income of which was to go to her husband, | vise, and bequeath all my real and personal and, on his death, the principal to the heirs estate, as aforesaid, unto and to the use of of her body then living, and in default of the said William Wing, his heirs, executors, such heirs to certain named remaindermen; administrators, and assigns, to and for his another fund of $15,000, the income to be and their absolute use and benefit." And paid to the daughter during her life, the the testator appointed his wife and defendprincipal to be paid at her death to the ant Wing executors. Mrs. Underwood by heirs of her body then living; in default of her will, made by virtue of a power, devised, such heirs, to her appointees by will; and bequeathed, and appointed all the real and in default of appointment, to the heirs of personal estate subject to the power, to Mr. the body of the testatrix then living, and in Underwood, his heirs, etc., absolutely; and default of such heirs, then to the same re- the will proceeded: "(Subject to the esmaindermen; while a third sum of $15,000 tates and interests of my children therein, was settled upon the son as to the income, under or by virtue of the will of the said [414] with the same provisions *as to the princi- John Tulley, deceased.) And in case my pal at his death as in respect of the daugh- said husband should die in my lifetime, then ter. The husband and children were lost at I devise, bequeath, and appoint the said heresea, and there was no evidence of survivor- ditaments and premises, and sum and sums ship between them. The case was decided of money, and arrears of income aforesaid, at special term by Van Vorst, J., whose unto and to the use of William Wing, his careful and elaborate opinion was adopted heirs, executors, administrators, and asby the court in general term, and fully ap- signs, to and for his and their own absolute proved by the court of appeals. It was use and benefit." And she appointed her held that the intention of the testatrix husband and William Wing executors. plainly was that the limitation over to the remaindermen should be effectual if for any reason the children could not take, and that the death of the children without issue or appointment, under the circumstances, and in the absence of evidence of survivorship, entitled the remaindermen to have the limitation carried into effect. Mr. and Mrs. Underwood and their three children embarked for Australia, their ship foundered, and all on board, with the exception of one sailor, perished. Both parents and the two boys were washed into the sea by the same wave, but the daughter survived for half an hour. All the children died under twenty-one and unmarried. Wing It was observed by Van Vorst, J.: "Where proved both wills and plaintiff obtained leta devise is limited to take effect upon a ters of administration of the estate of Cathcondition or contingency annexed to a pre-erine Underwood. 19 Beav. 459, 460. ceding estate, if that preceding estate should not arise the remainder over will take place, the first estate being considered as a preceding limitation and not as a preceding condition. As when a testator meant to dispose of all his property, and uses the words, 'if the legatee should not survive,'-held to mean ‘if the preceding legacy should from any cause fail." Underwood v. Wing and Wing v. Angrave are relied on to the contrary. 19 Beav. 459, 4 De G. M. & G. 632, 8 H. L. Cas. 183. The courts agreed in the conclusion that at common law there could be no presumption of prior decease in the absence of proof, although the evidence tended to show that the husband was in good health and an able swimmer, while his wife was in delicate health, and their children of tender age; and this ruling has ever since been accepted in the English courts and by the uniform current of authority in the United States. Under the wills, the husband, wife, and children having practically died simultaneThe facts were these Underwood and ously, the intention of both testators that his wife had three children,-Catherine, their estate should pass to Mr. Wing seemed Frederick, and Alfred. Being about to em- plain, but the House of Lords (and the[416] igrate with their children, Mr. and Mrs. courts below) held otherwise, and that as Underwood made mutual wills, dated Oc- Mr. Wing could not show, either that the tober 4, 1853. Mr. Underwood by his will death of the husband occurred in the wife's devised his real and personal estate to lifetime, or that the wife's death occurred Wing, his heirs, etc., in trust for Mrs. Un- in the husband's lifetime, he could receive derwood, her heirs, etc., absolutely; and the neither estate. In the construction which will proceeded: "And in case my said wife produced this result it cannot be said that shall die in my lifetime, then I direct that the courts of this country have generally my said real and personal estate shall be concurred. Lord Campbell, then Lord Chanheld by my said trustee, upon trust for such cellor, dissented, and, referring to the wife's of them, my three children, Catherine Un- will, said: "Of course, I fully recognize all derwood, Frederick Underwood, and Alfred the cases where, there being in a Underwood, as, being sons or a son, shall at-will a gift really meant to be on tain the age of twenty-one years, and being condition, or the happening of a para daughter, shall attain that age, or marry under that age, to be equally divided between or among them, share and share [415]alike; and in case all of them my said children shall die under the age of twenty-one years, being sons, or under that age and unmarried, being a daughter, then I give, de ticular event, the court decided that it could not take effect unless the condition was performed, or the event had happened. But the present seems to me to be a case of substitution, to take effect on failure of the prior estate." Granting that effect is to be given to the expressed, not the conjectural William ...