I am not surprised at the ardor and zeal with which he has entered into the controversy. It is a great struggle between power and liberty-power on the side of the North, and liberty on the side of the South. But, while I am not surprised at the part which the Senator from Massachusetts has taken, I must express my amazement at the principles advanced by the Senator from Georgia, nearest me (Mr. Forsyth). I had supposed it was impossible that one of his experience and sagacity should not perceive the new and dangerous direction which this controversy is about to take. For the first time, we have heard an ominous reference to a provision in the constitution which I have never known to be before alluded to in discussion, or in connection with any of our measures. I refer to that provision in the constitution in which the General Government guarantees a republican form of government to the States-a power which hereafter, if not rigidly restricted to the objects intended by the constitution, is destined to be a pretext to interfere with our political affairs and domestic institutions in a manner infinitely more dangerous than any other power which has ever been exercised on the part of the General Government. I had supposed that every Southern Senator, at least, would have been awake to the danger which menaces us from this new quarter; and that no sentiment would be uttered, on their part, calculated to countenance the exercise of this dangerous power. With these impressions, I heard the Senator, with amazement, alluding to Carolina as furnishing a case which called for the enforcement of this guarantee. Does he not see the hazard of the indefinite extension of so fatal a power? There exists in every Southern State a domestic institution, which would require a far less bold construction to consider the government of every State in that quarter, not to be republican, and, of course, to demand, on the part of this Government, the suppression of the institution to which I allude, in fulfilment of the guarantee. I believe

there are now no hostile feelings combined with political considerations, in any section, connected with this delicate subject. But it requires no stretch of the imagination to see the danger which must one day come, if not vigilantly watched. With the rapid strides with which this Government is advancing to power, a time will come, and that not far distant, when petitions will be received from the quarter to which I allude for protection-when the faith of the guarantee will be, at least, as applicable to that case as the Senator from Georgia now thinks it is to Carolina. Unless his doctrine be opposed by united and firm resistance, its ultimate effect will be to drive the white population from the Southern Atlantic States.

SPEECH

On the Removal of the Public Deposits from the Bank of the United States, delivered in the Senate, January 13th, 1834.

[THE Special Order now came up, the question being on Mr. Clay's resolutions in regard to the removal of the Public Deposits.]

MR. CALHOUN said, that the statement of this case might be given in a very few words. The 16th section of the act incorporating the Bank, provides that, wherever there is a bank or branch of the United States Bank, the public moneys should be deposited therein, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury; and that, in such case, he should report to Congress, if in session, immediately; and if not, at the commencement of the next session. The Secretary, acting under the provisions of this section, has ordered the de

posits to be withheld from the Bank, and has reported his reasons, in conformity with the provisions of the section. The Senate is now called upon to consider his reasons, in order to determine whether the Secretary is justified or not. I have examined them with care and deliberation, without the slightest bias, as far as I am conscious, personal or political. I have but a slight acquaintance with the Secretary, and that little is not unfavorable to him. I stand wholly disconnected with the two great parties now contending for ascendency. My political connections are with that small and denounced party which has voluntarily retired from the party strifes of the day, with a view of saving, if possible, the liberty and the constitution of the country, in this great crisis of our affairs.

Having maturely considered, with these impartial feelings, the reasons of the Secretary, I am constrained to say that he has entirely failed to make out his justification. At the very commencement, he has placed his right to remove the deposits on an assumption resting on a misconception of the case. In the progress of his argument he has entirely abandoned the first, and assumed a new and greatly enlarged ground, utterly inconsistent with the first, and equally untenable; and yet, as broad as his assumptions are, there is an important part of the transaction which he does not attempt to vindicate, and to which he has not even alluded. I shall, said Mr. Calhoun, now proceed, without further remark, to make good these assertions.

The Secretary, at the commencement of his argument, assumes the position that, in the absence of all legal provision, he, as the head of the financial department, had the right, in virtue of his office, to designate the agent and place for the safe-keeping of the public deposits. He then contends that the 16th section does not restrict his power, which stands, he says, on the same ground as before the passing of the act incorporating the Bank. It is not necessary to inquire

into the correctness of the position assumed by the Secretary; but, if it were, it would not be difficult to show, that when an agent, with general powers, assumes, in the execution of his agency, a power not delegated, the assumption rests on the necessity of the case; and that no power, in such case, can be lawfully exercised, which was not necessary to effect the object intended. Nor would it be difficult to show that, in this case, the power assumed by the Secretary would belong, not to him, but to the Treasurer; who, under the act organizing the Treasury Department, is expressly charged with the safe-keeping of the public funds, for which he is responsible under bond, in heavy penalties. But as strongly and directly as these considerations bear on the question of the power of the Secretary, I do not think it necessary to pursue them, for the plain reason that the Secretary has entirely mistaken the case. It is not It is not a case, as he supposes, where there is no legal provision in relation to the safe-keeping of the public funds, but one of precisely the opposite character. The 16th section expressly provides that the deposits shall be made in the Bank and its branches; and, of course, it is perfectly clear that all powers which the Secretary has derived from the general and inherent powers of his office, in the absence of such provision, are wholly inapplicable to this Nor is it less clear that, if the section had terminated with the provision directing the deposits to be made in the Bank, the Secretary would have had no more control over the subject than myself, or any other Senator; and it follows, of course, that he must derive his power, not from any general reasons connected with the nature of his office, but from some express provisions contained in the section, or some other part of the act. It has not been attempted to be shown that there is any such provision in any other section or part of the act. The only control, then, which the Secretary can rightfully claim over the deposits is contained in the provision which directs that the deposits shall be made

case.

in the Bank, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury; which brings the whole question in reference to the deposits, to the extent of the power which Congress intended to confer upon the Secretary, in these few words, "unless otherwise ordered."

With the same

In ascertaining the intention of Congress, I lay it down as a rule, which I suppose will not be controverted, that all political powers, under our free institutions, are trust powers, and not rights, liberties, or immunities, belonging personally to the officer. I also lay it down as a rule not less incontrovertible, that trust powers are necessarily limited (unless there be some express provision to the contrary) to the subject-matter and object of the trust. This brings us to the question, What is the subject and object of the trust in this case? The whole section relates to deposits-to the safe and faithful keeping of the public funds. With this view they are directed to be made in the Bank. view, and in order to increase the security, power was conferred on the Secretary to withhold the deposits; and with the same view, he is directed to report his reasons for the removal, to Congress. All have one common object, the security of the public funds. To this point the whole section converges. The language of Congress, fairly understood, is, We have selected the Bank because we confide in it as a safe and faithful agent to keep the public money; but, to prevent the abuse of so important a trust, we invest the Secretary with power to remove the deposits, with a view to their increased security. And lest the Secretary, on his part, should abuse so important a trust, and in order still further to increase that security, we direct, in case of removal, that he shall report his reasons. It is obvious, under this view of the subject, that the Secretary has no right to act in relation to the deposits, but with a view to their increased security; and that he has no right to order them to be withheld from the Bank so long as the