taken place which contributed much to the security of the established government. We have seen in the history of the late year the circumstances which occasioned a decline of the revolted cause in the Vendée, particularly the divisions which prevailed among their chiefs. This disunion, and the failure of the attempt made by England to support them, and the wise measures adopted by the republican generals, made them despair of success. The liberal offers of pardon made by the present administration had the desired effect of producing a disposition to submission. Charette and other chiefs now declared a desire of reconciliation: and a treaty of peace was agreed to, by which, on condition of their delivering up their arms, and acknowledging the established government, they were not only pardoned, but were assured of the free exercise of their religion, and indemnified for their losses; moreover, Charette received the command of 2000 republican troops." A correspondence was afterwards opened between the Chouan chiefs who had not made their peace with the state and some emigrants in England; and a plan was concerted for distressing the French government, and causing a diversion in favour of the allied armies, by a descent on the coast of Bretagne. In pursuance of this sir John Borlase Warren sailed with a squadron to the French coast, and debarked 3000 men, chiefly emigrants, in the bay of Quiberon. -Their force was in a short time augmented to above 10,000 men. But their army was no sooner formed than their fate was decided. Without discipline, subordination, or conduct, they had to contend with a body of regular forces under Hoche, an officer of experience. Being taken by surprise in their camp, they were all either slain or made prisoners. Most of the emigrants made their peace by uniting in disarming their officers, and crying "Vive la republique." And count de Sombreuil and several other emigrants of distinction, who had rashly embarked in this ill-judged, ill-timed enterprise, were condemned as traitors, and shot at Vannes." When men reflected on the successes of the French arms, both at home and abroad, in the course of the two last campaigns, when they compared the present situation of the French government with respect to foreign powers 1795 1795 powers with what it was at the commencement of the war, when they perceived the disunion and jealousy that prevailed among the powers which had been leagued for its destruction, when they saw the confederacy crumbling into atoms and supported only by the determined councils of one state, they expected to have seen the French armies proceed in the same prosperous career; and that the German empire would, in a few months, have been overrun by them. But we may daily learn caution from the events of war; which are often found to be influenced by accidents that are beyond the bounds of human sagacity, and which elude the reasonings and frustrate the plans of the wisest and most experienced statesmen. By means of the absolute power which the French government exercised they were enabled to send such armies into the field as astonished the world: but by doing it, by levying the supplies requisite for the maintenance of such a prodigious force, they exhausted their resources. Hence arose the extreme difficulty with which even a successful war was carried on. They were obliged to have recourse to such expedients to raise an adequate revenue as created dissatisfaction in the nation; being inconsistent with the principles of liberty which they professed. They levied such contributions on the Dutch provinces, which had been honoured with their alliance, as well as on the Austrian Netherlands which had been conquered by their arms, as excited disgust in all except those who felt themselves personally interested in the revolution. After vast exertions to provide for the ensuing campaign, by enormous taxes and the confiscation of the property of emigrants and traitors to the state, it was opened with active operations before Luxemburg, which had been invested in the late autumn. This is a place of vast strength, and was defended by a strong garrison, under general Bender, an officer of distinguished character. They sustained the vigorous assaults and severe bombardments of the besiegers with exemplary bravery. But when the general saw that he had no prospect of relief, he thought it advisable to save the lives of his men by a capitulation which enabled him to withdraw his garrison to Germany, rather than sacrifice his troops by a resistance which must terminate in a surrender at discretion. The Rhine was now destined to be the seat of hostilities, where the ablest generals † June 7. generals on each side were to display their genius.-Mentz was now the grand object of the French government, the possession of which would greatly further their design of making the Rhine the boundary of their dominions; and the situation of which at the junction of the Mayne with the Rhine would afford them an opening into the empire. We have seen Jourdan, at the close of the late campaign, forcing general Clairfait to retire within the German frontier, and to be a witness of his enterprises on the Rhine, without a force sufficient to check his progress. After some months of inaction the French general renewed his operations with the reduction of Dusseldorff. -Clairfait, who was obliged still to retire before him, was desirous to form a junction with Wurmser, who was stationed at a considerable distance, on the south of the Mayne, that they might be able to confront their enemies and counteract their designs. To prevent the execution of this plan, Pichegru, who had already gained possession of Manheim, || posted a strong body of forces to intercept. Clairfait's march, and enable them to prosecute their purpose of investing Mentz. This brought on an action between that division and Clairfait's army; in which the French were successful in driving the Austrians from their posts. But whilst they were gratifying their passion for plunder, in which they had been too much indulged, the Austrian cavalry came suddenly upon them, and so completely routed them that, after an ineffectual