cedent's estate cannot maintain a suit the state as construed by its courts because tribution of the estate decreed. [No. 39.] part of said notes has ever been paid ex- defendant, as administrator of the estate of Argued April 21, 22, 1902. Decided Decem- finally settled and probated, and that said ber 1, 1902. WRIT of Certiorari to the United nesota in favor of plaintiff in a suit against Fed. 1006. Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras: administrator had never been discharged On February 12, 1897, the defendant appeared and answered, admitting those allegations of the complaint which alleged the making and transfer of said notes, and that the same remained unpaid in the hands of the plaintiff, but denying that the defendant had in its hands as administrator of said Matteson any money or property applicable In January, 1897, the Black River Na-, to the payment of said notes. The answer tional Bank of Lowville brought an action also alleged that the estate of said Mattein the circuit court of the United States for son had been fully settled, probated, and adthe district of Minnesota against the Se ministered upon and discharged from the [212]curity Trust Company of St. Paul, as ad-probate court long prior to the commenceministrator of the estate of Sumner W. Matinent of plaintiff's action, and that the de teson, deceased. The complaint alleged that fendant had long before the commencement the plaintiff was a corporation duly organ of this action turned over all property, ized under the national banking laws of the money, and effects of said estate remaining United States, having its place of business in its hands, to the persons entitled thereat Lowville, Lewis county, and state of New to, and that defendant long before the comYork; that the defendant was a corporation mencement of this action had been discreated by the laws of the state of Minne-charged as such administrator, and was not sota, having its place of business at the city of St. Paul and state of Minnesota, and had been duly appointed administrator of the estate of Sumner W. Matteson, deceased, by the proper probate court of Ramsey county, Minnesota, on or about the 3d day of September, 1895; that the said Matteson had been during his lifetime a resident and citi zen of the state of Minnesota. For a cause of action the complaint averred that on the 27th day of February, 1894, the said Matteson had executed his two promissory notes, wherein for value received he promised to pay to the order of James H. Easton & Company, at the First National Bank of Decorah, Iowa, the sum of $2,500, four months after date, with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from date until paid; that thereafter, on March 22, 1894, and before the maturity of said notes, the said James H. Easton & Company, for value received, sold and assigned the same to the plaintiff; that said James H. Easton & Company was a copartnership doing business at Decorah, and that all the members thereof were residents and citizens of the state of Iowa; that no when said action was brought, and is not On March 20, 1897, the plaintiff filed a States. be heard, on the pleadings and stipulation to Wilson v. Perrin, 11 C. C. A. 71; Hill v. | Butz v. Muscatine, 19 L. ed. U. S. 490; Clark Hite, 29 C. C. A. 553; Griffin v. Overman v. Graham, 5 L. ed. U. S. 334; and Forepaugh Wheel Co. 9 C. C. A. 548; Elmendorf v. Taylor, v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (Pa.) 5 L. R. A. 508. 6 L. ed. U. S. 290: Jackson er dem. St. John v. Chew, 6 L. ed. U. S. 583; United States ex rel. Subsequently the cause was taken to the] United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, where, on October 17, 1900, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, on authority of the case of Secur[214]ity Trust Co. v. *Dent, reported in 43 C. C. A. 594, 104 Fed. 380. Whereupon a writ of certiorari was prayed for and allowed, and the cause was brought to this court. Mr. Edmund S. Durment argued the cause, and, with Mr. Albert R. Moore, filed a brief for petitioner: The defendant when sued was not administrator. State ex rel. Lindekugel v. Sibley County Probate Ct. 33 Minn. 94, 22 N. W. 10; State ex rel. Dana v. Ramsey County Probate Ct. 40 Minn. 296, 41 N. W. 1033; Stackhouse v. Berryhill, 47 Minn. 22, 49 N. W. 392; Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255; Ganser v. Ganser, 83 Minn. 199, 86 N. W. 18; State ex rel. Matteson v. Ramsey County Probate Ct. 84 Minn. 289, 87 N. W. 783. In the matter of the presentation of claims to the probate court, and their allowance, that court is simply "auditor of claims," performing no judicial function" in any proper sense of the term. Such allowance of claims is not the "establishment of claims" which this court has held a state cannot limit to its own courts. Ouachita County v. Wolcott, 103 U. S. 559, 26 L. ed. 505; Delaware County v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co. 133 U. S. 473, 33 L. ed. 674, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399; Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467, 34 L. ed. 196, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 406, 25 L. ed. 208. Mr. Edward C. Stringer argued the cause, and, with Mr. McNeil V. Seymour, filed a brief for defendant in error: Specific and positive legislation is necessary to clothe the probate court with power to enter a decree discharging an administrator. 2 Woerner, Am. Law of Administration, §§ 251-253, pp. 1255-1257. The mere allowance of the final decree is not the legal equivalent of a decree dis The final decree operates to change every liability of the administrator from an of-charging the administrator. ficial liability to a personal one. 2 Woerner, Am. Law of Administration, 2d ed. § 569, *1248; Melone v. Davis, 67 Cal. 279, 7 Pac. 703. McCrea v. Haraszthy, 51 Cal. 146; Dohs v. Dohs, 60 Cal. 255. Until a decree is entered by the probate court discharging the administrator from The failure to present the claim to the further liability, in pursuance of a statute probate court, according to the law of Min- authorizing such decree, the trust continues nesota barred the claim, so that the plain-in contemplation of law, and he remains till has no right which he could enforce in any court of Minnesota. Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 4511; Fern v. Leuthold, 39 Minn. 212, 39 N. W. 399; Hill v. Nichols, 47 Minn. 382, 50 N. W. 367; Hantzoh v. Massolt, 61 Minn. 366, 63 N. W. 1069; State ex rel. Thompson v. Rock County Probate Ct. 66 Minn. 246, 68 N. W. 1063; Fitzhugh v. Harrison, 75 Minn. 481, 78 N. W. 95. The mere fact that plaintiff is a nonresident and sues in a Federal court does not ender the Minnesota statute nugatory. Jones v. Drewry, 72 Ala. 314; Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 Fed. 53; Dodd v. Ghiselin, 27 Fed. 405; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95, Fed. Cas. No. 11,376; Walker v. Brown, 11 C. C. A. 135, 27 U. S. App. 291, 63 Fed. 208; Smith v. Union Bank, 5 Pet. 523, 8 L. ed. 214; Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 498, 11 L. ed. 1074; Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 754, sub nom. Walker v. Beal, 19 L. ed. 819; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 280, 22 L. ed. 538; Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U. S. 449, 28 L. ed. 1043, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Rio Grande R. Co. v. Gomila, 132 Ú. S. 484, sub nom. Rio Grande R. Co. v. Vinet, 33 L. ed. 402, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 358, 43 L. ed. 476, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179; Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 419, 18 L. ed. 659; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 243, 20 L. ed. 627; Ouachita County v. Wolcott, 103 U. S. 559, 26 L. ed. 505; Goshorn v. Alexander, 2 Bond, 158, Fed. Cas. No. 5,630; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 285, 20 L. ed. 576. clothed with the duties and authority of his office. Woerner, Am. Law of Administration, p. 1256; Sitzman v. Pacquette, 13 Wis. 292. The administrator is not discharged by an order of distribution. Davis v. Weed, 44 Conn. 569, Fed. Cas. No. 3,658. An administrator cannot be said to have been discharged by a formal order or decree, unless it appears with certainty, beyond mere conjecture, that such result was intended by the court. Re Scheffer, 58 Minn. 29, 59 N. W. 956. The enforcement of the rule that the court which first takes jurisdiction must retain and exercise it to the exclusion of all proceedings in other courts until its jurisdiction is exhausted by the final judgment or decree, and by its effective execution, is indispensable to prevent unseemly conflicts between courts and their officers, and confusion worse confounded." 66 Starr v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 110 Fed. 3. See also Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 27 L. ed. 359, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Carroll County v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556, 28 L. ed. 517, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539. The limitation of time within which a claim must be presented to the probate court is not binding upon the Federal courts. Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67, 10 L. ed. 357; Hartman v. Fishbeck, 18 Fed. 291; Union Bank v. Vaiden, 18 How. 503, 15 L. ed. 472; Chewett v. Moran, 17 Fed. 820; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 28 L. ed. 927, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies between citizens of different states cannot be impaired by the laws of the state which prescribe the modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution of their judicial power. Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 30 L. ed. 532, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Williams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107, 12 L. ed. 1007; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. ed. 536; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L. ed. 149; Rio Grande R. Co. v. Gomila, 132 U. S. 484, sub nom. Rio Grande R. Co. v. Vinet, 33 L. ed. 402, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155. The probate court does not possess exclusive jurisdiction of the estates of deceased persons. The jurisdiction of the Federal court is concurrent, so far as establishing the debt is concerned. Chapman v. Borer, 1 McCrary, 49, 1 Fed. 274; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 28 L. ed. 927, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378. Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court: This was a suit brought in January, 1897, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, by the Black River National Bank of Lowville, incorporated under the national banking laws of the United States, and doing business in the county of Lewis and state of New York, against the Security Trust Company of St. Paul, Minnesota, as administrator of the estate of Sumner W. Matteson, deceased, seeking to recover the sum of $5,000 and interest thereon, due on certain promissory notes made by said Matteson in his lifetime, and which were alleged to be the property of the said national bank. No defense was interposed as respected the execution of the notes or the ownership of the same by the bank. It was admitted that the Security Trust Company had been, on September 3, 1895, duly appointed by the probate court of Ramsey county, Minnesota, administrator of the estate of said Matteson. The defendant, however, alleged in its answer that, as the action was not brought until after the time limited by the order of the probate court for the filing, examination, and allowance of claims against Matteson's estate, nor until after the examination and allowance of the administrator's final account, under the laws of the state of Minnesota, the official existence of the defend ant company as administrator had ceased, and therefore no action could be maintained [215] against it, and also *that the right to a judgment on the notes in suit was, by the laws of Minnesota, forever barred, although they were owned by a nonresident of the state. and a recovery was sought in a Federal court. a the first question must be affirmatively answered, whether, notwithstanding