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GIFT SAVINGS BANK DEPOSIT-DECLARATIONS AS TO INTENTION. To constitute a deposit in a savings bank in the name of another a gift, the deposit must be made with the intention of making a gift, which must be accepted by the intended donee. F., having been notified by the treasurer of the bank where she was a depositor that a certain amount standing to her credit was not entitled to draw interest, because in excess of $1,000, made deposits in the name of each of the plaintiffs, without their knowledge, and retained the deposit books. In actions brought by each of the plaintiffs against the bank to recover the moneys deposited in their names, defendant offered to show that the deposits were made to avoid the provision as to interest on sums exceeding $1,000; declarations of F. to the effect that she never intended that the title to the money should pass to plaintiff; also statements made to the justice of the peace who drew her will that it was not her intention to give the money to the alleged donee; this evidence was objected to and excluded. Held error. Mrs. Ford, the claimant's intestate, deposited her money in a savings bank in the name of the plaintiffs, and the claimant is entitled to it unless his intestate made a gift to each of the plaintiffs of the money deposited in her name. Broderick v. Waltham Savings Bank, 109 Mass. 149; McCluskey v. Provident Institution for Savings, 103 id. 300. To constitute a gift to the plaintiff the deposit must have been put in her name with the intention of making a gift of it to her, and it must have been accepted by her. The difference between this case and Sweeney v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, 116 Mass. 384, is that in that case the donee was present when the deposit was made, and the donor delivered the deposit-book to her. In the case at bar the deposit was made without the knowledge of the donee, and the deposit-book was retained by the donor. Upon the question of the intention of Mrs. Ford in making the deposits, the letter of the bank to her, and her declarations relating to it, are competent. The length of time between the declarations and the deposit affects the weight but not the competence of the evidence. Upon the question of Mrs. Ford's intention in holding the book before the gift was perfected - whether she held it as owner or as agent, or depositary for the plaintiff-her declarations and acts while holding it, showing the character of the act, are competent. The taking of the order from the plaintiff for the payment to herself was an act, the significance of which depended upon her interest in it. Whether exercising dominion over the deposit as owner, or recognizing the dominion of the plaintiff, and her declarations and letters respecting it are competent. The letter to the plaintiff, Elizabeth A., was sufficiently identified as coming from Mrs. Ford by containing the order and being acted on as hers by the plaintiff, and sufficiently appeared to relate to the order, and should have been admitted. Each plaintiff relied upon a particular occurrence as proving the completion of the gift to her. The declarations offered of the donor in relation to making her will were after the gift was completed, if it ever was, and were either incompetent and immaterial, and were properly excluded. Whitney v. Wheeler, 116 Mass. 490; Whitwell v. Winslow, 132 id. 307. If the donor made the deposit and kept the book for the plaintiff, intending it as a gift to her, the gift would not be perfected until accepted by the donee, and acceptance implies a mutual act of the parties, or an act by one assented to by the other, equivalent to an acceptance of a chattel upon delivery. Gerrish v. New Bedford Savings Bank, 128 Mass. 159; S. C., 35 Am. Rep. 365. An acceptance and a completed gift might be inferred from the fact that the donor informed the

donee of the gift with the express or implied consent of the donee. Any act or speech between the parties which should show a mutual understanding that the gift was made would be sufficient evidence. The instructions to the jury were substantially correct, though not verbally accurate; but there was error in the exclusion of evidence. Scott v. Ford. Opinion by W. Allen, J. [See 31 Alb. L. J. 331, 426, 437, 445: 48 Am. Rep. 506.]

[Decided Oct. 23, 1885.]

MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE OF A CO-SERVANT.-The city, through its highway commissioner employed a carpenter and builder by the name of Gates to erect a public building, Gates to furnish the labor and tools and the city to furnish all the materials. The city had general supervision as to the dimensions and construction, but gave no directions as to the details of the work. The plaintiff, a workman, was injured by the falling of a staging, caused by a defective bracket, which belonged to Gates, and which he had brought there and directed to be put up by a workman by the name of Green. In an action against the city to recover damages for the injury, held, that if plaintiff was the servant of the defendant, he was the fellow servant of Gates and Green. That if the brackets were not strictly tools required to be furnished by Gates, they were nevertheless implements owned and kept by him, and which he might use under his contract with the defendant, and that the negligence, if any, was that of servants in constructing the unsafe staging, and not that of the master in not furnishing proper materials. Colton v. Richards, 123 Mass. 484; Killea v. Faxon, 125 id. 485. Hoppin v. City of Worcester. Opinion by W. Allen, J. [Decided Oct. 23, 1885.]