attempt to rally, they were forced to retreat precipitately to Manheim. The success of the Austrians on this day gave a turn to the fortune of the campaign. Clairfait, who had received strong reinforcements, came upon Jourdan's army, which was covering the siege of Mentz, by surprise --forced him to decamp hastily, leaving part of his artillery behind him—and harassed him, by continually skirmishing with his rear, on his retreat to Dusseldorff, where he repassed the Rhine. Pichegru, in the mean-time, was equally unsuccessful in the prosecution of his part of the plan. He had ordered the army engaged in the siege of Mentz to be strengthened; and was hastening from Manheim to take on him the command, and to bring the Austrians to a battle. But whilst he was preparing for the execution of his design, he had the mortification to receive intelligence that the besiegers had been so vigorously attacked by a strong September 6. VOL. III. September 20. + End of September. + End of October. 1795 1795 strong body of Austrians, supported by a sally from the garrison, that they were driven from their works, and forced to retire with the loss of their artillery. And the result of this campaign, which was expected to have been so glorious to France, was, that Clairfait, pursuing Jourdan's retreating army across the Rhine, formed a junction with Wurmser, and recovered the districts of the palatinate which lie on the west side of that river, between it and the Moselle: that Pichegru was constrained to repass the Rhine, in order to co-operate with Jourdan in checking the progress of the Austrians, who were now meditating the recovery of the Luxemburg: and that Manheim, though guarded by a strong garrison which he left for its defence, was reduced by the Austrians before the close of the campaign.||Happily for the harassed troops on both sides, a severe season put an end to active hostilities, and afforded them a period of refreshment, whilst their respective governments were meditating plans for the prosecution of the war. Here we may close the narrative of the military occurrences of France during the present year.-The naval events have been given in the English history: and the war on the Italian frontier had produced no action of memorable importance. The French government knew the great force which they should have to encounter in that quarter. And therefore, that they might concentre their strength on the Rhine and the low countries, they thought it politic to remain on the defensive on the side of Italy, till they should be prepared to make that the grand theatre of action. That comparative want of energy which is observable in the operations of the French armies in this campaign may be ascribed to the circumstances of the state and nation.-It has been before observed, and is now exemplified, that the French government, rent by factions whilst it was impelled by an enthusiastic passion for liberty, was calculated for transient efforts for the attainment of objects in which they all had a common interest, rather than for a regular exercise of legal authority, and a steady, uniform application of national resources. Such an effort had been made for the maintenance of what the great body of the people conceived to be the cause of liberty, and in the success of which, not only the republican leaders, but the very numerous proprietors of forfeited estates throughout the kingdom, thought that November 23. that their interests were deeply involved. Every nerve of the state and nation had been strained on this occasion: and the result seemed a sort of national paroxysm, in which enthusiastic rage was combined with reason in directing their efforts: the Austrian Netherlands and several districts on the German frontier were conquered: the Dutch provinces were subdued and rendered dependent: the revolt in the Vendée was quelled: the Prussian and Spanish monarchs had detached themselves from the coalition: Sweden, Tuscany, and other powers had acknowledged the republic. When, in addition to all these circumstances of prosperous fortune, it was seen that the royalists, whilst they indulged themselves with dreams of the re-establishment of the ancient monarchy in its full power, had neglected to embrace the opportunities which had presented themselves of restoring kingly government by a coalition with the partisans of free monarchy, and had thus rendered themselves insignificant, little apprehensions were afterwards entertained of the subversion of the republican system. Therefore, as the motives for such preternatural efforts decreased, the nation, who were not borne along by that ambition which had succeeded the passion for liberty in the breasts of their rulers, were desirous to relax from their exertions: they bore the load of taxes, and they took the field, with less cheerfulness when the absolute necessity of such enormous levies became less evident: and a comparative want of ardour being transmitted to the troops appears to have had the effect of rendering their efforts less vigorous. The divisions subsisting in the state was another circumstance which contributed to the remission of national energy.-The governing powers had two parties to contend with, equally hostile to them, though possess ing a different degree of weight in the nation.—The royalists, whom prejudice and misguided zeal had rendered deaf to the lessons of experience still continued occasionally to molest them.* But they had a much more formidable * Whatever credit we may give to the royalists for their principles or their intentions, we cannot but consider their zeal as misguided when we reflect on the opportunities which they had neglected to embrace of preserving or restoring monarchy, by a coalition with the constitutionists, and their perseverance in fruitless efforts to restore the old regime, with all its notorious defects.— One of the most dispassionate as well as intelligent writers of this period, after expressing his abhorrence of the anarchists, thus speaks of them. "The royalist party, zealous, more weak, more divided, more indiscreet, less bold, still opposed a powerful obstacle to the good which the "" convention 1795 |