The Land Department has been adhering to this same doctrine. Re Northern P. R. Co. 20 Land Dec. 332, 26 Land Dec. 422. A reservation for any purpose, within the limits of the withdrawal, made prior to the definite location of the line of the railroad and existing at such time, excepts the land covered thereby from the operation of the grant. Re Northern P. R. Co. 27 Land Dec. 505; Northern P. R. Co. v. Martin, 6 Land Dec. 657. It was the policy of the government from the beginning to secure to itself a fair proportion of the minerals, and the control of Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229; Gird v. the same. California Oil Co. 60 Fed. 531. Stone is included in the word "minerals" as used in a lease. Griffin v. Fellows, 81* Pa. 114. Natural gas is included within the meaning of the word "mineral." Westmoreland & C. Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 5 L. R. A. 731, 18 Atl. 724: State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana & 0. Oil, Gas, & Min. Co. 120 Ind. 575, 6 L. R. A. 579, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 758, 22 N. E. 778; Re Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. 73 Fed. 191. Granite is included in a purchase of "minerals and ores.' Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co. 147 N. Y. 495, 42 N. E. 186. And see further, as to what are mineral lands,- Lindley, Mines, §§ 94, 95; Ah Yew v. Choate, 24 Cal. 562; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. ed. 238, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; Freezer v. Sweeney, 8 Mont. 508, 21 Pac. 20. The policy of Congress was to exempt all mineral substances from railroad grants. Broder v. Natoma Water & Min. Co. 101 U. S. 274, 25 L. ed. 790; Barringer & Adams, Mines & Mining, p. 194; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660, 22 L. ed. 639; Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 317, 38 L. ed. 998, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030. Independent of the question whether stone was understood to be a mineral at the time of the passage of the act, Congress has so extended the mining laws as to make minerals include stone, and has otherwise reserved and appropriated stone lands, and consequently, at the date when the railroad became entitled to select these lands, they were otherwise reserved and appropriated, and were not free from other claims or rights, but were mineral lands within the meaning of the laws at that date, and subject to other claims or rights. There can be no doubt of the power of Congress to do this, and especially when the grant was made subject to the reserved power of Congress to add to, alter, or amend the act. Menotti v. Dillon, 167 U. S. 703, 42 L. ed. 333, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945; Northern P. R. Co. v. Sanders, 166 U. S. 620, 41 L. ed. 1139, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671; Lindley, Mines, § 158. Ivanhoe Min. Co. v. Keystone Consol. Min. Co. 102 U. S. 167, 26 L. ed. 126. If there is a deposit of any substance belonging to the mineral kingdom, and the land is more valuable for that particular substance than for agriculture, then it is mineral land; and if it is not a vein of quartz or other rock in place, then it is a placer. Lindley, Mines, § 419. This court in Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 29 L. ed. 423, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95, recognizes the criterion to be the value. See also Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. ed. 238, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628. The test of the character of railroad lands is the same as applied to the question between mineral and agricultural claims, viz., Are they more valuable for mineral than for agricultural purposes? Ivanhoe Min. Co. v. Keystone Consol. Min. Co. 102 U. S. 167, 26 L. ed. 126; Barringer & Adams, Mines & Mining, 533, note 2; Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030. The burden of proof is upon the railroad company to show the agricultural character of land that is returned as mineral by the Surveyor General. Re Central P. R. Co. 13 Land Dec. 603. The question whether a given tract of land within the primary or place limits of a railroad grant is mineral, and therefore excepted out of the grant, is to be determined according to the state of the law and the facts as they exist at the time the railroad company applies for its patent. Mullan v. United States, 118 U. S. 271, 30 L. ed. 170, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1041; Lindley, Mines, §§ 154, 159; Northern P. R. Co. v. Sanders, 1 C. C. A. 192, 7 U. S. App. 47, 49 Fed. 134; Northern P. R. Co. v. Hinchman, 53 Fed. 526; Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 330, 38 L. ed. 992, 1002, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030; Northern P. R. Co. v. Cannon, 4 C. C. A. 303, 7 U. S. App. 507, 54 Fed. 252. Land in reservation at the date of definite location is excepted from the terms of the grant. Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. McCabe, 4 Land Dec. 94; St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 Land Dec. 429; Southern P. R. Co. v. Nimmo, 4 Land Dec. 100; Sansom v. Southern P. R. Co. 4 Land Dec. 357; Story v. Southern P. R. Co. 4 Land Dec. 397. If this land was subject to entry under the mineral laws existing at the date of definite location of the road, then it was not "free from other claims or rights," and it did not pass to the road. Holmes v. Northern P. R. Co. 5 Land Dec. 336; Northern P. R. Co. v. McLean, 5 Land Dec. 529; Northern P. R. Co. v. Burt, 3 Land Dec. 490; Northern P. R. Co. v. Dudden, 6 Land Dec. 6. Lands reserved by the President after the grant, the reservation still being in force at date of definite location, are not "free from other claims," and are reserved, and do not pass to the road. Re Jackson, L. & S. R. Co. 5 Land Dec. 432. The condition of the land at the date of definite location determines whether it will pass under the grant. Cayce v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co. 6 Land Dec. 356; Neilson v. Northern P. R. Co. 9 Land Dec. 402; Showell v. Central P. R. Co. 10 Land Dec. 167; Olney v. Hastings & D. R. Co. 11 Land Dec. 188; Re Northern P. R. Co. 12 Land Dec. 572. The discovery of the mineral character of land at any time prior to the issuance of patent to the railroad effectually excludes such land from the railroad grant. Central P. R. Co. v. Valentine, 11 Land Dec. 238; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Tiernan, 17 Land Dec. 587; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Willard, 17 Land Dec. 554; Northern P. R. Co. v. Champion Consol. Min. Co. 14 Land Dec. 699; Re Northern P. R. Co. 13 Land Dec. 691. See also Lindley, Mines, § 162. When the original jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States is invoked upon the sole ground that the determination of the suit depends upon some question of a Federal nature, it must appear at the outset, from the declaration of the bill of the party suing, that the suit is of that character. Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 143, 37 L. ed. 1032, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. In order to maintain that the decision of the circuit court of appeals was not final, it must appear that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not dependent entirely upon the opposite parties being citizens of different states. Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 412, 40 L. ed. 200, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34. Under this doctrine it appears from the subpoena and bill of complaint herein "that the suit was one of which cognizance could be properly taken on the ground of diverse citizenship, and it did not appear therefrom that jurisdiction rested or could be asserted on any other ground." See also Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 105, 41 L. ed. 367, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40. Mr. R. A. Ballinger argued the cause for appellee on reargument. Assistant Attorney General Van Devanter argued the cause, and, with Mr. Arthur B. Pugh, filed a brief for the United States: | The term "mineral lands" and terms of like import, wherever used in the acts of Congress making railroad or other land grants, or in the mining laws, either as words of reservation or as authorizing the disposal of lands thus described, have the same meaning and the same breadth of signification. Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. ed. 238, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; 1 Lindley, Mines, §§ 86, 152, pp. 92, 170. Coal lands are "mineral lands" within the meaning of that term as used in statutes regulating the disposition of the public domain. Mullan v. United States, 118 U. S. 271, 30 L. ed. 170, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1041. Lands valuable for minerals, whether of the metallic or nonmetallic class, are subject to location, entry, and purchase under the provisions of the mining laws, and are also within the exception of "mineral lands" from railroad land grants. Montague v. Dobbs, 9 Copp's Landowner, 165; Hooper's Cuse, 1 Land Dec. 560; Maxwell v. Brierly, 10 Copp's Landowner, 50; 1 Lindley, Mines, $$ 96, 98, 137, 158, 162, pp. 113, 116, 153, 183, 188, 189; McGlenn v. Wienbrocer, 15 Land Dec. 370; Van Doren v. Plested, 16 Land Dec. 508; Hayden v. Jamison, 16 Land Dec. 537: Shepherd v. Bird, 17 Land Dec. 82; Gary v. Todd, 18 Land Dec. 58; Gibson's Case, 21 Land Dec. 327; Union Oil Co.'s Case, 25 Land Dec. 354; Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 25 Land Dec. 233; Alldritt v. Northern P. R. Co. 25 Land Dec. 349; Re Florida C. & P. R. Co. 26 Land Dec. 60; Richter v. Utah, 27 Land Dec. 95; McQuiddy v. California, 29 Land Dec. 181; Tulare Oil & Min. Co. v. Southern P. R. Co. 29 Land Dec. 269; Beaudette v. Northern P. R. Co. 29 Land Dec. 248; Schrimpf v. Northern P. R. Co. 29 Land Dec. 327; Morrill v. Northern P. R. Co. 30 Land Dec. 475. The construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons. United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 24 L. ed. 588; Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 210, 6 L. ed. 604; United States v. State Bank, 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. ed. 308; United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 8 L. ed. 587; Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 568, 28 L. ed. 1079, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648; Robertson v. Downing. 127 U. S. 607, 32 L. ed. 269, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1328; 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 342. See also United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219, 28 L. ed. 126, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 30 L. ed. 559, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 699. The legislative branch of the government is presumed to be cognizant of the construction given to a statute by public officers whose duty it is to execute it; and after long continuance of such construction with out legislative dissent, the courts will adopt it.. Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448. Petroleum is a mineral. Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. 312, 1 Atl. 921. Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 309. See also Black, Constr. & Interpretation of Laws, pp. 215, 216; Endlich, Interpretation of Stat-See also Westmoreland & C. Natural Gas Co. utes, § 360. Nothing passes by implication under grants of a public nature but in the clear and explicit language of the grant must be found all that is conveyed by it. When doubt arises, the grant must be construed most strictly against the grantee. Dubuque & P. R. Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66, 16 L. ed. 500; Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U. S. 412, 28 L. ed. 321, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475. See also Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030; Leavenworth, L. & G. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 23 L. ed. 634. The value of the mineral deposit, rather than its kind, appears to have been the controlling factor in determining whether the lands containing it were subject to entry and patent under the mining law. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. 235, 5 L. R. A. 731, 18 Atl. 724; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 22 L. R. A. 141, 27 Atl. 714. Natural gas is a "crude mineral." Re Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co. 73 Fed. 191. A statute imposing damages upon any person mining or digging out "any coal, iron, or other minerals, knowing them to be upon the land of another," applies to the act of digging and carrying away building stone from an open quarry on the surface of the ground. Ruttledge v. Kress, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 490. A mineral has been defined to be a fossil, or what is dug out of the earth. The term may, however, in the most enlarged sense, be described as comprising all the substances which now form, or which once formed, part of the solid body of the earth, both external and internal, and which are now destitute of The criterion of value has also been recog- and incapable of supporting animal or vegenized by this court as the means of deter- table life. In this view, it will embrace as mining whether lands containing mineral well the bare granite of the high mountain deposits are within the meaning of the min-as the deepest hidden diamonds and metalic ing laws. Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 25 Land Dec. 233. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 29 L. ed. 423, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95. See Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507, 35 L. ed. 238, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628. Lands containing a valuable stone quarry were subject to location and purchase under the placer mining laws. Freezer v. Sweeney, 8 Mont. 508, 21 Pac. 20; Johnston v. Harrington, 5 Wash. 73, 31 Pac. 316. See also Montague v. Dobbs, 9 Copp's Landowner, 165; Gird v. California Oil Co. 60 Fed. 531. An exception or reservation of "mines and minerals," contained in a lease of lands, includes all substances otherwise falling under the definition of minerals, which have a use and value of their own, either for the purpose of sale or for other purposes, independently of and separably from the use of the rest of the soil. Johnstone v. Crompton, 68 L. J. Ch. N. S. 559. Granite is a mineral within the meaning of a reservation of "minerals and ores," used in a deed of conveyance. Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co. 147 N. Y. 495, 42 N. E. 186. Limestone or granite ledges were within the meaning of an exception of "all mines and minerals" from a deed of conveyance. Brady v. Brady, 31 Misc. 411, 65 N. Y. Supp. 621. Marble is a mineral within the meaning of an exception of "mines and minerals" from a conveyance of land. Phelps v. Church of Our Lady, 53 C. C. A. 407, 115 Fed. 882. "Paintstone" is a mineral within the meaning of an exception of "mines and minerals," contained in a deed of convey ance. ores. Bainbridge, Mines, pp. 1, 2. "Mineral," in its general legal sense, is any valuable inert or lifeless substance formed or deposited in its present position through natural agencies alone, and which is found either in or upon the soil of the earth or in the rocks beneath the soil. Barringer & Adams, Mines, p. lxxvi. The mining laws from their earliest history have been administered by the Land Department as applicable in all their force and effect to the public mineral lands within the limits of the grant. Central P. R. Co. v. Valentine, 11 Land Dec. 238. This practice has been sustained by this court. Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030. The term "minerals," standing alone and as understood in mining law, generally comprehends and includes all the substances in the earth's crust which are sought for and removed by man for the substance itself. 