9. A man who finds another, trying to obtain access to his wife's room in

the night time, by opening a window, may not only remonstrate with
him, but may employ such force as may be necessary to prevent his
doing so; and if the other threatens to kill him, and makes a motion
as if so to do, and puts him in fear of his life, or of great bodily harm,
he is not bound to retreat, but may use such force as is necessary to
repel the assault. Alberty v. United States, 499.

10. The weight which a jury is entitled to give to the flight of a prisoner,
immediately after the commission of a homicide, was carefully con-
sidered in Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408; and, without repeat-
ing what was there said, it was especially misleading for the court in
this case to charge the jury that, from the fact of absconding they
might infer the fact of guilt, aud that flight is a silent admission
by the defendant that he is unable to face the case against him. Ib.
11. Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justi-
fies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, though
only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight, unless
explained by the circumstances, or accounted for in some way consist-
ent with innocence. Wilson v. United States, 613.

12. The existence of bloodstains at or near a place where violence has
been inflicted is relevant and admissible in evidence, and, if not satis
factorily explained, may be regarded by the jury as a circumstance in
determining whether or not a murder has been committed. Ib.
13. The testimony of the defendant in a criminal case is to be considered
and weighed by the jury, taking all the evidence into consideration,
and such weight is to be given to it as in their judgment it ought to
have. Ib.

14. In the trial of a person accused of murder, the picture of the murdered
man is admissible in evidence, on the question of identity, if for no
other reason. Ib.

15. The true test of the admissibility in evidence of the confession of a
person on trial for the commission of a crime is that it was made
freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, and this
rule applies to preliminary examinations before a magistrate or per-
sons accused of crime. Ib.

16. When there is a conflict of evidence as to whether a confession is or
is not voluntary, if the court decides that it is admissible, the question
may be left to the jury, with the direction that they should reject it if,
upon the whole evidence, they are satisfied that it was not the volun-
tary act of the defendant. Ib.

17. One count in an indictment may refer to matter in a previous count
so as to avoid unnecessary repetition; and if the previous count be
defective or is rejected, that circumstance will not vitiate the remain-
ing counts, if the reference be sufficiently full to incorporate the mat-
ter going before with that in the count in which the reference is made.
Crain v. United States, 625.

18. A count in an indictment which charges that the defendant did cer-
tain specified things, and each of them, the doing of which and of
each of which was prohibited by statute, and also that he caused the
doing of such things and of each of them, is not defective so as to re-
quire that judgment upon it be arrested; and there may be a verdict
of guilty upon proof that the accused had done any one of the things
constituting a substantial crime under the statute. Ib.

19. A record which sets forth an indictment against a person for the com-
mission of an infamous crime; the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney; the appearance of the accused in person and by his at-
torney; an order by the court that a jury come "to try the issue
joined;" the selection of a named jury for the trial of the cause,
who were "sworn to try the issue joined and a true verdict render;'
the trial; the retirement of the jury; their verdict finding the pris-
oner guilty; and the judgment entered thereon in accordance there-
with; does not show that the accused was ever formerly arraigned,
or that he pleaded to the indictment, and the conviction must be set
aside; as it is better that a prisoner should escape altogether than
that a judgment of conviction of an infamous crime should be sus-
tained, where the record does not clearly show that there was a valid
trial. Ib.

20. Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, affirmed on the following points:
(1) That the offence of aiding or abetting an officer of a national
bank in committing one or more of the offences, set forth in Rev. Stat.
§ 5209, may be committed by persons who are not officers or agents
of the bank, and, consequently, it is not necessary to aver in an indict-
ment against such an aider or abettor that he was an officer of the
bank, or occupied any specific relation to it when committing the
offence; (2) That the plain and unmistakable statement of the indict-
ment in that case and this, as a whole, is that the acts charged against
Haughey were done by him as president of the bank, and that the
aiding and abetting was also done by assisting him in the official
capacity in which alone it is charged that he misapplied the funds.
Coffin v. United States, 664.

21. Instructions requested may be properly refused when fully covered by
the general charge of the court. Ib.

22. When the charge, as a whole, correctly conveys to the jury the rule
by which they are to determine, from all the evidence, the question of
intent, there is no error in refusing the request of the defendant to
single out the absence of one of the several possible motives for the
commission of the offence, and instruct the jury as to the weight to
be given to this particular fact, independent of the other proof in the
case. Ib.

23. The refusal to give, when requested, a correct legal proposition does
not constitute error, unless there be evidence rendering the legal the-
ory applicable to the case. Ib.

24. When it is impossible to determine whether there was evidence tend-
ing to show a state of facts adequate to make a refused instruction
pertinent, and there is nothing else in the bill of exceptions to which
the stated principle could apply, there is no error in refusing it. lb.
25. Several other exceptions are examined and held to be without
merit. Ib.

26. A bank president, not acting in good faith, has no right to permit
overdrafts when he does not believe, and has no reasonable ground
to believe, that the moneys can be repaid; and, if coupled with such
wrongful act, the proof establishes that he intended by the transac-
tion to injure and defraud the bank, the wrongful act becomes a
crime. Ib.

27. When the principal offender in the commission of the offence made
criminal by Rev. Stat. § 5209 and the aider and abettor were both
actuated by the criminal intent specified in the statute, it is imma-
terial that the principal offender should be further charged in the
indictment with having had other intents. Ib.

28. An indictment against its president for defrauding a national bank,
described the bank as the "National Granite State Bank," "carry-
ing on a national banking business at the city of Exeter." The
evidence showed that the authorized name of the bank was, the
"National Granite State Bank of Exeter." Held, that the variance
was immaterial. Putnam v. United States, 687.

