Слике страница
PDF
ePub

IX. CONDITIONAL SALES.

court properly admitted testimony as to fact and amount of shortage in weight at destina-479 (8) (N.J.) In replevin for terra cotta tion, as compared with weight called for by bill supplied to construction company and delivered of lading and drafts, though testimony tended to show loss in transit and not deficiency in on defendant's ground, held that whether it had been sold under contract of conditional sale was shipment.-Id. for jury.-Wildwood Board of Education v. Bright, 103 A. 422.

2182 (Pa.) Where the facts are not in dispute, the question as to the place of delivery and when the title passed is for the court.Pittsburgh Provision & Packing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 103 A. 548.

SALESMEN.

See Principal and Agent, 103.

SALOONS.

A guaranty that the meat should be fresh was evidence that the place of delivery was intended to be the point of destination, where the condition of the meat could be ascertained. See Negligence, ➡32.

-Id.

[blocks in formation]

SATISFACTION.

SCAFFOLDS.

116, 286.

See Master and Servant,
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
See Charities, 12, 22; Colleges and Univer-

sities.

II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. (E) District Debt, Securities, and Tax

ation.

347 (4) (N.J.Sup.) Where defendant's signature by mark to contract to buy gas generator was obtained by fraud and imposition with intent to deceive him as to purport of con- 106 (Del.Super.) Rev. Code 1915, § 2294, tract, without which he would not have signed authorizing school tax collector to proceed by it, he might set up such fraud and imposition suit to collect taxes, does not contemplate a in action for breach of contract covenant to suit against a constable having the goods of a pay.-Oxweld Acetylene Co. v. Rizzotti, 103 A. taxable under execution or having the proceeds of the sale of such goods in hand.-Jester v. Millman, 103 A. 353.

989.

SEALS.

360(2) (Pa.) In seller's action for price of coke to be delivered in approximately equal monthly installments, the buyer was entitled to credit for loss in purchasing coke to make See Alteration of Instruments, 8, 30. up the deficiencies in the deliveries.-Poland Coal Co. v. Rogers, 103 A. 559.

[blocks in formation]

VIII. REMEDIES OF BUYER. (C) Actions for Breach of Contract. 416(1) (Conn.) In action by assignee of buyer against seller of brass chips for deficiency, testimony was properly admitted that accumulation of brass turnings was pointed out to buyer at or before making of contract, also testimony of seller's agent as to whole transaction, including custom and reason for specifying payment by sight draft on arrival.-Alderman Bros. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 103 A. See Husband and Wife, 267.

SELF-DEFENSE.

See Assault and Battery, 67.

SEPARATE ESTATE.

121-171, 242.

SEPARATE TRIALS.

417 (R.I.) In assumpsit for defendant's breach of a contract for sale and delivery of cows, evidence held not to sustain defendant's See Trial, 3. contention that the sale was conditioned upon plaintiff's receiving and removing them from

SEPTIC TANK.

defendant's premises before a certain time. See Explosives, 7. Dressler v. Andrews, 103 A. 564.

cover difference in contract price and price See Divorce, 266.

[blocks in formation]

castings to be had in the market, Gen. Laws See Master and Servant.

ket.--Rhode Island Malleable Iron Works v. O. See Appeal and Error, 425; Criminal Law,

1145

SERVICES.

See Guardian and Ward, 31.

SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.

SEWERS.

See Municipal Corporations, 270, 712.

SHELLEY'S CASE.

See Wills, 608.

SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES.

See Courts, m55.

II. SUBJECT-MATTER. contractor 27(2) (R.I.) Where building sued for price of extras, including in the declaration all sums due him "under said contract," defendant could recoup her damages for defective work, although plaintiff sought to prove that the amounts sued for became due under such an alteration of the original contract as to III (Conn.) Where constable with replevin constitute a new one.-McPhillips v. Durkin, 103 A. 929.

Where plaintiff sued for extras incorporated in a building, defendant could recoup her damages on account of unworkmanlike performance of the principal contract, since both the claim and the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction.-Id.