[418] or probable, intention of testators, he thought testatrix, as we must, we think it not open that by this will the testatrix clearly to doubt that she intended to dispose of all expressed her intention that if her her estate, and did not intend to die inteshusband did not take the property, tate as to any part of it; that she had in Wing should take it. "The mind only three objects of her bounlapse of the bequest to her husband ty, lier husband, her son, and the by his predecease being substantially home, and that her intention, failing the only event upon which the bequest to husband and son, was that the home him could fail, when she says, 'In case my should take. If husband alone survived it said husband should die in my lifetime,' was to go to the home at his death. If does she not, in substance say, in case the neither husband nor son survived it was to bequest to my husband should fail, then go to the home at once. Is her manifest inWilliam Wing is the object of my bounty, tention to be defeated because, instead of and all shall go to him? She has not pro- saying, "If neither my husband nor my son vided for the event of there being an impos- should survive me, I give and bequeath my sibility to determine whether she or her property to the home," she said: "In the husband died first. But although she has event of my becoming the survivor of both not in terms provided for this event, she has my husband, Oliver Wheeler Rhodes, and clearly intimated her intention, that in case of my son, Eugene Rhodes, I then give, deof the gift to her husband not taking effect, vise, and *bequeath all my property the ulterior gift to William Wing should to the Young Women's Christian Home?" take effect. And this seems to me not to be We do not feel compelled to so hold, and, an interpolation into her will, but a neces- by accepting so technical and literal a view, sary implication from what she has said. to reach an adverse result on the theory of How can it be supposed that if she had fore: a change in the burden of proof, or of an seen the event of an uncertainty as to accidental omission to prevent it. This is whether she or her husband died first, so not a case of supplying something omitted that her husband could not take from that by oversight, but of intention sufficiently uncertainty, she would have altered the in- expressed to be carried out on the actual tention she had so plainly expressed in favor state of facts. And as the estates of perof William Wing? Can it be considered pos- sons perishing in a common disaster, intessible that William Wing would, in that tate, notwithstanding the statutes of descent event, have ceased to be the object of her and distribution may not have made provibounty? What other destination of the sion in respect thereof, are disposed of as if [417]property, by her, can be conjectured? If each survived as to his own property, we her husband should not take, William Wing think, upon principle, that the property of was substituted for him. It seems Mrs. Rhodes should go as directed as if she to me to be a fallacy to say that this was a survived her son, in the absence of proof to gift merely on the happening of a particu- the contrary. lar event, unless that event is taken to be the failure of the prior gift to her husband." [8 H. L. Cas. 201.] It will be perceived that it was held that for the purpose of giving effect to the wills, the husband was not to be assumed to have survived the wife, nor the wife to have survived the husband; and yet, the wills having been thus eliminated, it was declared that the heirs and next of kin of Mr. Underwood were entitled to his property as though he had been the survivor, and that the heirs and next of kin of Mrs. Underwood should take her property as though she had been the survivor. It necessarily follows that title did not prima facie vest in the son, who is not shown to have survived his mother, and must be taken to have died at the same time. The property remained where it was vested, there being no evidence to show that it had been devested. The situation is illustrated by the case of Re Willbor, 20 R. 1. 126, 51 L. R. A. 863, 37 Atl. 634. There Charlotte, Martha, and Eliza Willbor, three sisters, perished in the same calamity, and there was nothing from which it could be inferred that either survived the other. Each left a will devising all her real and personal property, except Whether in a given case a condition prec-ing certain legacies, to her two sisters, or edent, a condition subsequent, or a conditional limitation, is prescribed, is, in the absence of unmistakable language, matter of construction. And conditions cannot be annexed from words capable of being in terpreted as mere description of what must occur before the estate given can arise. Edgeworth v. Edgeworth, L. R. 4 H. L. 35. As in all of these cases, so in this, we are remitted to the language of the will to ascertain the intention of the testatrix, and if that intention is clearly deducible from the terms used, taking the whole will together. then we are bound to give that construction which will effectuate, and not defeat, it. Reading this will from the standpoint of the either of the survivors, and to their heirs there being no interval of time as between | rendered upon a verdict in favor of the [419]the deaths of the three during which titles plaintiff in an action to recover license fees to property could vest, and the wills there- for telegraph poles and wires. Affirmed. fore stand as if they contained only the be- See same case below, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. quests to the legatees subsequently named." 