29. Conversations with a person took place in August, 1893. In Decem-
ber, 1893, he testified to them before the grand jury which found the
indictment in this case. On the trial of this case his evidence before
the grand jury was offered to refresh his memory as to those conver-
sations. Held, that that evidence was not contemporaneous with the
conversations, and would not support a reasonable probability that
the memory of the witness, if impaired at the time of the trial, was
not equally so when his testimony was committed to writing; and
that the evidence was therefore inadmissible for the purpose offered.
Ib.

30. On the trial of a national bank president for defrauding the bank,
a witness for the government was asked, on cross-examination, as to
the amount of stock held by the president. This being objected to,
the question was ruled out, as not proper on cross-examination, the
government "not having opened up affirmatively the ownership of
the stock." Held, that as the order in which evidence shall be pro-
duced is within the discretion of the trial court, and as the matter
sought to be elicited on the cross-examination for the accused was
not offered by him at any subsequent stage of the trial, no prejudicial
error was committed by the ruling. Ib.

31. The proof of guilt in this case was sufficient to warrant the court in
leaving to the jury to decide the question of the guilt of the accused.

lb.

32. The sentence on the counts having been distinct as to each, the entire
amount of punishment imposed will be undergone, although the con-
viction and sentence as to the second count are set aside. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4.

DEED.

1. In order to charge a purchaser with notice of a prior unrecorded con-
veyance of land, he or his agent in the purchase must either have
knowledge of the conveyance, or, at least, of such circumstances as
would, by the exercise of ordinary diligence and judgment, lead to
that knowledge; vague rumor or suspicion is not sufficient; and
notice of a sale does not imply knowledge of an unrecorded convey-
ance. Stanley v. Schwalby, 255.

2. A conveyance of land by a city to the United States, in consideration
of the establishment of military headquarters thereon, to the benefit
of the city, is for valuable consideration. Ib.

3. A purchaser of land, for valuable consideration, and without notice of
a prior deed, takes a good title, although his grantor had notice of
that deed. Ib.

4. Even where, as in Texas, a purchaser taking a quitclaim deed is held
to be affected with notice of all defects in the title, a purchaser from
him by deed of warranty is not so affected. Ib.

5. The United States, by warranty deed duly recorded, purchased land
from a city for a military station, in consideration of the benefits to
enure to the city from the establishment of the station there. The
attorney employed by the United States to examine the title testi-
fied that the city acquired the land by quitclaim deed, describing it
as "known as the McMillan lot; " that he had information of a sale
to McMillan, but satisfied himself that he had not paid the purchase
money; and searched the records, and ascertained that no deed to
him was recorded; and advised the United States that the title was
good. There was no evidence that the attorney had any other means
of ascertaining whether a deed had been made to McMillan. Held,
that the evidence was insufficient in law to warrant the conclusion
that the United States took no title as against an unrecorded con-
veyance to McMillan. Ib.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

See WILL;

WRIT OF ERROR.

FEES.

1. The jurat attached to a deposition taken before a commissioner of a
Circuit Court of the United States is not a certificate to the deposition
in the ordinary sense of the term, but a certificate of the fact that the

witness appeared before the commissioner, and was sworn to the truth
of what he had stated; and the commissioner is entitled to a separate
fee therefor. United States v. Julian, 324.

FRENCH SPOLIATION CLAIMS.

1. The proviso in the act of March 3, 1891, c. 540, 26 Stat. 908, "That in
all cases where the original sufferers were adjudicated bankrupts the
awards shall be made on behalf of the next of kin instead of to
assignees in bankruptcy, and the awards in the cases of individual
claimants shall not be paid until the Court of Claims shall certify
to the Secretary of the Treasury that the personal representative on
whose behalf the award is made represents the next of kin, and the
courts which granted the administrations, respectively, shall have cer-
tified that the legal representatives have given adequate security for
the legal disbursement of the awards," purposely brought the pay-
ments thus prescribed within the category of payments by way of
gratuity and grace, and not as of right as against the government.
Blagge v. Balch, 439.

2. Congress intended the next of kin to be beneficiaries in every case;
and the express limitation to this effect excludes creditors, legatees,
assignees and all strangers to the blood. Ib.

3. The words "next of kin," as used in the proviso, mean next of kin
living at the date of the act, to be determined according to the stat-
utes of distribution of the respective States of the domicil of the
original sufferers. Ib.

4. This court is inclined to adopt the established rule of interpretation in
England, which is that the phrase "next of kin," when found in ulte-
rior limitations, must be understood to mean nearest of kin without
regard to the statutes of distribution. Ib.

INDIAN RESERVATIONS.

1. The reservations granted by provision "First" in § 1 of the act of
December 19, 1854, c. 7, 10 Stat. 598, "to provide for the extinguish-
ment of the title of the Chippewa Indians to the lands owned and
claimed by them," etc., are limited to the territory ceded by the
Indians, both as applied to Indians of pure blood, and to Indians of
mixed blood. Fee v. Brown, 602.

2. The scrip certificates, under which the defendant in error claims, were
intended to be located only by half-breeds to whom they were issued,
and patents were to be issued only to the persons named in those
certificates; and, consequently, the right to alienate the lands was not
given until after the issue of the patents. Ib.

3. The act of June 8, 1872, c. 357, 17 Stat. 340, "to perfect certain land
titles," etc., was intended to permit a purchaser of such scrip certifi-
cates, who through them had acquired an invalid title to public land,