-- ACCEPTING SMALLER

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION SUM THAN DUE -CONTRACT-WRITTEN VARIED BY PAROL AFTER BREACH.-(1) While recognizing and giving effect to the rule of law that a creditor cannot bind himself by a simple agreement to accept a smaller sum in lieu of an ascertained existing debt of a larger amount, because such agreement is without consideration, courts have nevertheless often declared that the rule is not to be extended beyond a precise import, and especially if a consideration for such agreement is found to exist, of which the law can take notice, that courts will not inquire into its adequacy. Langdon v. Langdon, 4 Gray, 189; Brooks v. White, 2 Metc. 283; Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 35. The question, what will constitute a sufficient consideration for such agreement, has been discussed in many cases. Fitch

v. Sutton, 5 East, 230; Brooks v. White, ubi supra; Perkins v. Lockwood, 100 Mass. 250; Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 385; Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559; Met. Cont. 192; 1Smith Lead. Cas. 444. (2) It is also now well settled that ordinarily a written contract, before breach, may be varied by subsequent oral agreement, made on a sufficient consideration, as to the terms of it, which are to be observed in the future. Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Metc. 486, 489; Holmes v. Doane, 9 Cush. 135; Goodrich v. Longley, 4 Gray, 379, 383; Emery v. Boston Ins. Co., 138 Mass. 398; Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58. This rule in Massachusetts has been made applicable to a case where the original contract fell within the operation of the statute of frauds (Cummings v. Arnold, ubi supra; Stearns v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31), but in the present case there is no question under the statute of frauds. In reference to the contracts under seal, it was formerly held, especially in England, that they could not be thus varied. But in the United States the tendency of judicial decision has been to apply the same rule in this respect to sealed

instruments as to simple contracts. Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298; Mill Dam Foundery v. Hovey, 21 id. 417; Blaskell v. Souther, 6 Gray, 155; Barker v. Troy and Rutland Railroad, 27 Vt. 766; Lawrence v. Davey, 28 id. 264; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 528; Langworthy v. Smith, 2 Wend. 587; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330; Stryker v. Vanderbilt, 25 N. J. L. 482; McGrann v. North Lebanon Railroad, 29 Penn. St. 82; Cooke v. Murphy, 70 Ill. 96; 1 Smith Lead. Cas. (8th Am. ed.) 666. In the present case we are of the opinion that it was legally competent for the defendant to prove as a defense to the plaintiff's action for the rent, that after the delivery of the lease, the plaintiff, for a good consideration, entered into an oral agreement that for the future the rent should be reduced, and that the defendant's testimony and his offer of proof in respect to the plaintiff's alleged agreement in the fall of 1877, were sufficient, if believed, to warrant the jury in finding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the amount so agreed to be abated. Agreeing to take in a partner for the ensuing three years, and to borrow the sum of $40,000 and put the same into the business, provided the rent should be reduced, and actually fulfilling that agreement in consequence of the plaintiff's promise to reduce the rent, and continuing the business under these circumstances for three years, constituted a change of position on the part of the defendant, which might be of advantage to the plaintiff, and also of detriment to the defendant, provided the plaintiff's promise should be kept. Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 385; Hubbard v. Coolidge, 1 Metc. 92; Peck v. Requa, 13 Gray, 407; Rollins v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 116; Hinckley v. Arey, 27 Me. 362; Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266. Lovejoy. Opinion by C. Allen, J. [Decided Oct. 23, 1885.]

Hastings v.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

ORAL SALE OF GOODS- ACCEPTANCE. Where goods of the value of 107. or upward are sold by an oral contract and delivered, and the purchaser retains them, and deals with them in such a way as to prove that he admits the existence of a contract and admits that the goods were delivered under the contract, this is a sufficient acceptance to satisfy section 17 of the statute of frauds, although the purchaser afterward rejects the goods on the ground that they are not equal to sample, and if the goods prove equal to sample the purchaser is liable. Kibble v. Gough, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 204. Page v. Morgan. Ct. App., June 10, 1885. Opinions by Brett, M. R., Baggallay and Bowen, L. JJ.

INSURANCE LAW.

