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Department of Defense

PROPOSED FY 1952 MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLANNED FUND UTILIZATION

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a/ For Fiscal Years beginning in captioned calendar years. 1951 Non-Defense expenditures for Denmark & Italy not available

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1950 expenditures substituted.

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HOW WAS THE MILITARY FIGURE COMPUTED

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I would like to ask Mr. Batt this question, whether you can give the formula by which all of you together arrived at $5.2 billion for the military prgram. We are going to be asked this question, "Can you give us the details?"

And we will say "No, because it is all classified. We can't tell how many divisions; we can't tell how many tanks and guns and so forth."

We will be asked, "At least have you men had the information given you in a secret session so you can say to us that you are convinced that this is a sound figure?"

We can't even get that.

Then we will be asked, "How do they arrive at the $5.2 billion? What is the formula?"

Mr. BATT. That is primarily General Kibler's responsibility, and I think you will want him to answer that. I will add to it if it seems to need it.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am trying to get at what we Members of the Senate are going to say to the question we know from experience we are certain to be asked when the attempt is made to justify $5.2 billion for Europe on the military side.

Mr. BATT. We understand your problem quite clearly, and we know the answer to it.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. General Kibler, how would you answer that question?

General KIBLER. I would go at it this way: We obtained from the countries a statement of the breakdown of the forces, a detailed breakdown of the forces, which they are going to provide during the calendar year 1952. We have certain guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the criteria which we should use in judging the equipment which we might provide for those forces.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Please let me ask you right there; if they say "We are going to have so many divisions," do you determine what equipment they shall have, or do they give you their thoughts? General KIBLER. They give us a general idea. We piece it out and make recommendations to Washington.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. And you arrive at a figure as to total quantity?

General KIBLER. We screen these things at the country level in cooperation with the ECA mission. Our military advisory group works very closely with the ECA to determine what the countries ought to do for themselves, what they ought to produce for themselves. They help in the first case to screen out themselves what they say they are going to do, but we look at it with a critical eye to determine whether they are doing enough, whether their forces agree with the defense plans, and all that sort of thing.

Then, having determined the assets which the country has to apply against the requirements, you have a net statement of deficiency at that level. That goes up to the regional level, where the joint American military advisory group and Mr. Batt's outfit give it another screening, and we screen it particularly to see what one country ought to do for another and what can be done in the way of production in one country transferred to the other country.

Now, when that is done, the recommendation goes in to Washington with a statement of deficiencies which we think they ought to consider for supply from Washington. It has been very carefully screened, as I have said. We do not furnish them all the equipment by any means. We reduce the maintenance factor materially below what we would use. We reduce the scale of vehicles very materially below what we would use. We provide essentially the hard military items, such as weapons. We don't provide such things as clothing, mess kits, and so on.

That goes to Washington and the Joint Chiefs of Staff go over it again and consider what part they will recommend should be supplied from the United States.

Now, all you do is apply the prices of the equipment which they recommend and that gives you the value.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is just the kind of statement I wanted to get, to show that process of arriving at that final figure. (The following additional information was furnished for the record :)

EQUIPMENT (END ITEM) PROGRAMING

PRINCIPLES

1. The principles upon which MDA programs have been developed are contained in the broad programing criteria which the JCS furnish to JAMAG preparatory to the development of a program for a fiscal year. In summary, the following principles have been applied in the development of all approved programs as well as the planned Fiscal Year 1952 program:

(a) Equipment requirements for forces must conform to the force requirements approved by the North Atlantic Defense Committee and be based on the need for, and the ability of, the country to absorb and utilize the equipment requested.

(b) Combat forces are equipped so as to approach a performance capability comparable to that of similar United States units. However, the scale of equipment is related to the missions which the forces are expected to execute and to the conditions under which they are expected to operate. In other words, forces committed to a purely defensive role, and forces intended for specific conditions of terrain and climate, are not equipped to the scale of United States forces which must be prepared to perform almost any type of mission, almost anywhere. Also, most foreign forces are accustomed to operating on a more austere basis, as regards mechanical equipment and equipment to provide for th health and comfort of the men, than are United States forces.

(c) Generally speaking, items supplied should be those primarily for military application—especially essential combat weapons. Other items-such as food, clothing, medical supplies, POL, and most engineering equipment—are furnished only under special circumstances.

(d) In general, common (commercial) spare parts, otherwise procurable by the requesting countries such as spark plugs, fan belts, brake shoes, tires, tubes, etc. are not provided.

(e) Finally, but importantly, end items are not furnished to any country which can, within the time phasing called for by the medium term defense plan, produce, or otherwise obtain, the same or conparable items, itself or in any other country. This principle is applied by JAMAG in close collaboration with SUSREP, the United States representative on the NATO Defense Production Board.

PROCEDURES

1. An end-item program is developed as follows:

(a) Upon receipt of a directive from the JCS, giving the criteria upon which to develop a program, JAMAG sends out to the MAAG's detailed instructions concerning the preparation of deficiency lists for the period in question. The

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