination for the other; confequently the want of tafte for fuch good, and the prevalence of the inclination for fuch evil, are caufes folvable into confideration and judgement, which rule their volitions, and become motives, producing actions that either are or are not pernicious, and prohibited in fpite of every thing to the contrary, meaning that thole actions will happen as the effects of fuch volitions, by their own determination. A man of tafte, fays Mr. Hume, is always an honeft man, whatever frailties may attend him: were all men fo, all men would be honeft; but it is impoffible they fhould be fo; nature or conftitution affifts but little in making men focially honeft, however the would make them fo, independent of civil and political fociety. Education, habit, and example, may refine them, and practice render virtue familiar and eligible: to thefe is owing our moral conduct, and, in the degree as they are good or bad, will be the real meature of human virtue or vice."

The author of the work before us appear