an operation which he had so well begun. About the close of the action, however, Sir Arthur came up to him, and proposed to pursue the enemy. They had had a conference, the preceding night, on shipboard, and Sir Harry had then resolved to wait for the expected reinforcements before he advanced, in consideration of the strength of the enemy, his power of better equipment than the English possessed, his great superiority of cavalry, the almost total want of it in the British army, the reinforcements which he could draw, with ease and safety, from his headquarters, and the impossibility of advancing into the country, at a distance from the victuallers. The victory which he witnessed had no effect upon his pre-concerted plan:-he replied, that he saw no reason for altering his former resolution of not advancing, and that the same reasoning which before determined him to wait for the reinforcements, had still its full force in his judgment and opinion. At this moment the enemy were retiring, evidently in great disorder, and most completely disheartened by their defeat. Sir Arthur did not press his opinion: his reputation, his past victories, his immediate success, would have justified him in pressing it; the glory of his country, and the common interests of England, Portugal, and Spain, required that he should have pressed it with ardour. Whether the defe. rence due to superior rank, in this instance better forgotten, or an angry dissatisfaction, that he should have been superseded at such a moment, prevailed over feelings more generous, as well as more natural, and a wiser sense of duty, he submitted his judgment, and the irrecoverable opportunity was let pass. Nelson would

have acted otherwise: it was by wearing without orders that he obtained the great success of the battle of Cape St Vincent; it was by continuing the action, in disregard and disobedience of orders, that he saved the British fleet at Copenhagen, and dictated terms to Denmark.

On the following morning, Sir Hew Dalrymple Aug. 22. arrived, to supersede Sir Harry Burrard: so that the British army had three commanders-in-chief within four-and-twenty hours. He landed, according to his own account, entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army, and many circumstances of a local and incidental nature, necessarily of great weight in deciding what measures should be pursued. A few hours after his arrival, Gen ral Kellerman appeared, with a flag of truce from Junot, in order to propose a cessation of hostilities, during which a convention might be concluded for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. An armistice was soon concluded, upon the following terms-that the river Sisandre should be the line of demarcation between the two armies, and that neither of them should occupy Torres Vedras: that the English general should bind himself to comprehend the armed Portugueze in the truce; and that their line of demarcation should be from Leiria to Thomar: that it was agreed that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals of it should be transported to France with their arms and baggage and private property, and that they should be deprived of no part of it whatsoever that no individual, whether Portugueze, Frenchman, or of a nation allied to France, should be molested for his political conduct,

but should be protected, both in person and property, and have liberty to retire from Portugal within a limited time, with all his effects: that the neutrality of the port of Lisbon should be acknowledged for the Russian fleet; that is to say, that, when the English army and fleet should be in possession of the city and port, the said Russian fleet should neither be disturbed during its stay, nor stopped when it might choose to depart, nor pursued when it had sailed, till after the time fixed, in such cases, by maritime law: that all the French artillery, and all their cavalry horses, should be transported to France.*

The defect of judgment, in not pursuing the victory of Vimiera, was not imputable to Sir Arthur Wellesley; but he was chargeable with the far more grievous fault of having formed, or rather submitted to, this fatal armistice, of which every article was palpably dictated by the more able Frenchman. The definitive convention which followed was even more scandalous; it was more favourable to France, more disgraceful to England, more injurious and unjust to our allies; for not only was there an express article, declaring, that if any doubts arose as to the meaning of any point of the treaty, it should be explained favourably to the French; not only was there the same stipulation that the French army should carry with it all its equipments and property, and that all individuals of that army should be at liberty to dispose of their private property, of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers;-but the whole of the French exactions and confiscations, committed upon the

Appendix, No. XXXVII.