306. The result is that the property passed under the will to the home, and neither the next of kin of the mother nor the next of kin of the son can defeat its destination. The decree of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause remanded, with a di-50 per mile of wire on the telegraph, telerection to affirm the decree of the Supreme Court. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: within its limits. The Western Union Tele- WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COM- in the court of common pleas of Bucks *coun-]420] PANY, Piff. in Err., บ. BOROUGH OF NEW HOPE. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 419-427.) Constitutional law-state regulation of interstate commerce-license on telegraph poles and wires. An ordinance imposing a license fee on telegraph poles and wires within the limits of the municipality is not obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution when applied to poles and wires used for interstate business, although it yields a return in excess of the amount necessary to reimburse the municipality for the cost of supervision and inspection. [No. 101.] ty, in that state, against the company to re- Argued December 2, 3, 1902. Decided Jan-to the Western Union at Philadelphia; that uary 5, 1903. IN no part of the business that went to or from New Hope went over these lines of wires and N ERROR to the Superior Court of the poles; and that the local business handed State of Pennsylvania to review a judg-to the Western Union at Philadelphia ment which affirmed a judgment of the amounted to from about $7 to $7.50 per Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County month. The evidence further tended to NOTE. On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce-see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. (Va.) 13 L. R. A. 107; McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. C. A. 13; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 216; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041; and Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311. As to police power as affecting commercesee notes to People v. Budd (N. Y.) 5 L. R. A. 559; and State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana & O. Oil, Gas & Min. Co. (Ind.) 6 L. R. A. 579. On license taxes as affecting interstate commerce see notes to Rothermel v. Meyerle (Pa.) 9 L. R. A. 366; and American Fertilizing Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Agri. (C. C. E. D. N. C.) 11 L. R. A. 179. On the limit of amount of license fees-see note to State ex rel. Tol v. French (Mont.) 30 L. R. A. 415. Validity of charges on telegraph and telephone poles and wires. a reasonable charge to pay for such supervision. A charge of $1 per annum for each pole was And such a license fee was sustained in Bethlehem v. Pennsylvania Teleph. Co. 12 Lanc. L. Rev. 204; Norristown v. Keystone Teleg. & Teleph. Co. 15 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 9. A charge of $1 per annum for each pole, and $2.50 per annum for each mile of wire, has also been held reasonable. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Philadelphia (Pa.) 12 Atl. 144. In Philadelphia v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 67 Hun, 21. 21 N. Y. Supp. 556, the charge for each pole and each mile of wire under the Philadelphia ordinance was regarded as not unreasonable. A municipal corporation, being chargeable And ordinances imposing this charge were with the duty of supervising the construction sustained in Taylor v. Postal Teleg & Cable Co. and maintenance of telegraph and telephone 4 Lack. Legal News, 111; Taylor v. Central Pennlines within its streets and public places in or-sylvania Teleph. & Supply Co. 4 Pa. Dist. R. 92. der to prevent danger to the people from their The same ordinance as is involved in WESTdefective condition, may impose upon such lines ERN U. TELEG. Co. v. NEW HOPE, was also sus 462. hio St. 268; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. show that the cost value of its lines through | ed. § 768; Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. New Hope was about $372, and that the cost 701; State, North Hudson County R. Co., of inspection, repairs, and maintenance of Prosecutors, v. Hoboken, 4i N. J. L. 71; the plant of the company had averaged for Taylor v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 202 Pa. thirteen years $1.49 per wire per annum; 583, 52 Atl. 128. that since October, 1894, the borough had Under the guise of the power to regulate, not expended any money on account of the a city cannot exercise the power to tax. poles and wires of the company; that its ex- State, Benson, Prosecutor, v. Hoboken, 33 penditures were for repairing streets, street N. J. L. 280; New York v. Second Ave. R. Co. lamps, moderate sums in payment of official 32 N. Y. 261; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, services, etc., and that when on holidays the , 45 Am. Dec. 593; Mays