ITIES.
III. POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABIL-

writ entered front door of building and broke
down door into plaintiff's apartments, he ex-
ceeded his authority, since where there are dif-
common outer
ferent apartments having a
door, the door of each separate apartment is
the outer door which cannot be broken open.--
Fourette v. Griffin, 103 A. 123.

If the outer door is shut and latched, although not fastened, an officer with a writ of replevin has no right to open it and enter without the permission of the owner.-Id.

28(2) (N.J.Sup.) In view of Practice Act, § 12, and District Court Act, § 68, under sections 60, 61, as to discounts or set-offs, in painter's action for breach of contract by prevention 125(1) (N.J.Ch.) Power to amerce sheriff of performance, defendant's claim in set-off that plaintiff improperly abandoned job, so that defendant let out work to another at higher figure, and was subjected to loss, was proper.-MacPherson v. Mackay, 103 A. 36.

35(1) (Pa.) Unliquidated damages arising ex contractu from any bargain may be set off under the Defalcation Act, whenever they are capable of liquidation by any known legal standard.Roth v. Pechin, 103 A. 894.

41 (Pa.) Statutes of set-off require that there be mutuality both as to quality, which is mutuality of right with respect to the legal remedy, and identity of parties.-Hunter v. Henning, 103 A. 61.

Cross-demands to be mutual must be shown to belong individually to the defendant with the corresponding right to sue therefor in his individual name.-Id.

44(1) (Pa.) A claim due from plaintiff and others jointly cannot be set off, in an action of assumpsit brought by plaintiff alone, as to allow such a set-off would compel plaintiff to pay individually a debt for which he is liable only when called upon jointly with others.Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas Co., 103 A. 285.

Two or more persons sued jointly may set off a debt due by plaintiff to any one of them, and one of two joint obligees, with the consent an of the other, may use the obligation as an action by obligor equitable defense in against one of them alone.-Id.

under 1 Comp. St. 1910, p. 428, § 49, is independent of amercement under sections 48 and 50, and penalty thereunder cannot be inflicted unless the sheriff has adjourned the sale more than twice, or exceeding one month for each adjournment; and other derelictions, such as failure to advertise, must be prosecuted under other sections.-Pierson v. Chardavoyne, 103 A. $20.

Under 1 Comp. St. 1910, p. 428, § 49, sheriff was not liable to amercement for wrongful adjournment of execution sale, where he made two adjournments of one month each, by adjourning from week to week, to preserve integrity of published notice of sale, and avoid readvertise

ment.-Id.

Assuming sheriff's adjournments of execution sale were excessive, he should not be amerced, on motion on day preceding sale, without opportunity under 1 Comp. St. 1910, p. 428, § 49, to make the sale and be credited with the proceeds by bringing them into court before entry of judgment of amercement, especially where plaintiff suffered no injury but delay, and defendants were making efforts to pay the debt before sale.-Id.

140 (Conn.) Where a constable with a writ of replevin broke down the outer door of an apartment, without evidence that the breaking was accidental, instruction that if the locking of the door and its breaking were practically simultaneous the officer was not to be blamed, unless he broke the door intentionally, was erroneous, as misleading.-Fourette v. Griffin, 103 A. 123.

46(1) (Pa.) In action by receiver of bank against maker of note, defendant could not set off deposits made by him in a fiduciary capacity prior to insolvency of the bank.-Hunter v. Hen- See Wharves. ning, 103 A. 61.

SETTING ASIDE.

SHIPPING.

SIDEWALKS.

See Municipal Corporations, 451.'

[blocks in formation]

See Explosives,

SEWER GAS.
7.

SLEEPING CARS.

See Carriers, 414, 416.

SMOKING.

See Master and Servant, 373, 375.

SODOMY.