1 Snyder, Mines & Mining, §§ 134, 140, 143-145, 148; Snyder, Mines & Mining, § 926. *Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion [528] of the court: Motion was made to dismiss this appeal for the reason that, as the jurisdiction of the circuit court was invoked upon the ground of diverse citizenship, the decree of the circuit court of appeals is final, under § 6 of the court of appeals act of 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 828, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 549), as interpreted by the decisions of this court in Colorado Cent. Consol. Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35; Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U. S. 408, 40 L. ed. 199, 16 Sup. | United States, 118 U. S. 271, 30 L. ed. 170, Ct. Rep. 34; and Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1041, that coal lands are 164 U. S. 105, 41 L. ed. 367, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. mineral lands within the meaning of that 40. But, to impress the attribute of final- term as used in the statutes regulating the ity upon a judgment of the circuit court of disposition of the public domain. This efappeals, it must appear that the original fectually disposes of the argument that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was depend- word "mineral" must be construed as synent "entirely" upon diverse citizenship. onymous with metalliferous. That is not the case here. Plaintiff's bill does, indeed, set up a diversity of citizenship as one ground of jurisdiction, but, as it appears that its title rests upon a proper interpretation of the land grant act of 1864 as to the exception of nonmineral lands, there is another ground wholly independent of citizenship under that clause of § 1 of the act of 1888 (25 Stat. at L. 433, chap. 866) clothing the circuit court with jurisdiction of all civil suits involving over $2,000, "and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States." If the case made by the plaintiff be one which depends upon the proper construction of an act of Congress, with the contingency of being sustained by one construction and defeated by another, it is one arising under the laws of the United States. Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618, 31 L. ed. 844, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1228; Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 37 L. ed. 209, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. The word "mineral" is used in so many Under the allegations of the bill, the fact senses, dependent upon the context, that the that the Land Department had not deter- ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw mined whether the land in question was but little light upon its signification in a mineral or nonmineral does not involve a given case. Thus, the scientific division of question of fact, as the facts are admitted, all matter into the animal, vegetable, or but solely a question of law whether land mineral kingdom would be absurd as apvaluable for its granite is mineral or non-plied to a grant of lands, since all lands bemineral under the terms of the grant. Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660, 22 L. ed. 639. The fact that a patent issued pending suit [529] is neither set up in the pleadings nor no ticed in the opinion of either court. The motion to dismiss must therefore be denied. 2. We are thus brought to the main question in the case, viz.: Whether lands valuable solely or chiefly for granite quarries are mineral lands within the exception of the grant of 1864? The 3d section of the act containing the granting clause of land "not mineral" also contains the following provisos: "Provided further, That all mineral lands be, and the same are hereby, excluded from the operations of this act. And provided, further, That the word 'mineral' when it occurs in this act shall not be held to include iron or coal." [13 Stat. at L. 365, chap. 217.] The inference from this proviso is that in the absence of a special provision both iron and coal would be considered as minerals, and thus to repel the idea that only metals were included in the word "mineral." This inference is strengthened by the fact that the day before this act was passed, July 1, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 343, chap. 205,) another act was approved authorizing the public sale to the highest bidder of "any tracts embraeing coal beds or coal fields," and providing that any lands not thus disposed of shall thereafter be liable to private entry. Relying largely upon this act as a "legislative declaration" this court held, in Mullan v. 188 U. S. U. S., Book 47. Upon the other hand, § 2 declares that "the right, power, and authority is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road material of earth, stone, timber, etc., for the construction thereof." There is a possible inference from this that stone was not to be regarded as mineral, although it is more likely that a grant was intended of all material serviceable in the construction of the road, even though it might otherwise be excepted from the grant as a mineral. Taking these two sections together, it would seem that the reason for providing in the 3d section that iron and coal lands should not be deemed mineral was the same as the liberty given by the 2d section to take *ma-[530] terials of earth, stone, and timber; namely, to facilitate the construction and operation of the railroad, in which large quantities of coal and iron would be required. 