v. Cincinnati, burgess saw fit to appoint a policeman he often called on the constable, who was generally paid $2.50 per day. A lineman testified that during those years the borough never did anything, to his knowledge, "in the way of inspecting or repairing or removing or anything else in connection with the poles and wires of those telegraph companies." Defendant contended that the requirement of payment of the license fee in O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187; question amounted to a regulation of com- Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnp. Co. 13 Pa. 555; merce, and that the ordinance was therefore Millvale v. Evergreen R. Co. 131 Pa. 1, 7 L. R. A. 369, 18 Atl. 993; Com. v. Erie & N. The court left it to the jury to find wheth-F. R. Co. 27 Pa. 339, 67 Am. Dec. 471; [421]er the license fee *exceeded what was reasonable under the circuinstances. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and judgment was rendered thereon, which on error to the superior court was affirmed. 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 306. The supreme court of Pennsylvania refused to allow an appeal void. to that court. Mr. Silas W. Pettit argued the cause, and, with Messrs. George H. Fearons, Brown & Wells, H. B. Gill, and Robert M. Yardley, filed a brief for plaintiff in error: The rule limiting the amount of a license tax imposed under and in aid of the police power is well established to be the amount of the cost of such supervision and regulation and the cost of issuing the license. In Pennsylvania there is no power in a municipality to impose any charge upon telegraph companies by way of rental for the use of its streets, because they are expressly authorized by the Constitution and laws of that state to occupy the highways with their poles and wires. Philadelphia & T. R. Co.'s Case, 6 Whart. 25, 36 Am. Dec. 202; Northern Liberties v. Northern Liberties Gas Co. 12 Pa. 318; Mercer v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 36 Pa. 99; Danville, H. & W. R. Co. v. Com. 73 Pa. 29; Pittsburgh's Appeal, 115 Pa. 4, 7 Atl. 778; Williamsport Pass. R. Co. v. Wil liamsport, 120 Pa. 1, 13 Atl. 496; Homestead Street R. Co. v. Pittsburg & H. Electric Street R. Co. 166 Pa. 162, 27 L. R. A. 383, 30 Atl. 950; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 657. The Western Union Telegraph Company is engaged in interstate commerce, and the business it transacts is in itself commerce. Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Telcg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708. The police power of a state and, a fortiori, of a municipality, cannot obstruct interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exer Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. § 201; Cooley, tained by the Pennsylvania supreme court in 128. In Chester City v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 154 Pa. 464, 25 Atl. 1134, supra, the supreme court of Pennsylvania declared that the reasonableness of the charge for each pole maintained by a telegraph company may be measured partly by the liability of the city for injuries caused by defective poles and wires, as well as by the amount of actual expense for licenses. tral District & Printing Teleg. Co. 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 24. V. And it has even been held that the fact that the charge was more than ten times the cost of regulation and of all outstanding expenses, including liability for damages, loss, and expenses of every nature, is not sufficient to defeat the to collect the tax. Philadelphia right American U. Teleg. Co. 167 Pa. 406, 31 Atl. 628. A municipality may not justify the imposition of a tax on poles and wires of a telegraph company in excess of all expenses incurred by the municipality, as a means of coercing the comPhilapany to place its wires under ground. delphia v. Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. 42 C. C. A. 325, 102 Fed. 254. And that a borough is not precluded from Imposing a license fee on the poles and wires of The expense incurred by a telegraph company telegraph and telephone companies because it maintains no inspection and has incurred no ex-in repairing its wires on notice of defects hav pense was held in North Braddock v. Central District & Printing Teleg. Co. 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 24. ing occurred is of little importance in determining the reasonableness of an ordinance imposing a license tax on poles and wires. Ibid. The fact that the amount of a license tax on the poles and wires of telegraph and telephone companies largely exceeds the cost of maintenance is not sufficient to defeat an action to enforce payment of such tax. North Braddock v. Central District & Printing Teleg. Co. 11 Pa. Super. Ct. 24. And the fact that the revenue produced by an annual license tax on telegraph and telephone companies, of $1 per pole and $2.50 per mile of wire, is thirteen times the sum necessary to defray adequate inspection and supervision charges, has been held not to show such an abuse of discretion as to warrant the inter- The question of the reasonableness of a ference of the courts. North Braddock v. Cen-charge of $5 per pole for the privilege of using 187 U. S. 16 U. S., Book 47. 