United States would depend upon congressional action. While they were told that the administration intended to introduce legislation authorizing the transfer of military equipment, at the same time they were repeatedly warned that no assurances whatsoever could be given as to whether or not, in what form or in what amounts, such legislation would be approved. With these factors in mind the committee agrees that the treaty and the military-assistance program should be considered separately by the Congress, each on its own merits. The committee further agrees that a member of the Senate might vote for the treaty and still find valid reasons for opposing the program of implementation recommended by the administration. During the hearings several members of the committee publicly announced that their support for the pact did not necessarily mean they were going to approve the militaryassistance program. On this point the following statement of Secretary Acheson, as he testified before the committee, is pertinent: The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist the other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties. I, therefore, earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military-assistance program.1 7. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Since 10 of the nations forming the North Atlantic Pact are European nations, the committee considered the possible effect of the pact on the development of European integration in the economic and political fields. Much practical integration has already been achieved through the Benelux union 2 and the Brussels Pact.3 The European recovery program, which should insure a degree of lasting economic integration of the participating nations, and the proposed council of Europe, which has as its objective cooperation in the political field, are concrete and encouraging steps toward unity. The committee believes that the North Atlantic Pact, by providing means for cooperation in matters of common security and national defense, creates a favorable climate for further steps toward progressively closer European integration. Moreover, cooperation for common security gives added momentum to the movement toward unification. 1 Statement of Apr. 27, 1949; supra, doc. 5. 2 See convention of Sept. 5, 1944; Moniteur Belge, No. 236, Nov. 22, 1947. 3 See treaty of Mar. 17, 1948; infra, pp. 968-971. See statute of May 5, 1949, as amended; infra, pp. 1001–1012. 8. THE TREATY AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM While Germany is not a party to the North Atlantic Treaty the impact of the treaty upon Germany's future will be highly important. The committee believes it may make possible a solution of the German problem and a constructive integration of Germany into Western Europe. It should be kept in mind that all of the signatories of the pact, and particularly France and the other European countries, have suffered deeply from German aggression. All the signatory states are determined that Germany shall never again be permitted to threaten them. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the German people may turn to the Soviet Union unless adequate and sincere efforts are made to provide them with a decent and hopeful future as an integral part of free Europe. Our European partners might be reluctant to accept Germany if it were not for the additional unity and security which the pact will afford. The committee notes that there are already encouraging signs. In January 1949 the French Foreign Minister in a message to the German people declared that the German problem must be solved as part of the over-all European problem. He said: Our goal is above all to integrate all the European states in an association which should procure for all its members economic rehabilitation and political security. Other European signatories have indicated similar views. Among the first concrete benefits of the pact were the highly satisfactory Anglo-Franco-United States agreements on Germany reached in April in Washington.1 9. WORLD OPINION The committee believes that this treaty correctly represents the will of the American people, and the will of the other people of the North Atlantic community, to work for peace. In the United States it has the support of the great majority of our citizens. Abroad, except for the discordant note expressed by the propaganda of the Soviet Government, its satellites and Communist parties, there is the general feeling that the treaty has already brought new hope and confidence for the future. Among the signatory nations the conviction is unmistakable that the pact will receive the favorable verdict of history and of posterity. In the Canadian Parliament ratification was voted unanimously. In the Belgian, British, Norwegian, Danish, Luxembourg, and Icelandic Parliaments the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the treaty, with only the Communists in organized opposition. The peoples of other parts of the world have expressed their belief that the strengthening of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area will strengthen world peace and their own security. There is evidence that even behind the iron curtain many people find in the treaty new hope for the cause of freedom everywhere. 1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 585–590. PART V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. NEED FOR RATIFICATION The committee believes that our failure to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty would have disastrous consequences abroad. At the present time there is an encouraging momentum of confidence that has been building up in Europe during the past year as a direct result of our interest and assistance. The failure of the political strikes in France, the Communist losses in the Italian and French elections in 1948 and 1949, the recent success of the French internal loan and the increased strength of the western European currencies generally, the recent agreements on Germany, and the success of the recovery programall these things reflect this growing momentum. The great retarding factor in the European situation has been the pervading sense of insecurity. This sense of insecurity has been lessened during the past year as a direct result of American interest in common security problems as demonstrated by the passage of Senate Resolution 239 and our willingness to negotiate and sign the North Atlantic Treaty. The decision on the part of some of the European nations, such as Norway and Denmark, to participate in the treaty was not taken without full regard for the risks inherent in making clear their determination to resist aggression. The committee strongly believes that it would be in the best interests of the United States and indeed, the entire world, to sustain and encourage the momentum of confidence that has been building up in Europe, by ratifying the treaty at an early date. 2. SUMMARY OF REASONS COMMITTEE URGES RATIFICATION On June 6 the committee unanimously agreed to report the treaty to the Senate for favorable action. Its reasons for recommending ratification include the following: (1) The treaty should greatly increase the prospect that another war can be averted by making clear in advance the determination of these 12 nations of the North Atlantic area to throw their collective power and influence into the scales on the side of peace. (2) It expresses in concrete terms the will of the American people, and the other peoples of the North Atlantic area, to work constantly to maintain peace and freedom. (3) Since the course of action envisaged in the treaty is substantially that which the United States would follow without the treaty, there is great advantage to the United States and the entire world in making clear our intentions in advance. (4) The treaty is expressly subordinated to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the United Nations Charter and is designed to foster those conditions of peace and stability in the world which are essential if the United Nations is to function successfully. (5) It is wholly consistent with our Constitution and stipulates that all its provisions shall be carried out in accordance with the constitutional processes of the participating countries. STANFO (6) The treaty is in accordance with the basic interests of the United States, which should be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country. (7) In strengthening the security of the North Atlantic area the treaty greatly increases the national security of the United States. (8) It is strictly in accordance with the Senate's recommendation, expressed last year in Senate Resolution 239, that the United States should associate itself with collective defense arrangements and thus contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to defend itself against any armed attack affecting its national security. (9) The treaty will greatly increase the determination of the North Atlantic states to resist aggression and their confidence that they can successfully do so. (10) It will free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery and progress. (11) By encouraging this feeling of confidence and security it should eventually make possible substantial savings for the United States both in connection with the European Recovery Program and our domestic Military Establishment. (12) The treaty is essential to the development of that degree of unity and security among the North Atlantic states which will make possible the reintegration of Germany into western Europe and the ultimate solution of the German problem. (13) It will greatly stimulate the efforts of the North Atlantic states to help themselves and to help each other and, through proper coordination of these efforts, to achieve maximum benefits with minimum costs and bring far greater strength than could be achieved by each acting alone. (14) In the event our efforts for peace are undermined and war is imposed upon us, the treaty assures us that 11 other nations will stand with us to defend our freedom and our civilization. (15) The treaty is not confined to the prevention of war but reflects the will of the participating nations to strengthen the moral and material foundations of lasting peace and freedom. In tendering this unanimous report on the North Atlantic Treaty, we do so in furtherance of our Nation's most precious heritageshared in common with the other signatories continuing faith in our dependence upon Almighty God and His guidance in the affairs of men and nations. 7. PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY, OCTOBER 17, 1951 1 The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty, Agree as follows: ARTICLE I Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.2 ARTICLE II If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows: "For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack (i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; (ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer." ARTICLE III The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the 1 TIAS 2390; 3 UST 43-51. Ratification advised by the Senate Feb. 7, 1952; ratified by the President Feb. 11, 1952; entered into force Feb. 15, 1952. 2 Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Feb. 18, 1952. 415900-57-58 STANFOR |