tution. If so, they are void. No treaty can alter the fabric of our government, nor can it do that which the constitution has expressly forbidden to be done; nor can it do that differently which is directed to be done in a given mode,—all other modes being prohibited. For instance, the constitution says, no money "shall be drawn out of the treasury but by an appropriation made by law." Of course no subsidy can be granted without an act of law; and a treaty of alliance could not involve the country in war without the consent of this House. With this limitation, it is easy to explain the case put by my colleague, who said, that according to one limitation, a treaty might have prohibited the introduction of a certain description of persons before the year 1808, notwithstanding the clause in the constitution to the contrary. I will speak plainly on this point:-it was the intention of the constitution that the slave trade should be tolerated till the time mentioned. It covers me with confusion to name it here; I feel ashamed of such a tolerance, and take a large part of the disgrace, as I represent a part of the Union by whose influence it might be supposed to have been introduced. Though Congress alone is prohibited, by the words of the clause, from suppressing that odious traffic, yet my colleague will admit that it was intended to be a general prohibition on the Government of the Union. I perceive my colleague indicates his dissent. It will be necessary to be more explicit.

[Here Mr. C. read that part of the constitution, and showed that the word "Congress " might be left out, in conformity with other parts of the constitution, without injury to the sense of the clause; and he insisted that the plain meaning of the parties to the constitution was, that the trade should continue till 1808, and that a prohibition by treaty would be equally against the spirit of the instrument.]

Besides these constitutional limits, the treaty-making power, like all powers, has others derived from its nature and ob

jects. It has for its object, contracts with foreign nations; as the powers of Congress have for their object, whatever may be done in relation to the powers delegated to it, without the consent of foreign nations. Each, in its proper sphere, operates with general influence; but when they become erratic, then they are portentous and dangerous. A treaty never can legitimately do that which can be done by law; and the converse is also true. Suppose the discriminating duties repealed on both sides by law,-still what is effected by this treaty would not even then be done; for the plighted faith of both would be wanting. Either side might repeal its law without breach of contract. It appears to me, that gentlemen are too much influenced on this subject by the example of Great Britain. Instead of looking to the nature of our own, they have been swayed in their opinions by the practice of that government, to which we are but too much in the habit of looking for precedents. Much anxiety has recently been evinced, to be independent of English broadcloths and muslins; I hope it indicates the approach of a period when we shall also throw off the thraldom of thought. The truth is, but little analogy exists between this and any other government. It is the pride of ours, to be founded in reason and equity; all others have originated, more or less, in fraud, violence, or accident. The right to make treaties, in England, can only be determined by the practice of the government; as she has no written constitution. Her practice may be wise in regard to her government, when it would be very imprudent here. Admitting the fact to be, that the king refers all commercial treaties affecting the municipal regulations of the country, to parliament, for its sanction; the argument drawn from this would be very feeble to prove that this, also, was the intention of our constitution. Strong differences exist between the forms of the two governments. The king is hereditary ;—he alone, without the participation of either house of parliament, negotiates and makes treaties.

England has no constitution emanating from the people, alike superior to the legislature and the king. Not so here. The President is elected for a short period; he is amenable to the public opinion; he is liable to be impeached for corruption; he cannot make treaties without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate-a fact very material to be remembered-which body is in like manner responsible to the people at periods not very remote. Above all,-as the laws and constitution are here perfectly distinct, and the latter is alike superior to laws and treaties,-the treaty-making power cannot change the form of government, or encroach on the liberties of the country, without encroaching on that instrument, which, so long as the people are free, will be watched with vigilance.

SPEECH

On the motion to Repeal the Direct Tax, delivered in the House of Representatives, January 31st,

1816.

[NOTE.-January 9th, 1816. The Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred that portion of the President's Message relating to the revenue, reported, among others, the following resolution:

"Resolved, That it is expedient so to amend an act, entitled, 'An act to provide additional revenues for defraying the expenses of Government and maintaining public credit, by laying a direct tax upon the United States, and to provide for assessing and collecting the same,' passed on the 9th of January, 1815, as to reduce the tax to be levied for the year 1816, and succeeding years, to $3,000,000, with a similar provision in regard to the direct tax on the District of Columbia. This resolution being called up in Committee of the

Whole, caused much debate. Mr. Clay moved to amend it, so as to limit its operation to one year, with a view to place it under the annual control of the House. This was carried; and then Mr. Harden of Kentucky moved to amend it, by declaring it expedient to repeal the laws laying a direct tax, altogether. This called forth discussion for several days successively, in which many of the most prominent men in the House took part. The motion was finally negatived by a vote of 81 to 73.]

MR. CHAIRMAN:-There are in the affairs of nations, not less than in those of individuals, moments, on the proper use of which depend their fame, duration, and prosperity. Such I conceive to be the present situation of this country. Recently emerged from a war, we find ourselves in possession of a physical and moral power of great magnitude; and impressed by the misfortunes which have resulted from want of forecast heretofore, we are disposed to apply our means to purposes most valuable to the country. In a situation of such interest, I hope we shall be guided by the dictates of truth and wisdom only; that we shall prefer the lasting happiness of our country to present ease; its security to its pleasure; fair honor and reputation to inglorious and inactive repose.

The

We are now called on to determine what amount of revenue is necessary for this country in time of peace. This involves the additional question: what are the measures which the true interests of this country demand? principal expense of our Government grows out of measures necessary for its defence; and in order to decide what those measures ought to be, it will be proper to inquire, what ought to be our policy towards other nations ? and what will probably be theirs towards us? I intentionally leave out of consideration the financial questions, which some gentlemen have examined in the debate, and also the question of retrenchments; on which I will only remark, that I hope, whatsoever of economy shall enter into the measures of Con

gress, they will at least be divested of the character of parsimony.

Beginning with the policy of the country. This ought to correspond with the character of its political institutions. What, then, is their character ? They are founded on reason and justice. These being the foundations of our Government, its policy ought to comport with them. It is the duty of all nations, especially of one whose institutions recognize no principle of force, but appeal to virtue for their strength, to act with justice and moderation—with moderation approaching to forbearance. In all possible conflicts with foreign powers, our Government should be able to make it manifest to the world, that it has justice on its side. We should always forbear, if possible, until all shall be satisfied, that when we take up arms, it is not for the purpose of conquest, but for the maintenance of our essential rights. Our Government, moreover, is also founded on equality; it permits none to exercise violence; it permits no one to trample on the rights of his fellow-citizens with impunity. These maxims we should also carry into our intercourse with foreign nations; and as we render justice to all, so we should be prepared to exact it from all.

Our policy should not only be moderate and just, but as high-minded as it is moderate and just. This appears to me to be, for our country, the true line of conduct. In the policy of nations there are two extremes: one, in which justice and moderation may sink into feebleness-another, in which that lofty spirit which ought to animate all nations, particularly free states, may mount up to military violence. These extremes ought to be equally avoided ;-but, of the two, I consider the first far the most dangerous, far the most fatal. There are two splendid examples of nations which have ultimately sunk by military violence; the Romans in ancient times the French in modern. But how numerous are the instances of nations that have gradually sunk into insignifi