turn it to the public treasury, where it was ordered to be deposited by an act of the legislature.

There is another aspect, said Mr. C., in which this subject may be viewed. We all remember how early the question of the surplus revenue began to agitate the country. At a very early period, a Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Dickerson) presented his scheme for disposing of it by distributing it among the States. The first message of the President recommended a similar project, which was followed up by a movement on the part of the Legislature of New-York, and, I believe, some of the other States. The public attention was aroused the scheme scrutinized-its gross unconstitutionality and injustice, and its dangerous tendency-its tendency to absorb the power and existence of the States, were clearly perceived and denounced. The denunciation was too deep to be resisted, and the scheme was abandoned. What have we now in lieu of it? What is the present scheme but a distribution of the surplus revenue? A distribution at the sole will and pleasure of the Executive-a distribution to favorite banks, and through them, in the shape of discounts and loans, to corrupt partisans, as the means of increasing political influence.

We have, said Mr. C., arrived at a fearful crisis. Things cannot long remain as they are. It behooves all who love their country-who have affection for their offspring, or who have any stake in our institutions, to pause and reflect. Confidence is daily withdrawing from the General Government. Alienation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create a state of things inimical to the existence of our institutions, and, if not arrested, convulsions must follow; and then comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will be thrown over the cause of liberty and the future prospects of our country.

I

SPEECH

On the proposition of Mr. Webster to recharter the Bank of the United States, delivered in the Senate, March 21st, 1834.

[NOTE.-The question being upon granting leave to Mr. Webster to introduce into the Senate a bill to recharter, for the term of six years, the Bank of the United States, with modifications:]

I RISE, said Mr. Calhoun, in order to avail myself of an early opportunity to express my opinion on the measure proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts, and the questions immediately connected with it; under the impression that, on a subject so intimately connected with the interests of every class in the community, there should be an early declaration of their sentiments by the members of this body, so that all may know what to expect, and on what to calculate.

I shall vote for the motion of the Senator, not because I approve of the measure he proposes, but because I consider it due in courtesy to grant leave, unless there be strong reasons to the contrary, which is not the case in this instance; but while I am prepared to vote for his motion, and, let me add, to do ample justice to his motives for introducing the bill, I cannot approve of the measure he proposes. In every view which I have been able to take, it is objectionable. Among the objections, I place the uncertainty as to its object. It is left entirely open to conjecture whether a renewal of the charter is intended, or a mere continuance, with the view of affording the Bank time to wind up its affairs; and what increases the uncertainty is, if we apply the provisions of the proposed bill to the one or the other of these objects, it is equally unsuited to either. If a renewal of the charter be

intended, six years is too short; if a continuance, too long. I, however, state this as a minor objection. There is another of far more decisive character: it settles nothing; it leaves every thing unfixed; it perpetuates the present struggle, which so injuriously agitates the country-a struggle of bank against bank-of one set of opinions against another; and prolongs the whole, without even an intervening armistice, to the year 1842: a period that covers two presidential terms, and by inevitable consequence, running, for two successive presidential elections, the politics of the country into the bank question, and the bank question into politics, with the mutual corruption which must be engendered; keeping, during the whole period, the currency of the country, which the public interest requires should have the utmost stability, in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation.

But why should I pursue the objections to the plan proposed by the Senator? He, himself, acknowledged the measure to be defective, and that he would prefer one of a more permanent character. He has not proposed this as the best measure, but has brought it forward under a supposed necessity-under the impression that something must be done something prompt and immediate, to relieve the existing distress which overspreads the land. I concur with him in relation to the distress, that it is deep and extensive; that it fell upon us suddenly, and in the midst of prosperity almost unexampled; that it is daily consigning hundreds to poverty and misery; blasting the hopes of the enterprising ; taking employment and bread from the laborer; and working a fearful change in the relative condition of the money dealers on one side, and the man of business on the other-raising the former rapidly to the top of the wheel, while it is whirling the latter, with equal rapidity, to the bottom. While I thus agree with the Senator as to the distress, I am also sensible that there are great public emergencies in which no permanent relief can be afforded, and when the wisest

are obliged to resort to expedients; to palliate and to temporize, in order to gain time with a view to apply a more effectual remedy. But there are also emergencies of precisely the opposite character; when the best and most permanent is the only practicable measure, and when mere expedients tend but to distract, to divide, and confound, and thereby to delay or defeat all relief; and such, viewed in all its relations and bearing, I consider the present; and that the Senator from Massachusetts also has not so considered it, I attribute to the fact that, of the two questions blended in the subject under consideration, he has given an undue prominence to that which has by far the least relative importance-I mean those of the Bank and of the currency. As a mere bank question, as viewed by the Senator, it would be a matter of but little importance whether the renewal should be for six years or for a longer period; and a preference might very properly be given to one or the other, as it might be supposed most likely to succeed; but I must say, that, in my opinion, in selecting the period of six years, he has taken that which will be much less likely to succeed than one of a reasonable and proper duration. But had he turned his view to the other and more prominent question involved; had he regarded the question as a question of currency, and that the great point was to give it uniformity, permanency, and safety; that, in effecting these essential objects, the Bank is a mere subordinate agent, to be used or not to be used, and to be modified, as to its duration and other provisions, wholly in reference to the higher question of the currency, I cannot think he would ever have proposed the measure which he has brought forward, which leaves, as I have already said, every thing connected with the subject in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation.

All feel that the currency is a delicate subject, requiring to be touched with the utmost caution; but in order that it may be seen as well as felt why it is so delicate-why slight

touches, either in depressing or elevating it, agitate and convulse the whole community, I will pause to explain the cause. If we take the aggregate property of a community, that which forms the currency constitutes, in value, a very small proportion of the whole. What this proportion is in our country and other commercial and trading communities, is somewhat uncertain. I speak conjecturally in fixing it as one to twenty-five or thirty, though I presume this is not far from the truth; and yet this small proportion of the property of the community regulates the value of all the rest, and forms the medium of circulation by which all its exchanges are effected; bearing, in this respect, a striking similarity, considering the diversity of the subjects, to the blood in the human or animal system.

If we turn our attention to the laws which govern the circulation, we shall find one of the most important to be, that, as the circulation is decreased or increased, the rest of the property will, all other circumstances remaining the same, be decreased or increased in value exactly in the same proportion. To illustrate: If a community should have an aggregate amount of property of thirty-one millions of dollars, of which one million constitutes its currency; and that one million should be reduced one-tenth part, that is to say, one hundred thousand dollars, the value of the rest will be reduced in like manner one-tenth part, that is, three millions of dollars. And here a very important fact discloses itself, which explains why the currency should be touched with such delicacy, and why stability and uniformity are such essential qualities; I mean that a small absolute reduction of the currency makes a great absolute reduction of the value of the entire property of the community, as we see in the case supposed; where a reduction of one hundred thousand dollars in the currency reduces the aggregate value of property three millions of dollars—a sum thirty times greater than the reduction of the currency. From this results an important