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LIFE POLICY-FALSE ANSWERS AS TO PREVIOUS DISEASE APPLICATION, HOW CONSTRUED — EVIDENCESTATEMENTS OF PHYSICIANS IN PROOFS OF DEATH PRIVILEGED.-To the question in an application for insurance whether the applicant had "ever had any of the following complaints: * * pneumonia, ** spitting or raising of blood, * or any disease of the lungs," the answer was "No;" and to the question, "What sickness or sicknesses has the party had during the ten years last past?" the answer was, "None except fever-cure perfect; " and to the question, “Is the party now in good health?" the answer was "Yes." Held, that the answers were true, within the meaning of the contract, although the insured had on one occasion "spit blood;" the evidence showing that he had not had the spitting in such form as to be called a dis

ease, disorder or constitutional vice; and that the question did not require him to state every instance of blood-spitting, but only such as amounted to a disease. Cont. Life. Ins. Co. v. Kessler, 84 Ind. 310; Conn. Mut. Life v. Union Trust Co., 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Geach v. Ingall, 14 Mees. & W. 95; S. C., 2 Bigelow Life & Acc. Ins. R. 306; Insurance Co. v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475; and Vose v. Eagle Life Ins. Co., 6 Cush. 42, are cases which illustrate the distinction, and are in this respect different from the case now presented. See, also, Cushman v. Insurance Co., 70 N. Y. 72, and authorities cited. Statements in the proof of death, made by the physician of the insured, as to the previous complaints and ailments of the insured, are privileged communications within the meaning of the Indiana statute and not admissible to show that the answers made to certain questions in the application for insurance were false. Penn. Mut. Life v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92; 50 Am. Rep. 769; Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Beck,77 Ind.208; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra. It is true that by the terms of the policy the plaintiff, in order to have a right of action, was bound to furnish the company within a specified time "satisfactory proof of the death;" but this did not entitle the company to go further, as it seems to have done, and require of the plaintiff a statement by the physician of his knowledge concerning the previous complaints and ailments of the deceased, which, proximately at least, did not cause the death; and I see no reason at all why such statements, when so obtained, should become available to the company as evidence, in a suit upon the policy, of facts which could not be shown by the testimony of the one who made the statement. The law which declares communications between patient and physician confidential should not be evaded in any such way. Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32; Walther v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Cal. Sup. Ct.) 13 Ins. L. J. 815; S. C., 4 Pac. Rep. 413; Campbell v. Charter Oak, etc., Co., 10 Allen, 213; Moore v. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Me. 97. These cases declare the general proposition that "the preliminary proofs presented to an insurance company in compliance with the condition of its policy of insurance are admissible as prima facie evidence against the assured;" but no one of them goes to the extent, either in terms, or as I conceive, in principle, of holding that statements by physicians which are by statute made confidential become available to the company as evidence, because found in or connected with the preliminary proofs; especially when, as in this case, the statements in question are not concerning the last sickness or proximate cause of death. In the opinion in Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Beck, supra, it is conceded or implied that after the death of the patient the physician may testify at the instance or with the consent of "the party who may be said to stand in the place of the deceased;" but this was aside or beyond the question presented in that case. And there explicit authorities to the effect that the restriction of the statute can be waived only by the one who makes the confidential communication. Westover v. Etna Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. Ct. App.), 1 N. E. Rep. 104; Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424; Grattan v. Metropolitan Life. Ins. Co., 80 id. 281; Bowman v. Norton, 5 Car. & P. 177; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 243. Dreier v. Continental Life Ins. Co. U. S. Circ. Dist. Ind. Opinion by Woods, J. (24 Fed. Rep. 670.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

HONOR TO WHOM HONOR IS DUE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I have read with great pleasure the article in your paper of November 7, 1885, entitled, "Is it expedient

to have a Class of Counsel?" It has brought back to

my mind a letter I wrote to your paper, with the signature "H. A. W.", which was published in the issue of April 5, 1873 (7 Alb. L. J. 223). That letter was written with the audacity and in the crude language of youth; but I am pleased to see that the views expressed in it are so similar to those put forth in the recent article above mentioned.

I do not wish to accuse the author of the article referred to of borrowing my ideas. I am satisfied he could show his innocence of such a charge; but I would be pleased to have the credit of first suggesting the measure which he advocates.