See Indictment and Information, 125.

peared that suit was not begun until three years after performance was due, and no tender of consideration was made, and part of 5 (Del.Gen.Sess.) The contention that an petitioner's stockholders were opposed to proindictment is faulty because it alleges that de- ceeding, refusal of relief prayed for held not fendant solicited the other party to permit de- error.-In re Kutz's Estate, 103 A. 293. fendant to commit sodomy is unavailing, since 121 (4) (N.J.Ch.) To enforce specific pereither party may be indicted for the offense.formance of parol contract for sale of realty, State v. Wimer, 103 A. 752. proofs of contract must be clear and convineing.-McEvoy v. Brooks, 103 A. 403.

A count in an indictment for sodomy held too indefinite and uncertain, and not in any way to allege an overt act.-Id.

[blocks in formation]

In suit for specific performance of parol agreement to repurchase vacant lots taken as part payment for residence property sold defendant by complainant, evidence of positive engagement to repurchase held insufficient to warrant decree for complaint.-Id.

121(8) (Del.) In a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, evidence held not to sustain the defense that the contract had been induced by false representations as to the identity of the purchaser. -Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 103 A. 355.

[blocks in formation]

8 (Pa.) The granting of relief by chan- See Receivers, 102. cellor is a matter of grace and not of right, though the court must exercise a legal discretion, and be governed by equitable principles, and not rule the matter arbitrarily.-In re Kutz's Estate, 103 A. 293.

17 (N.J.Ch.) Lessee's executrix and sole devisee may enforce option to purchase contained in lease.-Thommen v. Smith, 103 A. 25.

II. CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE. 30 (N.J.) Contract to purchase 64,000 acres of land, price of 3,750 acres, worth about 25 per cent. of whole, to be ascertained by arbitration, cannot be specifically enforced in whole or in part.-Davila v. United Fruit Co., 103 A. 519.

32(1) (Pa.) An agreement lacking in mutuality cannot be enforced by specific performance. In re Kutz's Estate, 103 A. 293.

57 (N.J.Ch.) Lessee may enforce specific performance of option to purchase contained in lease. Thommen v. Smith, 103 A. 25.

III. GOOD FAITH AND DILIGENCE.

87 (Pa.) In suit for specific performance, plaintiff must show that he has performed, or was ready to perform, his part of the contract, and not been guilty of laches or unreasonable delay. In re Kutz's Estate, 103 A. 293.

90 (Pa.) In suit for specific performance, plaintiff must show that he has not been guilty of laches or unreasonable delay. In re Kutz's Estate, 103 A. 293.

97(1) (Pa.) Tender of performance on part of vendee, plaintiff, is prerequisite to a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. In re Kutz's Estate, 103 A. 293.

See Equity, ~85.

STATES.

I. POLITICAL STATUS AND RELA-
TIONS.

4 (R.I.) The federal Constitution is supreme, and must govern in case of conflict between its provisions and those of a state Constitution. In re Opinion to the Governor, 103 A. 513.

See Railroads,

STATIONS.

282.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

See Frauds, Statute of.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
See Limitation of Actions.

STATUTES.

See Constitutional Law.
For statutes relating to particular subjects, see
the various specific topics.

1. ENACTMENT, REQUISITES, AND VALIDITY IN GENERAL.

351⁄2 (Md.) Referendum, broadly speaking, is reservation by people of state or local subdivision thereof of right to have submitted for their approval or rejection under certain prescribed conditions any law or part of law passed by lawmaking body.-Beall v. State, 103 A. 99.

IV. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. 352 (Me.) Under Const. art. 4, pt. 3. §§ 17, 121(3) (Pa.) In proceeding to compel 20, held, that referendum petitions must, when specific performance of contract for sale of filed within 90 days after recess of Legislature,

amended after the expiration of such period.-, fying petitioner, the names on the petition could
In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 A. 761.

Where city clerk certified all signatures on
referendum petition to be those of persons
qualified to vote for Governor, such statement
was prima facie evidence of the fact, and his
letter to Governor stating that he did not ex-
amine the voting lists prior to making such cer-
tificate, did not overcome the prima facie show-
ing, so that names on such petitions should be
counted.-Id.

