I utterly deny. I call on those who make the claim to so extravagant a power, to point out the article of that instrument which warrants such a construction. Will they cite that which establishes the liberty of speech here? Its object is far different, and it furnishes not the shadow of such a power. Will they rely on its general spirit? It knows no object but the general good, and must for ever condemn all factious opposition to measures emanating from its own authority. It is then not authorized either by the letter or the spirit of the constitution. If, then, our opponents have the right, it is because it is not expressly forbidden. In this sense there is no limitation to their constitutional rights, A right might be thus derived to violate the whole decalogue. The constitution forbids almost no crimes; nor ought it to be considered in the light of a voluminous penal code, whose object is the definition and prohibition of all acts injurious to society. Even were this the case, the argument that what is not forbidden is justifiable, would be fallacious; for there are many acts of the most dangerous tendency (of which an unprincipled opposition is one), which in their very nature are not susceptible of that rigid definition necessary to subject them to punishment. How absurd, then, the argument, as applied to the constitution, whose object is the mere enumeration, distribution, and organization of the powers of the body politic.

I have been compelled by the great and dangerous errors of the gentleman on the other side, to take a view more general, than is usually proper, of a subject on which it is so important to think correctly; and I cannot take my seat without reiterating my admonition to this body and the country, to guard against the pernicious effects of a factious opposition. Universal experience and the history of all ages furnish ample testimony of its dangerous consequences, particularly in a state of war. Could any certain remedy be applied to restrain it within the bounds of moderation, then,

indeed, might our liberty be immortal. I know of none but the good sense and the virtue of the people. The triumph of a party can be nothing to them. They can have no

interest but in the general welfare.

SPEECH

On the Loan Bill, delivered in the House of Representatives, February 25th, 1814.

millions of

[NOTE.-January 31st, 1814. Mr. Eppes from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported a Bill to authorize a loan of dollars, which was read and referred to the Committee of the Whole. The debate on this Bill, in which almost all the leading men of both ties participated, took a wide range; embracing all the great questions of the day, which were elaborately discussed. On the character of the discussion, a shrewd contemporary makes the following pertinent remarks:

par

"The debate (not on the Loan Bill, but suffered while it was before a Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives) has had an unlimited range. Every question of politics that has agitated the United States for fifteen or twenty years past, and every one that may be expected for twenty years to come, appears to have been embodied in the speeches of the members: some of whom, it is said, have spoken three hours, without mentioning the Bill at all."

The principal grounds of the opposition were, the inexpediency of the war-to carry on which the loan was asked-and the impossibility, if granted, of obtaining the money. Mr. Calhoun spoke to these objections and in favor of the Bill.]

MR. CHAIRMAN:-It is now more than two weeks since the commencement of this debate; the greater part of which time has been consumed by the opposition in attempting to prove the bad faith, poverty, folly, and injustice of our government and country: for all of their arguments and declamation, however variant and contradictory, are reducible to

two objections against the passage of this bill. First-That such is the want of capital, or of public credit, that the loan cannot be had, or if at all, only at an extravagant interest; and secondly-If the amount can be obtained, the bill ought to be rejected; because, in their opinion, the war is unjust and inexpedient. The last of these objections I propose to disTo examine both at large would occupy too much time. Without, therefore, discussing the question whether the loan can or cannot be had, I will merely offer a few reflections incidentally connected with it.

cuss.

It is a little remarkable that not one of the minority has discussed the material points on this part of the subject; I mean the question,-is the money proposed to be raised by this bill, indispensable for the service of the year? And, if so, is a loan, the only, or the best mode of obtaining it? The chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means has presented an estimate of the expenditures already ordered, or which must be incurred, by which it appears, that the sum proposed to be raised by this bill, with other sources of revenue, will be absolutely necessary to meet them. The silence of the opposition sanctions the correctness of the estimate; and as no other mode has been indicated of obtaining the necessary supplies, this may be presumed to be the only or the best It ceases, then, to be a question, whether the loan can be had at this or that interest. It is necessary; it must be had; and the rate per centum will depend principally on the state of the money market-and not on arguments used here. Again; on comparing the two objections to the passage of this bill, one of them destroys all confidence in the other. Our opponents contend, not only that the loan cannot be had, but that it ought not to be granted. To defeat the passage of the bill in, or to prevent its successful operation out of this House, is the declared object of their policy. It is true that all have not made the latter declaration; but none, as far as my memory serves, have disavowed it. When,

one.

then, they argue that the loan must fail, they must be considered either as dupes of their wishes, or, what is more probable, as aiming to destroy the confidence of moneyed men in the public faith; for it cannot be presumed that they have any hope of defeating the passage of the bill.

But to proceed to the objection which I proposed to discuss. The war, say our opponents, is unjust and inexpedient, and, therefore, this bill ought to be rejected. The facts of the supposed injustice and inexpediency of the war, on which this objection rests, have claimed the exclusive attention of the opposition. The inference deduced from them-that they justify the rejection of this bill, though far from being a self-evident proposition, has received no part of their arguments or elucidations. For my part, I consider it not only false but dangerous; and shall, therefore, not only consider the alleged injustice and inexpediency of the war, but also the inference assumed from these charges. I trust, with the attention of the committee, to prove that both are equally unfounded. I must beg an attentive and deliberate hearing; for a correct mode of thinking on this subject, I sincerely believe to be necessary to the lasting prosperity of our country. I say an attentive and deliberate hearing, for it is not sufficient that the mind be fixed on the discussion; but it should also be free from those passions and prejudices unfavorable to the reception of truth. The fact that discussion here assumes the form of debate produces a state of things unfavorable to dispassionate attention. In debate here, as between two individuals, the opposite sides are much more disposed to find objections to an argument, be it ever so clear, than to receive it with a proper degree of assent. In their zeal, the interest of the country is too often forgotten; and mere recriminations made to take the place of earnest endeavors to discover and enforce the claims of truth. I hope what I have to say will not be viewed as a mere exercise of skill in discussion, in which those who hear me have little or no interest; but as

containing principles believed to be essential to the public interest. I trust I hold in proper contempt the spirit of idle debate. Its heat and zeal are momentary. Not so with our principles and measures. On them must depend our future prosperity and happiness.

Is the war unjust and inexpedient? This is the question which I now propose to discuss. The eagerness and zeal with which our opponents endeavor to prove this point, seem to me not at all consistent with sound principles, or due love of country. In their zeal they often presume that we are wrong, and our enemy right; and that the burden lies on us to prove their charges false-before they have attempted to prove them true. How contrary this to the maxims of Roman wisdom! That wise and virtuous people, so far from presuming their country to be wrong, considered it as a crime in a citizen to doubt the justice of the public cause. In a state of war, how worthy of our imitation! It was at the root of Roman greatness. Without it, a free state must ever lose much of its native and peculiar strength; the spontaneous and concurring zeal of its citizens. The charge of injustice and inexpediency in respect to the war, necessarily leads me to investigate its cause. It originated, as agreed on all sides, in certain commercial aggressions on the part of England, and her practice of impressing American seamen from American vessels on the high seas. Though I have named commercial injuries first, it is my intention to give impressment the preference in the order of discussion; not only because the war is continued for it, but because it is of greater intrinsic importance. The life and liberty of a citizen are more important to him and his country than his property; and consequently the obligation to protect the former is more sacred than the latter. To the truth of this position, our political institutions bear testimony. A single judicial process determines a question of property; but it requires a double investigation, first, before a grand and then a