He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently feek him.

N

EXT to the belief of the being of a God, and of his exercising a providence over the world, the great article of natural religion is that of a future state of recompence : and this is what the author of the Epiftle to the Hebrews means in that part of the text, which afferts that God is a rewarder of them that diligently feek him. He had begun to give an account of the effects of faith in the holy men before and after the flood; of that faith, without which, as he fays, it is impoffible to please God. And among other inftances of those, who

were actuated by this leading principle, he mentions Enoch, who pleafed God, and therefore was tranflated by him, that he should not fee death. This account has a reference to the history, which Mofes gives us of him, when he tells us in other words, but to the fame fenfe, that Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him: plainly intimating that the reward of Enoch's faith was not meerly a freedom from temporal death, but an enjoyment of happiness in some other state, where God was more immediately prefent than upon earth. And in this view we are to confider the Apoftle's words in the text; that he is a rewarder of them that diligently feek him; a rewarder of them, not with refpect to this world only, for Enoch's reward was not affigned him here; but a rewarder of them in that state, to which the happy patriarch was tranflated; befides this, there is another very material obfervation to be made upon the words of the text, namely, that Enoch lived under natural religion, long before either the law of Moses, or the gofpel of Chrift were communicated to the world, long before any fcheme of duties is known to have been revealed to mankind: so

that

that reafon and the light of nature only feem to have taught him this truth, that God was a rewarder of them that diligently feek him. And by the help of thefe two obfervations the words of the text afford us this important leffon, "That from natural reafon only it may "be gathered, that every man is to receive a

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recompence after this life, according as his "actions have been good or evil." I mention evil, as well as good; for though the text only fpeaks of the latter, yet it can fcarcely be made a matter of doubt, that the fame divine justice, which rewards the righteous, is equally concerned to punish the wicked.

My bufinefs, therefore, at prefent shall be to fhew, (without the help of fcripture, that great ftorehoufe of proofs for a future ftate,) that there are reafons fufficient to induce any confiderate man to believe, that God will render to every one in some future state, according to what he hath done in the body, whether it be good or bad.

To evince this truth, I fhall proceed to thew,

First, That man is a creature every way fitted to give an account of his actions to his Creator.

Secondly, That the attributes of God require, that fuch an account fhould be given by mankind, and a fuitable cenfure be paffed upon it.

Thirdly, That, generally fpeaking, no effects of this cenfure of God upon men's actions are feen in this world, and therefore,

Fourthly, That there must be fome future state, in which the good will be distinguished from the bad, and the one be rewarded with happiness, while the other is punished with mifery.

These are the four steps by which I shall proceed in the enquiry before us;

With respect to the first ;

To make a creature thus accountable, two things only can be neceffary, viz, that he has a knowledge of his duty, and a power fufficient to do it, If either of these be wanting, we could not, properly fpeaking, have any virtues or vices imputed to us but that we want neither of thefe, may appear from the following confiderations.

In

In the first place, man is not only endued with a power of perceiving and thinking; he is not only capable of reflecting upon what is present, of calling to mind what is past, and meditating upon things which are to come; in all which the brute beasts seem to have a fhare, though in a very faint and imperfect degree: but man has, beyond all this, a power of carrying his reason fo far, as to fee the difference of moral good and evil, which is the foundation of religion: and here we leave the company of the brutal, and, as it is commonly called, the irrational part of the creation. For whatever appearances of reafon we meet in them, we meet with none of religion. Knowledge they may have, and feem to have; but no knowledge of any thing as virtuous or vicious. Whereas man, by the help of that refined and peculiar part of reafon, which we call the light of nature, can confider what obligations lie upon him, from the relation in which he stands to God as his Creator, and to his neighbours as his fellow-creatures: from thence he fees, or may fee, plainly, what is his rule under natural religion, and whether he acts according to that rule of his duty, He may

fome