Where city clerk certified names on referen-
dum petition to be those of persons entitled to
vote for Governor, his letter to the circulator
of the petitions, requesting their return so that
he could examine the voting list to determine
whether his certificate was correct, did not pre-
clude counting names on such petitions.-Id.
After 90 days from filing petition for referen-
dum, the Governor cannot hear evidence as to
whether the city clerk, having certified petition
signatures to be those of duly qualified voters,
requested a return of the petitions to permit
him to examine voting list to determine wheth-
er his certificate was correct.-Id.

Where city clerk certified names on referen-
dum petition to be those of duly qualified vot-
ers, though the Governor was satisfied that the
circulator of petition refused the clerk's request
for a return thereof to permit examination of
voting list, the names should be counted.-Id.
Names on a referendum petition, certified by
city clerk who is one of the petitioners and
acts as verifying petitioner, should be counted.
-Id.

Where a petitioner for referendum signed
two or more petitions and acted as verifying
petitioner on each of them, only the names on
the petition bearing the earliest date should be
counted.-Id.

Where a verifying petitioner's jurat followed
the clerk's certification on the blank, the mere
fact that the verification bore a date preceding
the certification did not vitiate the petition, and
the names thereon should be counted.-Id.

not be counted, since the clerk's certificate that
the names appearing on the blanks from 1 to
100, inclusive, were those of duly qualified voters
did not include the name of the verifying peti-
tioner.-Id.

Under Rev. St. c. 1, § 6, par. 20, signature
to referendum petition by mark is valid, and,
when duly witnessed, should be counted.-Id.
Where clerk certified names of voters on lines
1 to 48, inclusive, to be those of duly qualified
voters, and no name appeared on line 47 but
that of the verifying petitioner appeared on line
49, the error was only clerical, and did not pre-
vent counting the names on the petition.-Id.
Where referendum petition with 100 lines had
names on each line except 25 and 91, and the
verifying petitioner's name appeared in the first
column below the number 50, and the clerk's
certificate showed that all the names from 1 to
100 were those of duly qualified voters, the
names on the petition could not be counted.-Id.
Where the verifying petitioner's name was in-
serted ahead of No. 1 on the petition, which
contained 100 lines, and the clerk certified the
names from 1 to 101, inclusive, to be those of
qualified voters, the names on the petition
should be counted.-Id.

Failure of the town clerk's certificate to spec-·
ify the date on which his certificate is made,
though it gave the month and year, did not viti-
ate the certificate filed within the required
time.-Id.

Where jurat of the officer taking the oath of
the verifying petitioner on a referendum peti-
tion bore no date, or the month and year were
given and the day omitted, the jurat was suffi-
cient, and the names should be counted.-Id.

Where referendum petitioner signs two peti-
tions, his name on the first dated petition only
should be counted.-Id.

A referendum petition, verified by its circula-
tor, who did not himself sign it, is not to be
counted.-Id.

Where the petitioner verifying a referendum
Where a verifying petitioner's name was sign-petition took oath before a notary, the latter's
ed "Ralph Richards," and the only petitioner by failure to attach his official seal did not vitiate
the name of Richards was R. W. Richards, the the verification, and the names on the petition
names on the petition should be counted; the should be counted, in view of Rev. St. c. 40, §
verifying petitioner being sufficiently identified. 26.-Id.
-Id.

Where the verifying petitioner's name ap-
peared as "W. W. Farrar," and in the petition
the name "Walter W. Farrar" appeared, the
names on the petition should be counted.--Id.

Since Rev. St. c. 5, § 14, requiring registration
of voters by full name, does not apply to the
referendum, signatures on referendum peti-
tions, giving only initials for Christian and mid-
dle names, should be counted.-Id.

The town clerk's certification of a referendum
petition made on a typewriter and not by hand,

was invalid and the names should not be count-

ed since, under Rev. St. c. 1, § 6, par. 20, it is
the signature in handwriting which authenti-
cates the petition.-Id.