Portugueze and the English settlers in Portugal, were sanctioned by the British generals, in an article, which stated, that such arrears of contributions, requisitions, and claims of the French government, against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in the country, which had not been paid up to the date of this convention, were cancelled; the necessary consequence of such an arti cle being, that their right to all which they had already extorted was ac knowledged, and the possession thereof secured to them. By another article, the Portugueze traitors were not only promised indemnity, but even placed under the protection of the British commanders. Liberty was given them to retire into France, if they pleased; that is, liberty was secured for them to remain in Portugal, if they thought they could be more serviceable to France there, and assist in betraying it a second time. And because the Spanish troops detained on shipboard in the Tagus were to be set free, the British commander-in-chief engaged to obtain of the Spaniards to restore all such French subjects in Spain as had been imprisoned, not having been taken int battle. The article in the armistice concerning the Russian fleet, Sir Charles Cotton absolutely refu sed to ratify; yet he consented to terms of which all that can be said is, that they were only not as disgraceful as the former. He agreed that the ships should be held as a deposit by England, to be restored to the czar within six months after the conclusion of a peace between Russia and Great Britain, and that the admiral, with all the officers, seamen, and marines, should be conveyed

+ Appendix, No. XXXVIII.

home in men of war, or proper vessels, at the expence of his Britannic majesty, without any condition or stipulation respecting their future *services. The intimate connection which had so lately subsisted between the courts of London and Petersburgh, and the personal regard which the British admiral entertained for Admiral Siniavin, were assigned, by Sir Hew Dalrymple, as reasons why an understanding acceptable to both nations should be accepted. Certain ly it became us to manifest every mark of personal respect towards the Russian officers, because, though the want of principle and judgement in their sovereign had involved the two countries in war, there existed no hostile feelings nor jarring interests between them; and the wishes of both were for a renewal of that long established intercourse which was beneficial to both and it also behoved us especially to show ourselves grateful for the protection which the Russians had afforded to the English and Portugueze refugees, and the facilities which they had given them of effecting their escape. These were personal favours, for which the obvious personal return would have been, immediately to have liberated the officers, on their parole, and to have shown every courtesy by which the evils of hostility can be mitigated. But to talk of personal regard between the two admirals as influencing the terms of capitulation, was a thing as unheard of as the terms themselves. Hold in deposit!-the phrase had never before been known in the British navy: they knew what it was to fight their enemies, they knew what it was to beat, to capture, to sink, burn and destroy them, ac

cording to the spirit and letter of their instructions. This was what the navy said; this was what the nation said; and the bitter reflection occurred to both, how would Nelson have received such a proposal!

Sir Arthur Wellesley's account of the battle reached England a fortnight before the armistice and convention arrived. The account was neither clear nor satisfactory; nevertheless, his declaration that the enemy had suffered a signal defeat, confirmed, as it was, by tidings, at the same time, that the French had proposed to evacuate Portugal, filled the whole nation with joy; and the news of Junot's unconditional surrender was expected, as what must certainly ensue.

When the terms of the convention arrived, the ministry ordered the Park and Tower guns to be fired, as if it had been matter of rejoicing. Never did any ministry so completely mistake the temper of the public; and never was any public feeling so unanimously and so instantaneously manifested, as the indignation of all England at these unparalleled terms of advantage conceded to a beaten enemy,-and to such an enemy!-an enemy, who, having entered Portugal without any formalities or pretext of war, but with professions of peace, had reduced it to the state of a conquered country, and exercised oppressions, and committed atrocities there, to which no conquered country in Europe, since the barbarous ages, has been subjected, and who, having thus outlawed themselves by their crimes, were to be regarded as banditti and buccaneers, not as honourable soldiers. Great Britain had had its share of disaster and disgrace: the capitulations of

the Helder and of Buenos Ayres were remembered; but they were remembered as less shameful than the convention of Cintra; and it was universally felt that no former transaction had ever so fatally blasted the hopes of the country, or inflicted so deep and mortal a wound upon its honour. Nothing else could be talked of, nothing else could be thought of: men greeted each other in the streets with execrations upon those who had signed this detested convention; it kept them waking at night, or disturbed their sleep, like a misdeed or a misfortune of their own. The London newspapers joined in one cry of wonder and abhorrence; on no former occasion had they been so unanimous, and scarcely ever was their language so energetic, so manly, so worthy of the English press. The provincial papers proved that, from one end of the island to the other, the resentment of this grievous wrong was the same:-some refused to disgrace their pages by inserting so infamous a treaty; others surrounded it with broad black lines, putting their journal in mourning for the dismal information it contained; some headed the page with a representation of three gallowses, and a general suspended from each, cut in wood for the occasion.