such condition of the statutory law of the state, an action can be successfully maintained by a citizen of another state in the circuit court of the United States on a cause of action not barred by the general statute of limitations of the state. It is scarcely necessary to say that, as respects the first of these inquiries, we must find an answer in the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of Minnesota as interpreted and construed by the supreme court of that state. The state Constitution and statutory provisions bearing upon the question involved are the following: A Const. art. 6, "§ 7. There shall be established in each organized county in the state a probate court, which shall be a court of record, and be held at such time and places as may be prescribed by law. probate court shall have jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianship, but no other jurisdiction, except as prescribed by this Constitution." Gen. Stat. 1894: "Sec. 4523. The probate court at the time of granting letters testamentary or of administration shall make an order allowing to the executor or administrator a reasonable time, not exceeding one year and six months, for the settlement of the estate. "Sec. 4524. The probate court may, upon good cause shown by the executor or administrator, extend the time for the settlement of the estate not exceeding one year at a time, unless in the judgment of the court a longer time be necessary." "Sec. 4527. When there is not sufficient personal estate in the hands of the executor [216] or administrator to pay all the debts and legacies and the allowance to the widow and minor children, the probate court may, on petition of the executor or administrator, order the sale of the real estate, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the same." Section 4471 provides that real estate shall descend subject to the debts of the intestate. "Sec. 4638. Every executor or adminis trator shall render his account of his administration within the time allowed him for the settlement of the estate, and at such other time as he is required by the court, until the estate is wholly settled. "Sec. 4639. When the estate is fully ad ministered the executor or administrator shall petition the probate court for an order fixing a time and place in which it will examine, settle, and allow the final account of the executor or administrator, and for the assignment of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto by law. The final account shall be filed in, the probate court at the time of filing said petition. Two inquiries are presented to us: First, whether, by virtue of the state statutes, the estate of Matteson had been so fully settled and administered, before the present action was brought, as to operate as a discharge of the administration, and as a bar to a right of the plaintiff to recover against the estate in the state courts; and, second, if law. "Sec. 4640. Upon the filing of said peti tion the court shall make an order fixing a time and place for hearing of the same. Said order shall be published according to "Sec. 4641. On hearing such petition, the probate court shall examine every executor and administrator upon oath as to the truth and correctness of his account before the same is allowed; but such examination may be omitted when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and there is no reason to doubt the justness and correctness thereof; and the heirs, legatees, and devisees may be examined on oath upon any matter relating to the account of any executor or administrator whenever the correctness thereof is called in question. If from such examination the account is found just and correct the probate court shall allow and settle the same, and upon satisfactory evidence shall determine the rights of the persons to the residue of said estate, and, unless partition is asked for and directed as hereinafter provided, make a decree accordingly, and assigning said residue to the persons thereto entitled by law. contingent, must be presented to the pro- "Sec. 4514. No action at law for the recovery of money only shall be brought in any of the courts of this state against any executor, administrator, or guardian upon any claim or demand which may be presented to the probate court, except as provided in this Code. No claim against a decedent shall be a charge against or lien upon his estate unless presented to the probate court as herein provided within five years after the death of such decedent: Provided, That this provision shall not be construed as affecting any lien existing at the date of such death: Provided, further, That said provision shall not be construed as affecting the right of a creditor to recover from the next of kin, legatee, or devisee to the extent of assets received. This provision shall be applicable to the estate of persons who died prior as well as to those who may die after adoption of this Code." "Sec. 4642. In such decree the court shall name the persons and the proportion of [217] parts to which each is entitled, and if *real estate, give a description as near as may be of the land to which each is entitled; and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same; and a certified copy of any decree of distribution of real estate may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in every county in this state in which are situated any of the lands described in such decree; and such register of deeds shall enter in his reception book the name of the deceased as grantor, and the names of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, as grantees, and shall make in such reception book so many "Sec. 4517. Upon the allowance or disalseparate grantor and grantee entries for lowance of any claim the court shall make such decree as there are persons taking real its order allowing or disallowing the same. estate in such county under said decree." The order shall contain the date of allow"Sec. 4509. At the time of granting let-ance and the amount allowed, the amount ters testamentary or of administration, the disallowed, and be attached to the claim court shall make an order limiting the time with the