Many plays which Shakspeare never wrote are accredited to him; many quotations are used as coming from the Bible which are not in it; many ideas are expressed as original in modern philosophy and theology which may be found in ancient books; but it seems to me when the original suggester of an advance step is found, to him should be awarded the merit.

It is scarcely necessary for me to add, that should it be discovered that some one anticipated the views which I expressed in my letter of April 5, 1873, as applicable to our courts and procedure, I am perfectly willing to let that person have the credit of originality which I now claim for myself.

I have not determined whether, if the idea presented in my letter and in said article, were to suggest itself to me now, I should approve it or reject it. Since I have grown older many of my youthful opinions have changed.

Yours respectfully,

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The well edited law journals, such as the ALBANY and the Central, and others of more local circulation, which owe their success and their hold upon their readers to the ability with which they present within their respective jurisdictions fresh and original views of questions of present interest to the profession, quite as much as to the condensed notes of current decisions have, we believe, nothing to fear from the new methods of reporting which are now inaugurated. If we mistake not, these new methods of Reporters," giving early publication to the decisions in groups of States, are but following up the work which the journals are carrying on, of leading the profession to a broader and freer comprehension and interpretation to the law; and so far from superseding the usefulness of such journals, they appear to us to add to the neces sity which the profession will feel, and the obligation they are under both to the condensed notes of cases too long to be read in full, and to the editorial comment and discussion which afford an invaluable aid to the discriminating reader of the reports.-New York Daily Register.

There was hardly any need to contradict the silly rumor which prevailed last week that Vice-Chancellor

Bacon intended to resign his seat on the bench at the end of the present sittings. The learned judge, having triumphantly passed through his cold, has returned to work full of vigor and vivacity; and at eighty-seven years of age displays a freshness of spirits not possessed by many of his sedate, though juvenile, colleagues. Long may he live to enliven the dreary Chancery bench.-Solicitors' Journal.

I fell across an amusing story the other day in Mad. ame Adam's interest ing book, La Patrie Hongroise. Hungary, says Madame Adam, swarms with barristers. It is the ambition of the Hungarian peasant to make one of his sons an advocate, as it is the ambition of the Breton and the Irish peasant to make one son a priest. The son of a small farmer in the neighborhood of Pesth was sent by bis father to the law school of the town, but either from want of parts or application, was plucked in the qualifying examination. Not daring to return home empty handed, after all the money that had been spent on his education, he forged a legal diploma. The father however was not so ignorant as not to be aware that such diplomas are always written on parchment Kutya-ber- dog-skin" in Hungarian. "Why is your certificate not made out on Kutya-ber?" asked the old man. "The fact is, father," answered the youth, "that there are more barristers than dogs in Hungary, and so there is not enough Kutya-ber to make diplomas for us all. - London Life.

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There was one happy spot in America on Thanksgiving day, and that was Sing Sing prison. The convicts were allowed to sing ad libitum all day long. The Tribune thus describes the affair: A Tribune reporter, accompanied by Principal Keeper Connaughton, walked through the corridors of the prison yesterday afternoon, and had a good opportunity to observe the result of the license allowed the convicts in the use of their vocal powers. German opera and Italian opera, Tony Pastor's, the Thalia Theater, the Academy of Music, the Metropolitan Opera House, and "Ed" Coffee's Garden were blended in painful confusion. On the fourth tier an Italian tenor, in for burglary, was delighting himself with the melody of "Non e ver," while one tier below a cornetist was pouring forth the mournful music of "The Last Rose of Summer." One of the keepers had been trying all day to spot the man, but he had ingloriously failed. A forger was piping out 'Nearer, my God, to Thee," while a brother in crime was ejaculating "Oh, dem Golden Slippers." A murderer, in for life, was declaiming, "Oh, that this too solid flesh would melt," while a German counterfeiter was calling out to his next neighbor, "Come out o' that, you man o' Cork." A small man with a falsetto voice was singing "Nanon, in Rapture I come to Thee," while a ponderous convict of 300 pounds made his cell resound with "When I can Read my Title Clear." 'Oh, come off cully," a negro convict ejaculated, and a general laugh went the rounds. One convict was in the midst of his declamatory effort: "I had a wife, and she had a tongue. Her tongue would wag, and I couldn't stop it. I hanged myself on a big lamp-post, and ” —“Oh, you were a big fool," was the interruption of two couvicts, and another laugh ensued. The "boys" were having a real jolly time. They could keep it up until 7 P. M., and they did so. They might be in for crimes of great magnitude, but they evidently intended to make the most of the holiday. They were apparently a happy, merry crew. "This effervescence does the men good," said Mr. Connaughton, "the convicts will do all the better work to-morrow."

