time when the house is in session, unless the constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid. The constitution of Michigan a strong incentive to the exercise of personal and sinister influences to effect the object.

"The subject has been twice adjudicated upon in New York. In Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for services performed in going to see individual members of the house, to get them to aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the house as a body, nor before its authorized committees. In Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kernan, 289, the Court of Appeals held the same doctrine, and stated its proper limits. Selden, J., makes the following comments on the case of Harris v. Roof: 'Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly presenting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary proofs and arguments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court, very justly distinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to the legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law; and may contract for and receive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted; but that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.'

"In Fuller v. Dame, cited above, Shaw, Ch. J., recognizes the well-established right to contract and pay for professional services when the promissee is to act as attorney and counsel, but remarks that 'the fact appearing that persons do so act prevents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations are weighed and considered accordingly.' He also admits the right of disinterested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a particular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another person; but a promise to pay for such service is void.

"Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract."

See further a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same conclusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 16 How. 314. See also Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152.

provides that no new bill shall be introduced into either house of the legislature after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired;1 and the constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in either house within the last ten days of the session.2 The purpose of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always be done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjournment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put immediately upon their passage.3

For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed thereon; unless, in case of urgency, four fifths or some other specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of its proceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or not; but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided by the constitution must be presumed, in accordance with the general rule which presumes the proper discharge of official duty.

1 Art. 4, § 28.

Art. 3, § 26.

A practice has sprung up of evading these constitutional provisions by introducing a new bill after the time has expired when it may constitutionally be done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the constitutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of Siam. One of the member's constituents applies to him for legislative permission to construct a dam across the Wild Cat River. Forthwith, by amendment, the bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may construct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed; but the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved! This dodge is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and the evidence at the same time so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter of surprise to find it so often resorted to.

* Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. S. 480. The clause in the constitution of Ohio is: "Every bill shall be fully

As to what shall constitute a reading of a bill, it seems to be held sufficient to read the written instrument that is adopted by the two houses; and if anything else becomes law in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred to in it, it is nevertheless not essential that it be read with the reading of the bill. Thus,

a statute which incorporated a military company by reference to its constitution and by-laws, was held valid, notwithstanding the constitution and by-laws, which would acquire the force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a part of it.2

It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States, that on the final passage of every bill the yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation; and also in furnishing definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has been passed by the requisite majority or not. "The constitution prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether the requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. The office of the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and authenticate and preserve the same. It must appear on the face of the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority. These directions are all clearly imperative. They are

and distinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three fourths of the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule"; and in Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. S. 481, and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. S. 178, this provision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill must be read cannot possibly be defined by any law; and it must always, from the necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine finally whether in this particular the constitution has been complied with or not; but the rule respecting three several readings on different days is specific, and capable of being precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it has a purpose beyond the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a purpose, that it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public interests and to the citizens at large, is very clear, and independent of the question whether definite constitutional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground of their being merely directory, we cannot see how this can be treated as anything but mandatory. See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424.

1 Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466.

Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards, 21 Geo. 592.

expressly enjoined by the fundamental law, and cannot be dispensed with by the legislature." 1

For the vote required in the passage of any particular law, the reader is referred to the constitution of his State. A simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by the constitution, a two-thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any particular class of bills, two thirds or three fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless it is expressly declared that this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, shall be requisite.2

The Title of a Statute.

The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the law-makers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect ambiguous or doubtful,3 yet it was not supposed to control, and the law might be good when that and the title were in conflict. The reason for this was that anciently titles were not prefixed at all, and when afterwards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed, and attracted but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk's idea of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than that of the house; and they therefore were justly regarded as furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come to possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional provisions, which not only require that they should correctly indicate the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to control, and exclude everything from effect and operation as law which is incorporated in the body of the act but is not within the purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great change in the law.4

1

183.

Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill.

* Southworth v. Palmyra & Jacksonburg Railroad Co. 2 Mich. 287; State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303.

* United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 480; Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, 157; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195. See Dwarris on Statutes, 502.

4

The constitutions of Minnesota, Kansas, Maryland, Kentucky, Nebraska,

In considering these provisions it is important to regard, 1. The evils designed to be remedied. The constitution of New Jersey refers to these as "the improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other." In the language of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the former practice: "The title of an act often afforded no clew to its contents. Important general principles were found placed in acts private or local in their operation; provisions concerning matters of practice or judicial proceedings were sometimes included in the same statute with matters entirely foreign to them, the result of which was that on many important subjects the statute law had become almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been to examine or act under it can well testify. To prevent any further accumulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the constitutional provision under consideration."1 The Supreme Court of Michigan say: "The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any eluOhio, and Pennsylvania provide that "no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." Those of Michigan, Louisiana, and Texas are the same, substituting the word object for subject. The constitutions of South Carolina, Alabama, and California contain similar provisions. The constitution of New Jersey provides that, " to avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The constitution of Missouri contains a similar provision, with the addition, that, "if any subject embraced in an act be not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as is not so expressed." The constitutions of Indiana and Iowa provide that "every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title." The constitution of Nevada provides that "every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." The constitutions of New York, Wisconsin, and Illinois provide that "no private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Whether the word object is to have any different construction from the word subject, as used in these provisions, is a question which may some time require discussion; but as it is evidently employed for precisely the same purpose, it would seem that it ought not to have. Compare Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28, and People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 192.

1 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 298.