After expiration of 90 days within which ref-
erendum petitions must be filed, the Governor
cannot receive evidence as to whether the clerk

in fact personally signed referendum petitions
by typewriter, since the petitions must be com-
plete within 90 days.-Id.

After expiration of 90 days within which ref-
erendum petitions must be filed, the Governor
may hear evidence as to whether signatures on
the petition are valid or forged, in view of Rev.
St. c. 1. § 6, par. 20.-Id.

The Governor after 90 days within which ref-
erendum petitions must be filed, may compare
the names appearing on petition, although cer-
tified by the town clerk and verified by the peti-
tioner, with the actual voting lists of the towns,
and may refuse to count such names as do not
appear on such lists.-Id.

Where Legislature adjourned on April 7,
1917, names on referendum petitions received
in the office of the secretary of the state be-
tween midnight July 5, 1917, and midnight July
6, 1917, should be counted, in view of Const.
art. 4, pt. 3, § 17.-Id.

60 (R.I.) Where constitutionality of taxing
act is attacked, Supreme Court will not review
judgment of Legislature as to whether the tax
review can be had only where repugnancy to
is unequal, by consideration of evidence, but
Constitution appears on the face of the act or
notice.-Manufacturers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
some facts of which the court can take judicial
Clarke, 103 A. 931.

II. GENERAL AND SPECIAL OR LO-
CAL LAWS.

76(1) (Md.) In view of Code, art. 23, § 444,
creating the Public Service Commission and
constituting it as body for determining rates
of public utilities companies, and repealing all
laws in conflict therewith, Acts 1910, c. 341,
prohibiting increase in rates of utilities compa-
ny of Westminster without the consent of
mayor or common council, was invalid as in vi-
olation of Const. art. 3, § 33, prohibiting enact-
ment of a special law for any cause for which
a general law makes provision.-City of West-
minster v. Consolidated Public Utilities Co.,
103 A. 1008.

~80(1) (Md.) Acts 1910, c. 341, providing that
Where referendum petition contained 100 existing rates of a utilities company for sup-
numbered blank lines, all filled, with two signa- plying water, gas, and electric light to a certain
tures below, one of which was that of the veri-city should not be thereafter increased without

the consent of the mayor and common council,
is a local and special act.-City of Westmin-
ster v. Consolidated Public Utilities Co., 103 A.
1008.

94(1) (Pa.) Act April 20, 1917 (P. L. 91),
relating to contracts and liabilities of coun-
ties and in terms applying to all counties in
state, is presumptively a general statute.-Ken-
nedy v. Meyer, 103 A. 44.

ate act, qualifying and limiting the first stat-
ute, but such intermediate act remains in force,
qualifying the new act as it did the first.-In
re Toner's Estate, 103 A. 541.

170 (Md.) Laws 1910, c. 109, intended to
repeal and re-enact with amendments certain
sections, including section 286, art. 4, Code Pub.
Loc. Laws, as amended and re-enacted by Laws
1898, c. 123, held legally enacted.-Swann v.
City of Baltimore, 103 A. 441.

VI. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-

TION.

95(1) (Md.) Acts 1914, c. 197, providing
for deduction from capital stock of domestic
fire insurance companies the amount of mort-
gages on land within the state held by such
companies, does not contravene Const. art. 3,
§ 33, prohibiting local or special laws relating181(1) (Conn.) When once the legislative
to taxation.-City of Baltimore v. German-
American Fire Ins. Co. of Baltimore City, 103
A. 980.

(A) General Rules of Construction.

will is discovered, the courts are not at liberty
to disregard it by invoking any rule of con-
struction.-Appeal of Young, 103 A. 639.

104 (Pa.) Act April 20, 1917 (P. L. 91), 206 (N.J.Ch.) In construing a statute it
partly validating contract of county for tun- is necessary that force be given, if possible,
nel work entered into under Act May 11, 1909 to every portion thereof.-Beardsley v. Wright,
(P. L. 506), subsequently declared unconstitu- 103 A. 809.
tional, held not local or special law in violation211 (R.I.) In construing an ambiguous pro-
of Const. art. 3, § 7, and valid.-Kennedy v. vision of a statute, the title of the act, as well
Meyer, 103 A. 44.
as other provisions thereof, may be considered
in ascertaining legislative intent.-Armour &
Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 103 A.
1031.