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The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, DECEMBER 12, 1885.

CURRENT TOPICS.

WHY HY will lawyers work themselves to death? This a question which occurred to us as This a question we read with regret the account of the recent death of Mr. Bangs, of the city of New York. This gentleman, although little known outside the city, was one of the dozen most energetic, capable and useful advocates at its bar. He has of late years appeared in many of the most interesting causes of a public character. He had an exceptionally strong and bright spirit, his sympathies were right, and his services were generally in accord with justice. But he worked himself to death at the age of fiftyseven years.

Intense anxiety, midnight studies, the foul air of court-rooms, incessant application without resting, have untimely ended a brilliant career. There are others in the city who are in the same danger. Haste to be rich, anxiety to be famous, the determination to "keep up with the procession," in the bewildering turmoil and clatter and strife of a great city's life, terminate many a career when it ought to be at its height. There is no good sense nor economy in such a course. Wise men in a long race do not start as if on a hundred

yards' spurt. If they see a rival doing so they simply smile, and let him go by, certain that he will not last. This spirit of rivalry is the bane of professional life in the city — rivalry domestic and social, as well as professional. Men are frequently

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not conscious what an unnatural strain they are putting on themselves. The mental and physical machinery move along smoothly. "I never had a head-ache," said a great lawyer once to us. "So much the more dangerous for you," said we; you are destitute of a useful monitor." The clock ticks regularly, till all of a sudden it stops with a crash. The bright candle goes out with a puff. Why will not men learn wisdom on this score? The difficulty is in the inborn conceit of human nature. Every man pities his failing rival and neighbor, but never dreams of his own possible failure. Be wise in time, ye city lawyers. Take long vacations, go fishing and sailing and driving; loaf vigorously; go to the theatre and the opera frequently; look in at your club; waste an occasional hour on family and friends; and above all shame that we should have to say it!— do not work on Sunday.

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on Tuesday evening of last week. Mr. Proctor's vindication is ingenious, and none the less interesting because it had been anticipated by Parton in his biography of Burr. Burr was a bold, selfish, unscrupulous, dark and dangerous man, of great powers, no doubt, but so much the more dangerous. It is quite possible that his great rival, Hamilton, has been idealized. He was a partizan, and a not too scrupulous politician. But what comparison can be made between the two careers? The one was the very greatest of our creative statemen, to whom this country owes a lasting debt of gratitude; the other an intriguer and conspirator, who cared only for himself, and whose private morals were detestable. Burr was not a patriot; he loved nothing but himself and his neighbor's wife. Hamilton loved his neighbor's wife too much, it is true, but he also loved his country. It is true that in killing Hamilton, Burr only took advantage of the prevailing code of honor of the day, and if he been to blame, judged by the standards of that had had a sufficient provocation he would not have day. But he had no sufficient provocation, and his challenge was little better than murder. Hamilton was no saint, we know, but Burr was an almost unmitigated sinner. Except that he fought gallantly in her cause, what good thing did he ever do for his country? Hamilton was not only a gallant soldier, but his political service to his country is priceless. A vindication of Burr can answer no good purpose. There is nothing to admire in the man, and ingenious defenses of those who have long stood at the bar of public opinion as crimi

nals are a waste of time and labor. Let Burr Richard III and Henry VIII, and Arnold and Judas. stand where he belongs, with such characters as There is no use in trying to whitewash them. It is much more useful to dwell on the good men of history than to invent ingenious defenses for the bad.

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In Mr. Stedman's recent book, "Poets of America," the most admirable piece of criticism ever put forth in this country he says: "No one can long remain a good lawyer and a fertile man of letters." This is true, and we are glad that Oliver Wendell Holmes knew it, and quit the law. If he owed the law any thing he has paid it in giving his son to it. Mr. Stedman also says, in speaking of the English heroic measure: "How it delights a class that still read Byron and Campbell and Scott"- of course he does not mean to say that Scott wrote it- "the learned body of jurists and other professional men, sensible and humane, who care little for the poetry of beauty alone. I observe that lawyers, veteran judges, merry and discreet, enjoy the verse of Holmes. It was asked concerning Landor, 'shall not the wise have their poets as well as the witless?' and shall we begrudge the wigged and gowned their rations of wit and epigram and lettered jest?"

