than that given after their commencement. | ville, Carmi, & Paducah Railroad Company, It is not easy to conceive what purpose and said election, held on the 13th day of would be subserved by confining the aid to November, 1868, resulting in a legal majorroads which have been begun; and there would be certain embarrassment in deciding the degree to which construction must be advanced. However, these are but passing ob servations. We may rest the validity of the bonds on the right of a bona fide holder, from their recitals, to assume that the county had the interest claimed and that the rail-ing the subscription as authorized above. road had been begun before subscription to its stock was made. It makes no difference whether the existence or nonexistence of those conditions could have been ascertained by inquiry. Purchasers were not expected to be at or near the sources of information. The bonds were not offered in Stanly county only, or in the state of North Carolina only. They were expected to be offered in the financial markets of the other states of the Union; even offered in the financial markets of the world. They were payable to bearer. They were expected to have, and their value, to an extent, depended upon their having, almost the currency and sanction of money. If a buyer of bonds is chargeable not only with want of power to issue them (a considerable risk, as the records of the courts show), but also with the performance of conditions in pais, their value would be much diminished. And what good would such a holding subserve? The affairs of a county can only be administered by its officers, and to their attention and duty its interests must be intrusted. When the power to issue bonds, therefore, depends upon the existence of conditions, the local officers are charged with the duty and the responsibility of ascertain[448]ing *them; and the presumption that the duty was exercised should and does accompany and guarantee the bonds in every financial market. And this court has so decided. In Evansville v. Dennett, 161 U. S. 434, 40 L. ed. 760, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613, the bonds passed upon recited that they were "issued by the city of Evansville in payment of a subscription to the Evansville, Henderson, & Nashville Railroad Company, made in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of Indiana, and ordinances of the city council of said city, passed in pursuance thereof." The bonds were dated May 1, 1858. Other bonds were issued December 1, 1870, in payment of the subscription of the city to the stock of the Evansville, Carmi, & Paducah Railroad Company. The recital in the latter bonds was as follows: ity in favor of such subscription, and by vir- [The charter of Evansville authorized the The charter of Evansville was amended in Sustaining the validity of the first series of bonds, the court said, by Mr. Justice Harlan, it could not be doubted that the city had the power to subscribe to the stock, upon the performance of the conditions expressed in the questions propounded, and further said they "were only conditions which the statute required to be performed or met be fore the power given was exercised. That there was legislative authority to subscribe to the stock of these companies cannot be 71 1133 [450] questioned, although the statute declared ↑ Ct. Rep. 327, where effect of recitals in bonds that the power should not be exercised except under the circumstances stated in the statute." And of the effect of the recital that the subscription was "made in pursuance of an act of the legislature thereof," it was ob served: "This imports not only compliance with the act of the legislature, but that the ordinances of the city council were in conformity with the statute. It is as if the city had declared, in terms, that all had been done that was required to be done in order that the power given might be exercised." Passing on the second series of bonds, and expressing the principle applicable, Inde pendent School Dist. v. Stone, 106 U. S. 183, 27 L. ed. 90, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84, was quoted from as follows: "Numerous cases have been determined in this court, in which we have said that where a statute confers power upon a municipal corporation, upon the performance of certain precedent conditions, to execute bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad, or for other like purposes, and imposes upon certain officers-invested with authority to determine whether such conditions have been performed-the responsibility of issuing them when such conditions have been complied with, recitals, by such officers, that the bonds have been issued in pursuance of,' or 'in conformity with,' or by virtue of,' or 'by authority of the statute, have been held in favor of bona fide purchasers for value to import full compliance with the statute, and to preclude inquiry as to whether the precedent conditions had been performed before the bonds were issued. Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484, 23 L. ed. 579; Douglas County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104, 24 L. ed. 46; Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83, 17 L. ed. 548; Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227, 238, 239, 28 L. ed. 966, 970, and authorities there cited Cairo v. Zane, 149 U. S. 122, 37 L. ed. 673, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803." And again: "As, therefore, the recitals in the bonds import compliance with the city's charter, purchasers for value having no notice of the nonperformance of the conditions precedent were not bound to go behind the statute conferring the power to subscribe, and to ascertain, by an examination of the ordinances and records of the city council, whether those conditions had, in fact, been performed. With such recitals be[451]fore them, they had the right to assume that the circumstances existed which authorized the city to exercise the authority given by the legislature." was thoroughly considered, and the doctrine of prior cases repeated and affirmed. The application of these cases to that at bar is denied by petitioners. The argument is (to quote counsel) : "The preliminary question, whether the railroad was incomplete or the county had an interest, was not one as to which the commissioners had peculiar knowledge, qualifying them to answer. They had such knowledge as the whole public could obtain,nothing more. It was incumbent on the respondents to inquire about the fact, because the incompleteness or completeness or the interest of the county was a test of the existence of the power of the board, not a condition precedent to the exercise of a power granted." It is also said that counties having an interest were constituted a class, and only members of the class could have exercised the power conferred by the Code sections. We think the distinctions made are not substantial. No matter how you may designate the interest of the county or the condition of the railroad, they were facts which bore the same relation to the power of the board of commissioners of Stanly county as the facts in the cited cases bore to the power of the officers, the exercise of which was sus tained. It is indifferent whether you call the facts which were to be ascertained tests of power or conditions precedent or marks of a class. They were something which were to exist prior to the exercise of the power, and the existence of which the law imposed on the board of commissioners the duty to ascertain. 1. 2. fractional sections on noneffect of resurvey. Letters patent from the United States to the state of Indiana, purporting to be in pursuance of the swamp land act of September 28, 1850, chap. 84 (9 Stat. at L. 520), which refer to the official plat of survey and describe the land as "the whole of fractional sections" therein enumerated, convey to the extent of full subdivisions the land under nca-navigable water on which such fractional sections border, as appears from the meander line shown on such plat, beyond which the survey did not extend. In Gunnison County v. E. H. Rollins & Sons [173 U. S. 255, 43 L. ed. 689, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390], the bonds passed on recited that all the requirements of law had been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of the bonds. It was held that the county was estopped from asserting, against a bona fide holder for value, that the bonds so issued created an indebtedness in excess of the limit prescribed by the Constitution of Colorado. See also Waite v. San- On title to land under water-see note to ta Cruz, 184 U. S. 302, 46 L. ed. 552, 22 Sup. ' Goff v. Cougle (Mich.) 42 L. R. A. 161. The title to lands embraced within patents from the United States in pursuance of the swamp land act of September 28, 1850, chap. 84 (9 Stat. at L. 520), cannot be affected by a resurvey of the land covered by water at NOTE--As to the effect of bounding a grant on river or tide water-see note to Hanlon v. Hobson (Colo.) 42 L. R. A. 502. the time of the original survey, and patents | L. ed. 346, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1157; Iowa Railgranted, pursuant to such resurvey, for tracts road Land Co. v. Antoine, 52 Iowa, 429, 3 below the original water line. N. W. 468. [No. 8.] Argued October 23, 1901. Ordered for reargument December 22, 1902. Reargued January 9, 12, 1903. Decided May 4, 1903. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff in a suit to quiet title. Affirmed. See same case below, 150 Ind. 699, 50 N. E. 85. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William P. Fennell argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiffs in error: A survey made by proper officers of the United States and confirmned by the Land Department cannot be shown to be inaccurate by collateral attack in the courts. Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. 158 U. S. 253, 39 L. ed. 971, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 827. The fact that the survey under which the patents issued was contested at every step by the interested parties and was finally decided after six months' consideration by the Secretary of the Interior affirming the decision of the Land Office affords strong evidence of its correctness and honesty. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 125 U. S. 273, 31 L. ed. 747, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850. This case is identical in law and in fact with Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 379, 35 L. ed. 432, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838, only the rule of property is different in Indiana from what this court assumed to be the law in Illinois. State v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 106 Ind. 459, 7 N. E. 379. By reference, the plat became a part of the patent as much so as if it had been copied therein. Piper v. Connelly, 108 Ill. 646; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ill. 455. When lands are purchased and conveyed in accordance with a plat, the purchaser will be restricted to the boundaries as shown by the plat. Riparian rights have nothing to do with the title to land under the water. Diedrich v. Northwestern Union R. Co. 42 Wis. 262, 24 Am. Rep. 399. Deeds of the border lands did not convey the bed of the lake. State v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 106 Ind. 459, 7 N. E. 379; Indiana v. Milk, 11 Biss. 197, 11 Fed. 389; Boorman v. Sunnuchs, 42 Wis. 233; State v. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461; Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521; Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257; Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38; Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377; Angell, Watercourses, § 41; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Diedrich v. Northwestern Union R. Co. 42 Wis. 248, 24 Am. Rep. 399. The action of the Land Department in issuing a patent is conclusive in all courts and in all proceedings where by the rules of law the legal title must prevail. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 83, 21 L. ed. 485; Warren v. Van Brunt, 19 Wall. 653, 22 L. ed. 219; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 340, 23 L. ed. 428; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. ed. 848; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473, 25 L. ed. 800; Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 519, 25 L. ed. 931; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 401, 26 L. ed. 173; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 646, 26 L. ed. 879; Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. 106 U. S. 447, 27 L. ed. 226, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 421, 26 L. ed. 800: Baldwin v. Stark, 107 U. S. 465, 27 L. ed. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 473; Powell v. Lammers, 10 Sawy. 246, 21 Fed. 200; Wight v. Dubois, 21 Fed. 693; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 693, 32 L. ed. 566, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203; Gazzam v. Phillips, 20 How. 374, 15 L. ed. 958. Land cannot pass as appurtenant to land. Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 369; Webber v. Eastern R. Co. 2 Met. 147; Parker v. Framingham, 8 Met. 260; Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25, 9 L. ed. 333; Jackson ex dem. Yates v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447, 8 Am. Dec. 263. Mr. Silas H. Strawn for defendant in error on original argument. Messrs. James F. Meagher, Frederick S. Winston, and G. E. Hamilton were with him on the brief: Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838, and Mitchell McCormick v. Huse, 78 Ill. 363; McClin- v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 35 L. ed. 442, 11 tock v. Rogers, 11 Ill. 279. As to mere intruders, the patents issued under the new survey are conclusive that the lands were of the character which by the patents they were represented to be. Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 30 L. ed. 1039, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Ehrhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S. 67, 29 L. ed. 346, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1157. It is the duty of the Land Department to determine whether land patented to a settler is of the class subject to settlement under the pre-emption laws, and its judgment as to this fact is not open to contestation in an action at law. Ehrhardt v. Hogaboom, 115 U. S. 67, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840, control this case. It is the settled law in the state of Indiana that where an inland non-navigable lake covers a portion of a section of land and the government survey designates the dry land in such subdivision as a fractional subdivision or lot, the purchaser from the government of such lots acquires title to all that portion of the bed of the lake included in the whole subdivision. Stoner v. Rice, 121 Ind. 51, 6 L. R. A. 387, 22 N. E. 968; Brophy v. Richeson, 137 Ind. 114, 36 N. E. 424: Tolleston Club v. State, 141 Ind. 197, 38 N. E. 214. 40 N. E. 690; Tolleston Club v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93, 43 N. E. 647; Mason v. Calumet Canal & Im The rights of the owners of land bordering the law of the state wherein the land lies. prov. Co. 150 Ind. 699, 50 N. E. 85; Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221, 42 N. E. 1011; Kir-on inland, non-navigable lakes are settled by wan v. Murphy, 28 C. C. A. 348, 49 U. S. App. 658, 83 Fed. 275; Forsyth v. Smale, 7 Biss. 201, Fed. Cas. No. 4,950. When a patent has been awarded, delivered, and accepted thenceforth all right to control the title or to decide the right to the title has passed from the Land Office. Not only has it passed from the Land Office, but it has passed from the Executive Department of the government. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 380, 35 L. ed. 433, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Lowndes v. Huntington, 153 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 615, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 758; Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 40 L. ed. 85, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 991; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comrs. 168 U. S. 349, 42 L. ed. 497, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. ed. The owner of lands bordering on non848; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 navigable inland lakes, when the subdiviL. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Mitch- sions of the land are surveyed by running ell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 35 L. ed. 442, a meander line between the dry land and the 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840; Davis v. Weib-water to ascertain the number of acres of bold, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. ed. 238, 11 Sup. dry land, and designating such subdivision Ct. Rep. 628. as a fractional quarter or a lot, giving the number of acres of dry land, takes the title to all the land contained within the subdivision. This court has repeatedly decided that if lands patented or attempted to be patented were not at the time public property, having been previously disposed of, the Department had no jurisdiction to transfer the lands, and their attempted conveyance by patent is inoperative and void. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 640, 26 L. ed. 876; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 30 L. ed. 1039, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 40 Fed. 618; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 31 L. ed. 844, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1228. Mr. Frederick S. Winston for defendant in error on reargument. Mr. Silas H. Strawn was with him on the brief: The supreme court of Indiana, having held that all of the land involved in this suit was in fact included in the survey of 183435, this court will not disturb that finding of fact. Gardner v. Bonestell, 180 U. S. 362, 45 L. ed. 574, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188, 41 L. ed. 680, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658, 38 L. ed. 305, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Hedrick v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 167 U. S. 673, 42 L. ed. 320, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922; Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas P. R. Co. 92 U. S. 315, 23 L. ed. 515. All of the land in question having been in cluded in the survey of 1834-35, the United States having conveyed it all under that survey to the state of Indiana in 1853, and defendant in error holding under mesne conveyances from the state, by the same description, the survey of 1875 was void, and plaintiffs in error acquired no rights thereunder. Mason v. Calumet Canal & Improv. Co. 150 Ind. 699, 50 N. E. 85; Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221, 42 N. E. 1011; Tolleston Club v. State, 141 Ind. 197, 38 N. E. 214, 40 N. E. 690; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 35 L. ed. 442, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 24 L. ed. 848; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 640, 26 L. ed. 876; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 30 L. ed. 1039, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 31 L. ed. 844, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1228. Ross v. Faust, 54 Ind. 471, 23 Am. Rep. 655; Ridgway v. Ludlow, 58 Ind. 248; Edwards v. Ogle, 76 Ind. 302; Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221, 42 N. E. 1011; Tolleston Club v. State, 141 Ind. 197, 38 N. E. 214, 40 N. E. 690; Indiana v. Milk, 11 Biss. 197, 11 Fed. 389; Stoner v. Rice, 121 Ind. 51, 6 L. R. A. 387, 22 N. E. 968; Brophy v. Richeson, 137 Ind. 114, 36 N. E. 424; Tolleston Club v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93, 43 N. E. 647. If there be any inconsistency in the several opinions of a state court, the general rule is that this court will follow the latest settled adjudications in preference to the earlier ones. Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 499, 43 L. ed. 1061, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L. ed. 261; Fairfield v. Gallatin County, 100 U. S. 47, 25 L. ed. 544. If the common law of Indiana were as found by this court, in Hardin v. Jordan, to be the common law of Illinois, then the defendant in error, as a riparian owner of bordering lands, owns to the center of the lakes, and, consequently, all of the land in controversy. Forsyth v. Smale, 7 Biss. 201, Fed. Cas. No. 4,950; Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462, 33 L. R. A. 146, 44 N. E. 286; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 381, 35 L. ed. 433, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: The This is a proceeding to quiet title, brought by the Calumet Canal & Improve ment Company in a court of the state of Indiana. The company got judgment, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the state (150 Ind. 699, 50 N. E. 85), and the case is brought here by writ of error. land in question is land bordering on and extending under certain non-navigable water up to the state line, the Illinois side of which was the subject of the decisions in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838, and Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 35 L. ed. 442, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840. But the facts in this case are somewhat different. The Cal- the lake. It would 'seem, to be sure, that [460] umet company claims title through mesne the settled understanding of the Land Deconveyances from the state of Indiana. partment has been that in cases like the The state of Indiana got its title under the present the meander line marked the limit swamp-land act, September 28, 1850, chap. 84 of the grant. But probably the cases are (9 Stat. at L. 520, Rev. Stat. §§ 2479 et seq., comparatively rare in which that underU. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1586), and pat- standing was acted on by an attempt subse[459]ents *of the United States, dated 1853, pur- quently to convey the land under water on porting to be in pursuance of that act, and the further side of the line at dates before referring to the official plat of survey, which the transactions with which we have to was made in 1834. The patent set forth deal. The title to such land was not condescribes "the whole of fractional sections" sidered of much importance in the early enumerated and bordering on the water, in days, or worth the trouble of an independwhich sections lies the disputed land. The ent survey. See Newson v. Pryor, 7 Wheat. state afterwards conveyed by the same de- 7, 11, 5 L. ed. 382, 383. The United States scription. It is not denied that the company got the land above the water line, as shown in the plat referred to, but it is denied that it got more. The water has been receding and drying up, so that the question is important. The defendants set up a later survey in 1875 of the land which was covered by water in 1834, and is covered, to a less extent, still, and patents from the United States in pursuance of the same, for tracts below the original water line. They deny that the state ever owned this land, or, if it did, that it conveyed it, and they allege the later survey to be conclusive. On general principles of conveyancing, the state would have acquired the land in controversy here by a conveyance from the United States describing the upland according to the survey, because the local law of Indiana, and the common law as understood by this court, are the same, so far as this case is concerned. Stoner v. Rice, 121 Ind. 51, 6 L. R. A. 387, 22 N. E. 968; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838. The case is stronger if the land passed under the swamp land act, as has been held by the state court with regard to this and similar patents. Mason v. Calumet Canal & Improv. Co. 150 Ind. 699, 50 N. E. 85; Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221, 42 N. E. 1011; Tolleston Club v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93, 43 N. E. 647; Tolleston Club v. State, 141 Ind. 197, 38 N. E. 214. See Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 414, 35 L. ed. 442, 445, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840. The making of a meander line has no certain significance. French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47, 52, 46 L. ed. 800, 802, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563. It does not necessarily import that the tract on the other side of it is not surveyed, or will not pass by a conveyance of the upland shown by the plat to border on the lake. It is not always a boundary. St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 19 L. ed. 74; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 380, 35 L. ed. 428, 432, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 414, 35 L. ed. 442, 445, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840; Horne v. Smith, 159 U. S. 40, 43, 40 L. ed. 68, 69, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 988; Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87, 93, 40 L. ed. 85, 87, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 991. In this case its immediate import was only to indicate the contour of was more anxious for settlers than for revenue from that source. It is not necessary to consider how we should decide the case with our present light if the question were a new one. It is not new. For twelve years the decisions in Hardin v. Jordan and Mitchell v. Smale have stood as authoritative declarations of the law. Probably in most cases the statute of limitations has cured the defects of title which those cases may have shown. Meantime many titles must have passed on the faith of those decisions. The United States can meet them by the form of its conveyances. It seems to us that it would be likely to do more harm than good to allow them to be called in question now. It is said that the land under water was not embraced in the survey of 1834. It would seem from the plat and the field notes that the sections and dividing lines were clearly marked off and posts set. The case is similar to Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221, 42 N. E. 1011, where the survey was pronounced sufficient. No difficulty was felt on the ground that the survey did not cover the submerged land in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838. But furthermore, the land was selected as "swamp and overflowed lands" by the state. It not appearing otherwise, the selection must be presumed to have included the land overflowed, and if so it was confirmed to the state by the act of March 3, 1857, chap. 117 (11 Stat. at L. 251, Rev. Stat. § 2484, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1588). The confirmation encounters none of the difficulties of cases like Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240, 39 L. ed. 966, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822. The land surrounding the water, at least, was surveyed, so that the identification of the submerged portion was absolute. We are of opinion that the state of Indiana got a title to the whole land in dispute. *If the state of Indiana got a title, it gave[461] one. There is not much controversy on this point. We should follow the decision of the state court in this case so far as this question is concerned, if there was no other evidence of the state law. But the law of Indiana is shown, by the other cases cited above, to be clear on this point. The resurvey by the United States in 1874 does not affect the Calumet company's rights. As the United States already had conveyed the lands, it had no jurisdiction |