offsets, if any." in which creditors may present claims against the deceased for examination and allowance, which shall not be less than six months nor more than one year from the date of such order; said order shall fix the time or times and place in which the court will examine and adjust claims and demands of all persons against deceased. No claim or demand shall be received after expiration of the time so limited, unless for good cause shown, the court may, in its discretion, receive, hear, and allow such claim upon notice to the executor or administrator, but no claim shall be received or al lowed unless presented within one year and six months from the time when notice of the order is given, as provided in the next section, and before final settlement, and the allowance or disallowance of any claim shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for or against the estate. "Sec. 4510. The order prescribed in section one hundred and two shall be published according to law, and shall be notice to all creditors and persons interested. lowance or disallowance of any claim in the district court. Section 4668 provides for serving notice court shall try the case as if originally com- be made up as in civil actions, and the is- *Section 4676. In case of a reversal or [219] "Sec. 4730. The probate court may, at any time, correct, modify, or amend its records to conform with the facts in the same manner as a district court." "Sec. 4511. All claims arising upon con- State ex rel. Lindekugel v. Sibley County tracts, whether the same be due, not due, or Probate Ct. 33 Minn. 94, 22 N. W. 10, was an application to the district court for a property to the distributees, they may bring "The want of jurisdiction in this case is "The Probate Code neither authorizes nor provides for an assignment of any part of the estate of a deceased person until after the estate is fully administered. It contemplates but one decree of distribution, by which the entire residue of the estate shall the proportion or part to which each is entitled. Gen. Stat. §§ 4639-4642. Read in the light of the statute, and of the admissions of the answer, we think the complaint would fairly admit of being construed as alleging that all this had been duly done, and that the proportion of the estate assigned to plaintiff was an undivided fifth. If this was the state of facts, the jurisdiction of the probate court over the property had ended. The effect of a decree of distribution is to transfer the In State ex rel. Dana v. Ramsey County title to the personalty and the right of posProbate Ct. 40 Minn. 296, 41 N. W. 1033, session of the realty from the *personal rep-[221] where, upon an application for the final resentative to the distributees, devisees, or settlement of his accounts by the adminis- heirs. The property then ceases to be the trator of an estate and for a final discharge, estate of the deceased person, and becomes the probate court made an order allowing the individual property of the distributees, the account and discharging the administrator, such order was held by the supreme court to be a final order discharging the administration of the estate, and that, as a final decree discharging the administration, it operated to discharge the lien of creditors upon real estate which might have been previously sold to pay debts. The opinion of the court was thus expressed: with the full right of control and posses- State ex rel. Matteson v. Ramsey County "The object of the application on the part of the acting administrator was to submit his final account and close the administration. The order made was evidently so in[220]tended, and must *be construed as a final order discharging the administration of the estate. The parties had their remedy by appeal, but the order could not be attacked collaterally or treated as void, so as to war rant subsequent proceedings to reach the real estate, as if the administration was still in progress and the estate still unset-signing the whole of the estate to the heirs tled. "1. The Probate Code of this state makes no provision for the formal discharge of an administrator, but the necessary legal effect of an order of the probate court allowing the final account of the administrator and its final decree of distribution, as and distributees, is to remove the estate of "The omission of the land from the inven- the deceased from the jurisdiction of the tory, and the subsequent discovery of the court, and to render the office of administrareal estate of the deceased which was not re- tor, which depends upon such jurisdiction, duced to assets by the administrator or dis- functus officio. 2. After the estate has been tributed to the heirs, do not operate to re- so settled and assigned, and while the final vive the administration and open the judg- decree of distribution remains unreversed ment or warrant further proceedings. The and unmodified, the probate court has no land descended to the heirs, subject to the jurisdiction to entertain a petition to issue claims of administration upon it. The efa citation to the administrator requiring fect of a decree assigning the real estate to the heirs is simply to discharge it from the administration, and, of course, the final discharge of the administration must discharge the lien of the creditors." In Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255, it was held that where the estate of a deceased person has been fully adminis tered, and a decree of distribution has been made, assigning the residue of the estate in the hands of the personal representative to the parties entitled thereto, the jurisdiction of the probate court is ended; and, if the personal representative does not deliver the him to further account for the property be- The facts and law of the case were then "Sumner W. Matteson, a resident of the county of Ramsey, having real and personal property therein, died intestate on July 22, 1895. The Security Trust Company was duly appointed by the probate court of such county, on September 3, 1895, administrator of his estate, and it duly qualified as such. and duly filed in such court an inventory of such estate. The probate court, on the |