"Blind Tom," the famous darkey pianist, used to applaud himself. We hope we are not to be act

cused of patting ourselves on the back, but once in a while a word of praise comes to us which it is not in human nature to resist telling our readers. For example, within a few days we have received some very kind words from two legal authors of this country. One of them says: "I get all the leading, I may say all the decent law periodicals, and count the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL the best by a length or more." The other, one of the most distinguished law writers of the present time, sends us a copy of his last work, not for review, saying: "Please accept it as a token of my respect for you personally, and as editor of the best law periodical of the present day." Even one of the new omnivorous "Reporters," while finding some fault with us, is gracious enough to say: "There is no law publication in the country for which we have more respect than for the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. It seems to have the good of the profession at heart, and its discussions of matters relating to the law and lawyers are generally characterized by clear insight and breadth of outlook, and have the appearance of disinterestedness."

The Virginia Law Journal, in commenting on a proposed married women's act in that State, remarks: "The provision for the specific enforcement of her agreements to sell or incumber her real estate illustrates the difficulties of the subject. Specific performance may be enforced (which now it cannot be) just as if she were a man, but yet the court must be of opinion that her interest will be promoted thereby. That is to say, she may take all the chances of gain which her contract offers, but is exempt from the risks of loss. So hard is it, in enacting a woman into a man, to break away from the influences of the common-law rules. Now, if she is competent to make one contract, she is competent to make any, and if she is required to stand by one she ought to be required to stand by all; in short, if the statute sets her free, to shift for herself, in matters of property, her emancipation ought to be complete, and she should abide all its consequences. And for the same reason we think that the proviso in section three of the act (clause [2] above) requiring the husband to unite in any disposition or conveyance of her separate real estate, should be omitted." We agree with this in the main. Let the wife be free to contract like a single woman. That is our law. Yes, we believe in letting wives "shift" for themselves in regard to their own property.

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of runners from carriers' vehicles and premises: 'The well-established right of carriers to make reasonable regulations for the conduct of passengers and others transacting business upon their premises is accompanied by the right to exclude from their premises persons having no business with the carrier, and whose presence would be detrimental to his interests, or the safety and convenience of passengers. This rule follows naturally from the strict accountability to which the carrier is held for the safety of passengers and goods intrusted to his charge. * Thus it has been held proper to exclude by force if necessary an innkeeper from a railroad depot whose habit had been to enter the depot and annoy passengers by soliciting patronage for his house, having been previously notified that he must discontinue the practice. Landrigan v. State, 31 Ark. 50; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 547. And such person's rights will not be enhanced in the premises even though he has in his possession a ticket entitling him to passage upon defendant's railroad, and he enters the depot with the bona file intention of taking the cars, if he fails to exhibit the ticket when ordered to leave the station, and his conduct is such as to induce the defendant's agent to believe that his intention is to continue to violate the regulations of the company. But the carrier's agent will not be justified in thus removing a person because, in his judgment and without proof of the fact, he has violated regulations of the company, although he had conducted himself offensively to such agent personally.' Thomp. Carr. Pass. 350; Comm. v. Power, 7 Metc. 596; Hall v. Power, 12 id. 482; Hutch. Carriers, § 546. The leading case upon the subject is Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner, 221, in which it was held that one common carrier is under no obligation to carry a drummer for a rival line. That was a case where a steamboat company had interdicted such agents from coming on board their boats, and had refused one of them passage in the boat, though he tendered the customary fare. Judge Story, delivering the opinion, said: "The right of passengers to a passage on board of a steamboat is not an unlimited right. But it is subject to such reasonable regulations as the proprietors may prescribe for the due accommodation of passengers, and for the due arrangement of their business. The proprietors have not only this right, but the further right to consult and provide for their own interests in the management of such boats as a common incident to their right of property. They are not bound to admit passengers on board who refuse to obey the reasonable regulations of the boat, or who are guilty of gross and vulgar habits of conduct, or who may make disturbance on board. Nor are they bound to admit passengers whose object is to interfere with the interest or patronage of the proprietors, so as to make the business less lucrative to them. And as passengers are bound to obey the orders and regulations of the proprietors, unless they are

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