III. SUBJECTS AND TITLES OF ACTS.
114(2) (N.J.Sup.) Act March 15, 1916 (P.
L. p. 97), entitled "An Act creating a work-222 (Pa.) A statute will not be construed
men's compensation aid bureau in the depart- as changing the common law beyond what is
ment of labor," is not in conflict with Const. expressly stated or necessarily implied, and in
art. 4, 7, par. 4, requiring that every law doubtful
the presumption is that no
shall embrace but one subject, expressed in its change was intended.-Johnston v. Knipe, 103
title.-Murphy v. George Brown & Co., 103 A. A. 957.

28.

115(3) (N.J.Ch.) Act March 3, 1915 (P. L.
1915, p. 61), entitled "An act amendatory of
and supplemental to an act entitled 'An act
directing the descent of real estates,' approved
April 16, 1846," abolishing dower and curtesy,
violates Const. art. 4, § 7, pl. 4, requiring law
to embrace but one object expressed in its ti-
tle.-Reese v. Stires. 103 A. 679.

~121(1) (Md.) Acts 1916, c. 704, § 184, re-
quiring licenses of construction firms, held not
invalid, under Const. art. 3, § 29, as not being
within title of act, in view of Code Pub. Civ.
Laws, art. 1, § 7.-State v. Case, 103 A. 569.

[blocks in formation]

V. REPEAL, SUSPENSION, EXPIRA-
TION, AND REVIVAL.

159 (Conn.) There are no exceptions to
the proposition that, if two statutes are ex-
pressly contrary, the later is the law.-Appeal
of Young, 103 A. 639.

161(2) (Md.) If susbequent act can be made
by any reasonable construction or intendment
to stand with the previous legislation, such
construction will always be adopted, especial-
ly when the acts are passed by the same ses-
sion of the Legislature.-City of Baltimore v.
German-American Fire Ins. Co. of Baltimore
City, 103 A. 980.

166 (Pa.) A later statute, merely re-enact-
ing a former one, does not repeal an intermedi-

cases

227 (N.J.) In a statute prescribing the ex-
ercise of the powers of municipal government,
the word "shall" is imperative, and imports ab-
solute obligation, unless a different meaning is
conclusively required by the context.-Foley v.
City of Orange, 103 A. 743.

230 (Me.) The Legislature in amending a
statute is presumed to have had in mind the de-
cisions construing the former statute.-Webber
v. Granville Chase Co., 103 A. 13.

(B) Particular Classes of Statutes.
241(2) (N.J.Sup.) A penal statute must be
srtictly construed, and will not be held to in-
clude other offenses by intendment.-Pennsyl-
vania R. Co. v. Fucello, 103 A. 988.

(C) Time of Taking Effect.

248 (Md.) Const. art. 16, §§ 1-6, as to
referendum, held not applicable to Acts 1917.
c. 13, as to sale of intoxicants within limits of
named county, so that section 19 of act de-
claring that it should go into effect immediately
was authorized by Const. art. 3, § 31.-Beall
v. State, 103 A. 99.

255 (N.J.) Under revision of 1912 (P. L.
1912, p. 809), relating to maintenance of public
roads, and providing that, after first county
road was constructed "under this act," board of
chosen freeholders should appoint qualified civil
engineer, etc., such words related to date of
passage and approval of prior act, known as
revision of 1905 (P. L. 1905, p. 94), and its
supplements.-King v. Smith, 103 A. 191.

(D) Retroactive Operation.

263 (N.J.Sup.) A statute will be given a
prospective effect, unless there are words con-
tained therein expressing a contrary intent.-
Monahan v. Matthews, 103 A. 40.

« ПретходнаНастави »