241 A license tax, irrespective of whether the amount is much or little, where levied upon the occupation itself, or upon the means of carrying on the business, is, where the business carried on is interstate commerce, a direct burden upon interstate commerce. ed. 678; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 | S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Asher v. Texas, 128 ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. U. S. 129, 32 L. ed. 368, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. Rep. 829. 241, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Stoutenburgh v. Пennick, 129 U. S. 141, 32 L. ed. 637, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 391, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 34 L. ed. 862, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 485, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 36 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. ed. 150, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 143, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725. The police power cannot be set up to control the inhibitions of the Federal Constitution, or the powers of the United States government created thereby. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 29 L. ed. 691, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 454; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed. 244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. streets, alleys, and public places of the city of St. Louis was left undecided by the Supreme Court of the United States in St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485, 149 U. S. 4C7, 37 L. ed. 812, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 990, that court deciding that such charge, being graduated by the amount of use, was not a privilege or license The dissenting opinion in this case denied that the charge was reasonable, stating that it amounted to 44 per cent of the entire value of the property of the company in the city. tax. On the new trial ordered in this case the ordinance was held void for unreasonableness because enormously greater than the rental value of abutting property, and greatly disproportionate to the value of the poles and wires. St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 63 Fed. 68. Any charge upon the poles or wires of a telegraph company, which are the necessary means of carrying on the business, is as much a tax on that business as would be a license fee exacted from the agent of the company as a condition of his being permitted to exercise his function, or as an occupation tax. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094. Mr. William C. Ryan argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error: The reasonableness of the fee is not to be measured by the value of the poles and wires, or of the land occupied, nor by the profits of the business. The elements which enter into the charge are the necessary or probable expense incident to the issuing of the license, and the probable expense of such inspection, regulation, and police surveillance as the municipal authorities may lawfully give to more, 79 Md. 502, 24 L. R. A. 161, 29 Atl. 819, Affirmed in 156 U. S. 210, 39 L. ed. 399, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356. The question of the effect upon the validity of this ordinance, of the exception in favor of street railways, does not seem to have been raised in this controversy. See, infra, on this point, Athens v. New York & P. Teleg. & Teleph. Co. 9 Pa. Dist. R. 253. The New York supreme court has refused to hold that the charge made by the Philadelphia ordinance for police regulation and supervision was unreasonable, and has held that it did not constitute a restraint upon interstate commerce. Philadelphia v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. 67 Hun, 21, 21 N. Y. Supp. 556. In Michigan an ordinance making an inspection charge of 50 cents per annum for each pole used for stringing electric wires was held void for unreasonableness, where the actual cost of Juspection was but about 5 cents a pole. Sag-further, that if it was engaged in interstate inaw v. Swift Electric Light Co. 113 Mich. 660, 72 N. W. 6. The general rule is that municipal charges for poles and wires of telegraph and telephone companies placed in the streets, when not unreasonable, are not precluded by the interstate character of the business. An ordinance imposing, a tax of $2 on each telegraph, telephone, electric-light, or other pole, except trolley poles used exclusively for wires of street railways, does not violate the right of a telegraph company which has accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of July, 1866, giving it the privilege of operating a line over post roads. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Balti But the circuit court of the United States refused to uphold the Philadelphia ordinance, in Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 728, 40 Fed. 615, declaring that Philadelphia was not authorized to tax a telegraph company occupying its streets, and, commerce the state could not confer such power. The opinion proceeds, however, to say that the city may charge for supervision of the telegraph lines what is reasonable, but cannot lay away any fund for imaginary future demands. and therefore that an ordinance which would Impose a charge of about $16,000 per year, while experience shows that $3,000 or $3,500 per year is sufficient to pay the expenses, was unreasonable and invalid. Therefore the Federal court, while acknowledging that the state courts upheld the ordinance, refused to uphold it. And the Philadelphia ordinance was again in Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 81 Fed. 948, 82 Fed. 797, held invalid as unreasonably |