37 long to the mineral kingdom, and therefore could not be excepted from the grant without being destructive of it. Upon the other hand, a definition which would confine it to the precious metals-gold and silver-would so limit its application as to destroy at once half the value of the exception. Equally subversive of the grant would be the definition of minerals found in the Century Dictionary; as "any constituent of the earth's crust;" and that of Bainbridge on Mines: "All the substances that now form, or which once formed, a part of the solid body of the earth." Nor do we approximate much more closely to the meaning of the word by treating minerals as substances which are "mined," as distinguished from those which are "quarried," since many valuable deposits of gold, copper, iron, and coal lie upon or near the surface of the earth, and some of the most valuable building stone, such, for instance, as the Caen stone in France, is excavated from mines running far beneath the surface. This distinction between underground mines and open workings was expressly repudiated in Midland R. Co. v. Haunchwood Brick & Tile Co. L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 552, and in Hert v. Gill, L. R. 7 Ch. 699. The ordinance of May 20, 1785, authorizing the sale of lands in the western territory, with a reservation of "one third part of all gold, silver, lead, and copper mines, to be sold or otherwise disposed of, as Congress shall hereafter direct," was evidently 581 | such vein, etc., into adjoining lands. The intended as an assertion of the right of the government to a royalty upon the more valuable metals—a prerogative which had belonged to the English Crown for centuries, though there confined to gold and silver, which were only considered as royal metals, and having its origin in the King's prerogative of coinage. 1 Bl. Com. 394. While [531]intrinsically the precious metals are the more valuable, in the aggregate, the non-in the 1st section. precious metals have probably contributed as much or more to the general wealth of the country. This act was amended July 9, 1870 (16 Stat. at L. 217, chap. 235), to allow the entry of "placer" claims, "including all forms of deposits, excepting veins of quartz, or other rock in place," and declaring that they shall be subject to patent under the same provisions as vein or lode claims. As placers are merely superficial deposits, occupying the beds of ancient rivers or valleys, washed down from some vein or lode (United States v. Iron Silver Min. Co. 128 U. S. 673, 32 L. ed. 571, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 195), this act has little bearing upon the present case, though in Freezer v. Sweeney, 8 Mont. 508, 21 Pac. 20, it was held by the supreme court of Montana to authorize the locating and patenting of a stone quarry. A division of lands into agricultural and mineral would also be a most uncertain guide to a proper construction of the word "mineral," since most of the lands included in the limits of this grant are neither one nor the other, but desert or rocky land, of no present value for agriculture, and of little value for their mineral deposits. So, too, the general reservations in the earlier acts of Congress of lead mines and saline springs seem to have been dictated by the fact that those were the only valuable minerals known to exist in the states to which the acts were applied, while in Michigan and Wisconsin there was a similar reservaAnother act having a more important tion of copper, lead, and other valuable ores, bearing is that of May 10, 1872 (17 Stat. at which were just then being discovered and L. 91, chap. 152), “to promote the developmade available. In the earlier grants of ment of the mining resources of the United Congress in aid of railroads there was gen-States," and providing in the 1st section erally no reservation of mineral lands, but in the grants subsequent to 1860, to the Lake Superior and Pacific roads, through unsurveyed and almost unknown territories, a reservation was invariably made of lands suspected of being rich in metals. It is quite true that, had it not been for the actual or suspected presence of these metals, Congress might not have deemed it worth while to reserve the nonmetallic mineral lands; but when its attention was called to the fact that valuable mines might exist along the line of these roads, as it appears to have been about 1860, its policy was changed, and not only metalliferous, but all mineral lands were reserved. Subsequent to that, it was only in states which had already received grants without reservation, or in known agricultural states, that such grants continued to be made. Considerable light is thrown upon the congressional definition of the word "mincrals" by the acts subsequent to the Northern Pacific grant of 1864, and prior to the definite location of the line in 1884. The first of these acts, that of July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. at L. 251, chap. 262), declares that the "mineral lands" of the public domain shall be free and open to exploration and occupation, subject to such rules as may be prescribed by law, and subject also to the local customs or rules of miners in the sev [532]eral *mining districts. The 2d section provides that whenever any person or associa tion of persons claim a vein or lode of quartz, or other rock in place, bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, he shall be entitled to enter such tract and receive a patent therefor, upon complying with certain preliminaries, and with a right to follow that "all valuable mineral deposits" in pub- Equally pregnant with meaning is the act |