What could be done? There were not wanting writers who called upon government to annul the convention. The Romans would have done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and haltered, to the enemy's discretion. Would it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was so framed that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith towards each and all of our allies! We were the allies

of Portugal; and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves, ravishers, and murderers out of the country in which they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible means of escape. We were the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of faith towards Spain, if four-andtwenty thousand French troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own country, with all their arms and baggage, that they might join the forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against the patriots. We were the allies of Sweden; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden, to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet, for the purpose of manning Russian ships against the Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our enemies, or to betray our friends? for to this alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced us! No law of nations could justify them in making such stipulations; no law of nations therefore could justify us in performing them. But the French, it was urged,had already fulfilled their part of the convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us into Lisbon. Thus we had already reap. ed the advantages on our side, and were, in honour, bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which was advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of honour was inevitable; but, evidently, it was less disgraceful to break the terms than to fulfil them ;-better that the French should reproach us, than that they should compliment us upon a fidelity which enabled them to injure our allies. And if Junot and his army were kept prisoners, even then their fate was better than

they had either expected or deserved; their lives were safe; whereas had the battle of Vimiera been followed up with proper activity, and if our commanders had acted with that conciliating and encouraging spirit towards Portugal which both policy and principle might have taught them, few of the French would have survived to be made prisoners; and especial care should have been taken, that Junot, and those who, by his orders, had put the Portugueze to death, as rebels, should have fallen into the power of the Portugueze, that they might have perished by the hand of the executioner.

The blow might have decided the fate of Europe. France had lost an army in Andalusia, and how deeply Bonaparte felt the loss was shewn by the anxiety with which he concealed it from the French people. What might not have been the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, following so close upon that of the former! How would it have encouraged the Portugueze, given new animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope and the courage of those various states who were suffering under the tyrant's yoke! It would have been some consolation to the people of England if they could have attributed treachery or corruption to the men who had thus sacrificed the interests of four nations: accustomed, however, as we are, to open and shameless corruption at home, such is still the British character, that no suspicion of this kind could be entertained; and for want of honour, want of feeling, want of sense, there was no other punishment than public contempt and indignation, to which men, thus morally and intellectually defective, must necessarily be in

sensible.

VOL. I. PART I.

These were the feelings of the people of England, and the more they examined the convention, and the more information they obtained, the greater was their astonishment and their shame. Sir Arthur Wellesley had acknowledged Buonaparte as emperor of France and king of Italy in the armistice, and given Junot the title of Duke of Abrantes ;-the former implied only a forgetfulness of forms, which yet it behoved him to have remembered and insisted on; for the latter recognition no possible plea of excuse could be alleged; for whom, or what, was he fighting in Portugal, if Junot was Duke of Abrantes? But the whole of the armistice and of the convention displayed the same insolent contempt of the feelings and rights of the Portugueze, Not till the second day after the armistice was concluded, did Sir Arthur notify it to the Bishop of Porto, a man so conspicuous among the patriots, both for his rank, character, and the services which he had performed; and then, without deigning to enter into any particu❤ lars, he told him that the agreement contained nothing remarkable, except a provision for securing the neutrality of the port of Lisbon to the Russian squadron! However little remarkable such an agreement might appear to the man who concluded it, the Portugueze saw it with clearer eyes; and General Freire entered a formal protest against the convention: first, against Sept. 4. the whole tenor of the treaty, because it was totally void of that deference due to the prince regent, or the government which represented him; on account of all that might be hostile in it to the sovereign authority and independence of the government, and of all that it contained a

2 A